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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE
D. PERRY.

Supreme Court Case No. 38694

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
Respondent on Appeal.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLEN

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT

PETER C. SISSON

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

Date: 5/31/2011

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 02:50 PM

ROA Report
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User: CCLUI\IDMJ

Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

3/18/2009

NCIE

CCCHILER

l\lew Case Filed - Informal Estate

3/19/2009

APPL

CCCHILER

Application for Informal Probate of Will and
Christopher Bieler
Informal Appointment of Personal Representative

WILL

CCCHILER

Last Will And Testament

Christopher Bieter

ACAP

CCCHILER

Acceptance Of Appointment

Christopher Bieter

STNP

CCMARTLG

Statement Of Informal Probate Of Will And
Christopher Bieler
Informal Appointment Of Personal Representative

LTST

CCMARTLG

Letters Of Testamentary

CDIS

CCMARTLG

Civil Disposition entered for: McCormick, Barbara Christopher Bieter
K, Other Party; Perry, George D, Subject. Case
Close date: 3/20/2009

STAT

CCMARTLG

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Christopher Bieter

STNP

CCMARTLG

Statement Of Informal Probate Of Will And
Informal Apointment Of Personal Representative

Christopher Bieler

LTST

CCMARTLG

Letters Of Testamentary

Christopher Bieler

CDIS

CCMARTLG

Civil Disposition entered for: McCormick, Barbara Christopher Bieler
K, Other Party; Perry, George D, Subject. Case
Close date: 3/20/2009

3/30/2009

CRCL

CCMARTLG

Creditors Claim (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

Christopher Bieter

4/7/2009

IFHD

CCMARTLG

Information To Heirs And Devisees

Christopher Bieler

4/15/2009

MISC

CCMARTLG

Satisfaction Of Probate Claim (Wells Fargo Bank Christopher Bieler
NA)

DEI\IO

CCMARTLG

Demand For Notice (Larry L Goins For Idaho
Dept Health and Welfare)

Christopher Bieler

CAES

CCMARTLG

Claim Against Estate (Idaho Dept Health and
Welfare)

Christopher Bieler

6/2/2009

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieler

6/4/2009

NOTC

CCCHILER

Notice of Disallowance of Claim (Idaho Dept
Health and Welfare)

Christopher Bieter

GERS

CCCHILER

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

6/15/2009

PETN

CCNELSRF

Petition for Allowance of Claim (Larry Goins for
Idaho Department of Health & Wealthfare)

Christopher Bieter

6/25/2009

OBJE

CCNELSRF

Objection to Petition for Allowance of Claim

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCNELSRF

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

MEMO

CCMARTLG

Memorandum In Support Of The PR's Objection
To Dept of Health And Welfare's Petn For
Allwance Of Claim

Christopher Biei:er

AFFD

CCMARTLG

Affidavit of Barbara K McCormick In Support of
Objection To Dept of Health And Welfare's Petn
for Allowance Of Claim

Christopher Bieter

PPUB

CCMARTLG

Proof Of Publication

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Telephonic Status Conference (1-08-09 Christopher Bieler
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@2:30 pm)

3/20/2009

11/27/2009

12/4/2009

Judge
Christopher Bieler

Christopher Bieter
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

12/4/2009

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/2010 02:30
PM) Telephonic Conference

Christopher Bieter

STAT

CCMARTLG

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Notice Of Telephonic Status
Conference (1-08-10@ 2 pm)

Christopher Bieter

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/2010 02:30
PM) Conference

Christopher Bieter

1/8/2010

HRHD

MCURIZDJ

Hearing result for Status held on 01/08/2010
Christopher Bieter
02:30 PM: Hearing Held Telephonic Conference

1/14/2010

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing On Objection To Petn For
Allowance of Claim (2-26-10@ 9 am)

Christopher BiEiter

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/26/2010 09:00 AM) Objection To Petn For
Allowance of Claim

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Notice Of Hearing On Objection To
Petn for Allowance Of Claim (2-26-10@ 9 am)

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

1/29/2010

MEMO

CCMARTLG

Memorandum In Support Of Petn for Allowance
Of Claim

Christopher Bieter

2/26/2010

HRHD

MCURIZDJ

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
02/26/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Objection

Christopher Bieter

12/9/2009

1/21/2010

Judge

To Petn For Allowance of Claim

Christopher Bieter

ORDR

MCURIZDJ

Order Disallowing Claim

CDIS

CCMARTLG

Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Department Of Christopher Bieter
Health And Welfare, Other Party; Idaho
Department Of Health And Welfare .. Other Party;
McCormick, Barbara K, Other Party; Perry,
George D, Subject. Case Close date: 3/10/2010

STAT

CCMARTLG

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Christopher Bieter

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Stay Pending Appeal (W Corey
Cartwright For Idaho Dept Of Health And
Welfare)

Christopher Bieter

BREF

CCMARTLG

Brief In Support Of Motn To Stay

Kathryn A. Sticklen

APDC

CCMARTLG

Appeal Filed In District Court

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CAAP

CCMARTLG

Case Appealed:

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOTR

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Reassignment (To Judge Kathryn
Sticklen)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/19/2010

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/23/2010

OGAP

DCTYLENI

Order Governing Procedure On Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/26/2010

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (4-20-10@ 2:30 pm)

Kathryn A. Sticklen
000003

3/10/2010

3/18/2010
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

3/26/2010

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/20/2010 02:30
PM) To Stay Pending Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/29/2010

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MEMO

CCMARTLG

Memorandum In Support Of Motn For Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

GERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (4-20-10@ 2:30 pm)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

GERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

RPLY

CCMARTLG

PR's Reply Memorandum To Dept's Motn For
Stay Pending Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

GERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

BREF

CCMARTLG

Brief Re Fiduciary Duty Of PR To Creditors

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/9/2010

RSPS

CCMARTLG

Response To Motn For Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/16/2010

RPLY

CCMARTLG

PR's Reply Memo To Dept's Brief Re Fiduciary
Duty Of PR To Creditors And Motn for Atty Fees
And Costs

Kathryn A. Sticklen

GERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/20/2010
Kathryn A. Sticklen
02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 500 To Stay Pending Appeal

AMEN

DCTYLENI

Amended Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Kathryn A. Sticlden

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Approving Motion for Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/10/2010

TRAN

CCMARTLG

Transcript Of Proceedings Lodged

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/11/2010

NOTC

DCTYLENI

Notice of Lodging of Appeal Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/20/2010

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order (RE: Motion
for Stay Pending Appeal)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/28/2010

GERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

6/3/2010

TRAN

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOTC

DCTYLENI

Notice of Filing Transcript on Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MOTN

CCSWEECE

PR's Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AFFD

CCSWEECE

Affidavit of Peter C Sisson In Support of PR's
Motion For Atty Fees and Costs

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MEMO

CCSWEECE

Supplemental Memorandum In Support of PR's
Motion For Atty Fees and Costs

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOHG

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Hearing (07-12-10 at 2:30 pm)

Kathryn A. Stick:len

HRSC

CCSWEECE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Attorney fees and Kathryn A. Sticklen
Costs 07/12/2010 02:30 PM)

CTSV

CCSWEECE

Certificate Of Service

4/2/2010

4/8/2010

4/20/2010

4/27/2010

6/18/2010

Judge

Kathryn A. Sticklen
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Date

Code

User

6/29/2010

BREF

CCNELSRF

Brief and Objection in Opposisiton to Attorney
Fees

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/7/2010

MEMO

CCSWEECE

PR's Reply Memorandum To Departments Brief
And Objection in Opposition To Attorney Fees

Kathryn A. Sticklen

GERS

CCSWEECE

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/8/2010

BREF

CCMARTLG

Appellant's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/12/2010

DCHH

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and
Costs held on 07/12/2010 02:30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: K. Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/23/2010

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Extension Of Time In Which To File
Respondent's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AFFD

CCMARTLG

Affidavit Of Peter C Sisson In Support Of Motn
For Extension Of Time In Which to File
Respondent's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

GERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticl<len

MEMO

CCNELSRF

PR's Memorandum on Applicability

Kathryn A. Sticklen

GERS

CCNELSRF

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticl<len

BREF

CCNELSRF

Simultaneous Brief RE: Finality and Idaho Code
12-117

Kathryn A. Sticl<len

7/27/2010

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Approving Motion for Extension of Time in
Which to File Respondent's Brief (due 9/2/10)

Kathryn A. Sticlclen

8/26/2010

BREF

CCMARTLG

Respondent's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticfden

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticf,len

9/16/2010

BREF

CCMARTLG

Appellant's Reply Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

9/22/2010

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (11-04-10@ 1:30 PM)

Kathryn A. Stic~:len

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
11/04/2010 01 :30 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Kathryn A. Sticklen

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
11/18/2010 02:00 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

GERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Stick:len

HRVC

CCMARTLG

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held
on 11/04/2010 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated

Kathryn A. Stick:len

10/13/2010

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order

Kathryn A. Stick.len

11/18/2010

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Kathryn A. Sticklen
on 11/18/2010 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100
Document sealed

7/26/2010

10/4/2010

Judge
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

3/16/2011

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/7/2011

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Document sealed
Appealed To The Supreme Court

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/11/2011

NOTC

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Preparation Of Appeal Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/31/2011

NOTC

CCLUNDMJ

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Ct.
Docket # 38694

Kathryn A. Sticklen

Judge
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-·
Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SISSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC

·-·-··---------- --~7

---LJ·: o~i

2402 West Jefferson Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 387-072()
Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Lhr # 4682
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CV
IN THE MATTER OF:

I

GEORGE D. PERRY.
Deceased.

J

E

O9 0 5 214

Case No.

APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL
PROBATE OF WILL AND INFORMAL
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE
(I.C. 15-3-301)

APPLICANT. BARBARA K. MCCORMICK. formerly BARBARA K. PERRY, STATES AND
REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT:
1.

Applicant's interest in this matter is that of the Daughter and Personal Representative of
Decedent. a dcvisee under the decedent's will and a person having priority for
appointment as personal representative.
The person whose appointment as personal representative is sought is the J\pplicant and
is qualified to act as such and has priority because there is no person \Vith a higher or
equal priority for appointment. The person whose appointment as personal reprcsent~tivc
is sought has priority for appointment as the person nominated in, or pursuant to the
exercise of a power conferred by, the decedent's will.

3.

The decedent died on February 25, 2009. at the age of 79 years. A copy of his death
certificate is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

APP LI CATION FOR INFORMAL PRO BA TE OF WILL AND
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 1
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4.

Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this county.

5.

The names and addresses of the children, heirs, and devisees of the decedent are:

Barbara J. McCormick
2525 Joretta Drive
Boise, Idaho 83704

George D. Perry, Jr.
20966 Wells Road
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Steven A. Perry
81 79 East McKenzre
Nampa, Idaho 83687

Richard J. Perry
594 W. Halverson
Middleton, Idaho 83644

Robert E. Boyle
3519 Rose Hill Street
Boise, Idaho 83705

Martha (Marty) Simonson
2085 N. Trailview Place
Boise, Idaho 83702

Martha Jean Perry
c/o Barbara J. McCormick, Trustee of the
Supplemental Care Trust for Martha J. Perry
2525 Joretta Drive
Boise, Idaho 83704

Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare
Medicaid Estate Recovery
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036

There are no surviving parents of Decedent. Decedent has no surviving siblings.
6.

No personal representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere whose
appointment has not been terminated.

7.

Applicant has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice of any probate or
appointment proceeding concerning the decedent that may have been filed in this state or
elsewhere.

8.

The time limit for informal probate or appointment has not expired because not more than
three years have passed since the decedent's death.

9.

The original of the decedent's will, dated February 4, 2005, accompanies this applicai:ion.
To the best of applicant's knowledge, neither that will nor any other will of the decedent
has been the subject of a previous probate order.

APPLICATlON FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 2
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test

22

--

SISSON AND SISSON

r· -":34 a.m.

2 /2

03-19-2009

I0.

Applicant believes that the will which is the subject of this application was validly
executed.

11.

Having exercised reasonable diligence, applicant is unaware of any instrument revoking
the will which is the subject of this application and believes that such will is the
decedent's last will.

12.

To the best of applicant's knowledge, the will to which this application relates is not part
of a known series of testamentary instruments (other than wills or codicils), the latest of
which does not expressly revoke the fonner.

13.

Bond is not required under J.C. 15-3-603.

14.

Any required notice has been given or waived.

WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:
I.

The decedent's will, dated February 4, 2005, be infonnally probated.

2.

Barbara K. McCormick be informally appointed personal representative of the estate of
the decedent, to act without bond.

3.

Upon qualification and acceptance, letters testamentary be issued.

DATED

!/;1At

~ /- - - ;- - - - I - - - -

Peter C. Sisson
Attorney for Applicant

APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL A~D
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE- PAGE 3
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VERIFICATION
STA TE OF IDAHO

)

:ss
County of Ada

)

13arbara K. McCormick, Applicant, being sworn. says that the focts set forth in the
foregoing application are true. accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and
belief.

Barbara K. McCormick - Applicant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
Pffm///r
, Idaho
My Commission Expires Z-/_!->o IL_.

APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE- PAGE 4
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.1~'r~~~~;"'
-:-

,~

I

STATE OF IDAHO
DEPART\1ENT OF HEAL Tri A"-1D WELFARE
BUREAU 0" \ ITA.L RECORDS A~D HEALTH STATIST CS

DAl (: f-'L!:C BY STATl:c ;:,EGISTRAR

STATE FILE NO

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

....,PEUF'
Mll"IT IN
-'ERM.I.NE~
BLA:K !NI<.
o,J.-.S:,T USE
FE.J..T"l? ?EN

'°'

'1SIFu:rioNS

m

'-'Airnf\001\S

.c

George D. Perry

]

0

4a. AGE ~-1~

0

79

8">-

~

. ._

ia. RESlbENC!:

"'

:.>.

~, UNO~R

db. UNDEFI 1 YEAR

1 DAY

7b. COUNTY

STATE OA FOREIGN COUt,fi'Rv

7d. STRE.E'I'" ANO NUMBER

;:;

•,1

Male

.e

" ,; ', 11

81.:ITHPLACE (l'

1351 \'/, Pine

IV~ra

~:d(t"!

:

Overland Park,

>!

_:n

L ..·,..~.:,,,

KS

7c cm oA row~

Meridian

Ada

ID

~

-·-

5. DATE OF BIRTf-f

J. SOC1AL SECURITY NUMBER

2 SE:r;

7e APT NO

7t ZJP CODE

7g INSIDE CIT't'

LIMITS-;,

x,,,,

83642

.. if"Sil.B_yrv_lNO SPOus·e S NAME.lit W,ip g,.-a r-1,~,,-,

.Si 8. \IARITAL STATUS ATTlME of DEATH

U:
~

X

:

Marr,.-.~

f,,1_1Tlf'd t'>u! sp1•arate11

~

ARMED
FORCES~

;;;
o...

X r-.0

""::l

\\•J.

1ta. FATHERS NAME

10 EVER IN US

'E

;r ·:.1

Archie W.

Martha Harper

r,,:,rc:eJ

"-' ~~,.-

MT

Perry

12a. MOTHER"S MAIDEN NAME ,F ..... '.'•ilt11e L.:st. ,3l[IT11I

~

<(

14. METHOD OF DISPOSITION

~

*

~

X

- 'lb RELATIONS"11P TO DECEDENT

15· f'LAi::-E OF Cl1SPOSITION \Na1..:ti

a,m,,.,""~"''"
0,h" ,..,...,,,

tJc. "4AIUNG ADDRESS ,::Clfl'f'I- 'll',1 r,1w, twr (',·,

"r-:

JOU -~s::. ol Ceme!ory,

115. NAME AND CQM~LETE ADDRESS OF FUNERAL FACILITY

•

Cloverdale Funer~l Home
1 200 N. Cloverdale Rd.
1200 N. Cloverdale Rd.
Bo.ise, _ID_ 8371 3
.
. .... Boise, I.D 8371 3

_ .....

17a. SIGNATURE OF FUNERAL SERVICE llCENSEE OR PERSON ACTING AS SUCH

:•

17b. LICENSE NUMBER

:0'

18. WAS CORONER CON-JACfEi:>

l·s:ensee)

DUE TO CAUSE OF DEATH?

f f1'CkrtpJ,1t'n!

PLACE OF DEATH (19-22)

*

19a IF DEATH OCCURRED IN A HOSPITAL
,nµallC'"'

19b !F DEATH OCCURRED SOMEWHERE ontER THAN A HOSPITAL

!X 'A ,

J

..

Crematory

M-804
*

;::-- ~ ,-,

~1 •'t>

2525 ,Toretta Dr.
Boise, .ID 83714 _.. _

Daughter

Cff'TCl~~;1;dale

~~:;:~:n~ni

IP:ri·-:---, er F('•e19n \uun!lyl

KS

Barbara McCormick

0 ~ ~~~:;, 8.,

o .

12b. BIRTHPLACE !Stale

Leona Cox

INFORMANTS NAME ( I 1'1"-' ,, p·1r11'

1111

zu *

c::_,re,9n CC'1,n1r,,

llti BIR.THf>LACE (Slato :.-~,;n':I\ c·

Si,IT,ll

"st~!

* 20. FACIUTI NAME (11 tlQ\ l.1011,ty. ytve -~!r@t>I

Ho,;~11,.e rac1illy

XX!,lwsi;,q ,, -, ,r ',

*

c11 J r,ur•it>er)

t.,, hty

~

(>\.'<,,;;,,Jpnt s h0me

Meridian,

Meridian Care and Rehab
* 23. DATE OF DEATH 1Mo,'Da~'rt) tS(w+I 1r.,1,t'11
February 25, 2009

r,,,. 1 •p111, i:;a":

24. TIME

Ollw•

,

21. CITY, TOWN, OR lOCAriON ()F DEATH, AND ZIP CODE

OF DEATH

(~"N'( :f,')
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

MAR t

OF

:!

2009

J. D/\V,D NAV

GEORGE D. PERRY

CV IE

Bv L fvl.:i.r·:~-:;,. ·
UEi-·ur,

0905214

I, George D. Perry, with the present addressof2 l 04 Tendoy, Boise, Idaho 83705, being
of lawful age and sound mind and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence
of any person, do make, publish and declare this my LAST WILL and TEST AMENT in the:
manner following, to-wit:
ITEM I
REVOCATION OF PRIOR WILLS/CODICILS
I hereby expressly revoke any and all other and former Wills and Codicils to Wills by
me at any time heretofore made.
ITEM II
MARITAL ST A TUS
I am married and my spouse's name is Martha J. Perry. All references in this Will
to my spouse's name are to Martha J. Perry.
ITEM III
CHILDREN
I have four (4) living children, whose names are as follows, to-wit: George D. Perry,
Jr., Barbara K. Perry, Richard J. Perry and Steven A. Perry.
Richard J. Perry and Steven A. Pe~are the children ofmy marriage to my wife,

Martha J. Perry. George D. Perry, Jr. and Barbara K. Perry are children of a previous
marriage. Donna J. Holmes and Christine N. Ramsey, also children of my previous
marriage, are deceased. Christine N. Ramsey did not leave issue. Donna J. Holmes left
issue. I intentionally make no provision for any distribution from my estate to any of
Donna J. Holmes' issue.
My wife, Martha J. Perry, has two children from a previous marriage, whose names
are as follows, to-wit: Robert E. Boyle and Marty Simonson. I will refer to them herein as
my step-children. I further certify that I have no other children, living or deceased, nor have
I ever adopted a child.
ITEM IV
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
I direct that my Personal Representative shall not be required to furnish bond, and
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shall be allowed to administer my estate without the intervention of Court, with full power
to sell, mortgage, lease or dispose of all my Estate, real, personal or mixed, at public or
private sale for any reason which may seem right or proper to said Personal Representative,
regardless of whether or not it is necessary to do so for the purpose of administering my
Estate, and I vest full power and authority in my Personal Representative to carry out the
provisions of this, my Last Will and Testament, under a non-intervention Will procedure.
I nominate and appoint the following people in the following order of priority as my
Personal Representative until one such person qualifies and accepts to act as my Personall
Representative:
1. Barbara K. McCormick, of 2525 Joretta Drive, Boise, Idaho 83 704;
2. George D. Perry, Jr., of20966 Wells Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83605;
3. Steven A. Perry, of 8179 East McKenzre, Nampa, Idaho 83687.
My Personal Representative shall have the full power and discretion to do everything
necessary to settle my Estate. I direct that my Personal Representative, shall pay all the
expenses of my last illness and burial, and all transfer and other taxes due on or from my
Estate, all costs and charges of the administration of my Estate and all my just debts, as soon
as the same can be conveniently paid, and that no order of Court be required therefor.
All estate, inheritance, succession or other death taxes, duties, charges or assessments.
imposed on or in relation to any property by reason of my death, whether passing under this
Will or otherwise, shall be paid by my Personal Representative out of the residue of my Estate,
without proration of any charge therefor against any person who receives such property under
the terms of this Will or otherwise.

ITEMV
FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS
It is my intention to prepare a "Letter of Instruction" regarding my preferred burial
wishes, and I direct that my Personal Representative follow these instructions in so far as
possible.
ITEM VI
CHARACTER OF PROPERTY
All of my Estate is separate property and community property. It is my intention by this
Will to dispose of my separate property and my one-half interest in the community property
of myself and my spouse.
Last Will and Testament - -b.Z'.::::XL.J:~~~~,__/j~~-1,.,,P,./v
Page 2 - George D. Perry
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ITEM VII
PERSONAL PROPERTY DISTRJBUTION
I give my personal and household effects of every kind, including but not limited to
furniture, appliances, furnishings, pictures, silverware, china, glassware, jewelry, wearing
apparel, boats, personal automobiles and other vehicles, in accordance with a written statement
signed by me or in my handwriting which I intend to leave at my death. I give all of such
property not effectively disposed of by such written statement to my children who survive me,
to be divided among them as they shall agree, or if they shall fail to agree within six months
after the appointment of my personal representative, to be divided among them in portions of
approximately equal value, as determined by my personal representative.
ITEM VIII
SUPPLEMENTAL CARE TRUST FOR SURVIVING SPOUSE
A. If my spouse, Martha J. Perry, survives me for five (5) days, then I give, devise and
bequeath to her the rest, residue and remainder of my estate IN TRUST, to my Personal
Representative, as Trustee, in lieu of any statutory allowances available to my surviving
spouse. This share of my estate that is set aside for Martha J. Perry, shall be held by my
Trustee, in a trust for the benefit of Martha J. Perry, in a Supplemental Care Trust in
accordance with the following provisions:
1. Intent.
It is my intention by this Trust to create a purely discretionary supplemental care fund
for the benefit of Martha J. Perry, herein after referred to as the beneficiary. It is not my
intention to displace public or private financial assistance that may otherwise be available to
the beneficiary. The following enumerates the kinds of supplemental, nonsupport
disbursements that are appropriate for the Trustee to make from this trust to or for the
beneficiary. Such examples are not exclusive: medical, dental and diagnostic work and
treatment for which there are no private or public funds otherwise available; medical
procedures that are desirable in the T mstee's discretion, even though they may not be necessary
or life saving; supplemental nursing care and rehabilitative services, differentials in cost
between housing and shelter for shared and private rooms in institutional settings; care
appropriate for the beneficiary that assistance programs may not or do not otherwise provide;
expenditures for travel, companionship, cultural experiences, and expenses in bringing the
beneficiary's siblings and other appropriate persons for visitation with the beneficiary.
2. Supplement, not support.
I do not want this Trust eroded by the beneficiary's creditors nor do I want the
beneficiary's public or private assistance benefits made unavailable to the beneficiary or
terminated. This Trust is not for the beneficiary's primary support. It is to supplement the

;J , g4AIJ'

Last Will and Testament - - ~ ¼
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--beneficiary's supplemental care needs only.
I have no obligation of support owing to the beneficiary, and the beneficiary has no
entitlement to the income or corpus of this trust, except as the Trustee in his, her or its
complete, sole, and absolute, and unfettered discretion, elects to disburse. In this regard the
Trustee may act unreasonably and arbitrarily, as I could, ifl were living and in control of these
funds. The Trustee's discretion in making nonsupport disbursements as provided for in this
instrument is final as to all interested parties, including the state or any governmental agency
or agencies, even if the Trustee elects to make no disbursements at all. The Trustee's sole and
independent judgment, rather than any other parties' detennination, is intended to be the
criterion by which disbursements are made. No court or any other person should substitute its
or their judgment for the discretionary decision or decisions made by the Trustee.
3. Income.
Any income received by the Trustee not distributed to or for the benefit of the Trust
beneficiary, shall be added annually to the Trust's principal.
4. Access to Public Benefits.
The Trustee shall consider all resources and income limitations that affect the
beneficiary's right to public assistance programs. Distribution to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary shall be limited so that the beneficiary is not disqualified from receiving public
benefits to which the beneficiary is otherwise entitled. The beneficiary's probable and possible
future supplemental care needs should be considered by the Trustee in connection with
disbursements made by the Trustee from this Trust. The interests of remainder beneficiaries
are only of secondary importance.
5. Resist Requests.
The Trustee should resist any request for payments from this trust for services that any
public or private agency has the obligation to provide to my beneficiary. In this regard, the
Trustee may not be familiar with the federal, state and local agencies that have been created to
financially assist disabled persons. If this is the case, the Trustee should seek assistance in
identifying public and private programs that are or may be available to the beneficiary so that
the Trustee may better serve the beneficiary.
6. Spendthrift Provisions
No part of this Trust, neither principal nor income, shall be subject to anticipation or
assignment by the beneficiary nor shall the Trust corpus or income be subject to attachment by
any public or private creditor of the beneficiary; nor may the Trust principal and income be
taken by any legal or equitable process by any voluntary or involuntary creditor, including those

I ,ast Will and Testament -
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that have provided for the beneficiary's support and maintenance. Further, under no
circumstances may the beneficiary compel distributions from this Trust.
7. Trustee - Authority to Terminate Trust
If the existence of this supplemental care Trust adversely affects the beneficiary from
receiving public entitlements or private support benefits, the Trustee may terminate this Trust.
If this occurs, the remainder interest will be accelerated, and the remainder beneficiaries shall
receive the accrued and undistributed income and corpus then held by the Trustee.
In the event of voluntary termination, as provided for in this article, it is my hope and
expectation that the remainder beneficiaries will continue to provide for the nonsupport care
needs of the beneficiary. This request is an expression of my wishes. It is not binding on the
remainder beneficiaries, and is merely precatory language in this paragraph.

If Martha J. Perry fails to survive me for five (5) days, or upon the death of the
beneficiary or upon the Trust's earlier termination. the trust created for Martha J. Perry, shall
be distributed according to Item VIII (B) of this Last Will and Testament.
8. Trustee's Powers
To carry out the purposes of the Trust created under this Will, and subject to any
limitations stated elsewhere herein, the Trustee is vested with all of the powers and authority
as set forth in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, being Chapter 1 of Title 68, Idaho Code, as
now in effect and as it may hereafter from time to time be amended after the date of my Will
and after my death. The Trustee shall specifically have the power to invest in non-income
producing assets.
9. Unsupervised Administration
The Trust created by this Will may be administered by my Trustee free from the control

of any court that may otherwise have authority over my estate.
10. Successor Trustee: Trustee Powers and Duties
No resignation shall be effective until acceptance by the successor Trustee. No Trustee
shall be required to post surety or personal bond while serving in this fiduciary capacity.
The Trustee should take whatever legal steps may be necessary to initiate or continue
any public assistance program for which the beneficiary is or may become eligible. The
Trustee may bring such action in any court or regulatory agency having jurisdiction over the
matter, to secure a ruling or order that the Trust described in this article is not available to the
beneficiary for any purpose absent specific exercise of the Trustee's discretion. Any expenses

Last Will and Testament -
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of the Trustee, including reasonable attorney's fees, specifically incurred in connection with
matters relating to determination of eligibility of the beneficiary for public or private support,
but not limited to such services, shall be a proper charge to the Trust.
11. Choice and Effect of Law
This Last Will and Testament is entered into and executed in the State ofldaho. It shal I
be administered in accordance with the laws of that state.
B. The rest, residue and remainder of my estate shall be distributed in equal shares to
my children and step-children who survive me for five (5) days. In the event any of my said
children or step-children should predecease me or should not be living upon the death of the
beneficiary of the Supplemental Care Trust referred to herein or upon the Trust's earlier
termination, then in that event such individual's share shall lapse.
ITEM IX
CONTEST
Every person under this Will who shall contest in any Court any provision of this
instrument shall not be entitled to receive any property of any type whatsoever under this Will.
That person shall receive absolutely nothing under the provisions of this Will or out of my
estate. Any property which would have passed to that person under this Will, shall instead be
distributed as if such person had died prior to my death without issue. My Personal
Representative is specifically authorized to defend at the expense of my estate any contest or
attack of any nature upon this Will, or upon any portion thereof.
ITEMX
CHARACTER OF DISTRIBUTION
Unless otherwise specifically stated, all distributions, whether of income or principal.
shall be the separate property of each individual distributee, beneficiary or heir under this will.
All income, rents, issues, profits, gains and appreciation of property distributed to each individual
as separate property shall also be the separate property of each such individual.
ITEM XI
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed these presents and do publish and declare
the same as and for my LAST WILL and TESTAMENT, consisting of eight (8) typewritten
pages, the witnesses' certificate included, and on the bottom of each page I have signed my
name for greater security.

l/

I, George D. Perry, the Testator, sign my name to this instrument this
~ay of
February, 2005, and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that
Last Will and Testament - __.=-------:=:...=--=-"""""'-':.,P.--.L-1.c,.<~--¥='---""'C.....:;..=-,
Page
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I sign and execute this instrument as my Last Will and that I sign it willingly (or willingly
direct another to sign for me), that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes
therein expressed, and that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under
no constraint or undue influence.

Geo,;h:; ~f) ~
1

Testator

We, George D. Perry, Jr. and Steven A. Perry, the witnesses, sign our names to this
instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that the
Testator signs and executes this instrument as his last Will and that he signs it willingly (or
willingly directs another to sign for him), and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of
the Testator, hereby signs this Will as witness to the Testator's signing, and that to the best of
our knowledge the Testator is eighteen ( 18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no
constraint or undue influence.

Residing at Caldwell, Idaho

..z........---~~A
'?_---------------..:~~Steven A. Perry
-··c_:;)
Residing at Nampa, Idaho

'j--'

J) ·
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STA TE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
: ss.
)

On this t/7!.,__ day of February, 2005, before me personally appeared George D. Perry.,
the Testator, and George D. Perry, Jr. and Steven A. Perry, the witnesses, known to me (or
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the persons whose names an::
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this

Notary Public in and r Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho.
My commission expires 12/12/08.

Last Will and Testament - ~ k " ? ,,..
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

APR

1 5 2009

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
ByLMARTIN
DEFUT'f

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Division of Human Services
LARRY L. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 2295
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214

GEORGE D. PERRY,

)

DEMAND FOR NOTICE

)
)
Deceased.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

(LC. § 15-3-204)
EXEMPT I.C. § 31-3212

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, (hereinafter the
"Department") pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-204, and hereby files its Demand for Notice of orders
or other filings pertaining to the estate of the above-named Decedent. The Department asserts that
it has a financial or property interest in said estate based upon the amount of medical assistance
benefits which it was required to pay on behalf of the Decedent's spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY, and
based upon its right to recover the amount of medical assistance benefits paid on her behalf as set
forth at Idaho Code § 56-218.

DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 1
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PenyM\C&D. wpd
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The Department further requests a copy of the Inventory and Appraisement, upon its
preparation within three months ofthe personal representative's appointment, pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 15-3-706.

Notice should be given to the Department through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy
Attorney General, Division ofHuman Services, 3276 Elder, Suite B, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0036.
DA TED t h i s ~ day of April, 2009.

~~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
DEMAND FOR NOTICE was mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 1--3
day of April,
2009, to:

BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
ADA COUNTY CLERK
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83 702

Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services

DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 2
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\C&D.wpd
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NO.---;-:-:---;-::---;::;;-;:;::------

l ,• I C'

Fil.ED

A..M~-~---L.l-''-"-J ~..PM. _ _ __

ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

APR 1!i 2009
J_ DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Division of Human Services

By L MftRTIN
DEPUrv

LARRY L. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 2295
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF
GEORGE D. PERRY,

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE
(LC. § 15-3-804)
EXEMPT: LC.§ 31-3212

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the "Department"),
through undersigned counsel, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate. This
claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the amount of medical assistance paid
on behalf of the Decedent's spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY, as set forth at Idaho Code§ 56-218. The
Claimant has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent's spouse MARTHA J.
PERRY in the amount of $106,251.08, as of April 8, 2009. To the extent that the Claimant is
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obligated to make further medical assistance payments on behalf ofthe Decedent's spouse, it reserves
the right to supplement its claim.

IMPORTANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Department's right to establish
its claim pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218. As long as the decedent's spouse survives, there: is no
demand for payment of this claim. This claim is made against any property or estate which, at any
time, had been the community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been
the property of decedent's spouse. The Department will not object to distribution of the estate

to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands that, before any other
distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the future payment of the Department's
claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-81 0(b )(2). Transfers of property by either spouse (except to
one another), including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affe:ct the
eligibility of the survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in accordance with Idaho Code

§ 56-218(2).
DATED this

1.34

day of April, 2009.

~~

Deputy Attorney General

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

JULIE RAICHART, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That I am the Claimant's
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate and know the
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct.

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\C&D.wpd

000023

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

I~1""

day of April, 2009.

~z.f~t'12J

Notary Public for Idaho
Commission Expires: 8--1'-f ,,.,JO(?

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing
day of April,
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the '-3
2009, to:

BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
ADA COUNTY CLERK
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702

Division of Human Services
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JUN O4 2009

Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SISSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West Jefferson Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 387-0729
Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Har# 4682
Attorney for Personal Representative

IN Tl IE DISTRICT COURI OF Tl IE FOURTI l JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE ST A TE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN Tl IE f\1\TTER Of:

GEORGE D. PERRY.
Deceased.

Case No. CV IE 0905214

NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE
OF CLAIM
(J.C. 15-3-806)

TO: THE DEAPRTMENT OF HEAL TH AND WELFARE. Claimant.
The undersigned personal representative of the above-entitled estate hereby disallows
your claim for $106.251.08 (and any supplemental claim for further medical assistance payments
made on behalfofDeccdcnfs spouse) presented on April 13. 2009. Claimant's reliance upon
I.C.

~

56-218 to make its claim "against any property or estate which. at any time. had been the

community property of the decedent and decedent" s spouse, or which had been the property of
decedent's spouse" exceeds the scope of recovery allowed by federal law. is preempted by
federal law. and is hereby disallowed.
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Claimant's demand that "before any other distribution of the estate, adequate provision be
made for the future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-810(b)(2)" is also
hereby disallowed because no assets of the estate are subject to the Claimant's claim, nor wil I
they he upon Decedent's spouse's death.
Failure to protest the disallowance by filing a petition for allowance in the above named
court. or commencing a proceeding against the undersigned, within sixty (60) days after the
mailing of this notice shall result in your claim for the disallowed amount indicated above being
forever barred.
DATED this

zJ day of June, 2009.

cif(V4MQ~
BARBARA K. McCORNUCK
Personal Representative

ST A TE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
: ss.
)

On this V, day of June, 2009, before me personally appeared Barbara K. McCormick.
known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name
is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed the same .

..............,,

~••• ~~RIE JJ, '•,,

~~ "••.••••••••••/<.<.P_ .....~

,:.

Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho
Residing at It/ 47YJ/J JJ. Idaho
My commission expires 2 -/J '#LI .
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RECEIVED

-

Jl-., 1 5 2009
Ada County Clerk

N0.---,---,------

A.M

LA WREN CE G. WAS DEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

\00.S

Fli_ED

P.~i _ _ __

JUN 15 2009
J. DAVID NAVAl~RO, Clerk

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division

By RIC i!ELSO~J
OEPUT"

LARRY L. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder Street, Suite B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 2295
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE EST ATE OF
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214
PETITION-FOR ALLOWANCE
1
OF CLAIM

)

)

COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (Department), claimant
in the above matter, by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, and
pursuant to Idaho Code § l 5-3-806(b ), petitions the Court as follows:
1.

The Department has paid medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits on behalf of the

decedent's surviving spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY in the amount of$109,464.23 to date;
2.

After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written

statement of the Department's claim in the amount of 106,251.08, was timely mailed to the Personal
Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on April 15, 2009;
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3.

The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and payment should be allowed for

the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent's surviving spouse to the fullest
extent possible.
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court enter an Order allowing
the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible.
DATED t h i s ~ day of June, 2009.

'-----

_A_;-

~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the //
day of
June, 2009, to:
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
SISSON & SISSON
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE, ID

Ir)Cy~

Q:m"

~ e Premo, Legal Assistant

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2

000028

NO,-----=-=-=------c:i
FILED
A.M ~ Y \
P.M _ _ __

Peter C. Sisson
SISSO~ & SISSON
The ~]dcr Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West Jdkrson Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 387-0729
Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Bar# 4682

JUN 2 5 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By RIC NELSON
DEPUTY

Attorney for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STAIE OF IDJ\I IO. IN AND FOR TI IE COl lNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF:

<,LOR<,E D. PERRY.

Case No. CV IE 0905214
OBJLCT!ON TO PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM

Deceased.

COf\1ES NOW. Barbara K. McCormick. the Personal Representative of the above-named
estate. hy and through her attorney Peter C. Sisson. and hereby objects to the Petition for
Al lo\\ ancc

or Claim

i'i led herein hy the State of Idaho. Department

or I lea Ith and

\\ cl fare.

This Objection is based on the fvtemorandum in Suppo11 of Objection to Petition for
Allowance (l!'Claim and aflidavit(s) in support to he filed in this matter. Oral argument is
requested at the hearing to be set on this matter. Time for creditor claims runs on August 10,

'/N.,~

2009. The Personal Representative will notice up a hearing on this matter after that date.
DATED this~ofJune, 2009.

PETER C. SISSON
Attorney for Personal Representative

OJBECTION TO PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1
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J. 1_,.-r.v/8 !'Jl"\''."A¥1rr.:1 C.H~n,
By ·~, !~tit:Jti~'; ~ - -,
1

Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SISSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 387-0729
Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Bar# 4682

-.'~f'i,. ' . .

Attorney for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF:

Case No. CV IE 0905214

GEORGE D. PERRY,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE'S
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
I AND WELFARE'S PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM

Deceased.

COMES NOW, Barbara K. McCormick, the Personal Representative of the above-named
estate, by and through her attorney of record, Peter C. Sisson, of the firm Sisson & Sisson, The
Elder Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of the
Personal Representative's Objection to the Department of Health and Welfare's ("Department'')
Petition for Allowance of Claim.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Personal Representative ("PR"), Barbara McCormick, was appointed in this probate
action on March 19, 2009. Pursuant to statute, the Department was given notice of the probate
action on April 3, 2009. On April 13, 2009, the Department filed its Claim Against Estate in the
amount of $106,251.08. On June 2, 2009, the PR timely filed her Notice Of Disallowance Of
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Claim, denying the Department's Claim in its entirety. On June 11, 2009, the Department filed
its Petition For Allowance Of Claim. On June 25, 2009, the PR filed her Objection To Petition
For Allowance Of Claim, noting that the time for creditor claims had not yet passed, but when it
had, she would file a Memorandum in Support and set the matter for hearing. The PR has now
filed the Legal Advertising Proof of Publication from the Idaho Statesman, verifying that legal
notice to creditors was duly published and the time for claims has now passed. She now files her
Memorandum in Support of Objection to the Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim, the
PR's affidavit in support of said Objection, and hereby requests that a hearing be set on the IPR's
disallowance of the Department's claim this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On July 31, 2006, Martha Jean Perry, George's spouse (hereinafter "Martha"),

conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the couple's home located at 2104 Tendoy Drive,
Boise, Idaho via quit claim deed to her husband, George Perry. Affidavit of Barbara McCom1ick,
Exhibit A, incorporated herein by reference.

2. As of October 1, 2006, the Department approved Martha for Medicaid benefits.
Affidavit of Barbara McConnick, Exhibit B, incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Martha's health care needs have progressively increased over the years and she now

lives in a skilled nursing facility. From October, 2006, Martha has continued to receive
Medicaid benefits and she receives those benefits today.
4.

Over the years, George's health situation also progressively declined. He ultimately

was forced to enter into a nursing home after a long-struggle to remain home. By this time he
had exhausted his liquid resources and decided to sell his home because he would be unable to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
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maintain it, even if qualified for Medicaid benefits. In an effort to sell the home, he provided the
Department with written verification documenting the fair market value of the home and the
Department agreed that the proposed sale price of $150,000 was fair market value. Affidavit of
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit C, incorporated herein by reference.
5.

Unfortunately, delays in receiving response from the Department caused the buyer

who had wanted to purchase the property to back out of that transaction. The home remaim:d on
the market. George Perry died in a nursing home on February 25, 2009, before he could
complete the sale of the home with a new buyer who had by that time agreed to purchase the
home.
6.

The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry consummated the sale

of the home on March 26, 2008, for a total sales price of $160,000. Affidavit of Barbara
McCormick, Exhibit D, incorporated herein by reference.
7. The balance of the house sale proceeds, minus disbursements for administrative costs,
is now held in the Estate's checking account as reflected in the Estate Inventory. Affidavit of
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit E, incorporated herein by reference. The proceeds from the sale of
George Perry's home are the only assets that are contained in the Estate of George Perry. The
Inventory makes clear that all estate assets were George Perry's separate property. The
Department failed to make any objection to the PR's Inventory. George's personal property was
of de minimus value and was given to charity prior to his death when he moved to the nursing
home. The Estate of George D. Perry holds no other real or personal property.
8.

The only property that Martha currently owns is one financial account located at
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Wells Fargo, checking account# ending -3540. This account is an income-qualifying or "Miller"
trust account that was necessary to qualify Martha for Medicaid. Martha's fixed monthly income
(social security and pension) is direct deposited into this account every month. Funds are then
paid out of this account in the same month for Martha's Medicaid patient share of cost, for her
health insurance premium and for her personal needs allowance. This account holds less than
$2,000 at the end of each month after the above amounts are paid out every month. Affidavit of
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit F, incorporated herein by reference. Martha owns no other re:al or
personal property. Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, incorporated herein by reference.
9.

The Personal Representative stipulates and agrees that upon Martha Jean Perry's

death, any amounts left in Wells Fargo checking account# ending -3540 are owed to and will be
paid to the Department pursuant to its right to recover for Medicaid assistance paid out during
her lifetime against assets in which Martha had an interest at her death. Aside from the funds in
this Wells Fargo checking account, Martha does not own any interest in any other property.
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case requires interpretation of a federal statute and consideration of whether the
Department's application ofldaho law (LC.§ 56-218) violates federal law and is therefore
preempted by federal law. Under certain circumstances specified by federal law, the states are
allowed to recover correctly paid medical assistance benefits from the estates of Medicaid
recipients. Federal law requires the states to make claims against the probate estates of Medi caid
1

recipients to recovery correctly paid benefits. Federal law also allows the states to expand the
definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a recipient at the time of the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
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recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of "estate." LC.§ 56-218(4).
Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct medical assistance estate
claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of benefits. Despite strong
pressure from the states and others, in 1993 Congress refused to enact legislation to allow direct
claims against the estates of non-recipient surviving spouses.
Under the current statute, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estat,~ any
real or personal property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the
time of the recipient's death (to the extent of the interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, Idaho
Code § 56-218, requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased
recipient, but also requires that a claim be asserted against the estate of a surviving spouse who
never received medical assistance benefits. The Department's interpretation and application of
LC. § 56-218 in its estate recovery claims (including the one at bar) conflicts with federal law to
the extent that the Department asserts recovery claims against assets in the non-Medicaid
spouse's probate estate which were not assets in which the Medicaid recipient held an interest at
the time of the Medicaid recipient's death.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the United States government's
principal agency in charge of protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential
human services. The work of HHS is conducted by the Office of the Secretary and 11 agencies.
CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) is the HHS agency that governs the
Medicaid program in the United States. HHS most recently stated in clear and unambiguous
terms that an estate recovery claim by a state could be asserted only against assets in which the
Medicaid recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of death to the extent of the interest.
MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFTHEPERSONALREPRESENTATIVE'SOBJECTIONTO
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In the instant case, none of the assets in the Estate of George Perry are assets in which
Martha Perry, the Medicaid recipient, holds a legal title or interest. Since she doesn't hold any
such interest now, while she is alive, she cannot possibly hold any such interest at the time of her
death. The Department's claim in this probate action is exactly the type ofrecovery claim which
goes beyond what federal law allows. That is why the PR disallowed the Department's Claim
and that is why this Court should uphold that disallowance.

OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID
Statutory Framework
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure
medical care to individuals who do not have the resources to cover essential medical services.

Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006); In Re Estate of
Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436,439, 111 P.3d 121 (2005). The program is jointly funded with the
states as a "cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance
to participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297,308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation
and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S.
Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp.
III 2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each
state administers its own program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) administer the program and approve state plans. Arkansas Dept.

ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
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DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 6

000035

One of the requirements imposed on state plans in order to participate in the program and
receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [42 U.S.C. § 1396p]
with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid, transfors of
assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000).
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. §
1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid. The value of the couple's home is not
included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42
U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(l) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to
an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not considered available
to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the
recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or
her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of
community spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need to provide for his or her own
support.

Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is important to start with the pre1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, because it is the basis for the rationale of several relevant
cases, including the sole case in Idaho that peripherally addressed the issue at bar. Prior to
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amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal
Medicaid statute stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid
Medicaid benefits, subject to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of
an individual under the State plan may be made, except --

****

(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he
received such assistance, from his estate.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988).
Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recover Medicaid
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the
recipient's estate. The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could
only be made after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse. Id. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988).
Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving spouse, there was no
express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law
contained no definition of the term "estate."
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), (4) (2000)). As amended, the federal law
retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid payments correctly
paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the
1993 amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, the 1993 amendments
lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. Second, the 1993 amendments made
recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, the amendments
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added a definition of "estate,'' which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As
amended, the general nonrecovery rule and the relevant exception read as follows:
( 1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:
****
(8) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate * * *. (emphasis added)
Id. The amended version of section 13 96p(b )( 1)(8) retained the express reference to recovery

from the recipient's estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the
recipient's estate is only permitted after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any
adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's
surviving spouse, if any* * *." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). As with the pre-1993
version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to,
recovery from a surviving spouse's estate.
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery,
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law:
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual -(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State* * * any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
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Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid
recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone els1~ on
the recipient's death. For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right
of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the
surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the optional expanded
definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to
the surviving joint tenant.
Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the scope ofrecovery of
medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42 U .S.C. § 1396p.

Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
Idaho 's Medicaid Recovery Provisions
Idaho Code (LC.)§ 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part,
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fiftyfive (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both: ...

(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
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deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust or other arrangement. ( emphasis added).
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand
the definition of "estate" beyond the scope of probate law. LC.§ 56-218(4). Therefore, it
follows that Idaho is required to abide by the interpretation of the language in the federal statute
that CMS and HHS promulgate. Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for
medical assistance paid "from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such
aid paid to either or both." LC.§ 56-218(1). The Department does not interpret and apply this
statutory language consistently with federal law. In order to be consistent with federal law, the
Department's claims against a Medicaid spouse's estate must be against "assets in which the
individual [Medicaid recipient] had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of
such interest." The Department, however, regularly makes claims against assets in which the:
Medicaid recipient had no legal title or interest at the time of his death. That is the case in this
matter and that is the reason this Court should rule in favor of the Personal Representative's
disallowance of the Department's claim in this case.

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Does federal law limit the scope ofrecovery against the individual's estate or the
estate of the spouse to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her
death, thereby preempting the broader recovery sought by the Department in this case?
2. If recovery is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at th1;:
time of her death what, if any, interest does Martha Perry have in the homestead sale proceeds
that make up the assets in the Estate of George Perry, her deceased husband?
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........
ARGUMENT
I. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation.
Congressional purpose is "'the ultimate touchstone"' of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. White

Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks
Int'lAss'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)).
The Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal.

Fed. Sav. &LoanAss'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987).
The United States Supreme Court has explained that "[ c]onsideration of issues arising under the
Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516,518, 112 S.Ct.
2608).
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S.
at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id.
Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is, "congressional intent to pre-empt state
law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary
state regulation." Id. at 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146). In
this case, Congress did not expressly preempt state law nor did it so completely occupy the field
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as to leave no room for state action, because the Medicaid program specifically permits and even
requires action by participating states.
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress has not chosen to
displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless preempt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan A.ss'n,
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
II. THE DEPARTMENT'S APPLICATION OF LC.§ 56-218 IN THIS CASE
ACTUALLY CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
The Department's claim against the Estate of George Perry is premised on the Medic.aid
benefits paid out on behalf of his spouse, Martha. Federal law precludes the Department from
asserting a claim against any property which Martha, the Medicaid recipient, does not have legal
title to or an interest in at the time of her death. See discussion, supra. In this case, the
Department's claim against the estate of Martha Perry's spouse must be denied because she has
no legal title to nor any interest in the assets of the Estate of George Perry, nor will she ever have
such an interest, even at the time of her death.
The appellate courts in Idaho have not squarely addressed the issue presented in this case,
although the only two Idaho cases which have dealt with Medicaid recovery claims are discussed
below. However, a very recent decision from the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the
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procedural aftermath of that decision is particularly instructive in this case. In Re Estate of Barg,
752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on point and is on all fours with
the instant situation. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth and exhaustive review of
state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety is very instructive on the issue
at bar because Minnesota's department of health and welfare made the same argument in favor of
its recovery action as is made by Idaho's Department in this action. The facts of Barg, when
pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts as are present in this probate. For the
Court's convenience, the PR has appended a complete copy of Barg to this Memorandum as
Appendix 1.
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving
spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage. In that
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Minnesota Supreme Court determined
that the county could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in
at the time of her death. Since Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died
because she had transferred her interest to her husband while she was alive, the Court ruled that
the county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate. Id.
These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her interest in the
couple's home to her husband years ago in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She
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retains no legal interest in that real property, nor in the proceeds from the sale of that real
property, which are the only assets that make up her husband's estate. Statement of Facts
("SOF"), ,r,r 1-2, 7-8.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed the federal statute at length, which is directly
applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal language verbatim in LC. §
56-218. In discussing the statute at issue it addressed the state's argument that the "other
arrangement" phrase opened the door for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's
statute. The Court rejected that argument. The Court's opinion on the scope of the Minnesota
recovery statute, directly on point with the instant case, is cited at length below.
We tum to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving
spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent with federal law.
Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B. l 5 allows the state to recover from a
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital
property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." (Emphasis
added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section l 396p(b) should
be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to expand, not
restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for broad estate
recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals
of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to
more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses from

pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section
1396p(b)(l) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4)
allows expansion of the estate only to include assets in which the recipient had an
interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed
by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language.
Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the
recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have
interpreted federal law to allow direct claims against the estate of a surviving
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-spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that were
transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied
on language from the 1993 amendments to support that extension. See In re
Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000).
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recovery
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d
at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of 'estate' in [section]
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death"'); see also In re
Estate of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov .1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had interest in
assets at time of death) ....
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle
requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. Although the North Dakota
court had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson decision that recovery allowed
under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an
interest at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court
rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at
851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid

recipient to his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the
surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court stated that limiting
recovery under section 1396p{b) to "assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the
Medicaid recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancyin-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust" would ignore the words
"interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885.
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the
court relied on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. The court did not
explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with
the limitation to recovery from assets in which the recipient had an interest at the
time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz.
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We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the
time of the Medicaid recipient's death.
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of any other real and personal property and
other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor,
heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The clause
describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any
legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to
whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes
several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust,
or other arrangement." Id.
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient
having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a federal statute we
must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would be to read the words
"at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other arrangement"
cannot include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context.
"[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the
time of death. The list ofrecipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign
of the deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid
recipient, must have died for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have
heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the
deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language

and its context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that "other arrangement" is
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 17

000046

not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold
that Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis
added)
Id. at 68-71.

The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. In May of 2009, the U.S. Solicitor
General submitted an amicus curiae brief authored by not only that office but joined by the
attorneys from the Department of HHS in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's order inviting
the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. This is THE most recent le;gal
briefing by HHS on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every
argument posited by the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond
that allowed by federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor
General's amicus curiae brief filed in In Re Estate of Barg is attached hereto and incorporated
herein as Appendix 2.
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The
legal positions taken in that briefrepresent HHS's interpretations of federal law. CMS, as noted
above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid program, Idaho is
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 18

000047

legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law. In its 2009
briefing in Barg before the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States Solicitor General and HHS
expressly reject the interpretation and application that Idaho's Department relies upon in using
LC. § 56-218 to support the claim made against the Estate of George Perry in this case.
The United States in Barg, supra at p. 8-9, stated in pertinent part,
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid
benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but limits that
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the
time of her death ...
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Medicaid
Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid benefits from assets
in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal interest at the time of her death.
Under the Medicaid Act, a State generally may not seek to recover
correctly paid Medicaid benefits. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l). The Act provides,
however, that a State (1) must seek recovery of nursing home and related benefits
paid on behalf of an individual over the page of 55 from "the individual's estate"
as defined by state probate law; and (2) may, at its option, define "the individual's
estate" more broadly to include any "assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other
arrangement." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(B), (b)(4)(A) and (B). Thus, the Medicaid
Act, which permits recovery only after the death of the recipient's surviving
spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a State to file a reimbursement
claim against the surviving spouse's estate, up to the value of any assets in
which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death.
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's estate "the
value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned
property at any time during the marriage, "Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.15, subd. 2
(2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the recipient retained an
interest in the assets at the time of her death. Because a State may not recover
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correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent authorized by federal
law, see 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l), Minnesota's statute conflicts with federal law
and is therefore preempted. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 280-282 (1987). (emphasis added).

The Minnesota Supreme Court in Barg went on to determine whether Dolores Barg
owned any interest in the property held by her husband's estate. It stated,
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer
existed at the time of her death. No other recognizable interest has been
identified .... We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of
her death that were part of a probate estate or an expanded estate definition
permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no basis for the County's
claim against the estate.
Id. at 72-73.

The same conclusion follows in this case. Martha Perry retains no legal interest
whatsoever in the house sale proceeds that make up the Estate of George Perry. Nor can she be
said to have any interest in those assets under the expanded estate definition permissible under
federal law. She conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the home to her husband years ago
via a quit claim deed. SOF, 1 1. The Department has no valid recovery claim nor will it ever
have a valid claim against the assets making up the Estate of George Perry. The Court should
rule accordingly.
Idaho Cases

In 2005, our Supreme Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a
Medicaid recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate ofKaminsky, 141 Idaho
436, 111 P. 3d 121 (2005). Although the issue in Kaminsky was the timeliness of the
Department's clam, the Court did recognize that the Department's recovery claim was properly
made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated,
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Medicaid is a public assistance program designed to provide medical care and
services to persons with insignificant financial resources. The provisions of
Idaho's Public Assistance Law (Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code) and its
implementing regulations provide eligibility requirements. Only persons with few
financial resources qualify for assistance and assistance comes with strings
attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of the State, pursuant
to I.C. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid assistance from the
estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition, this right of recovery
constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate. (emphasis added).

Id. at 439. The Department did not attempt in Kaminsky, however, to assert any claim against the
surviving/community spouse's estate. 1
In 1998, our Supreme Court in Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132
Idaho 213, 215, 970 P.2d 6, 8-10 ( 1998), held that the version of LC. § 56-218 then in effect
(pre-OBRA 1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but
expressly recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the
Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized
that federal law does preempt the authority granted to the Department by LC. § 56-218, and held
that the only asset that might be recoverable against from the surviving spouse's estate was
community property accumulated by the couple after the execution of their marriage settlement
agreement. Id. at 215-216. Our Supreme Court has already recognized, therefore, that federal
law does preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery claims - i.e. with respect to LC. § 56-218.

Jackman is also important with respect to two further points in that opinion.
First, the Court held that the separate property assets of the Medicaid recipient's spouse
(the community spouse) were not subject to an estate recovery claim by the Department. Id. at
Reference is sometimes made in case law to the "surviving spouse" which is often used to refer to the "commw1ity
spouse" or the spouse which is not the Medicaid recipient. This Memorandum refers to George Perry as the
community spouse because he did not in fact "survive" his spouse, Martha Perry, the Medicaid recipient.
1
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216. This conclusion is consistent with the federal law because the Medicaid recipient does not
own any interest in the community spouse's separate property. In Jackman, the Court held that
all assets transferred to the community spouse upon the Medicaid spouse's approval for Medicaid
by use of a marriage settlement agreement effectively transmuted those assets into the separate
property assets of the Medicaid recipient's spouse, precluding the Department's claim against
those assets. The Court held that the community spouse's separate property, including the
community property transmuted by agreement, was not part of the Medicaid recipient's estate
and not subject to the Department's recovery claim. Id. at 216-217. In this case, all property of
the estate in the Inventory served on the Department was identified as George Perry's separate
property. Those assets are entirely made up of proceeds from the sale of George's home. Martha
conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the home to George in 2006. Therefore, the home
and the proceeds from the sale of the home are George's separate property assets. The
Department never objected to that characterization in the Inventory.
Second, the Jackman Court also rejected the Department's effort to use the post-OBRA
1993 definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B) as support for a broader right to
recovery. Id. The Jackman Court rejected this argument because the definition of "assets" was
not in effect at the time the agreement transmuting the couple's community property into the
Medicaid recipient spouse's separate property was signed in that case. In other words, the
definition of "assets" that the Department sought to rely upon in Jackman was pre-OBRA 1993.

If the Department seeks to resurrect that argument in this case, the Court should reject it a second
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time, but not because the definition is not in effect. The Court should reject it because the
argument lacks substantive merit.
The State of Minnesota posited the very same argument when it sought certification
before the U.S. Supreme Court in order to reverse the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in In Re
Estate Of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In rejecting the State of Minnesota's argument that the

term "assets" supported a broader right to recovery, the U.S. Solicitor General stated,
2.
Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery from the estate of the
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the term "assets"
to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the individual's
spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). According to petitioner, "[b]y including
resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in the meaning
of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources fall within the
scope of§ 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27.
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid
recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision of the Medicaid
Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which the individual had any
legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b )( 4)(B) (emphasis
added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary to rewrite that clause to read
"'any * * * assets in which leither or both the individual and the individual's
spouse] had any legal title or interest."' Pet. 26 (brackets and asterisk in
original) (emphasis added). But this editing does nothing less than make the
statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain language of the operative
provision of the Act refutes petitioner's readings.2
3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds little support in the
Act's other provisions concerning the treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28.
As petitioner notes, the Medicaid Act generally considers the community
2 In

describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the legislative history of the 1993
amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits, rather than the
resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 835
( 1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [which] * * * recovery is sought may include any real or
personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death, including
the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OJBECTION TO DEPARTMENT'S PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM- 23
File #09-039

000052

spouse's assets for purposes of determining whether an institutionalized
individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts certain
property, such as the couple's home, from consideration, 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(10,
1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of
resources and income that are not considered available to pay for the applicant's
medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (f)(2). Moreover, once the
institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible for benefits, the Medicaid Act
provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall be deemed available to
the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act, in
short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted principle that
"spouses are expected to support each other." Pet. 27. To read Section
1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with its plain terms thus is consistent with the
broader statutory scheme.
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting
spousal estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient
had a legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption
does not come into play, Pet. 28 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 ( 1996))-even assuming, arguendo, that this presumption has force in the
context of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative program like Medicaid in
which the State's program is subject to federal approval. And for similar reasons,
petitioner's suggestion that the decision below improperly enforces against the
State "[a]n ambiguous condition" on the acceptance of federal funds under
Spending Clause legislation lacks any merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arlington Cent.
Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. V. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,296 (2006)). (emphasis added)
Petitioner also errs (Pet. 20-23, 28 n.8) in asserting that the Minnesota
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1396(b)(4)(B) is inconsistent with the
interpretation of the responsible federal agency. HHS has neither promulgated
regulations nor issued guidance interpreting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorize
this kind of estate recovery that petitioner urges in this case. To be sure, CMS in
2007 approved Minnesota's state plan amendment incorporating its statutory
spousal recovery provisions. See Pet. App. 89a-93a. But CMS' s approval is not
the equivalent ofbinding interpretive guidance. Cf. 42 C.F.R. 430.16(a)(l) (a
state plan or plan amendment is deemed approved if CMS does not act within 90
days after submission). Moreover, CMS's approval followed binding judicial
decisions in Minnesota's own courts interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit
recovery to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at time of death.
See, e.g., In re Estate o.fGullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
As set forth above in this brief, seep. 9, supra, HHS also interprets the Medicaid
Act to limit recovery in that manner. (emphasis added).
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The Department applies the language in LC. § 56-218 too broadly in
attempting to recover against assets in which Martha, the Medicaid recipient, has no title
or interest. Martha conveyed all of her interest in those assets to her husband years ago.
The Department's effort to broaden the scope ofrecovery allowed under LC.§ 56-218
violates federal law and is therefore preempted by federal law. This Court should uphold
the PR's disallowance of the Department's claim in its entirety.

CONCLUSION
None of the assets in the Estate of George Perry are assets in which Martha Perry will
hold a legal title or interest at the time of her death. She holds no such interest now. She
relinquished any right, title or interest to that property years ago. The Department is applying
LC.§ 56-218 too broadly in making a claim in this probate, in contravention of federal law. The
Department's recovery claim in this action seeks to recover against the separate property assets of
George Perry- assets in which Martha has no title or interest.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the
Court uphold her disallowance of the Department's recovery claim against the Estate of George
Perry.

,-g_

DATED this 12_ day of November, 2009.

Attorney for Personal Representative
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Appeal from the District Court, Mille Lacs County, Steven P. Ruble, J.

56
Mille Lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs
County.
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent Michael Barg.
Julian J. Zweber, St. Paul, MN, for amici curiae Elder Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association and National
Senior Citizens Law Center.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae
Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en bane.

OPINION
MEYER, Justice.
The Mille Lacs County Family Services and Welfare Department (County) filed a claim against the Estate of Francis E.
Barg (Estate), seeking to recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of his predeceased wife, Dolores Barg. The
Estate partially allowed the claim, and disallowed the other part. The district court, concluding that Dolores Barg's
interest in the couple's property was limited because she had conveyed it to her husband before her death, evaluated
her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. The County appealed, arguing that it was entitled to
recovery from the full value of the property. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, partially allowing the claim
and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in the property as a joint tenancy interest equivalent to one-half the value of the
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property. In re Estate of Barg, 722

57
N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Factual and Procedural Background.

The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Dolores J. Barg was born in 1926, married Francis E. Barg in
1948, and remained married to him until her death in 2004. In 1962 and 1967, in two separate transactions, th2 Bargs
took title as joint tenants to real property in Princeton, Minnesota. Their home was located on this property. On October
24, 2001, Dolores Barg entered a nursing home in Mille Lacs County, at first paying the costs herself. In December 2001,
she applied for long-term Medicaid benefits.(fnl)
An asset assessment for Dolores Barg was completed in February 2002. The Bargs' marital assets including their
homestead totaled $137,272.63.(fn2) Approval for long-term Medicaid benefits was given retroactive to DecemlJer 1,
2001.
On February 27, 2002, Francis Barg executed his will, nominating the couple's son Michael F. Barg as personal
representative, leaving his estate to his surviving descendants, and making no provision for his wife. Dolores Barg
transferred her joint tenancy interest in the homestead property to Francis Barg on July 2, 2002, when her dau~Jhter and
guardian of her estate, Barbara Anderson, executed a Guardian's Deed. Also in July 2002, Barbara Anderson de eted
Dolores Barg's name from certificates of deposit the couple held jointly at Bremer Bank. There is no allegation tl1at these
actions were improper or fraudulent.
On January 1, 2004, Dolores Barg died, having received $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death,
assets belonging to either Dolores or Francis Barg included three certificates of deposit, a checking account, ancl an IRA
account, all in the name of Francis Barg alone; one certificate of deposit payable to the funeral home for Dolores Barg's
funeral; two vehicles, together worth approximately $9,000; the homestead titled in Francis Barg's name, valued at
$120,800; and miscellaneous household goods and furniture. All of these assets had been jointly held at some time
during the couple's 55-year marriage.
On May 27, 2004, Francis Barg died, never having received Medicaid benefits. On July 30, 2004, the County filed a
claim against Francis Barg's estate, seeking to recover $108,413.53, the full amount Dolores Barg had received in
Medicaid benefits.
Michael Barg disallowed $44,533.53 of the claim, and allowed $63,880. The County petitioned for an allowa:ice of
the full claim, arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both the homestead and the certificates of deposit,
was subject to its claim because Dolores Barg's joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire property. The
district court concluded that Dolores Barg's interest in the property at the time of her death was

58
equivalent to a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance.
The County appealed. The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate of Gu/Iberg, 652 N.W.2d 709
(Minn.App. 2002), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was limited to Dolores's interest in marital
or jointly owned property at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The court decided that property law
principles should be applied to determine the nature of that interest and that under federal law and Gu/Iberg, Dolores
Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. Id. at 497. The court valued that
interest as an undivided one-half of the property's value, and remanded the case to the district court for a recalculation
of the amount of the claim that was allowable. Id.
The County petitioned for review. The Estate opposed review but sought conditional cross-review on the issue of
whether federal law permits the State to recover at all from a surviving spouse's estate. We granted review, as well as
cross-review, and asked for briefing on whether the Estate had adequately preserved for review the issue of "whether
the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a
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surviving spouse." We granted requests by the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to file an amicus curiae brief
aligned with the County and to participate in oral argument.(fn3) We also granted requests by the Elder Law Section of
the Minnesota State Bar Association and the National Senior Citizens Law Center to file an amicus curiae brief ciligned
with the Estate. After oral argument, we asked the parties for supplementary briefing on the relationship of the 2003 and
2005 amendments of Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subds. 1 and lc-lk (2006), to the authority the County argues exists under
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la (2006) and Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how that relationship affects
preemption analysis and the scope of recovery permissible under Minnesota law.
Statutory Framework.

Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure medical care to individuals who
do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N. W .2d 1, 9
(Minn. 2002). Medicaid was intended to be the payor of last resort. Id The program is jointly funded with the states as a
"cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them
in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980).
Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those
plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III
2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its own
program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)(fn4) administer
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the program and approve state plans. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the requirements imposed on state plans is that
they must "comply with the provisions of [42 U.S.C. § 1396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of
medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000).

To receive Medicaid, a person must qualify as either "categorically" or "medically" needy. Estate ofAtkinson v. Minn.
Dep'tofHuman Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn.1997). A person is "categorically needy" if he is eligible for other
specified federal assistance programs. Id at 211. A person is "medically needy" if he incurs medical expenses that
reduce his income to roughly the level of those who are categorically needy. Id To qualify as medically needy a person
may have income no higher than a defined threshold and may own assets of no more than a defined value. Id If the
assets of a Medicaid applicant and her spouse exceed the qualifying threshold, they must "spend down" their assets until
they are at or below the qualifying threshold. Id. If a potential Medicaid recipient transfers assets below fair market value
within a certain period of time before eligibility, the recipient is deemed ineligible for benefits for a time period Ji1andated
by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2000). This provision prevents people who are not needy from becoming eligible for
Medicaid by transferring their assets away.
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider assets of both husband and
wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in
place to protect the community spouse(fnS) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of assets needed to
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d at 211; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2000). The value of the
couple's home is not included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. Id § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42 U.S.C. §
1382b(a)(l) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets
designated for his or her needs that is not considered available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r-S(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead,
to his or her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community spouses to
contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the accommodation of the community
spouse's need to provide for his or her own support.
Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions.

Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is useful to start with the pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid
recovery, because it is relied on in the parties' arguments and is the basis for the rationale of several relevant cases.
Prior to amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute
stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject
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to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the
State plan may be made, except -* * * *
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such
assistance, from his estate.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b}(l} (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recove1· Medicaid
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the recipient's estate. The
statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the recipient's
surviving spouse. Id.§ 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving
spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law
contained no definition of "estate."
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), (4)
(2000)). As amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid
payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993
amendments changed section 1396p(b} in several ways. First, they lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55.
Second, they made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, they added a definition
of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule and
the relevant exception read as follows:
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:

****
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate* * *.

Id The amended version of section 1396p(b}(l)(B) retained the express reference to recovery from the recipient's
estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the recipient's estate is only permitted after the
death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only afferthe
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any* * * ." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b}(2) (emphasis added). And like the pre1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recovery from a
surviving spouse's estate.
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, with a mandatory provision
that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the
scope of probate law:
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual -(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as
defined
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for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal property and other assets in
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which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of
"estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be part
of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on the recipient's death. For
example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the decea~.ed joint
tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the
optional expanded definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to the surviving joint
tenant.
Minnesota's Medicaid Recovery Laws.

Minnesota has long had a policy of requiring participants in the Medicaid program and their spouses to use their own
assets to pay their share of the cost of care during or after enrollment. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a) (2006). To
implement this policy, since 1987 Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. la (originally enacted as Act of
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255, 3347). As relevant here, subdivision la provides that, "on
the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, * * * the total
amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the
[recipient] or the estate of the surviving spouse." Id. (emphasis added). A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse
for medical assistance provided to the recipient spouse may be made up to "the value of the assets of the estate that
were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." Id., subd. 2 (emphasis addecl).
The broad estate recovery authority contained in subdivisions la and 2 was supplemented in 2003 by amendments
to the statute expanding subdivision 1 and adding subdivisions lc-lk. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50,
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-17. These amendments implement the optional expanded definition of
"estate" authorized in the 1993 amendments to the federal law. See Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a)(2) (2006); 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The 2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate recovery law modify common law to provide for
continuation of a recipient's life estate or joint tenancy interest in real property after his death for the purpose of
recovering medical assistance, Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a)(3) (2006), and include that continued interest in the
recipient's estate. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. lg, lh(b), li(a), lj. The 2003 amendments also establish specific
procedures for exercising claims against these continued life estate and joint tenancy interests, as well as procedures
and waiting periods that differ according to whether the recipient's spouse, dependent children, or other relatives
62

living in the homestead survive the recipient. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess. 1751, 2213-17 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subds. li and lj). In this case, the County filed its
claim under subdivisions la and 2 and did not rely on provisions added in the 2003 amendments.
The issues presented in this case involve several questions about the relationship between the recovery provisions of
federal and Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County's claim was
proper, relying on its earlier decision in Gu/Iberg that the broad authorization in subdivision 2 for recovery up to the value
of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned at any time during the marriage was partially
preempted by the 1993 amendments to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient
spouse had a legal interest at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing Gu/Iberg, 652 N.W.2d 21t 714).
The County, and its supporting amicus curiae the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, argue that
the court of appeals was wrong, both here and in Gu/Iberg, in finding any preemption of the broad estate recovery
authorized in subdivisions la and 2. They contend that there was nothing in the federal statute prior to the 1993
amendments that limited the states' authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that the 1993
amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit them. Alternatively, the County argues that
even if recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had
an interest in the property notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, and the court of appeals erred in valuing
that interest as only one-half the value of the homestead.

000060
https://demo.lawriter .net/states/NlN/books/Case_ Law/result?number= 1

11/2/2009

-

Casemaker - MN - Case La,,· - Search - Result

··-

Page 6 of 15

The Estate and its supporting amici curiae counter that federal law authorizes recovery only from a recipient's estate,
and Minnesota law that allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is therefore preempted.(fn6) The Estate argues
that recovery is also barred because, to the extent recovery is allowed from the estate of a surviving spouse, federal law
limits that recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, and
subdivision 2 of section 256B. 15 is preempted to the extent it allows broader recovery. Finally, the Estate argues that
there should be no recovery here because Dolores Barg had no legal interest

63
in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed her interest to her husband
during her lifetime.
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. First, does federal law preempt the authorization in Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15,
subd. la, for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid for a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse? Second, if
such recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is not preempted, does federal law limit the recovery to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, preempting the broader recovery allowed in Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15,
subd. 2, as to assets owned as marital property or in joint tenancy at any time during the marriage 7 Third, if recovery is
limited to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death what, if any, interest did Dolores Barg
have in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, and specifically, was the court of appeals
correct in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy interest for purposes of estate recovery even though she
transferred that interest to her husband during her lifetime? We address these issues in turn, after first reviewing basic
preemption principles.

I.
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.

Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is a question of law, which we also review de novo.
Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 488 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn.1992).
Congressional purpose is,,. the ultimate touchstone"' of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Assn, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). Our primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of
Congress. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s]
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Opollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608,
120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, '>18, 112

S.Ct. 2608).
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 479 U.S. at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First,
it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id. Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is,
"congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal reiiulation
is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state
regulation." Id. at 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress
neither expressly preempted state law nor so completely occupied the field as to leave no room for state action, because
the Medicaid program specifically permits and even requires action by participating states. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11.
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress
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has not chosen to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-empt
state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683.
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when the state law is "an obstaclei to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61
S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
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II.
We now turn to the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, which requires Medicaid recovery against
the estate of a surviving spouse, is preempted by federal law, particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). Because only
conflict preemption may be applicable, we seek to determine whether compliance with both statutes is impossible or
whether the state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law.
The County seeks recovery here under subdivision la of section 256B.15, which authorizes--indeed require,-recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient. The Estate argues that this state law
authorization to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse is preempted because it conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p
(b)(l), which prohibits recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits except from the estate of the recipient of the
benefits.
The federal statute establishes a general prohibition against recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to
three specified exceptions:

( 1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (emphasis added). Only one exception potentially applies to the circumstance of this case:
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate** *.

Id.§ 1396p(b)(l)(B) (emphasis added). Because this express exception to the general rule against recovery of
Medicaid benefits directs that recovery come from the recipient's estate and makes no reference to a surviving spouse's
estate, the Estate argues that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law. Because
exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct.
1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it appears on its face that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by
federal law.
Two courts have agreed with this analysis and concluded that section 1396p(b)(l)(B) authorizes recovery only from
the recipient's estate and does not allow recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 221
Ill.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (2006); In re Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245,
246 (1995), rev. denied546 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that the federal statute
never "counter[ed] tt1e initial blanket prohibition"

65
on recovery by authorizing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246. The Illinois
Supreme Court noted that under federal and Illinois law, the state had authority to seek reimbursement from the
recipient's estate after the death of his surviving spouse. Hmes, 302 Ill. Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d at 153. But insteacl, as
here, the state sought recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id. The court explained that federal law allows
only three exceptions under which a state may seek reimbursement and "[a]II are specifically directed to the estate of
the recipient. No provision is made for collection from the estate of the recipient's spouse." Id. The court declined to add
to the unambiguous language of the federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond those specified in the federal law.

Id.
The Commissioner argues that Hines and Budney were wrongly decided, misinterpreting the federal statute,
particularly in light of the presumption against preemption. The County contends that this statutory exception to the
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally against individuals who received benefits after age 55, and does not
narrowly limit the sources of recovery. The County asserts that the reference to the individual's estate is merely a
designation of the timing for recovery rather than a limit on the scope of recovery, because the language does not say
that the state may recover "only" from the individual's estate. The County argues that, absent such express limiting
language, and applying the presumption against preemption, section 1396p(b)(l)(B) merely specifies one potential
source of recovery, the recipient's estate, and does not preclude others, such as a spouse's estate.
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In our view, the plain language of section 1396p(b)(l)(B) comports far more closely with the interpretation of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Hines than with the County's expansive view of the authority imparted by that provision.
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted the County's broad view of that language alone. Indeed, in explaining
the then-existing law in a report on proposed OBRA amendments in 1993, a House Report referred only to the possibility
of recovery from the estate of the recipient, even when describing recovery after the death of a surviving spouse:
Under current law, a State has the option of seeking recovery of amounts correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under its Medicaid program from the individual's estate if the individual was 65 years or older at
the time he or she received Medicaid benefits. The State may not seek recovery from the beneficiary's
estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the individual has no surviving minor 01·
disabled child.
H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, at 208 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 535 (emphasis added). In contrast,
describing the proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid recovery law passed by the House, the same House Report
stated that newly-required state estate recovery programs would have to "provide for the collection of the amounts
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the
surviving spouse." Id. Thus, when the House wanted to describe recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, it said so
clearly.
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain language providing only for recovery from the recipient's estate, we
acknowledge that several courts have interpreted the federal recovery provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a
surviving

66
spouse. The courts reaching this conclusion have for the most part relied on the 1993 amendments to the federal law
that allow the states to adopt an expanded definition of estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery. For example, the New
York Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that although federal law did not expressly provide for recovery of Medicaid
payments from the "secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 amendments gave the states power to recover against
the spouse's estate for certain categories of assets. In re Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d
1003, 1006 ( 1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the Craig interpretation that the 1993 expanded estate
provision gave the states the option to recover against a surviving spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint tenancy
or right of survivorship. In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.1998). Indeed, the court in Thompson
rejected the ruling in Budney that recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law on the
basis that the Budney court had not considered the optional expanded definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at
850. The North Dakota court concluded that "consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to trace the
assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies." Id. at
851. The court explained that, under the circumstances, it made no difference whether recovery was from one estate or
the other:
Because the expansive federal definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b )( 4) extends only to assets in
which the medical assistance benefits recipient "had any legal title or interest in at the time of death," it is
a matter of little moment whether the department seeks to recover the benefits paid by filing a claim in
the estate of the recipient after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse or by filing a claim in the
surviving spouse's estate.
Id. n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d
6, 9-10 (1998), the Supreme Court of Idaho also ruled that some recovery of Medicaid benefits could be made from the
estate of a surviving spouse, but held that such recovery was preempted by federal law except to the extent of assets
that had been in the recipient's estate as defined by state probate law.
These courts provide little explanation for their conclusions that the statutory language expressly mentioning
recovery only from the recipient's estate also allows recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the courts
viewed the authority to recover from assets that were part of the recipient's estate after the death of the surviving
spouse to fairly imply authority to recover those assets from the surviving spouse's estate to which they had passed on
the death of the recipient. In other words, to the extent assets in the surviving spouse's estate are there because they
had passed to the surviving spouse from the estate of the recipient, recovery from those assets in the surviving spouse's
estate is, in essence, recovery from the recipient's estate.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have made a similar unspoken inference in assessing preemption of
California Medicaid recovery laws in two cases. Bucholtz v. Be/she, 114 F.3d 923 (9th Cir.1997); Citizens Actior' League v.
Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 1524, 108 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). In toth cases,
the

67
Ninth Circuit addressed whether California's Medicaid recovery law was preempted by pre-1993 amendment federal law.
The California law allowed the state to seek recovery not only from the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient, but
"' against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival."' Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005 ( q Joting Cal.
Welf. & Inst.Code§ 14009.5 (West Supp.1989)). Thus, California law allowed the state to trace assets of the d2ceased
Medicaid recipient and seek reimbursement from the recipients of those assets.
In Kizer the plaintiffs were individuals who had owned property in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient and had
succeeded to ownership by right of survivorship upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. Id. at 1005. To determine
whether California's claimed right of recovery from these surviving joint tenants was inconsistent with federal law, the
court looked to section 1396p(b)(l)(B), which, as discussed above, provided the general prohibition against recovery with
the exception for individuals who were 65 years old when they received assistance. Id. at 1006. The Ninth Circuit noted
that the federal statute provided only for recovery from the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a federcil statutory
definition of estate, looked to common law for the meaning of the term. Id. at 1006. The court held that an "ectate"
under common law did not include property held in joint tenancy at death, and therefore the California law that allowed
recovery against such property went beyond the recipient's estate and was too broad. Id. at 1008. The court in Kt:Zerdid
not expressly address the issue of whether assets within the definition of "estate" could only be reached by a claim
against the recipient's estate, or whether federal law would permit the state to follow those assets and make tre claim
against a surviving joint tenant--or, as here, a surviving spouse.
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 federal law, the Ninth Circuit again addressed a preemption challenge to
the same broad California Medicaid recovery provision. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz was application of
the state recovery law to assets of Medicaid recipients that had been subject to three forms of Joint interests: inter vivos
trusts, tenancy in common, and community property. Id. at 924. The court applied the Kizer principle that"' use of the
word "estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision limits a state's recovery to property which descends to the recipient's
heir or the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,"' id. at 925 (quoting Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to each of the
forms of shared interest at issue. The court concluded that, like the joint tenancy in Kizer, property held in an inter vivos
trust is not part of the decedent's estate under California common law, and therefore was not part of the estate subject
to recovery under the federal law. Id. at 926. In contrast, the court explained, a decedent's interest in property held in
tenancy in common or community property is subject to disposition and administration as part of the decedent's estate
under California law. Id. at 926-27. The Ninth Circuit concluded not only that the decedent's interest in property held in
those forms was subject to recovery under the federal law, but also held, albeit without explanation, that recovery could
be sought from the heirs or beneficiaries who received that property; "[californ1a] may, however, pursue people who
received property held by the decedent in the form of tenancy in common or community property." Id. at 928 (•=mphas1s
added). Like other courts, the Ninth Circuit seems to have inferred that the federal law's reference to recovery from the
Medicaid recipient's "estate" conferred

68
authority to follow the assets from that estate and recover them from the people who received the property.
Thus, the courts that have considered the issue are split on the question of whether the narrow reference in section
1396p(b)(l) to recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient allows recovery only through a direct claim a9ainst that
estate, or whether recovery is also allowed from those who received covered assets from the Medicaid recipient's estate,
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were this an ordinary question of statutory interpretation, we would conclude
that the plain language of the federal statute provides only for recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, as the
Illinois court persuasively reasoned in Hines. But we are influenced by the principle that preemption of state laws is
disfavored, combined with the fact that allowing recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is consistent with both the
federal provision precluding recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a surviving spc,use as
well as with the purposes of the federal legislation.(fn7) These additional considerations lead us to conclude that the split
in authority, in these particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate
recovery language that we cannot say that Minnesota's requirement in Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, to seek
reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with federal law such that it is preempted.
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Accordingly, we hold that federal law does not preclude all recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse, and the
authorization in subdivision la to make a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. The
question remains whether federal law limits the scope of recovery against the estate of a surviving spouse and, in
particular, whether that recovery may reach all property previously held by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as
marital property or jointly with the surviving spouse during the marriage, as allowed by Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. 2.
III.

We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's estate allowed under
Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover from a
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at
any time during the marriage." (Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993
amendments were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this

69
argument for broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals of federal
law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting
community spouses from pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 1396p(b)(1)
allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed
by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of
the plain meaning of its language. Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-1993 federal
law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but
transferred by the recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that
were transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000).
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other than the Medicaid recipient's estate have
construed that authority to reach only assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death,
that is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state probate law or included in the
estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27
(limiting recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006
(same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid
recovery statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under
state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of· estate' in [section]
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient· had any legal title or inte1·est in at
the time of death"'); see also In re Estate of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery against estates of surviving spouses have
required that recipient had interest in assets at time of death).
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 amendments as authority for recovery from a surviving spouse's estate, our court of
appeals acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit the assets subject to recovery to those in which the Medicaid
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. See Gu/Iberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714 (holding that Minn.Stat.§
256B.15, subd. 2, authorization to reach assets that were marital property or owned jointly at any time during the
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law limitation to assets in which recipient had interest at time of death). And
the court of appeals acknowledged that limitation again in this case. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496 ("After Gu/Iberg, the
state's ability to recover was limited to the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the
recipient's death.").
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle requiring
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an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. Although the North Dakota court: had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson
decision that recovery allowed under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest
at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving
spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtzthat any assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to
his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. T1e court
stated that limiting recovery under section 1396p(b) to "assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the Medicaid
recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wi~ 607 N.W.2d at 885.
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. The court did
not explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with the limitation to recovery from assets
in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz.
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied
in Wktz. The plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is arrangements other
than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient's death.
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional definition of "estate" allows inclusion of
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further describes the assets that a state may
include in this expanded estate. The clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are "conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers
back to the immediately preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any legal title or
interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a
"survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes several
methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -- "through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." Id.
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of
death. When we construe a federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used " Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To read "other arrangement" to include a
lifetime transfer would be to read the words "at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other
arrangement" cannot

71
include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of
conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died for the conveyEInce to
occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the deceased"
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its context, the conclusion of the Witt!"court
that "other arrangement" is sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery of assets in
which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale for
finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law
to recover from the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wiltz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow
states to expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits
that expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold that
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's
estate of assets that the recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time during the
marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the ti 1le of
her death.
1
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IV.
This brings us to the question of whether Dolores Barg had any interest in property at the time of her death that
would allow the County to make a claim against the estate of her surviving spouse, despite her transfer of her joint
interest in the property prior to her death. As we have noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the interest-at-time-ofdeath limitation on spousal estate recovery, but nevertheless found that for these purposes Dolores retained a joint
tenancy interest at the time of her death that made the value of that interest recoverable from Francis's estate. Barg,
722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. Eschewing reference to either marital property law or probate law to determine the nature of
any interest at the time of death, the court of appeals looked to standard real property law and Gu/Iberg in deciding that
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest. Id. at 496-97. We do not agree.
The court of appeals determined that Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the property based on its
understanding that the court in Gu/Iberg had recognized a continuing joint tenancy interest because the lifetime transfer
was an "other arrangement," and because the court apparently understood section 1396p(b)(4) to "explicitly allow[] a
state to broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include joint-tenancy interests
that have been previously conveyed to a spouse." Id. at 497. Section 1396p(b)(4) cannot be construed to include lifetime
transfers of property in the phrase "other arrangement" because the plain language and the context require that phrase
to be limited to conveyances occurring upon the death of the recipient. For that reason, we cannot
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agree with the court of appeals' characterization of section 1396p(b)(4) as allowing the expanded definition of estate to
include "previously conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language of section 1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death,
not one that was previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores did not retain a joint tenancy interest in the property at
the time of her death, because that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death.
The question remains whether Dolores had any other interest in the property at the time of her death that may be
considered part of an expanded estate for recovery purposes under Minnesota law. We agree with the court of appeals
that courts should not look to marital property law to find such an interest, because the statute in which marital property
is defined limits the definition to the purposes of that chapter. Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b (2006);(fn8) see Barg,
722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, we agree that the recognizable interests at the time of death cannot be limited to those
defined by probate law, because the purpose of section 1396p(b)(4) is to allow states to expand the definition of estate
beyond probate law. See Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree that real property law principles, informed by
principles of probate law, should be the basis for ascertaining any interests at the time of death. Any interest recognized
must be consistent with the underlying foundational rationale that recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is allowed
only because of its relationship to the recipient's estate, from which federal law expressly allows recovery. With those
principles in mind, we caution that for an interest to be traceable to and recoverable from a surviving spouse's estate,
the interest must be (1) an interest recognized by law, (2) which the Medicaid recipient held at the time of death, and
(3) that resulted in a conveyance of an interest of some value to the surviving spouse that occurred as a result of the
recipient's death. Further, to the extent the interest is not part of the standard probate estate, Minnesota law must have
expanded the definition of estate to include the interest, as authorized by section 1396p(b )( 4).
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer existed at the time of her death. No
other recognizable interest has been identified.
The County argues that the reference to marital property in subdivision 2 reflects the Minnesota legislature's intent
to make all marital property subject to spousal estate recovery. But subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest at
the time of death or to re-defining the probate estate to include all marital property, even property transferred prior to
death. This is not surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted long before the optional estate definition authority was
added to federal law.
The district court indicated that because Dolores was married to Francis even after the transfer of her interest in the
homestead, she retained some interest in the property. But whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's death,
rather than resulting in transfer of an interest of value to Francis.
We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of her death that were part of a probate estate or an
expanded estate definition permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no
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73
basis for the County's claim against the estate.
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota legislature amended section 256B.15 by extending the definition of
estate for Medicaid recovery purposes to include assets owned by a recipient spouse in joint tenancy or life estate at the
time of her death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-2217
(codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1, 1c-1k). The amendments do not mention the other fo1·ms of
conveyance at death listed in the federal definition of "estate," except that the "right of survivorship" is mentioned with
respect to joint tenancies. Id. subds. 1(a)(6), lg, lh(b). Thus, the legislature chose only to include two forms of
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. Also, as provided in the federal law, the inclusion of joint tenancy and life
estate interests in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to interests the recipient owned at the time of death.
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1h(b)(2), li(a). The amendments further limit the scope of recovery by exemptinq from the
reach of subdivisions le through 1k a "homestead owned of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the recipient and
the recipient's spouse as joint tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(6). In 2005, the
legislature retroactively made the provisions continuing life estates and joint tenancies effective only for life estate and
joint tenancy interests created on or after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn.
Laws 2454, 2649 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(c)).

It is difficult to discern the intended reach of the 2003 amendments.(fn9) If the pre-2003 law allowed recovery
against the surviving spouse's estate as argued by the County, there was little need to enact the 2003 amendments to
reach those assets in the case of a recipient who leaves a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree that the 2003
amendments do not apply to or influence this case, for reasons that are not clear to us.
It suffices to say that even if the 2003 amendments were applicable, they would provide no basis for the County's
claim. The new subdivision li specifically applies to circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient against whom a recovery
claim could otherwise be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1i(b). That subdivision provides
procedures for filing a claim without making a recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. Id., subd. 1(f). If this
subdivision were to be applied to this case, several limitations would preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient,
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at the time of her death. If she had owned a joint tenancy at the time of
her death, it would have been a homestead owned of record by her and her spouse as joint tenants with a right of
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach of subdivision li. Id., subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that joint tenancy was
established in the 1960s, well before August 1, 2003.
In summary, we hold that federal law does not preempt all Medicaid recovery from spousal estates, and Minn.Stat. §
256B.15, subd. la, is therefore not preempted to the extent it allows claims against the estate of a surviving spouse of a
Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable scope of spousal estate recovery is limited. Subdivision 2 of section 256B.15
is preempted to the extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid recipient did not have a
legal interest at the time of death, and to
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the extent that it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient's interest. Finally, we hold that Dolores Ba.-g had no
interest in property at the time of her death that can form the basis for recovery against the estate of Francis Barg.

V.
We have concluded that the County's claim for full recovery against all the assets in Francis Barg's estate was
preempted by federal law because recovery is limited to assets in which Dolores had an interest at the time of her death,
but the question of the appropriate remedy remains, because the County argues that the Estate waived the right to deny
the claim in its entirety. Although we have decided as a matter of law in our preemption analysis that the state is
preempted from requiring reimbursement from assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient spouse had no interest
at the time of her death, that does not resolve the remedy issue here. Although a state may not compel payment from a
spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by federal law, federal preemption does not preclude an estate from
voluntarily paying all or part of a claim that could not be compelled.
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed the County's claim, thus allowing the remainder of the claim. Minnesota
Statutes§ 524.3-806(a) (2006) provides that, on petition of the personal representative after notice to the claimant, the
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court may "for cause shown permit the personal representative to disallow" a previously-allowed claim. But the personal
representative made no such request here. When questioned at the hearing in district court whether the personal
representative was challenging the entire claim of the County, the representative affirmed that he was challen9ing only
the part already disallowed. When the district court affirmed that partial disallowance and the County appealed, the
Estate did not file a notice of review in the court of appeals to challenge the implicit award to the County of the allowed
part of its claim. A respondent who does not file a notice of review to challenge an adverse ruling of the distrid: court
waives that issue in the court of appeals. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.
Co., 294 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially allowed the County's claim and having then failed to properly
seek a reversal of that allowance in both the district court and court of appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek
that relief for the first time in this court.
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court's denial of the
County's claim for full recovery is affirmed. The court's remand for an award to the County based on the existence of a
Joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment based on the partial
allowance made, but not subsequently challenged, by the Estate.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.

Footnotes:
FNl. "Medicaid" is the popular name for this cooperative federal-state program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1396v (2000).
In Minnesota it is referred to as "medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 256B.02, subd. 8 (2006).
FN2. For purposes of determining eligibility of one spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home is excluded. 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1)(2000). In the asset assessment for Dolores Barg, $L04,875
was excluded. This amount corresponds to the value of the home, one jointly-owned vehicle, and a burial lot. When
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the couple's resources is reserved for the needs of the spouse not
applying for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5( c)(2), (f)(2)(A) (2000). Protected assets for the non recipient spouse, Francis
Barg, were calculated to be $24,607.
FN3. The Commissioner's motion to supplement the record on review is granted as to the following documents:
North Dakota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 05-012; Idaho
Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 06-10. The motion is
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated November 4, 1999.
FN4. Formerly the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). See Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer,
534 U.S. 473, 479 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002).
FNS. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses is premised on circumstances similar to those of the Bargs.
One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. The other, who we refer
to as the community or surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and survives the recipient spouse.
FN6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of "whether the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly
paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a surviving spouse." We requested briefing on whether that
issue had been adequately preserved for review. The County argues that the Estate failed to preserve the issue because
it only partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed before the district court that only the disallowed portion of the
claim was contested, and it asked the court of appeals to affirm the district court's decision. The County's argum~nts go
to the scope of the remedy available in this case, an issue that we address infra. But this issue also has a legal aspect
independent of the specific scope of recovery available in this case. That legal component is necessary to a thorough
analysis of the preemption issues presented here, and we will therefore address the issue in that context. No new or
controverted facts are needed in order to address this purely legal question, and no prejudice will result from our
consideration of the issue because the parties addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, the court of
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appeals, and this court. See Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Minn.1997).
FN7. The United States Supreme Court has described Congress's passage of the anti-impoverishment provisions as
an effort to "protect community spouses from 'pauperization' while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining
Medicaid assistance." Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 480, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, because the spouse
must be dead for the recovery to occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid benefits to other impoverished
individuals; indeed, it can be expected to do quite the opposite. See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that Congress expected the estate recovery provisions to allow
government to realize savings of $300 million over five years, and that the savings have been even greater).
FN8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subds. 1, 5 (2004).
FN9. The parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on this question.

MN
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QUESTION PRESENTED

The Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., gen-

erally forbids participating States from recovering correctly paid benefits. The statute requires, however, that
a State seek to recover the cost of nursing home services
paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55 from
the individual's probate estate, after both the individual
and her surviving spouse have died. The statute also
permits (but does not require) a State to recover from
"any other real and personal property and other assets
in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of
the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B).
The question presented is whether, under Section
1396p(b)(4)(B), a State that seeks to recover correctly
paid benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving
spouse is limited to recovering the value of assets in
which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of
her death.
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No.08-603
LEO Vos, DIRECTOR, MILLE LACS COUNTY,
MINNESOTA, FAMILY SERVICES AND WELFARE
DEPARTMENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
V.

MICHAEL F. BARG

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is filed in response to the Court's order
inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States. In the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
STATEMENT
1. a. The Medicaid program, established in 1965 in
Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42
U.S.C. 1396 et seq., is a cooperative federal-state pro-

gram under which the federal government provides fund~
ing to States to provide medical asaistance to eligible
needy persons. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301
(1980).

To participate in the Medicaid program, a State must
develop a plan specifying, among other things, the categories of individuals who will receive medical assistance
(1)
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2
under the plan and the apeclflc kinde of medical care and
aervicea that will be covered. 42 U .S.C. 1896&. State
Medicaid plane &n! reviewed by the Cent.en for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (formerly the Health
Care Financing Admlnlatration) In the Departniant of
Health and Human ServJceB (HHS). 42 U.S.C. 1896; see

66 Fed. Reg. 85,487 (2001). If CMS approvea a State'•
pl~ the State is thereafter eligible for federal reimbunement for a specified percentace of the amounts
"expended • • • ae medical uaiatance under the State
plan." 42 U.S.C. 1896b(a){l), 1896d{b).
b. The Medicaid .Act requirea participating States
to provide Medicaid benet'lta to the .. categorically needy, .. that ie, those persona elig1ble tor ttnancial aa&tat.ance under specifled federal programs.
Atkin.a
v. Ri11ttra., 477 U.S. 164, 157 (1986); see 4.2 U.S.C.
1896a(a){l0)(A)(l)(IV). (VI) and (VII).
The Act aleo permit& States to extend benefit.a to
the "medically needy," that ia, "peraoru, lacking the ability to pay for medte&I expenses, but with lncomea too
large to quality for categorical -iatance." Sclw1riJeer v.
Grag Po.ftlMTtJ, 458 U.S. 34, 87 (1981); see 42 U.S.C.
1896a(a)(lO)(C). To quality u medically needy, a person
may have Income no higher than a deftned threshold and
may own aaseta o! no more than a deftm,d valne. If the
aueta of a Medicaid applicant eltceed the qualifying
threshold, ehe muat "apend down .. her asset.a until they
are at or below the qualifying threshold. See 42 U .S.C.

1896a(a)(17).

When a married peraon tis inBtitutiouatized 1n a nuning home or other fac:lllty. the Medicaid A.ct considen the
aaaeta of both the tnat1tut.tonallzed apouae and the nonlnetitottonalized, or "community," apooae tn determining the applicant'• ellgtbWty for beneftte. 42 U .S.C.

000078
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1896r-5(c). To prevent the community apouee f'rom beilli:
impoveriahed ae a reault of a required spend-down or
aa&eta, the at.atute exempt.a certain aa~ta, auch aa thE1
couple"s home and an automohil•, 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(l),,
1396r-5(c)(6), and &llowe the community spouse to retain.
a certain level of reeources and income that are not considered available to pay for the applicant's medical care,.

4.2 U.S.C. 1896r-6(d) and (t)(2). See Wiaconain Dep't of
Hsalth & Famil,v Sen,11. v. Blunurr, 584 U.S. 478, 480
(2002) (anti-impoverishment provisions are Intended to
"protect COllll1'1unity spouaea from •pauperi~tion' while
preventing tinanctally aecuN couplee from obtaining
Medicaid asaiatance"). Furthermore, although the Medicaid Act generally forbids a Medicaid applicant or her
spouse from trand'erring aaaetft at below market value in
order to become eligible for beneftta, 42 U.S.C.
1896p(c)(lXA), the atatute expreealy perm1t8 the applicant to tranafer uaeta, including an lntere«it in the homestead. t.o the community spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2).
Once the inatitutionalized spouse le determined to be
eligible tor beneftta, the atatute provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall be deemed available to the inatitutionaltzed spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1896r6(c)(4).

c. Aa a general rule, the Medicaid Act forbids Stat.ea
from seeking recovery ot Medicaid benefit.a that were
correctly paid. 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l); aee also 42 U.S.C.
1S96a(a)(18). The statute provide• an exception, however, for recovery from tbe eetAte8 of certain tnstttuttonalized and older beneftciaries.
Before 1998. the Medicaid Act•a recovery provision
permitted. but did not require, States to recover beneflts
paid on behalf of certain individuals, from the individuals' estate.a. 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l)(B) (1988). In 1998,

000079

4

Congress amended Section 1396p to require States to
recover correctly paid benefits in certain circumstances.
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993), Pub.
L. No. 103--66, § 13612, 107 Stat. 627. As amended. the
Act's estate-recovery provi&ion requires States to seek
recovery in the case of an individual who was permanently institutionalized, 42 U.S.C. 1396p{b)(l){A), and in

the case of a person who received, at age 55 or thereafter, nursing facility services, home and communitybased services, or related hospital and prescription drug
services, 42 U.S.C. 1S96p(b)(l)(B). In addition, a State
has the option to seek recovery of the cost of other items
or services paid on behalf of individuals over the age of
55. Ibid. The recovery "may be made only after the
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any," and
only at a time when the individual has no surviving children under the age of 21 or children who are blind or
disabled. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2) and (2)(A). Such recovery may be waived in cases where it "would work a.nundue hardship." 42 U.S.C. 1396p{b)(3).
The statute provides for recovery or the cost of benefits paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55
from "the individual's esta~." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l)(B).
The term "estate," for those purposes, "shall include all
real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of
State probate law." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(A). The statute further provides that an individual's "estate"
may include. at the option of the State • • • , any
other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or intereet at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint ten-
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ancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life e5tate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B).
2. Since 1987, Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of a recipient's
surviving spouise, as well as from the estate of a recipient. Act of June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82 (Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 256B.15 (2007)). Minnesota's estate-recovery law
provides that "[a] claim against the estate of a surviving
spouse who did not receive medical assistance, ror medical assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, is
limited to the value of the aasets of the estate that were
marital property or jointly owned property at any time
during the marriage." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.15, subd.
2 (2007).
3. In 2004, petitioner filed a claim against the estate
of Francis Barg, in which he sought recovery of Medicaid
benefits paid on behalf of Mr. Barg's predeceased
spouse, Dolores Barg. Pet. App. 4a. 1
a. During their marriage, the Bargs purchased real
property in Princeton, Minnesota, to which they took
title as joint tenants. In 2001, Ms. Barg entered a nursing home, and shortly thereafter applied for, and received, long-term Medicaid benefits. Pet. App. 2a-3a.
Ms. Barg subsequently transferred her joint tenancy
interest in the homestead property to Mr. Barg. At the
time of the transfer, the assessed value of the property
was $120,800. Ms. Barg also terminated her ownership
interest in certificates of deposit the couple had held
jointly. Id. at 3a-4a.
1 On March 2, 2009, this Court granted the State otMinnet0ta's conditional motion to intervene a& a party .Ugned with petitioner Vos. All
references in this brief to "petitioner" refer to petitioner VOIi.
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Ma. Barg died ln 2004, having received a total of
$108,413.53 In medical-assistance benefit.a through the
state Medicaid program. Mr. Barg died five months

later. Pet. App. 4a.
b. In his claim against Mr. Barg"e estate, petitioner
sought to recover the full amount of Medicaid benefits
paid on behalf of Ms. Barg. Pet. App. 4a. Respondent,
who is the representative of Mr. Barg's estate, allowed
$68,880 ae a claim against the estate, but disallowed
$44,533.53. Ibid. 1
Petitioner filed a claim-allowance petition in state
court. The district court upheld the partial disallowance.
Pet. App. 46a-51a. The court relied on the Minnesota
Court of Appeals' decision in In re Eat.ate of Gullberg,
652 N.W.2d 709 (2002), which held that Minnesota's
eat.ate-recovery law is preempted Insofar 88 it permit&
recovery up "to the value of the assets or the estate that
were marital property" at any point in the marriage, because 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(B) permits recovery only "to
the extent of" the Medicaid recipient's interest at the
time of deat.h. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714. The court
concluded that, at time of her death, Ma. Barg's interest
in the aaaete of Mr. Barg's estate that were marital property, including a life-eetate interest in the homestead and
a personal property allowance, totaled '68,880. Pet. App.

50a·5la.
c. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for recalculation of petitioner's allowable
claim. Pet. App. 52a-64a. Like the district court, the
1 Respondent"s partist allowance oC '68,880 apparently rested on
the premise that Ma. Barg (1) had a one-half 1nt.ereet in the homestead,
valued at '58,880, at the time of her deatll. deapte the inter viv0& tranll·
fer, and (2)was entJtJed to a persona.I property allowance In the amount
of S5()00. See Pet. App. 49a.
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court of appeals concluded that, under federal law, the
claim was necessarily limited to the value of Ms. Barg's
interest in specified assets at the time of her death.
Id. at 58a (citing Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714). The
court of appeals concluded, however, that Ms. Barg's
interest in the homestead at the time of her death was a
joint tenancy interest. valued as a one-ha1f interest in the
propertys value of $120,800, or $60,400. Id. at 62a.
d. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part
and reversed in part, concluding that petitioner was not
entitled to full recovery from Mr. Barg's estate. Pet.
App. la-45a.
As an initial matter, the court rejected respondent's
contention that federal law completely preempts Minnesota's estate-recovery law insofar as it permits recovery
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient's surviving
spouse. Pet. App. 19a-30a. The court concluded that
allowing recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is consistent with both the Act's preclusion of recovery from
the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a
surviving spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(A), as well as the
purposes of the Medicaid Act's recovery provisions. Pet.
App. 29a.
The court concluded, however, that federal law limits
the scope of recovery against a surviving spouse's
estate to the value of assets in which the recipient spouse
had an interest "at the time of death," 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b)(4)(B), and thereby preempts Minnesota's
estate-recovery law insofar as it permits the State
to reach any other assets "that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.'' Pet. App. 31a (quoting Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 256B.15, subd. 2 (2007)); see id. at 30a-37a.

"ON 3!0-ld

000083

8

The court further concluded that Ma. Barg did not
have any lnt.ereat In the bomeatead or bank account.a at
the time of her death, because she had transferred her
iDtereet in thoee aeaete to Mr. Bara before she died. The
court therefore held that petitioner had no tesal entltJement to eatiefaction of the State'e claim trom thOBe ae- ·
a,et,.,. Pet. App. 87a-48a. But because re•pondent had
partially allowed petitioner'• claim, and never challenaed
the district court·• award or that partial allowaace of

$63,880, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that petitioner could recover that amount. Id.. at 48a-46a.
DISCUSSION
The Minneeota Supreme Court'• decision la correct
and does not warrant further revie-w. The federal
Medicaid Act permit. recovery ot correctly paid beneftta
trom the estate of the recipient's 8Urviving spouse, but
limf~ that recovery to the value of BBSeta in wWch the
recipient had a lecaJ. intere•t at the time other death.
Alt.hoagb the """'1t iD th1e cue diffen t'rom t.he reault
in /n, n /GtJtau <if Wins, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). the
difference may not reflect a disagreement about t.be
meaning of federal Medicaid law, but only divergent conclusion• about when, under atate law, an tndtvidual retains a legal interut in aueta conveyed to a spouee. The
petf tion tor a writ of certiorari ehould be denied.
A. Th• Decltton 01 'l'b. Mlnneaota SapNDMt Court. le Corr.et

1. The Minneaota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Medicaid Act forbids petitioner from
aeektna to recover correctly paid benetlte trom aaaeta ln
whfoh the Medicaid recipient had no lecaJ illterest at the
time of her death.

~ : 0 t 6002' 9t
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Undt!tr the Medicaid Act, a State generally ma.y not
Hek to recover correctly paid Medicaid benefit&. 42
U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l). The Act providea, however, that a
State (1) mu.at seek recovery of nursing home and related beneftta paid on 'b41ih.it of an individual over t.he age
of 56 from .. the individual'• estate,. u defined by state
probate law; and (2) ma11, at tta option, deftne "the individual'• m,tate" more broadly to include any ""asaets tn
which the individual had any legal title or Interest at t.he
time of death (to the extent of such intereet), including
euch assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or aaaign of the
dece&aed individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, aarvtvorahtp, Hfe eatate, living truet. or other

arrangement." "2 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l)(B), (b)(4)(A) and
(B). Thu.a, the Medicaid Act, which permit.a recovery
only after the death of the reetpient'e surviving spouse,
42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(2), aathorizell a State to file a reimbursement claim againat the surviving epouse's estate,
up to the \ralue of any &Met.A in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death.
The Minneaota eetate--recovery law exceeds the scope
of that authorization. It permfte the State to recover
from a survtvtng spouse'A eat.ate "the value of the aaseta
of the eat.ate that were marital property or Jointly owned
property at Oft!( tinw during tlu ffl4rria.g•," Minn. Stat.
Ann. I 266B.16, aubd. 2 (2007) (emphuia added), without
regard to whether the recipient retained an interest in
the &&sete at the thne of her death. Because a St.ate rnay
not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefit.a except to
the extent authorized by federal law, •ee 42 U.S.C.
1896p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute conructa with federal
law and fa therefore preempted. See Califm-n,ia. FtJd.
Sav. & Loan A.s'n v. Guctrra, 479 U.S. 272. 280-282
(1987).
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2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery

from the estate of the Medkaid recipient's surviving
spouse, because the Act defines the term "asseta" to in~
elude "all income and resources of the individual and of
the individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). According to petitioner, "[b]y including resources of both 'the
individual' and 'of the individual's spouse' in the meaning
of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's
resources fall within the scope of§ 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet.
27.

Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of "assets" does encompass resources of
both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid recipient) and
"'the individual'& spouise," the particular provision of the

X.

Medicaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which the indimdual, had any legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary
to rewrite that clause to read "'any * * • assets in
which [either or both the individual, and the individual's
apouse] had any legal title or interest.'" Pet. 26 (brackets and asteriks in original) (emphasis added). But this
editing does nothing less than make the statute say the
opposite of what it says. The plain language of the oper-

ative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's reading. 3
• In describing the operation of the amended estat.e-recovery provision, the legislative history of the 1998 amendments al.so focused on
the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefit.a, rather
than the rei.ources of both the individual and his or her ~pou~. See

H.R. Con!. Rep. No. 218, 103d Cong., 1st Bess. 835 (1993) ("At the
opt.ion of the State, the estat.e against [which] • • • recovery is MJught
may include any real or personal property or other assets in which t/w

'ON 31'-0fd
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3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds
little support in the Act's other provisions concerning the
treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. As petitioner notes, the Medicaid Act generally considers the
community spouse':.'! assets for purposes of determining
whether an institutionalized individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts certain prop-erty, such as the couple's home, from consideration. 42
U.S.C. 1382b(a)(l), 1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of resources and
income that are not considered available to pay for the
applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (f)(2).
Moreover, once the institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible for beneflt.s, the Medicaid Act provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall
be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse." 42
U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act. in short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted
principle that "spouses are expected to support each
other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with its plain terms thus is consistent with the
broader statutory scheme.
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity
about limiting spousal estate recovery to the value of
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption does not come into play, Pet. 28 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))-even assuming, arguendo, that this presumption has force in the context of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative program like Medicaid in which the State's program is subbeneficia:ry had any legal title or interest at the time of death, including
the home.") (emphasis added).
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j ect to rederal approval. And for similar reasons, peti-

tioner's suggestion that the decision below improperly
enforces against the State "[a]n ambiguous condition" on
the acceptance of federal funds under Spending Clause
legislation lacks any merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arlington
Cent. Sek. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,
296 (2006)).
Petitioner also errs (Pet. 20-23, 28 n.8) in a~serting
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of
Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) is inconsistent with the interpretation of the responsible federal agency. HHS has neither promulgated regulations nor issued guidance interpreting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorize the kind of
estate recovery that petitioner urges in this case. To be
sure, CMS in 2007 approved Minnesota's state plan
amendment incorporating ite statutory spousal recovery
provisions. See Pet. App. 89a-98a. But CMS's approval
is not the equivalent of binding interpretive guidance.
Cf. 42 C.F.R. 430.lG(a)(l) (a state plan or plan amendment is deemed approved if CMS does not act within 90
days after submission). Moreover, CMS's approval followed binding judicial decisions in Minnesota's own
courts interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit recovery to
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at
time of death. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gullberg, 652
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). As set forth
above in this brief. see p. 9, 8Up-ra, HHS also interprets
the Medicaid Act to limit recovery in that manner.
B. The Decision Below Does Not Warrant Further Review

1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 24-25) that review is
warranted to resolve a conflict between the decision below and the North Dakota Supreme Court•s decision in
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Wirtz, 8'1.1:pra.' In Wirtz, much 88 in this case, a Medicaid
recipient had transferred assets to his spouse before his
death, and the State sought to reeover the cost of the
Medicaid benefits from the :spouse's estate after her
death. The court held that the State was permitted under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) to recover the value of any
assets "in which the deceased recipient once held an interest," including assets conveyed to his spouse before
his death. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886.
But the different results in this case and in Wirtz may
not reflect a disagreement about the meaning offederal
Medicaid law. Notably, the North Dakota Supreme
Court, like the Minnesota Supreme Court, stated that
the State "[ could] assert a claim against real or personal
4 A:, the Minneljot.a Supreme Court noted (Pet. App. 2la-22a), two
other state court,; have concluded that s.ctlon 1300p(b) authorizes r.,_
covery unly from the estate of a Medicaid recipient, and not from the
estate of his or her spouse. See HiTUJI v. De-po.rtm.ent ofPub. Aid, 850
N.E.2d 148(Ill.2006);lnreEstateofB1'dnc,y,641 N.W2d 245 (Wie;.Ct.
App. 1996). But those decisions and the decision below are not in conflict. Both Hfl'IU and Budney are consistent with the principle that a
State may recowr from the estate of a Medicaid recipient's survivin&
spouse ifit exercises its option under Section 1396p(b)(4XB) to define
Lhe individual's estate mON broadly than it Is defined l,,lllder state probate law. See Hitl.68, 850 N.E.2d at 153-154 (explaining that the stat.e
legislaw.re could have defined the recipient's estate in such a way u to
provide for recovery of certain asset.a from the estate oflm survivin1
spouse, but had chosen not to do »o); Budn.ey, 541 N.W.2d at246 &
n.2 (holding that a state statute authorizing .fu.1.1 recovery from a 8111"viving spouse's eat.ate exceeded the State's authority under 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b), without considerini whether it would have been permissible
for the State to recover from the surviving spouse's estate the value of
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death). Respondent here, in any event, does not challenge the Minnesota Supreme
Court's conclusion that a State is pennitted to recover from the estate
of a surviving spouse in some circumstances. See Br. in Opp. 6, 8-9, 19.
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property, and other assets in which [the recipient] had
any legal Litle or other interest at his death." Wirtz, 607
N .W.2d at 885 (emphasis added); see also ibid. ("Our
inquiry • * • is • • "' whether [the recipient] had
'real and personal property and other assetis in which
[he] had any legal title or interest at the time of death.")
(emphasis added). Although its reasoning is not entirely
clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to conclude that the
recipient in that case, despite formal conveyance of certain assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death, when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangement." 607
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The
court did not elaborate on the nature of that interest,
although it referred to the State's argument that
the recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of his death, id. at 883, and
noted that other courts had interpreted Section
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach state·law community-property
and homestead interests, id. at 885.
The different results reached by the North Dakota
Supreme Court and the court below on similar facts thus
may reflect not conflicting interpretations of federal
Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under
state law, a spouse retains a legal interest in property
conveyed to his or her spouse. Compare Wirtz, 607
N.W.2d at 885-886, with Pet. App. 38a-40a (concluding
that, after Ms. Barg transferred her interest in the
homestead and bank accounts, she no longer had a legal
interest that could have been conveyed to Mr. Barg upon
her death), and id. at 40a (noting that Minnesota law
"makes no reference to • • • re-defining the probate
estate to include all marital property, even property
transferred prior to death").
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Even if the decisions in Wirtz and this case do reflect
a disagreement as to proper interpretation of the Medicaid Act, this Court's review would not be warranted.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
law is correct, and to date, only the North Dakota Supreme Court has allowed Medicaid recovery following an
inter vivos transfer of Msete between spouses. Assuming arguendo that t.he North Dakota Supreme Court misunderstood federal Medicaid law, rather than simply
applied a peculiar feature of its own property law, the
North Dakota court has not had an opportunity to consider HHS's interpretation, and the conflict may work
itself out as the issue is further addressed in the lower
courts.
2. Although petitioner (Pet. 31-33) is correct that
estate-recovery efforts are important to the Medicaid
program, questions concerning the scope of the Act's
estate-recovery provisions have not arisen frequently,
and relatively few States have opted to seek estate recovery to the maximum extent permitted by federal law.
See Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy & Evaluation, HHS, Policy Br. No. (J, Medicaid Estate Recovery
Collection8 tbl. 4 (Sept. 2005) (only nine States make
maximum use of federal policy options); see also Pet. 81.
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits
estate recovery to those assets in which the Medicaid
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, the
nature and extent of such interests remain largely the
domain of state law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has
proposed redefining marital property interests to permit
recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's

Recommendation, Minnesota State Budget, 1010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Senri.ces Dep't 132 (Jan. 27,
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2009). That. proposal has not become law, nor has it been
reviewed by the Secretary of HHS. The proposal, however, suggests that Minnesota may be able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear
terms of federal Medicaid law.
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
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Attorney for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

STA TE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

Case No. CV IE 0905214

AFFIDAVIT
OF
BARBARA
K.
McCORMICK
IN
SUPPORT
OF
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE'S PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM

)
: SS.
)

BARBARA K. McCORMICK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. I am the duly appointed Personal Representative of the above entitled estate and the
daughter of decedent, George D. Perry ("George"). I make this affidavit based on my
personal knowledge.
2. On July 31, 2006, Martha Jean Perry, George's spouse (hereinafter "Martha"), and my
long-time step-mother, conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the couple's home

AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE'S
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1
File #09-039
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located at 2104 Tendoy Drive, Boise, Idaho via quit claim deed to her husband, George
Perry. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit A is a true and
correct copy of the Quitclaim Deed in which Martha quitclaimed all of her right, title and
interest in that real property to George.
3. As of October 1, 2006, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department")
approved Martha for Medicaid benefits. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Department notice of approval for
Medicaid.
4. Martha's health care needs have progressively increased over the years and she now lives
in a skilled nursing facility. From October, 2006, Martha has continued to receive
Medicaid benefits and she receives those benefits today.
5.

Over the years, George's health situation also progressively declined. He ultimately was
forced to enter into a nursing home after a long-struggle to remain home. By this time he
had exhausted his liquid resources and decided to sell his home because he would be
unable to maintain it, even if qualified for Medicaid benefits. In an effort to sell the
home, he provided the Department with written verification documenting the fair market
value of the home and the Department agreed that the proposed sale price of $150,000
was fair market value. A true and correct copy of the December 16, 2008 letter from the
Department agreeing that $150,000 was the fair market value of the property is attached
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit C.
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6. Unfortunately, delays in receiving response from the Department caused the buyer who
had wanted to purchase the property to back out of that transaction. The home remained
on the market. George Perry died in a nursing home on February 25, 2009, before he
could complete the sale of the home with a new buyer who had by that time agreed to
purchase the home.
7. The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry consummated the sale of
the home on March 26, 2008, for a total sales price of $160,000. A true and correct copy
of the settlement statement on that closing is attached hereto and incorporated herein as
Exhibit D.
8. The balance of the house sale proceeds, minus disbursements for administrative costs, is
now held in the Estate's checking account. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of the Personal Representative's
inventory of the Estate. The proceeds from the sale of George Perry's home are the only
assets that are contained in the George's Estate. The Inventory makes clear that all estate
assets were George Perry's separate property. The Department failed to make any
objection to the PR's Inventory. George's personal property was of de minimus value and
was given to charity prior to his death when he moved to the nursing home. The Estate of
George D. Perry holds no other real or personal property.
9. I handle Martha's finances for her. The only property that Martha Jean Perry currently
owns is one financial account located at Wells Fargo, checking account# ending -3540.
This account is an income-qualifying or "Miller" trust account that was necessary to
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF
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qualify Martha for Medicaid. Martha's fixed monthly income (social security and
pension) is direct deposited into this account every month. Funds are then paid out of this
account in the same month for Martha's Medicaid patient share of cost, for her health
insurance premium and for her personal needs allowance. This account holds less than
$2,000 at the end of each month after the above amounts are paid out every month.
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit F is a true and correct
copy of a letter from Paula Guenat, Premier Banker at Wells Fargo, establishing that as of
9/9/09, this account had a balance of$1,682.96. Martha owns no other real or personal
property.
10. The Personal Representative stipulates and agrees that upon Martha Jean Perry's death,
any amounts left in Wells Fargo checking account# ending -3540 are owed to and will be
paid to the Department pursuant to its right to recover for Medicaid assistance paid out
during her lifetime against assets in which Martha had an interest at her death. Aside
from the funds in this Wells Fargo checking account, Martha does not own any interest in
any other property. No other property could possibly pass from Martha to George Perry's
Estate or to any other individual upon Martha's death because she doesn't own or have
any interest in any other property.
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
DATED this 2o'day of

NdVcA-tfi-t'.1/-

, 2009.

,,1

JJJ~ I{ ~t {~>d-~
BARBARA K. McCORMIC

SUBSCRI~ED ~ND SWORN TO before me this~y of
J,./(Jlle.,u, bei/ , 2009.
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QUITCLAIM .DEED
FOR VALUE RECEIVED,

M-ft":. Tilt!:

~

fl~ .

Granter, does

hereby convey, release, remlse and forever quitclaim unto

G ~oR..a at, l>

I

~rVJ

.whose address is

a.Jo 4 - ~ E>,y PA fkr~L x:A

~a?Cth~_fullowing

described premises. to-wit:

./Cr-1 Y'

-J f

$: o ~
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.ci, L. f.,J h'(
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c.,
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___, _ _ _ _ _ _ county.
Together with the appurtenances.
This deed Is Intended to convey to the Grantee all right, title, and interest of the Granter
in and to said property, now owned or hereafter acquired.
~

Date

{--8/.... ~ k , 20_.
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Guy A Henry
823 Park Centre
Nampa Id 8365 l

DAHO

DEPARTMENT

OF

HEALTH & WEI.1FARE
We provide interpreter services at no cost. If you need help reading this letter, please call us at 1-866-262-8640. After your call is
answered, please wait on the line while you are connected with a translator.
Nosotros proveemos los servicios de un interprete, sin costo alguno. Si necesita ayuda leyendo esta carta por favor llamenos al
l-866-262-8640. Cuando contesten su Hamada, favor de esperar un momento en la linea mientras le conectan con un traductor

Martha J Perry
C/0 Sisson/Sisson
605 E Highland View
Boise ID 83702

November 24, 2006
Case Number 714828

Important Information About
Your Health Coverage
Your Health Coverage for Martha Perry is approved starting the first of
October 2006.
Home and Conwnuni ty-Based Services (HCBS) for Martha Perry are appr,oved
starting October 2006.

You may need to pay part of the cost of your care. You will get a separate
letter from our Regional Medicaid Unit with the payment information.
If you don't agree with this decision about your application or case,
please call me. We can review the facts used to make this decision
together or you may ask for a hearing. In a hearing you and I tell a
neutral person from outside Health and Welfare, called a hearing officer,
about your case. This person will decide if the Department action on your
case was correct.
You may ask for a hearing in writing or by calling me. If you make a
hearing request in writing you may make a copy for your records. You may
use a hearing request form from our office or just write on a piece of
paper why you want a hearing. Then mail, fax, or bring your request to my
office.
If you would like a hearing, you must make your request by December 24,
2006.
Guy Henry
208-465-8444 (phone) 208-442-2810 (fax)
HenryG@idhw.state.id.us

Case Manager: Guy Henry

Caseload: 55

Case: 714828
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We based your Health Coverage on the following facts.

Your family size is . . . . . . . . . .

1

Monthly Income:
Social Security, pension and money from other sources
Money from work . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total money for month . . . . . . . . .
Limit for your household size . . . . .

$1,396.77
$0.00
$1,396.77
$1,056.00

Monthly Deductions:
Money from work not counted . . . . .
Money from other sources not counted.

$0.00
$20.00

Countable Assets:
Such as cash, bank accounts, investments & vehicles
Limit for your household.
. ........ .

$0.00
$2,000.00

More Information About Your Health Coverage
The first time we approve Heal th Coverage, we send each eligible p,erson a
Idaho Health Coverage card. If you haven't already received a card, one
will arrive in about 10 days.

Keep your card in a safe place.
me for a replacement.

If your card is lost or stolen please call

Always take your card with you when you get health care services.
We do not discriminate on the basis of:
» Age
» Color
» Disability
» Religion
» Race
» National Origin

»

Gender

If you believe you have been discriminated against, you can file a
complaint at your local Health and Welfare office or at either of the
offices listed below:
»

Civil Rights Manager
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID
83720-0036

Case Manager: Guy Henry

»

Dept of Health and Human Services
Region X
Mail Stop RX-11
2201 6th Ave
Seattle, WA 98121

Caseload: 55

Case: 714828

Field Office: 3214
000102
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DEPARTMENT

OF

RECEIVED
DEC l u 2008

HEALTH & WELFARE
C.L. "BUTCH" omR. GovERNOA
RICHARD 'tj@~ffi~I.- ~.r°10()8

DIVISION OF MEDICAID
BUREAU OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036
PHONE 208-287-1150
FAX 208-334-6515

Sisson & Sisson
2402 West Jefferson St
Boise ID 83702
RE: George E. Perry MID# I 525875 and Martha J. Perry MID# 1525874
Dear Mr. Sisson,
The Department acknowledges the proposal for the property owned by Martha and
George Perry at 2104 W Tendoy Drive, Boise ID. Upon reviewing the documentation
you provided, and the current market, the Department agrees that the proposed sale price
of$ 150,000 is fair market value. Please inform me who the title company will be, as the
department will need to review the preliminary HUD 1 Settlement Statement prior to the
closing.
I will need to know what your client's intent is for the proceeds. Will they be using it to
pay privately for the skilled nursing and or nursing home fees? They may only use it for
their care and not gift any away. Your prompt response is appreciated.
We thank you for your cooperation and continued communication with the department.
If you have questions or need any assistance, please feel free to call me.

{~~

Estate Recovery Otlicer
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TITLEONE CORPORATION
1101 W. River St.
Boise, ID 83702
(208)424-8511

..._,,

STATEMENT OF SETTLEMENT FOR SELLERS
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 2104 W. Tendoy Drive, Boise, ID 83705
PURCHASER/BORROWER(S): Karyl Hayden
SELLER(S): Martha Jean Boyle and Estate of George Donald Perry
DISBURSED: March 27, 2009

SETTLEMENT DATE: March 26, 2009

PRORATION DATE:March 27, 2009

DEBIT

CRECIIT
160,000.00

Contract Sales Price
Prorata Sewer & Trash

03/01/09

thru 04/30/09

$

57.30

Wells Fargo

Payoff of first mortgage

32.88
66,574.75

Ada County Treasurer
2nd half2008 Taxes
01/01/09 to 03/27/09
County Taxes
9,600.00
Commissions - Total commissions: to 6.0000

Less Deposit Retained
4,800.00
4,800.00
Settlement or Closing Fee

861.56
251.12
9,600.00

1,000.00

Grouo One
Swope Investment Properties
TitleOne Corporation

262.50

Westcor Land Title Insurance Company

Title Insurance Premium
Recording Fees

785.00
9.00

TitleOne Corporation

Subtotals

78,343.93

Balance Due TO Seller

81,688.95

TOTALS

160,032.88

160,032.88

160,032.88

The above figures do not include sales or use taxes on personal property

APPROVED and ACCEPTED

h)e4/¼_

~~

Martb1'Jean B ~

~ /
~ kt_

ESCR?jV A ~ G
. N_

SELLER(S):

~'1a,.,6&4~7J1/~~
~oil-~...,,;,.. d'ac;[itleOne C o r ~

C,4fL/c}

/

Estate of George Donald Perry

BYJ?0--tA'k<£

,!I Y11 r ~ . ,

~_,/~.

{A0982008. PFD/A0982008/21)
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90-DAY INVENTORY OF PROPERTY OF
GEORGE D. PERRY, Deceased
Date of Death: February 25, 2009
RECAPITULATION
Community Property

Separate Property

Schedule A - Real Estate
Schedule B - Cash/Investments
Schedule C - Miscellaneous Other Property
Schedule D - Expenses/Costs paid since D.O.D.

$

$

$
$
$

$
$
$

81,788 96

TOTAL NET VALUE

$

$

77,095 92

(4,693.04)

SCHEDULE A- REAL ESTATE
Description

Community Property

Separate Property

$

Totals

$

$

SCHEDULE B - CASH
Community Property
Estate checking w/Wells Fargo

$

$

Totals

$

$

SCHEDULE C -OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY
Community Property

Totals

Separate Property
81,788.96

81,788.96

Separate Property

$

$

$

$

SCHEDULE D - EXPENSES/COSTS PAID SINCE D.O.D.
Publication fee
Attorney's fees
Filing fee

$
$
$

Amount
(100.04)
(4,500.00)
(£13.00)

Totals

$

~4,6S13.04)
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Date

09 t 09 12009

To: Barbara McCormick
FBO Martha J Perry
2525 N Joretta Dr
Boise, ID 83704

us
Regarding Customer:
Martha J Perry
2525 N Joretta Dr
Boise, ID 83704

us

To Whom It May Concern:
This letter is verification that the customer named above has an account with Wells Fargo. This account, number
2578173540, was opened 01/14/2009 and has a current balance of $1682.96.

If you need deposit information, refer to the customer named above. The account holder can provide deposit
information from their monthly statements.
Please call the Wells Fargo Customer Service location at 1-800-869-3557 (1-800-TO-WELLS) if you h;!lve any
questions. We hope that this information is useful.
Sincerely,

(/

--=Rl~DwnJ
Paula Guenat
Premier Banker

TQOM120699
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By PATRICIA A DWONCH
DEPUT"V

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
PO Box 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
)
)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.
________________

)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF
CLAIM

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
"Department") and submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of its

Petition for Allowance of Claim:

I.
ISSUES AND SUMMARY

The personal representative has filed her "Memorandum in Support of the Personal
Representative's Objection to Department of Health and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of
Claim" (hereinafter "PR Brief') which argues, in essence, that the spousal recovery provisions in
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1
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Idaho Code § 56-218(1) are invalid and pre-empted by federal law. This argument relies
primarily on the reasoning found in a Minnesota Supreme Court case, In re Estate of Barg, 752
N.W.2d 52 (2008), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota's spousal
recovery law was partially preempted by federal Medicaid law.
The personal representative's reliance on Barg, however, is misplaced. Whether a
spouse's estate is subject to recovery is a question of state marital property and probate law. The
Idaho Supreme Court has already considered this exact issue in the case ofldaho Department of
Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) (copyprovided)1, and held
that Idaho law permits spousal recovery where the property had been owned by the Medicaid
recipient or jointly owned after October I, 1993. Because each Supreme Court was interpreting
its own state's law, Barg is not necessarily inconsistent with Jackman, but if it is, Jackman
controls in Idaho, not Barg.
Jackman is dispositive in this case. Even if it were not, however, the real property in this
estate was jointly held at the time of the decedent's death because the decedent's attempted
transfer of the property to himself, using his power of attorney, was improper and invalid.
Therefore, even the Barg decision does not support the disallowance of the Department's es.tate
recovery claim.

1Copies

of relevant cases have been provided together with the exhibits as a convenience to court and counsel.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
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II.

BACKGROUND FACTS
George D. Perry ("George") was born
age of 79. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was born

, and died February 25, 2009, at the
, and at the time of this

memorandum is still living. Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no later
than September 18, 1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real
property in Ada County. Exhibit A. At some point in time later, Martha and George were
married. On November 18, 2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as
"Martha Jean Boyle" and the grantee as ''Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." Exhibit B.
At some point, with Martha's health declining, George and Martha needed assistance in paying
for Martha's care. About September 15, 2006, they applied for medical assistance, also known
as Medicaid, to help pay for Martha's care. Martha was determined to be eligible for Medicaid
beginning October 1, 2006. Since that date, the Department has provided payment for Martha's
care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least $108,364.23. 2
About July 31, 2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real property to
himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Martha as her Power of Attorney. See
Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. As stated earlier, George died February 25,
2009. On March 19, 2009, Barbara McCormick was appointed personal representative for
George's estate and on March 26, 2009, Barbara McCormick executed a Deed of Distribution
conveying the real property to one Karyl Hayden. Exhibit C. The inventory does not reflect the

2This

was the amount on April 27, 2009. Medicaid expenditures are ongoing.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 3
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real property, but shows "Cash/Investments" in the sum of $81,788.96, which are the net
proceeds of the sale of the real property. 3 On April 8, 2009, a Medicaid lien was filed with the
Secretary of State's Office securing the Department's interest in George's estate.
A Notice to Creditors was published April 8, 2009. About April 15, 2009, the
Department filed its Claim Against Estate in the sum of$106,251.08. The Department's claim
was presented as a contingent claim and stated as follows:

IMPORT ANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Department's
right to establish its claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218. As long as the
decedent's spouse survives, there is no demand for payment of this claim. This
claim is made against any property or estate which, at any time, had been the
community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been the
property of decedent's spouse. The Department will not object to distribution of
the estate to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands
that, before any other distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the
future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to Idaho Code§
15-3-81 0(b)(2). Transfers of property by either spouse (except to one another),
including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affect
the eligibility of the survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in
accordance with Idaho Code§ 56-218(2).
About June 2, 2009, the personal representative filed a Notice ofDisallowance of Claim. On
June 15, 2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim.

3The personal representative suggests that the Department has somehow agreed with her characterization of the
estate property as separate property because "the Department failed to make any objection to the PR's Inventory." PR
Brief, p. 3, 'I[ 7. While it makes no legal difference, the Department notes that there is nothing in the probate code that
requires the Department to object to errors in the inventory. Therefore, there was no "failure" on the part of the
Department and the Department has neither acquiesced or agreed to anything by not objecting to the Inventory.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 4

Y:\MRCases\Eslate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd

000114

III.
THIS IS AN ORDINARY SPOUSAL RECOVERY CASE OF
THE TYPE ANTICIPATED BY IDAHO CODE§ 56-218.

A.

Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept.
While the statutes and rules governing estate recovery can be complicated, the concept of

estate recovery is actually quite simple:
Nursing home care has become astonishingly costly. Medicaid assists elderly couples in
paying for nursing home care. Medicaid is the payer of last resort. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is
not an insurance program; there are no premiums or payroll deductions. Medicaid is a public
welfare program paid for with general fund monies from both the state and federal governments.
Normally, a person must have exhausted their own resources before becoming eligible for
Medicaid. A single person can have no more than $2,000 in available resources to qualify.
When one spouse of a couple needs assistance, the healthy spouse, who will stay at home, needs
the home, the car, and money, just to survive in the community. The Medicaid spouse is allowed
to transfer assets to the non-Medicaid spouse to provide for his needs.
When both spouses have passed away, the couple's assets are recovered to repay
Medicaid, up to the amount Medicaid has paid. Medicaid assists the needy elderly. It is not
intended to preserve an inheritance for the able-bodied heirs of Medicaid recipients.
B.

This Is an Ordinary Case Falling Squarely Within Idaho Code§ 56-218(1).
The personal representative suggests this is an "as applied" challenge to Idaho law, as if it

is not the law itself she attacks, but merely the "Department's application of' the law. 4 Make no

4PR

Brief, pp. 4, 5, 13, 19.
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mistake, however, her attack goes to the very core of spousal recovery in Idaho and would
eviscerate Idaho's estate recovery law. The system is designed to assure the couple's assets are
available for their needs and permits them to freely transfer property between themselves to
accomplish that. If recovery were not possible from assets conveyed to the spouse for his needs,
the only spousal recovery that would be made would be from people too ill-informed to hire an
elder law attorney to help them transfer their assets.
Where a single individual is on Medicaid, recovery is simple: When that person dies, the
state recovers from the assets of her estate. When the nursing home spouse dies first, she
normally has so little, her property simply passes to her surviving spouse and the state waits. for
the second death, the death of the surviving spouse, and recovers from the estate of that spouse.
When, however, the non-Medicaid spouse dies first, as in this case, there are three possibilities:
(1) If the couple's assets pass by law to the Medicaid spouse, the state merely waits for
the death of the Medicaid spouse and can recover from the resulting joint probate;
(2) If probate is opened for the non-Medicaid spouse, and the property passes to the
Medicaid spouse, the Department must file a claim, but will defer recovery and will recover from
the remaining estate of the Medicaid spouse;
(3) If probate is opened for the non-Medicaid spouse, and the couple's property is to pass
to third parties, the Department must file a claim and the estate must provide for the
Department's future recovery of Medicaid payments.
This is the process created by Idaho Code § 56-218(1 ):
( 1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law
medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 6
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was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such
assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the
spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both:
(a) There shall be no adjustment or recovery until after the death of both
the individual and the spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has
no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or
permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c.

(b) While one ( 1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be
authorized pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under
this section may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse.
(c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse must be made
within the time provided by section 15-3-801(b), Idaho Code, if the estate is
administered and actual notice is given to the director as required by subsection
(5) of this section. However, if there is no administration of the estate of the first
deceased spouse, or if no actual notice is given to the director as required by
subsection (5) of this section, no claim shall be required until the time provided
for creditor claims in the estate of the survivor.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added).
The Department's claim in cases like this falls under Idaho Code § 15-3-810 and requires
that, before assets are passed to third parties (not the spouse), arrangements are made for the
future payment of the Department's claim:

15-3-810. Claims not due and contingent or unliquidated claims.
(a) If a claim which will become due at a future time or a contingent or
unliquidated claim becomes due or certain before the distribution of the estate,
and if the claim has been allowed or established by a proceeding, it is paid in the
same manner as presently due and absolute claims of the same class.
(b) In other cases the personal representative or, on petition of the personal
representative or the claimant in a special proceeding for the purpose, the court
may provide for payment as follows:
(1) if the claimant consents, he may be paid the present or agreed value of
the claim, taking any uncertainty into account;
(2) arrangement for future payment, or possible payment, on the happening
of the contingency or on liquidation may be made by creating a trust, giving a
mortgage, obtaining a bond or security from a distributee, or otherwise.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
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Idaho Code § 15-3-810 (underline added). The contingency, of course, is the death of the
Medicaid spouse.
In this case, the entire estate is traceable to property Martha, the Medicaid spouse, owned
at the time she married George. By rule, the Department makes its recovery only from property
in which the Medicaid spouse had an interest at some point in the past. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20
provides, in part:
20. Limitations on Estate Claims.
* * * A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to
the value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1,
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate
property, and jointly owned property....
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. Therefore, if George had had separate property, that had always been
retained as his separate property, the Department would not recover from that property for
Medicaid paid for Martha.
IV.

THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY
REJECTED THE PRE-EMPTION ARGUMENT MADE
HERE.
The personal representative makes the simplistic argument that federal law only permits
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient. She argues that since Martha transferred her
property to George before George died, and George carefully disinherited Martha in his will,
Martha must now be left destitute on public assistance, and the heirs named in the will should
share the estate assets free from any claim for Medicaid reimbursement. Obviously, this is not
what the legislature intended and is contrary to the simple principle of Medicaid recovery.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 8
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Congress and the legislature intended to assist the Medicaid spouse and protect the non-Medicaid
spouse. They did not intend to spend taxpayer money paying for Martha's care so George's heirs
could have Martha's property. Were the drafters of the Medicaid recovery laws so shortsighted?
No. The Idaho Supreme Court has already considered this question and has upheld estate
recovery in cases such as this.
A.
The Federal Pre-emption Issue Was Thoroughly Presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in
the Case ofldaho De,partment of Health and Welfare v. Jackman.

In the case ofldaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970
P.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaiid
spouse. In the Jackman case the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred all her property to her
spouse, Lionel, in order to qualify for Medicaid. Hildor passed away and Lionel passed away
two weeks later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of Lionel's estate and the
Department filed an estate recovery claim. The personal representative challenged the
Department's claim on numerous grounds including federal pre-emption. Exhibit D. 5 The Idaho
Supreme Court upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of
estate permitted by federal law6 and adopted by Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b), together with the
definition of assets found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l), validated recovery of property that had, at
any time after October 1, 1993, been community property.

5So that the court can see how completely the pre-emption argument was made to the Idaho Supreme Court in
Jackman, the Department has provided copies of the briefing in the Jackman case as Exhibit D hereto. The same
argument the personal representative makes here was made by Jackman. See Respondent's Brief (Oct. 8, 1997), St:ction
IV, p. 16.
642

u.s.c. § 1396p(b){4)(B).
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The Jackman decision must be read carefully because of the way it was decided. Th,~
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the
Department. Exhibit E. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modified its decision
because the effective date of the federal law on which they had relied in their original opinion
was after the date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that
recovery would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date
of the federal law, "OBRA 93." 7 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery against the
federal pre-emption argument, but in the Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided
by a marriage settlement agreement in April, 1993, prior to the effective date of the law.
The published summary of the case correctly captures this two part holding:
... The Supreme Court, Johnson, J., held that: (I) if the estate of the individual
who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of the
assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from the estate of the
surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when recipient and her husband
entered into marital settlement agreement transmuting most ofrecipient's and
husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited the
Department to recovering any community property recipient and husband may
have accumulated after the agreement.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 213, 970 P.2d at 6 (underline added). Justice Johnson's introduction also
explains the court's holding:
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that section 56-218(1) of
the Idaho Code (LC.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, authorized the

7This

limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 cited above, limiting spousal recovery to property that
had been community property at any time after October 1, 1993.
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Idaho Department of Health and Welfare {the Department) to recover from the
available estate of a surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments received
by an individual who was fifty-five years old or older when receiving the
payments if the individual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount. We
conclude, however, that federal law applicable to this case prohibited this
recovery, except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated
after a marriage settlement agreement transmuting their community property into
separate property of each.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 214, 970 P.2d at 7 (underline added). Justice Johnson explained that the
Department was limited in the Jackman case only because the marriage settlement agreement
was executed before the effective date of the federal law expanding the definition of estate for
Medicaid recovery purposes:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8.
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10. 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{e){l). "other assets" are
only those included within Hildor's estate. as defined by LC. § 15-1-201{15).
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7, 970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added).
To understand the breadth of the Jackman decision and why it necessarily applies in this
case, it is valuable to understand that the Supreme Court's reasoning is based on the interaction
between Idaho marital law and federal Medicaid law. As discussed more fully in section V,
below, what property is available for estate recovery is a question of state law, not federal law.
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Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) provided the expanded definition of
estate. Then, importantly, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1) 8 provided as follows:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any
income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to
but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) (underline added). Therefore, where a spouse divests herself of assets,
even where permitted by Medicaid law, those assets are estate assets for purposes of Medicaid
recovery.
As noted, above, in Jackman, the court altered its decision because it determined the
transfer of assets from Hildor to Lionel occurred prior to the enactment of the OBRA '93 which
included both 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l).9 The court remanded
the matter for a determination of what community property the parties had acquired since their
marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the Department was not permitted to recover the
property transferred through the marriage settlement agreement was because of the timing: the
marriage settlement agreement divided the property before the effective date of OBRA '93.

8Now 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) (the numbering was changed after DRA 2005).
9See

Exhibit D Jackman Respondent's Rehearing Brief, p. 28.
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..__,,
Therefore, the Jackman case conclusively holds that in Idaho, the Department may
recover from the estate of the spouse as long as the property had been community property,
jointly owned property, or the property of the Medicaid spouse, at any time after October 1, 1993.
V.

THE DECISION IN BARG DOES NOT CHANGE
JACKMAN.
The personal representative bases her claim of preemption on a Minnesota case, In r,~
Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In Barg the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially preempted by federal law. As discussed
above, the Jackman case relied on the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore,
the Barg holding and the Jackman holding, in which each state's highest court was interpreting
its own law, is not necessarily inconsistent.
A.

The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in Jackman.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l) 10 significant in

their analysis. The original decision stated the following:
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as
well as from the estate of the surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "all real and
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ... " and
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had
any legal title or interest at the time of death ..... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); LC.§
56-218(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not
affect the status of the assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because

°Now 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l).

1
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of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B). Jackman's
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor and
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Department from recovering the balance
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate.
Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit E) (underline added). On rehearing, the Supreme Court
did not retreat from their original holding except to recognize the marriage settlement agreement
was executed before the "assets" definition of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B) came into effect:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8.
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10. 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October I, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
defmition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15).
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the
agreement, is not part ofHildor's estate.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7, 970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court didn't
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.C. § l 396p(e)(l ). In fact, by necessary implication, it
stated that with the definition of assets contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l) the transferred
assets would have been part of Hildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg. did not even consider the effect of this important
definition of "assets." Therefore, the Barg court didn't even consider or discuss the section of
federal law the Idaho Supreme Court found dispositive in Jackman.
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B.

The State of Minnesota Has Already Amended its Law to Overcome the Barg Holding.
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to

other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882
(N.D. 2000) (copy provided). It is understandable, then, that Minnesota has already amended its
state law to overcome the holding of its supreme court in Barg. Exhibit F is a copy of changes
made to Minnesota law in 2009 for the express purpose of fixing the Barg decision. This
legislation makes it clear that a Medicaid recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets
jointly owned at any time during marriage, even when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the
non-Medicaid spouse. See Exhibit F, Subd. 2b. This is exactly the effect of the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Jackman.
Obviously, if Minnesota can correct Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not
federal law,per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision.
The personal representative here cites, with approval, the Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari. 11 In that brief, the Solicitor General
argues that Supreme Court review is unnecessary because Minnesota is in the process of fix:tng
the Barg decision through new legislation. In doing so, the Solicitor General recognizes that
what property is available for estate recovery is a question of state, not federal, law:
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits estate recovery to
those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her
11 The

personal representative claims, without any authority whatsoever, that "Idaho is legally obligated to abide
by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law." PR Brief, pp. 18-19. She goes on to suggest that Idaho must
follow the legal arguments of the Solicitor General in its Amicus brief in Barg. Id. This is not true. Idaho is bound by
federal law and appropriately promulgated rules, not by legal arguments by federal government attorneys.
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death, the nature and extent of such interests remain largely the domain of state
law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has proposed redefining marital property
interests to permit recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's Recommendation,
Minnesota State Budget, 2010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Services Dep 't 132
(Jan. 27, 2009). That proposal has not become law, nor has it been reviewed by
the Secretary of HHS. The proposal. however. suggests that Minnesota may be
able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear terms of
federal Medicaid law.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-16
(underline added) (Appendix 2 to PR Brief). Therefore, the Solicitor General clearly recognized
that state law, not federal Medicaid law, determines what property is available for Medicaid
recovery.
The Solicitor General, in its Amicus brief also discussed the North Dakota Wirtz case,
and noted that the contrary holding in Wirtz could simply be a difference in state law, and not
necessarily a conflict with Barg:
Although its reasoning is not entirely clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to
conclude that the recipient in that case, despite formal conveyance of certain
assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death,
when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangement." 607
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The court did not elaborate on
the nature of that interest, although it referred to the State's argument that the
recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of
his death, id. at 883, and noted that other courts had interpreted Section
1396p(b)(4)(8) to reach state-law community-property and homestead interests,
id. at 885.
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the
court below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of
federal Medicaid law. but only different views of when. under state law. a spouse
retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14
(underline added) (Appendix 2 to PR Brief).
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Like the North Dakota Supreme Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held
that Idaho's law permits recovery under the circumstances of this case. These holdings are not
necessarily inconsistent with Barg. The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and
has already been corrected by a change in Minnesota law.
VI.
GEORGE'S GIFT OF MARTHA'S PROPERTY TO
HIMSELF WAS INEFFECTIVE TO ELIMINATE
MARTHA'S COMMUNITY INTEREST.
In this case, Martha brought the real property of this estate into the marriage as her sole
and separate property. See Exhibit A. She later transferred the property to herself and to George,
granting George an interest in the property. Exhibit B. George later transferred Martha's interest
to himself. Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. However, the transfer of
Martha's interest to George, was not performed by Martha, but by George using his power of
attorney for Martha. See id. The power of attorney, however, contains no provision permitting
gifting, much less, self-gifting. Exhibit G. Indeed, the power of attorney includes some language
clearly prohibiting self dealing. See Exhibit G,

11 G and H.

George's gift to himself was,

therefore, invalid, and failed to eliminate Martha's interest in the real property. While this failure
is irrelevant under Jackman, even if the court were to follow Barg. this estate is still subject to
recovery.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWAN CE OF CLAIM - 17
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd

000127

A.
A Power of Attorney Does Not Support Making Gifts Unless it Contains an Expres~?
Authorization.

It is black-letter law that a power of attorney does not grant authority to make gifts absent
an express provision in the power of attorney granting that power. As stated in 3 Am. Jur. 2d
Agency § 87, "The authority of an agent to make a gift on behalf of the principal must be
express." Courts have uniformly supported this view. In Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65, 924
P.2d 559,565 (Haw.Ct.App.1996) (copy provided), the court explained:
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent
principal's checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the
power of attorney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re Estate of
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself of principal's property;
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing of principal's
intent to make the gift), affd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975).
Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71,924 P.2d at 565; see also Matter of Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d
168 (Iowa, 1996) (absent express grant in power of attorney, of power to make gift,
attorney-in-fact did not have that power) (copy provided); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166
(Alaska 1984) (in the absence of express authority to make a gift, none maybe made) (copy
provided); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an
attorney in fact to himself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the
instrument itself) (copy provided).
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Idaho law is consistent with these pronouncements. In Idaho, powers of attorney are
strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified. Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47
Idaho 306,274 P. 800 (1929) (copy provided); accord Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12
P.2d 259 (1932). In the case of Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,210 P.
1003 (1922), the Idaho Supreme Court said:
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course of his agency because of his failure
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such
transaction, as a matter of law, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal.
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is,
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to the
interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal,
either for himself or for others.
Jensen, 36 Idaho at

, 210 P. at 1005 (underline added).

Likewise, Idaho Code § 32-912 requires an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to
convey or encumber community property:
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and
either may bind the community property by contract, exc~t that neither the
husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless
the other joins in executing the sale agreement. deed or other instrument of
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the
spouse who did not so consent provided. however. that the husband or wife may
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell,
convey or encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds,
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity
herewith are hereby validated.
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....,,t
Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added). 12 The title company may have recognized this defi::ct
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal
representative sold the real property. 13 See Exhibit "D" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick.
Therefore, even if the court were to find that Barg were controlling law in Idaho, tht::
estate is still subject to the Department's claim: The deed George executed conveying Martha's
interest in the property to himself, using his power of attorney for Martha, is ineffective to
extinguish Martha's interest in the real property.
VII.
CONCLUSION

The question presented by the personal representative has already been conclusively
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v.
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in _earg
has no application to Idaho marital property law. Even if Barg were applicable in Idaho, this
estate is still subject to recovery because George's attempted gift of Martha's interest to himself
is invalid. The Department's claim should be allowed in full.
DA TED this 29th day of January, 2010,

Deputy Attorney General

12The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the transfer of Martha's

interest to George, but it also includes the requirement for an express grant of authority to make a gift of the principle's
property. Idaho Code§ 15-12-201(1)(b), (c).
13Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in
fact for Martha.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 20
Y:\MRCases\Estate\perryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd

000130

}v . eJ'Wtl

Jt~)~V

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was ~ '
postage pre-paid, to the following:
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702

DATED this~ day of January, 2010.

'2DtJ,i.& AiLt.

@./l..l.

lY),£)

MarchehePremo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services
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STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Ada

)

339-/016

} ss.

Blaine F. Evans, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and. c:ays:

That he wav the attorney for Martha Jean Boyle at all

time& mentioned herein.

In that certain agreement by and

between Martha Jean Boy~e and Henry F~ancie Boyle dQted
Aprill, l96~Henry Francia Boyle agreed co furnish ~tba

Jean Boyle with a residence of her choice to be located'in
Ada county, taaho,
~hat thereafter in an agreemen~ datec! the 13th day of

Ja.nua~y, lj64, by and between Hen;cy- r~ancis ~oyle ana Martha

.:,~,~~,~~-~ . ~J'"~
.. ,;;.·.j.'. , .

·•

Boyle, ~enry francis Boyle agreed .tha~ · the house selecte~ .... .,

in Boiae, Idaho was the aeparate property of his wife which
said agreement was approved by the second 3udicial Ois~rict
Court of the S~ate of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe

on ths 26th day of Maren, 1964,

Thae the house aalected by

l'Urtha Jean Boyle and referred to in said agreements and in
the court decra• was and is described aa follows:
Lo: 115 of Columbus Park Subdivision No. 2,
according to the piat ~~ereof filed in the

.,. ..... ..

records of Ada County, Idaho,

:• ."••

DATED This ~ d a y of September, 1977.

,~SUBSCRIBED ~ND 5WOM ~o before me this

L8~day

of

Notary Publl.e for xaiio,;'.)
Re$~din9 at Boi~e. ,Idaho

•).

~-

.
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ADA COUNTY RECORDER J. DAVID NAVARRO
BOISE IDAHO 11/18/02 03:52 PM
DEPUTY Joanne Hooper
RECOftDED-REQUEST OF
AMOUNT
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6.00

~·~&;r
LF298-04
R298-04

QUITCLAIM DEED

TIDS QUITCLAIM DEED, executed this
by first party, Grantor,

/11~ {J ~ M(..,

whose post office address is
to second party, Grantee,

"i I

day of

Te~y

I

;\/4,ue;flbe~
O'

k-

,/J

•

,;//tJ"f

O -

/:.J ~

JJ1-vt;t)~ ~ a.,.c.,, T

whose post office address is

ulh

~1 f

t:Jp;',se

J

/_ .

,

, 20 ),

~ f)

~ ;~{.

~e-

Td'C,

~

(/

1

?3 J& .>

WITNESSETH, lbat the said first party, for good consideration and for the sum of
)
Dollars($ 0
paid by the said second party. the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby remise, relf:ase
and quitclaim unto the said second party forever, aJI the right, title, interest and claim which the said first
party has in and to the following described parcel of land, and improvements and appurtenances thereto in
State of Z::a/a /tP
to wit:
the County of ,/J

c./a
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B

•

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said fi.rst party has signed and sealed these presents the day and year
first abov written. Signed, sealed d delivered in presence of:

71f«<tzi.v:..., (lU£.c_
Signature of First Py

Jea n

;v/

tJ I' fit a
Print name of First Party

Signature of Witness

Signature of First Party

Print name of Witness

Print name of First Party

State of rota.ho
County of /'.=kt C\
.
On l 1 / t&{ o 2
before me, Lo..1.A.r 1e ~ .tra..c.....+~
,
appeared Geor",_Q.. ~ ~e.12..ll'{ • rrtG..Y-t~ ---:Je.cr.V\.. Pt..et.j
personally known rd me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) whose
name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the
same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the
person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.
W
ESS my hand and official seal.

.JA
Affiant _ _Known
Type of ID ------"'b,,,_L
__

'/ Produced ID

--r,______

(Seal)
State of
County of
On
appeared
personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) wh,:>se
name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the
same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the
person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

Signature of Notary
Affiant
Known_ _ Produced ID
Type of ID _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(Seal)

Signature of Preparer
Print Name of Preparer
Address of Preparer
Page2
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AMOUNT 6.08
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DEED OF DISTRIBUTION
/trfl~Zrxk /J&Jtso BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
THIS DEED, made by BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, as Personal Representative of 1the
Estate of George D. Peny, deceased, Grantor, to KARYL HAYDEN, an unmarried person,
Grantee, whose current address is 2295 Sunset Peak Road, Boise, Idaho, 83702;
WHEREAS, Grantor is the qualified Personal Representative of said estate, filed as Case
No. CV IE 0905214, in Ada County, Idaho;
WHEREAS, Grantee is entitled to distribution of the hereinafter described real property
THEREFORE, Grantor quitclaims, transfers, and conveys to Grantee the following
described real property in Ada County, Idaho:

See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
with all appurtenances.
EXECUTED this/G.

~~

day of

,20~.

t~eu-.,K.'rvt~
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK,
Personal Representative of the Estate
of George D. Peny

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: ss

(l_~---------- )

Cowity of _ _

d

,

On this _2'._ day of
l'?'k,
2~, before me, the undersigned, a notary
public ·in and for said state, personally appeared, BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, known ,or
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Peny, deceased, and acknowledged to me that she
executed the same as such Personal Representative.
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EXHIBIT "A"

lot 115 of Columbus Park No. 2, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 16 of Plats at Page(s) 1065
and 1066, official records of Ada County, Idaho.

Exhibit"A"
Legal Description
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
In the Matter of the Estate of

~---~---./

)
)

LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,

Supreme Court No. 23928

)
)

Deceased.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,
Petitioner/Appellant,
~-

BARBARA JACK.1v1AN, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE for the Estate of
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,

________________
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Latah.
Honorable JOHN R. STEGNER, District Judge, Presiding.
\V. Corey Cartwright

Deputy Attorney General
Division ofHwnan Services
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720·0036
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Wi11iam C. Kirsch
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9384
Moscow, ID 83843-9384

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO

In the Matter of the Estate of

)
)
)
)
)

LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,
Deceased.

Supreme Court No. 23928

)
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,
Petitioner/Appellant,

)
)
)

TI.

)

BARBARA JACKMAN, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE for the Estate of
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,
.__.

)
)

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Latah.
Honorable JOHN R. STEGNER, District Judge, Presiding.

W. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036

William C. Kirsch
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9384
Moscow, ID 83843-9384

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
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STATE:MENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature Of The Case.
This is a Medicaid "estate recovery" case. The petitioner/appellant is the Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department"). The respondent is the
appointed personal representative of the estate of Lionel Knudson, Barbara Jackman
(hereinafter "Jackman" or "personal representative"). Jackman is the adult daughter of
Lionel and Hildor Knudson, both deceased.
Medicaid, referred to as "medical assistance" in Idaho statutes, is a joint Statefederal program that provides medical care to the poor. 1 Eligibility is based on limited
income and resources of the Medicaid recipient and the recipient's spouse. Certain
resources (in this case the decedents' home) are excluded in determining eligibility.
Where Medicaid pays for nursing care or certain home-based care for persons over 55
years of age, Idaho Code § 56-218 (Appendix A) permits the State to recover its
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient or the recipient's spouse, after both
have passed away. This case involves the State's attempted recovery from the estates
of a deceased Medicaid recipient and her deceased spouse.

1 Unli.ke

Social Security or Medicare, Medicaid is not an insurance program. No premiwns are paid
for entitlement to benefits. There is no pool which assumes the risk of loss as an insurer does. Rather,
Medicaid is a fonn of welfare funded directly by taxpayers.
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B.

Course Of Proceedings.
This matter arose as a claim by the Department against the estate of Lionel

Knudson for recovery of Medicaid payments made on behalf of Lionel Knudson's
spouse Hildor Knudson. The personal representative failed to pay the Department's
claim and the Department brought a Petition for Allowance of Claim, to which the
personal representative objected. Hearing was held on May 6, 1996, and the court,
William C. Hamlett, Magistrate, presiding, entered a Memorandum Decision
(Appendix B) on January I 7, I 997, holding the Department was not entitled to recover
from Lionel Knudson's estate. The Department appealed to the District Court which
reviewed the briefs filed before the magistrate and accepted supplemental briefs. The
District Court, heard oral argument on May 28, 1997, and affirmed the magistrate's
decision by order entered June 4, 1997. This appeal followed.

c.

Statement Of The Facts.
Hildor L. Knudson, the spouse of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, was a recipient of

Medicaid. R. p. 25. From about January, 1993, until her death on October 27, 1994,
Medicaid paid for most of Hild or's nursing home care. In all, the public paid
$4 I ,600.55 on her behalf. R. pp. 25-40.
Hildor was eligible for Medicaid because, through a Marriage Settlement
Agreement (Appendix

q, she had conveyed the bulk of her interest in community

property to her spouse. R. pp. 63-66. Such inter-spousal transfers are permitted by
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 2
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both State and federal law. 2 Indeed, the very purpose of the Marriage Settlement
Agreement was to impoverish Hildor so she would be eligible to receive Medicaid.
Lionel Knudson, as the community spouse, received all of the couple's property except
for an irrevocable burial trust and $1,90()3 in the parties' accounts. R. pp. 63-66. The
agreement was signed, on behalf of both parties, by Barbara Jackman, who, according
to the agreement was Hildor Knudson's guardian and the holder of a durable power of
attorney for Lionel Knudson. R. p. 65.
Hildor died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died just two weeks later on
November 11, 1994. R. p. 10.
On November 28, 1994, probate proceedings were initiated for Lionel's estate
by the appointment of Barbara Jackman as personal representative. R. pp. 10-18.
Hildor's estate was not probated. On January 9, 1995, the Department filed a claim
against Lionel's estate. R. pp. 19-20.
At the time of her death, Hildor was in possession of a bank account in the
amount of $1,861.30 and her burial trust. R. pp. 58-61. As stated, above, no probate
proceeding was initiated. Rather, Jackman obtained the money from the bank account

2See

42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2); IDAPA 16.03.05.693.01.

3 For

eligibility pWJ)oses, Hildor Knudson's resources had to be reduced below $2,000. See 42
U.S.C. § 1382(a)(l)(B). Medicaid eligibility for persons such as Hildor Knudson is based upon eligibility for
SSI or AABD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(I0)(A)(l)(l).
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about August 1, 1995, by affidavit. 4 R. pp. 67-69. About August 22, 1995, Jackman's
attorney paid $1,638.03 to the Department. R. pp. 70-71. The Department had
previously notified Jackman's attorney that it would accept the payment only as a
partial payment, not sufficient to satisfy the Department's estate recovery claim. R.
pp. 143-147 (Appendix D).
On December 26, 1995, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim.
R. pp. 21-22. The personal representative of Lionel Knudson has valued the estate at
$40,798.35 .

....,

4 Pennitted

in small estates by Idaho Code§ 15-3-1201.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

l.

Whether Idaho Code§ 56-218 permits Medicaid payments to be

recovered from the estate of the recipient's after-deceased spouse.
2.

Whether the court should have granted the Department's Petition for

Allowance of Claim.
3.

Whether attorney fees and costs should be assessed against Jackman.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5
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ARGUMENT
Estate recovery has a long history in Idaho, beginning no later than 1943. The
purpose has always been to permit elderly recipients of public aid to keep their homes (and in some cases other limited assets), but to obtain repayment from those assets after
the need for them has ended. In this case the personal representative, Jackman,
intentionally manipulated the estates of her parents to impose the costs of her mother's
care on the public, while obtaining a windfall for herself. Idaho Code § 56-218 was
not intended to permit this injustice.

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a case is appealed from a district court's appellate review of a magistrate's
decision, the Court makes an independent appellate review of the magistrate's decision,
after giving due regard to the district court's ruling. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839,
840, 864 P.2d 1126, 1127 (1993); In re Estate of Reinwald, 122 Idaho 401, 402, 834
P.2d 1317, 1318 (1992); Swope v. Swope, 122 ldaho 296,298, 834 P.2d 298, 300
(1992); McNelis v. McNelis, 119 Idaho 349, 351, 806 P.2d 442, 444 (1991); State Y,
Woolf, 120 Idaho 21, 22, 813 P.2d 360, 361 (1991) rev. den. (1991); State v, Allison,
112 Idaho 572, 733 P.2d 793 (App. 1987). An appellate court will freely review
questions of law. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 840, 864 P.2d 1126, 1127 (1993);

Clements Farms. Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 188, 814 P.2d 917, 920
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6
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(1991); In re Goerig, 121 Idaho 26, 28, 822 P.2d 545, 547 (App. 1991) rev. denied
(1992).
In this case, there are no material issues of fact and the matter presents only
issues of law. 5 Therefore the standard is free review of the magistrate's decision after
giving due regard to the ruling of the District court.
II.

IDAHO CODE SECTION 56-218 PERMITS SPOUSAL
ESTATE RECOVERY IN TIDS CASE.

A

Estate Recovery History and Purpose in Idaho.
In the case of State

ex re!. Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009

(1948) (Appendix E), the executor of an estate denied the claim of the State for
recovery of old-age assistance payments made to the decedent. The State brought an
action against the executor to which the executor demurred. The trial court sustained
the demurrer and dismissed the claim, believing the estate recovery statute in question
to be violative of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the

law, pointing to the valid public purpose behind the estate recovery law:
Provision ... for recovery against the estates of recipients has been
part of the law of this State continuously since March 2, 1943, when
Chapter 119 of the Laws of 1943 became effective. Section 2 of such Act
added Section 24-a to the Public Assistance Law of the State and read as

'Before the magisll'ate, Jackman argued spousal estate recovery is preempted by federal law. The
magistrate ruled against Jackman on that issue, nnd Jackman has not cross-appealed. The sole issue,
therefore, involves the interpretation ofldaho law. See R pp. 148-154.
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follows:
Section 24-a. Recovery from recipients6. On the death of any
recipient, the total amount of assistance paid or relief granted under
this Act shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the estate of
such person and shall be subject only to the expense of the last
illness, funeral expenses not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of
administration of said estate. No claim shall be enforced against
any real estate or personal property of a recipient while such real
estate is occupied by the recipient, a surviving spouse, or a
dependent ....
Chapter 119, 1943 S.L. [Appendix F]

Nielson, 68 Idaho at 229, 191 P.2d at 1010.
In examining the above provision, the court reviewed 1939 changes to the Social
Security Act which permitted the State to retain all sums obtained through estate
recovery. 7 In doing so, the court noted the logic of recovering such sums after the
death of both husband and wife:
A most generous thing for the Congress to do in this: It gives a state, for
instance Idaho, a much larger amount of money to use in avoiding placing
the aged and needy in poor-houses, by granting assistance to those owning
the homes in which they live and enabling them to continue to live in such
homes until both husband and wife have passed on, after which, of
course, they no longer require the use of a home. The generosity of the

Congress does not end there. It also provides more money to meet the
requirements of the needy and destitute who are not the owners of homes.
At first blush, one may wonder why "spouse" is not mentioned in this statute. The difference
between the original old age assistance and Medicaid, however, is that old age assistance was paid to enable
people to remain in their homes instead of a "poor-house." The practice of impoverishing a spouse to pennit
Medicaid to pay for nursing home care did not arise until the 1980s. See infra.
6

7The 1935 Social Security Act required States to pay 1/:t of amounts recovered through estate
recovery (the same proportion as the federal share) to the federal government. Social Security Act of 1935, §
2(a)(7) (full text available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/35actinx.html). Today, the State is required to pay a
proportionate share (approximately 70 percent) of amounts recovered through estate recovery to the federal
government.
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Nielson, 68 Idaho at 231, 191 P.2d at 1011. Later, the court further expounded on the
public policy behind estate recovery:
The statute, in line with modern ideas, makes it possible in many
cases to avoid placing the needy aged in institutions and contemplates the
granting of assistance to those who may own the home in which they live
or other property as well as to those absolutely destitute, if their income
and sources of subsistence are not sufficient to meet the statutory
standards. Under these provisions the recipient of public assistance is not
required to liquidate all of his property. Ofttimes the recipient continues
to live in his own home, which he is able to preserve for use during his
lifetime and for the use of his widow during her lifetime after his decease.
The method of caring for the needy aged has proven far superior in many
cases to placing the needy aged in institutions. It has not only proven to
be more efficient and economical from the State's standpoint, but more
humanitarian, providing the recipient with a more normal existence,
freeing him of much of the stigma and many of the hardships and
disagreeable features of life in an institution.

Nielson, 68 Idaho at 232-3, 191 P.2d at 1012.
Several years later, the court upheld successor provisions which permitted a lien
to be imposed on the property of old-age assistance recipients:
The old-age assistance law is to be distinguished from so-called

'poor laws' or 'indigent statutes' in that the old-age assistance act does not
require that the recipient be a pauper or absolutely destitute to entitle him
to payments thereunder.

***

The conditions imposed by the statute are not so onerous as those
ordinarily imposed in private lending transactions. On the contrary, the

law provides a fair and humane plan by which needy aged, who own a
home, may secure old-age assistance while continuing to occupy and
enjoy their home, rather than being required to mortgage or sell it, and
consume the proceeds in living expenses before receiving aid. At the
same time it preserves the property as a means of reimbursing the welfare
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9
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fund, thus giving the recipients the satisfaction of paying their own way as
far as they are able, and with the least hardship. It also reduces the
amount which must be continuously provided by the taxpayers of the state
and nation, who, through their legislative representatives, have voluntarily
assumed the moral obligation to provide such aid. It is a matter of
common knowledge that some states have so burdened themselves with
various forms of public assistance and old-age pensions that the threat of
insolvency has forced a modification of their plans. In all states the
burden of such assistance has become a major problem. Various methods
of recovery have been devised, and perhaps none has been entirely
satisfactory. Among such plans some states have provided for
reimbursement by relatives, legally responsible for the care of their needy
elders. This, however, has been found difficult of application and, in
some circumstances, unjust. Instead of requiring the relatives to provide

the support, or to reimburse the state. our Jaw limits recovery to the
esta~. or the real property, of the recipient. The relatives are asked only
to forego. to the extent of such payments, what they otherwise might
inherit.
Newland v, Child, 73 Idaho 530, 537-9, 254 P.2d 1066, 1069-71 (1953) (citati_ons
omitted, underline added) (Appendix G).
Clearly, Idaho estate recovery provisions have always had the purpose of
permitting the elderly to obtain assistance while preserving their homes and other assets
to reimburse the public after their deaths.

B.
Idaho Code § 56-218 Was Passed Specifically to Recover Inter-spousal
Transfers.
Idaho's current estate recovery law was passed in 1988. S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § 1,
p. 73 {Appendix H). 1988 was a significant year with regard to the application of
public assistance laws to married couples. Healthy elderly persons were under pressure:
to divorce their ill spouses so Medicaid could pay for the ill spouse's nursing care
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without depleting assets needed for the care of the healthy spouse. In response,
Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, P.L. 100-360, §
303, amended by the Family Support Act of 1988, P.L. 100-485. Among other things.,
these acts amended sections of the Social Security Act replacing asset transfer
restrictions in the Supplemental Security Income law with transfer penalties under the
Medicaid law, and permitting interspousal transfers of assets. See 42 U .S.C. §§
1396a(a)(18) and 1396p (Appendix n and notes thereto referencing the 1988
amendments. These federal changes became effective July 1, 1988. Id. Sometimes
called federal spousal impoverishment, or FSI, the effect of these changes was to
permit spouses to transfer assets from one to the other to "impoverish" the ill spouse so
he or she could qualify for Medicaid nursing payments.
The same issues had apparently been on the mind of the Idaho Legislature, since
the legislature beat Congress "to the punch" with the addition of section 209e of title 56,
Idaho Code. S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § I, p. 74 (Appendix H). This new section was
enacted
to reduce the number of situations in which medicaid regulations as they
apply to long term care costs, cause either the destitution of the entire
family, or a dissolution of marriage carried out to prevent destitution.
Idaho Code§ 56-209e(l). Section 209e provided for the use of community property
principles in determining the Medicaid eligibility of a married person. The section had
to be amended the following year to conform to the federal changes. See S.L. 1989,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11
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ch. 67, § 1, p. 107 (Appendix J); Opinion of the Attorney General 89-3. Both section
209e and the new estate recovery law were passed on the same day. See Appendix H.
It makes sense that the estate recovery law, passed at the same time as provisions
permitting spousal impoverishment would be drafted to permit recovery of those
transferred assets. Logically, the new estate recovery law permitted spousal estate
recovery:
56-218. RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE. (1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on
behalf of an individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the estate,
or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be
charged for such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim
for such medical assistance correctly paid to the indivi~ual may be
established against the estate, but their shall be no adjustment or recovery
thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any ....
S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § I, p. 73 (Appendix H). 8

C.
The Langua.~e of the Estate Recovery Law. While Archaic, Clearly Anticipates
Recovery from a Surviving Spouse's Estate.
Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) now reads as follows:

56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance. - (1) Except
where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who
was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such
assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the

estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to
either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical assistance
correctly paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but

8This

...,

.

language may have been drawn from Oregon Jaw. See O.R.S. § 413.200.
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there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of
the surviving spouse, if any ....
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added) (Appendix A). Reading this section as a
whole, its meaning is clear: if the Medicaid recipient has an estate from which recovery
can be made, then recovery is made from that estate, but only after the death of the
surviving spouse; if recovery cannot be made from the estate of the recipient, then
recovery is made from the estate of the surviving spouse.
Jackman contends that the "if there be no estate" language should be interpreted
as a qualifier, i.e., recovery can not be made from the spouse's estate if the recipient
dies possessed of any property whatsoever. Since it is inconceivable that any person
could die without any possessions at all,9 Jackman's interpretation conveniently nullifies
the spousal recovery provisions of the statute.
Idaho Code§ 56-218, however, is not part of the probate code. The "if there be
no estate" does not specify whether a recovery can be made, but rather, directs an order
for making the recovery.
While the quoted language is archaic, it is not uncommon in statutory language.
New York statutes contain several similar references describing to whom certain
moneys are paid:
all elderly nursing home patients have some income from Social Security or another pension.
While most of this is used for the recipient's care, a small portion is kept in an account for the patient's
personal needs. Even if that were not true, even the meager possessions of a destitute nursing patient, such as
a photograph or a toothbrush, constitute an estate under the probate code. See Idaho Code § 15-1-201 ( 15),
(37) (Appendix K).
9Almost
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If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or children of the
deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to such dependent or
dependents as defined in section seven of this article, as directed by the
workers' compensation board; and if there shall be no such dependents,
then to the estate of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable
funeral expenses as provided in subdivision one of section seven of this
article, or, if there be no estate, to the person or persons paying the
funeral expenses of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable
funeral expenses as provided in such subdivision one.
NY Vol. Amb. Ben. § 10 (underline added); see also NY Work. Comp. § 15 and NY
Vol. Fire Ben. § 10 (containing nearly identical language);

United States Steel Corp. v,

Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 536 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1988) (citing Pennsylvania
law with very similar language). The "if there be no estate" language is used in a
context very similar to that here in the case of Penny

v, Pritchard & McCall, 255 Aia.

13, 49 So.2d 782 (1951):
Under the Codes of 1852, 1876, 1886 and 1896, the fees of jurors
and witnesses in such cases were made payable out of the estate of the

person of unsound mind or, if there be no estate, out of the county
treasury. Section 2763, Code of 1852; 5054, Code of 1876; section
3695, Code of 1886; section 1385, Code of 1896. Under the Code of
1907, section 1385, and that of 1923, section 7293, the pay of jurors is
made out of the county treasury as under the Code of 1940. The pay of
witnesses is required by the Code of 1907, section 3681, and by the Code
of 1923, section 7241, to be paid as jurors are out of the county treasury,
the same as under the Code of 1940.

Penny, 255 Aia. at 17, 49 So.2d at 784 (underline added).
In each of the above instances, the language in question was not a qualifier, but
rather a designation of the order of priority. In each instance, the 11 estate" in question
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was either a source or a receptacle of funds. The same is true here. The language in
Idaho Code§ 56-218 is not a qua]ifier. It simply means that if recovery can be made
from the estate of the recipient, then that estate is looked to for recovery. If full
recovery cannot be made from the estate of the recipient, then recovery can be made
from the estate of the spouse.
A person whose nursing care is paid for by Medicaid can have no more than
$2,000 in liquid assets. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(l)(B). 10 Therefore, a person who is
eligible because all his or her property has been transferred to the spouse will never
have more than $2,000. The legislature was certainly aware that such small amounts
would pass automatica1ly to the surviving spouse through the probate homestead
allowance and exempt property allowance. See Idaho Code §§ 15-2-401 and 15-2-402.
Moreover, since Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) specifically forbids recovery while the spouse
survives, there is never a recipient's 11 estate" to serve as a source for estate recovery
when a spouse survives. To the contrary, recovery can only be made from a recipient's
estate if (1) the recipient is pre-deceased by the spouse, or (2) the recipient later
becomes ineligible for Medicaid due to a monetary windfall such as an inheritance.
In the ordinary course of things, then, recovery is made from the

estate of the

recipient when the recipient's spouse has pre-deceased (in which case the recipient

10 Medicaid

is a "categorical" eligibility program. Elderly nursing patients qualify based on eligibility
for SSI or AABD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(I0)(A)(l)(I).
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already owns the spouse's share of the property), and (more commonly, since the
recipient is typically the less healthy spouse) recovery is made from the

estate of the

recipient's spouse when the recipient passes away first. This is what the legislature
intended.

m.
THE INTERPRETATION PROPOSED BY JACKMAN
IS UNFAIR TO THE NEEDY AND LEADS TO
ABSURD RESULTS.

A.

Jackman Intentionally Manipulated Her Parents' Estates.
As noted, above, Hildor died in possession of $1,861.30 and pre-deceased her

husband. Lionel, as surviving spouse, was entitled to at least the first $7,500 of his
wife's property. 11 Whether Lionel got it is not clear. Jackman obtained Hildor's
money by affidavit. R. pp. 67-69. Her attorney kept some of the money for his fee,
and sent the remainder to the Department. Of course, neither Jackman's attorney, nor
Jackman herself, had any authority to deal with Hi!dor's estate in that fashion. Idaho
Code§ 15-3-103 requires a legal appointment for a person to assume the powers of a
personal representative. Jackman was only appointed as personal representative for
Lionel's estate, not for Hildor's. If, when Jackman's attorney sent money to the
Department, Jackman was acting as personal representative of Lionel's estate, then the

11 A surviving

spouse takes, at least. the probate homestead allowance in the amount of $4,000, and
the exempt property allowance in the amount of$3,500, irrespective of any wilJ. and ahead of the decedent's
unsecured creditors. See Idaho Code§§ 15-2-401 and 15-2-402.

,....,
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money had already passed to Lionel's estate, and Jack.man was paying the Department

from Lionel's estate.
The fact that Hildor had any property, at all, would mean, under Jack.man's
interpretation of the estate recovery law, that the Department could not recover
anything from Lionel's estate. Then why was the money sent? In an effort to make it
appear as if the Department had already recovered from Hildor's estate.
There is no question but that Jackman manipulated her parent's estate to attempt

to reap

awindfall for herself.

12

B.
The Interpretation Advanced by Jackman Is Both Unfair and Leads to Absurd
Results.
The interpretation of the estate recovery law advanced by Jackman would make
it so simple to avoid, that estate recovery would almost never occur. Since every
Medicaid recipient will leave an estate (as defined by the probate code), no recovery
will be possible from any recipient's spouse. Estate recovery would only be possible
from unmarried recipients. A married person could simply give all his or her property

to the spouse, obtain nursing care at public expense, and have the property passed on to
the adult children.
Of course, the adult children of those whose spouses had pre-deceased would not
stand by and see the Department recover from their parent's estate. They would simply

12The magistrate noted, in his Memorandum Decision, that "[i]t is wu-efuted the estate was
rnanipuJated by the personal representative ...." R p. 151 (first full paragraph) (Appendix B).

~
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encourage and assist their elderly parent to marry a "straw" spouse, and have the parent
transfer all the property to the spouse, with a prenuptial agreement to pass the property
on to the adult children after the parent's death. 13
At oral argument before the District Court, Jackman's attorney argued that some
property, such as the family home, was an exempt resource and did not have to be
conveyed to the spouse to enab]e the other to be eligib]e for Medicaid. 14 Therefore,
according to Jackman's attorney, the Department would still recover when such
property was not transferred. All this means is that the Department would only recover
from the estates of people who can not afford the advice of an estate planning attorney.
It is manifestly unfair, and perhaps unconstitutional, to condition estate recovery on

whether the Medicaid recipient can afford an attorney.

IV.
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AGAINST
JACKMAN.

In the case of State ex rel. Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009
(1948) (Appendix E), in which the court discussed the benefits of estate recovery to the

13 WhiJe some may doubt aduJt children would engage in such tactics, this is not at aJI farfetched. In
this case, Lionel and Hildor may have been totally tmaware that Hildor gave all her property to Lionel: the
marriage settlement agreement was signed for both of them by Jackman. R. p. 65. The Department has dealt
with cases where an adult children have gone to great lengths to hide property from estate recovery.

14The

Department does not have the power to prevent such transfers since they are specifically
allowed by federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{c){2) {Appendix I).
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elderly, the court recognized that there was really no argument between the recipient of
assistance and the State, but only between the State and the recipient's heirs:
The conflict of interest here is not between the State and its needy aged.
It is between the State and the heirs, next of kin or other distributees of
the estates of the deceased recipients. "The right to dispose of one's
property by will, and the right to have it disposed of by the law, after
decease, is created by statute, and therefore the state may impose such
conditions upon the exercise of this right as it may determine. n
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 223, 191 P.2d at 1012 (citations omitted). The court reiterated
this fact in the later case of Newland v Child, 73 Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066 (1953)
(Appendix G):
Instead of requiring the relatives to provide the support, or to reimburse
the state, our law limits recovery to the estate, or the real property, of the
recipient. The relatives are asked only to forego, to the extent of such
payments, what they otherwise might inherit. As was suggested in State
ex rel. Nielson v. Lindstrom, the real objection to this lien law is that of
the prospective heirs.
The conflict of interest here is not between the State and its needy
aged. It is between the State and the heirs, next of kin or other
distributees of the estates of the deceased recipients. State ex rel.
Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009, 1012.
Having no vested interest, they have no right to complain. In re Smith's
Estate, 188 Old. 158, 107 P.2d 188; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §
228.

Newland, 73 Idaho at 539, 254 P.2d at 1070-1. This case, likewise, is really between
Jackman and the Department.
In this case, Jackman intentionally manipulated the estates of her parents to place
the burden of her mother's nursing care costs on the public, and retain a windfall for
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herself. She has denied the Department's claim and opposed recovery by the
Department unreasonably and without foundation. The Department is, therefore,
entitled to an award of its attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.
Because the question is certain to arise on remand, the denial of attorney fees to
Jackman should also be addressed. A personal representative who brings or defends

an

action in good faith is entitled to attorney fees from the estate, whether the personal
representative wins or loses. Idaho Code§ 15-3-720. This creates a "Catch 22n for the
Department in cases such as this where the Department's claim exceeds the value of the
estate, because the personal representative can challenge the Department's claim at the
Department's own expense. However, in this case, Jackman, having intentionally
manipulated her parents' estates, has not defended against the Department's claim in
good faith and should not receive attorney fees from the estate. Likewise, in this case,
Jackman has taken the actions she has, not for the benefit of the estate, but for her own
benefit. The estate should not be reduced by attorney fees incurred in Jackman's
pursuit of her own interests in the estate.

Eliasen v, Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 668

P.2d 110 (1983).

CONCLUSION
Despite Jackman's manipulation of her parents' estates, the Department is
entitled to recover from the estate of Lionel Knudson. The language of the estate
recovery statute, while archaic, is not susceptible to Jackman's interpretation and can
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only be read to permit spousal estate recovery under the circumstances of this case.
The decision beiow should be reversed and the Department's Petition for Allowance of
claim granted.
DATED this 8 day of September,.1997,

v.

W. COREYC

Deputy Att

ey General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing document were
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William C. Kirsch
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9384
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DATED this

7)

day of September, 1997 .
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section are severable. [1941, ch. 181, § 14, p. 379; am. 1943, ch. 119, § 1, p.
228; am. 1951, ch. 246, § 4, p. 520; am. 1974, ch. 233, § 8, p. 1590; am. 1978,
ch. 74, § 1, p. 148; am. 1981, ch. 121, § 1, p. 207; am. 1989, ch. 67, § 2, p.
107; am. 1995, ch. 214, § 4, p. 742; am. 1996, ch. 50, § 8, p. 147.)
Compiler's notes. Sections 1613(c) and . Section 3 of S.L. 1995, ch. 214 is compiled
19171c) and (d) of the Social Security Act, as § 15·5·409a.
Section 7 of S.L. 1996, ch. 50 is compiled as
referred to in this section, are compiled as 42
§ 56-210.
U.S.C., § 1382b and 1396p, respectively.

tie

Ill
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56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective until
July 1, 1998.] -(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance wii:h
federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual :who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid
paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district
court.
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c, the amount of any medical assistance
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (5.5)
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and
may be paid from the estate.
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the
·
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient.
( 4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent'
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign. of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy i1n
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section sha]] be classified and paid as a
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.
(6) The department may file lien against the property of any estate
subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against re.al
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for whom medic:ai
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assistance was paid under this chapter, file the lien in the same general form
and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3)(a), Idaho Code, in the office of
the recorder of the county in which the property of the estate is located. The
lien shall be recorded, indexed, and extended in the manner provided in
sections 56·218A(3)(a) and 56-218A(5), Idaho Code. In order to perfect a
security interest in personal property, the department shall, within ninety ·
(90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the
individual for whom medical assistance was paid under this chaptur, file the
security interest in accordance with chapter 9, title 28, Idaho Codi~. Failure
to file a lien or a security interest does not affect the validity of claims made
pursuant to this section.
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers for the following circumstances:
(a) The.only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for
other family members; or
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the
deceased individual to public assistance. {I.C., § 56-218, as added by
1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch. 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch. 105,
§ 1, p. 336.]

,

Compiler's notes. For this section as effective July 1, 1998, see the following section
alao nwnbered § 56-218.

56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective; July 1,
1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with ·federal
law medical assistance pursuant to. this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate: or if there be no
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for i;uch aid
paid. to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the ·
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. ·1382c. Transfers
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an actiori_ in the district
court.
·
·
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 tr .S.C, 1382c, the amount of any m·edical .assistance
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)°"
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and
may be paid from the estate .
."•
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(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient.
( 4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5} Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property of any
estate subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against
real or personal property, the department shall, within ninety {90) days
after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for
whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file a notice of lien in
the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3) (a),
Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section
· - 1904, Idaho Code. Failure to file a notice of lien does not affect the
....-idity of claims made pursuant to this section.
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers for the following circumstances:
{a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for
other family members; or
{b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the
deceased individual to public assistance. [1.C., § 56-218, as added by
1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch. 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch. 105;
§ 1, p. 336; am. 1997, ch. 205, § 2, p. 607.]

a

Compiler's notes. For this section as effective until July 1, 1998, see the preceding
section also numbered§ 56-218.
Section 10 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 read: "Notwithstanding the effective dates specified in
section 1 through 9 of this act, noLhing in this
act shall take effect unless the secretary of
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Commission that he has received a sufficient appropriation to provide for the development of the
technology required to _implement the provi-

sions of this act. If the certification is noL
made by the twenty-first day after lhe adjournment sine die of the First Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislalure, this
act shall be null and void."
The Secretary ·or State has so certified to
the Idaho Code Commission and thus the
Chapter 205 became effective as presc_ribed
herein.
·
·
Section 1 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 is compiled
as §§ 45-1901 through 45-1910.

56-218A. Medical assistance liens during life of recipient. [Effective until July· I, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and _may
impose a lien ag~inst the real property of any individual prior to his death
for medical assistance· paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf
• an individual:
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(a) Who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is
required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution undE1r the
state plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of
his income required for personal needs; and
(b) With respect to whom the department has determined, after notice
and opportunity for hearing, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be
discharged from the medical institution and to return home.
(2) No lien may be imposed on the home of an individual under subsection
(1) of this section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home:
(a) The spouse of such individual;
(b) Such individual's child under age twenty-one (21) years;
(c) Such individual's child who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c; or
(d) A sibling of such individual who holds an equity interest in such home
and who was residing in such home for a period of at least one (1) year
prior to the individual's admission to the medical institution.
(3)(a) In order to perfect the lien, the department shall file in the office of
the recorder of the county in which the real property of the individual is
located a verified statement in writing setting forth the name and last
known address of the individual, the name and address of the official or
agent of the department filing the lien, a brief description of the medical
assistance received by the individual, the amount paid or about to be: paid
by the department on behalf of the individual, and, if applicable, the fact
that the amount of the lien may increase over time. The county :recorder
shall record the claim in the real property records of the county where the
claim shall be indexed, as deeds and other conveyances are requ.ir<ed by
law to be indexed.
(b) The department shall file any lien under this section within ninety
(90) days of the final determination of the department, after hearing if
any, required in subsection (lXb) of this section, with the exception of
property against which the department is prevented from filing a lien
pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. With respect to the property
described in subsection (2) of this section, the department shall file a lien
within ninety (90) days after the department is notified in writing· that
subsection (2) of this section ceases to apply to the property.
(4) Any lien imposed in accordance with subsection (1) of this section
shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge from the medical institution
and return home.
·
(5) The lien, or any extension thereof, may, within five (5) years from the
date of filing for record, be extended by filing for record in the office of the
county recorder a new verified statement setting forth the information
required in subsection (3Xa) of this section, and from the time of filing the
lien shall be extended in such county for five (5).years, unless fully rel1~ased
or otherwise discharged.
(6) No recovery shall be made under this section for medical assistance
correctly paid except from such individual's estate as defined in subsE1ction
(4) of section 56-218, Idaho Code, and subject to subsections (3), (5) and (6)
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:.:::tion 56-218, Idaho Code, or upon sale of the property subject to a lien
may be made only after the death of such individual's surviving spouse,
1.y, and only at a time:
=) When he has no surviving child who is under age twenty-one (21)
;ars, or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42
1.S.C. 1382c; or
l) In the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection (1) of .
1is section, when none of the following is lawfully residing in such home
,ho has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the
ate of the individual's admission to the medical institution:
(i) A sibling of the individual, who was resid\ng in the individual's home
for a period of at least one (1) year immediately before the_ date of the
individual's admission to the medical institution; or
(ii) A son or daughter of the individual, who was residing in the
individual's home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately
before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution
and who establishes to the satisfaction of the state that he or she
. provided care to such individual which permitted such individual to
reside at home rather than in an institution.
7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple,nt this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
r~c;hip waivers, as provided in section 56-218(7), Idaho Code, and a
_, ure for notice and opportunity for hearing on the department's
termination that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to be
;charged from a medical institution and to return home. [I.C., § 56-218A,
added by 1995, ch. 105, § 2, p. 336.]
;ompiler's notes. For this section as eftive July 1, 1998, eee the following section
o numbered § 56-218A.

Sec. to sec. ref. This section is referred to
in § 56-218.

56-218A. Medical assistance liens during life of recipient. [Effecve July 1, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and may impose a
•n against the real property of any individual prior to his death for medical
,sistance paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf of an
dividual:
(a) Who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is
required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution under the
state plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of
his income required for personal needs; and
(b) With respect to whom the department has determined, after notice
and opportunity for hearing, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be
discharged from the medical institution and to return home.
(2) No lien may be imposed on the home of an individual under subsection
) of this section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home:
(a) The spouse of sue~ individual;
(b) Such individual's child under age twenty-one (21) years;

'·
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(c) Such individual's child who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c; or
(d) A sibling of such individual who holds an equity interest in such home
and who was residing in such home for a period of at least one (1) y,:!ar
prior to the individual's admission to the medical institution.
(3)(a) The lien shall be perfected by filing in the office of the secretary of
state a notice of lien pursuant to section 45-1904, Idaho Code. The notice
of lien shall include, in addition to the information required by section
45-1904, Idaho Code, the amount paid or about to be paid by the
department on behalf of the individual, and, if applicable, the fact that the
amount of the lien may increase over time.
·(b) The department shall file any notice of lien under this section within
ninety (90) days of the final determination of the department, after
hearing if any, required in subsection (1) (b) of this section, with the
exception of property against which the department is prevented from
filing a lien pursuant to subsection (2) of this section:With respect to the
property described in subsection (2) of this section, the department sha.11
file a notice of lien within ninety (90) days after the department is notifie,d
in writing that subsection (2) of this section ceases to ap:ply to the
property.
· (4) Any lien imposed in accordance with subsection (1) of this section
shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge from the medical iinstitution
and return home.
· (5)" No recovery shall be made under this section for medical assistance
correctly paid except from such individual's estate as defined in subsection
(4) of section 56-218, Idaho Code, and subject to subsections (3), (5) and (6)
of section 56-218, Idaho Code, or upon sale of the property subject to a lien
and may be made only after the death of such individual's surviving spouse,
if any, and only at a time:
(a) When he has no surviving c}:iild who is under age twenty-one (21:,
years, or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42
U .S.C. 1382c; or
(b) In the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection (1) of
this section, when none of the following is lawfully residing in such home
who has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the
date of the individual's admission to the medical institution:
(i) A sibling of the individual, who was residing in the individual's home
for a period of at least one (1) year immediately before the date of the
· individual's adn1ission to the medical institution; or
(ii) A son or 'daughter of the individual, who was residing in the
individual's home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately
before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution
and who establishes to the satisfaction of the state that he or she
provided care to such individual which· permitted such individual to
resi9e at home rather than in an institution.
(6) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers, as provided in section 56-218(7), Idaho Code, and a

.··.
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procedure for notice and opportunity for hearing on the department's
determination that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to be
discharged from a medical institution and to return home. [I.C., § 56-218A,
as added by 1995, ch. 105, § 2, p. 336; am.1997, ch. 205, § 3, p. 607.]
Compiler's notes. For this section as effective until July 1, 1998, see the preceding
section also numbered § 56-218A.
Section 10 of S.L. 1997,' ch. 205 read: "Notwithstanding the effective dates specified in
section 1 through 9 of this act, nothing in this
act shall take effect unless the !'lecretary of
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Commission that he has received a sufficient appropriation to provide for the development of the
technology required to implement the provi-

sions of this act. If the certification is not
made by the twenty-first day after the adjournment sine die of the First Regular Ses·
sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, this
act shall be null and void."
The Secretary of State ha.e so certified to
the Idaho Code Collllll.ission and thus the
Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed
herein.
Section 4 of S.L. 1997_, ch. 205 is compiled
as§ 63-3051.

56-223. Public assistance not assignable.
Public assistance
awarded under this act shall not be transferable or assignable, and none of
the money paid or payable under this act shall be subject to execution,
attachment, or other legal process; except that the department may transfer
funds to another public agency in lieu of payments to recipients, said funds
to be transferred by such agency to project sponsors for payment as wages
to said recipients participating in special work projects. [1941, ch. 181, § 23,
p. 379; am. 1969, ch. 30, § 2, p. 51; am. 1997, ch. 30, § 1, p. 54.]
~

56-224. Recovery. -The department may recover the amount of any
public assistance obtained by any person who was not entitled thereto. If at
any time during the continuance of assistance, the recipient thereof becomes
possessed of any property or income in excess of the amount stated in the
application, it shall be the duty of the recipient to notify the state
department immediately of the receipt or possession of such property or
income. Any assistance granted after the recipient has come into possession
of such property or income in excess of eligibility standards, may be
recovered by the state department.

.

On the death of a recipient who has received public assistance to which he
was not entitled, or who has received public assistance in an amount greater
than that to which he was entitled, by reason of possession or having come
into possession of resources which he did not disclose to the department, or
which had, or which acquired, a greater value than was disclosed, the total
amount of such assistance paid to such recipient to which he was not
entitled shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the estate of such
recipient. [1941, ch. 181, § 24, p. 379; am. 1951, ch. 246, § 5, p. 520; am ..
1997, ch. 31, § 1, p. 55.]
56-227C. Subpoena power.
Opinions of Attorney General. Refusal

sonable cause or legal excuse" for failing to

to provide records or documents on the
grounds that such records or document.s are
exempt from disclos)Jre pursuant t.o the Idaho
Public Records Act· does not constitute •rea-

comply with the Department of Health and
Welfare's administrative subpoena. OAG
95-6.
A document's lack of availability under the

'·
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDIC!l•,L
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9~.TCT: ..

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR ·THE COUNTY OF LATAH
l

In the Matter of the Estate
of;
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,
.Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

case No.

SP94-0353

MEMORANDUM DECISION

)
)

The State of Idaho, throuqh the Health and Welfare Division,
seeks

to

recover

Knudson from
Knudson.

Medicaid

Pavments

made

on

behalf

of

Hildor

the estate of her deceased spouse Lionel Malcolm

This recovery has been initiated by the state's f iliri<:7 olE'

a Petition for allownce of claim against Lionel Knudson's estate.
The facts are not in dispute, and the parties have exhaustively
briefed the legal issues.
The legal issue submitted in this matter is whether the Stat~!

may recover Medicaid assistance paid on behalf of·a pre-deceased
spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse when the pre-·
deceasing

spouse,

who

has

received

Medicaid

payments,

dies

poss·essed of an estate.
In assistance of discussing the issue presented, the Court:
finds
the
following
..
..
. .
. - .
.
..facts:

.

1. Hi+dQ~ ang ~~Qn~i Knuq~Qn

w~~~

ma~~i~d pe~s.ons;

2. On 8 November 1993 Hildor and Lionel executed a Marriage1
....,.

Settlement Agreement which defined their community property and!

148
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~

then

altered

separate.

the

character

of

those

properties

making

the!m

Hildor received property characterized as separate in a.n

amount of approxinately $1,900.00+:
3. The alteration of the character of the community property
was done to make Hildor eligible for Medicaid;
4. Hildor died on 27 October ·1994, and at death had received
public Medicaid benefits in an amount of $41,600.55;
5. Lionel died on 11 November 1994.

His estate was offered

for informal probate on 28 November 1994;
6. The estate of Hildor was collected by procedures authorized
by I.e. 15-3-1201 on 1 August 1995.

The residue of her estate,

$1,638.03 was tendered to the Department of Health and Welfare as
settlement of monies due under I. C. 56-218 which the Department
rejected as a full and final settlement;
7. The Department filed a claim against the estate of Lionel

on 9 January 1995 for the $41,600.55 paid as medical assistance for
Hildor.

A Petition for Allowance of the claim was filed on 215

December 1995.

on 6 February 1995 the personal representativ,~

objected to the Petition for Allowance.

a. The estate of Lionel had an Inventory value of $40,798.35.
DISCUSSION

The initial grounds stated by the Objection to the Petition
for Allowance was the State's claim exceeds the authority under
Federal Medicaid statutes, particularly 42 USC 1396p(b).

From that

departure point the excellent briefing by both parties addressed
that profoundity and also implicated the more prosaic issue of thE!
interpretation of the Idaho statute, I.e. 56-218.

149
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As a

predicate to participation in the

Federal Medicaid

program the applicable Federal Law requires the State enact a plan
for adminstration, execution of the Congressional intent, and fc,r
recovery or adjustment of payment assistance.

Some parts of tlle

Federal enactment are mandatory and some are optional. 42 USC 1396
et. seq.

In the cases of recovery, the underlying Federal statu1:e

r42 use 1396p(b)(4)1 defines "estate" in more broad terms than tlle
probate definition by a1·1owing the State the option of includin~p
..• (A)nv other real and personal orooertv and other
assets ln which the individual had anv leqal title or
interest at the time of death (to the-extent of such
interest), includinq such assets conveved to a survivor
heir, or assiqn of the deceased individual throuqh ioint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
The State of

Idaho elected to exercise the optional form e>f

recovery by enacting I.e.

56-218,

which at I.e.

56-218(4)(1:>)

replicates the above-cited Federal language.
The personal representative argues the Estate of Budney. 54,1
N.W.2d

245 (Wis.App.1995)

is authority for the proposition t.he

Idaho statutory scheme for recovery is pre-~mpted by Federal law.
I find that authority unpersuasive.

Likewise, the Estate of Craigr.

624 N.E.2 1003 (N.Y. 1993) is not on point to the present issue a.s
it did not construe a spousal recovery statute.
Based upon the specific statutes above cited or referenced,
and the fact

the Idaho law,

I.C.

56-218(4)(b)

permitted optional Federal statute language,

replicates the

and there is no

compelling case authority to the contrary, I conclude that I.e. 56218 does not

allow for recovery in excess of the authority granted

by 42 USC 1396p, and conclude that the State can recover from the
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estates of surviving spouses under the appropriate factual and
legal predicates.
The more prosaic question to be addressed is whether, undE~r
the

facts

of

this

case,

recovery

is

allowed

against

Knudson's estate under the authority of I.e. 56-218.

Lionel

A critical

fact in this case is that Hildor died possessed of an estate of
approximately

$1,900.00.

It

is

unrefuted

the

estate

was

manipulated by the personal representative in a manner which would
leave a residual after estate expenses and payment of final debts
(i.e. no payment of statutory allowances).
I.e. 56-218 provides in part:
Recovery of certain medical assistance. (1) Except where
exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older
when the individual received such assistance may be
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the
estate of the surviving spouse, ·if any, shall be charged
for such aid paid to either or both; •••
This specific Idaho enactment, optional under Federal law, contains
the curious phrase, "or. if there be no. estate the estate of the
surviving spouse. 11

The State urges the · definition of estate

include the Federal definition adopted in I.e. 56-218(4),

That

assertion is beyond dispute as the Idaho enactment replicates the
wording of the
argument

to

adopt

appearing at 42

The state

Federal statute.

use

the

Federal

definition

then expands · its
of

"other assets"

1396p(e)(l):

The term "assets", with rescect to an individual, include:s
all income and resources of the individual and of the
individual's spouse, including any income or resources
which the individual or such individual's spouse does not
receive because of ..•
Clearly the Federal law intended an estate to include the income!

151
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135 (1990). When a statute is unambigious, it must be interpreti:!d
in accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted,
and a reviewing court may not apply rules of construction.
v. Windmeie:r.::.

121 I 189, 191 (1991).

~:e

As this is a matter c:,f

significant public policy regarding the recovery of public monies,
and the issues certainly demand the review of a court of record,
this Court adopts a most conservative approach and concludes on the
above facts and law that·:
1. Idaho Code 56-218(4) does not adopt the Federal definition
of "asset" appearing at 42

use 1396p(e)(l);

2. Hildor Knudson had a separate estate of $1, 900+ at "tl'Le
time of death".

Hildor Knudson had no "legal title or interest" i.n

Lionel Knudson's "real and personal property and other assets" as
...,

required by

I.e. 56-218(4);

3. The language of I. C. 56-218 ( l) stating "or if there be

n10

estate" is limiting language requiring an absence of estate on th.e
part of the individual receiving assistance before the estate of
the surviving spouse may be charged.

That conclusion is made with

full recognition of the state's argument that a toothbrush could be
construed as an estate, though de minimus.

The conclusion is

further supported by the statutory provision appearing in

I.e. 56-

218( 1) detailing the right of the State to set aside transfers
without consideration.

That provision would appear to provide the

State with a legal method of recovering properties transferred to
preserve

estates

cumbersome.

for

nonspousal

heirs,

though

admittedly

No such action to set aside the transfer is before th,e

court and no opinion as to the voidabili ty of the transfer is
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expressed.

The personal represent.ati ve is directed to prepare an order
consistent with these findings and conclusions and to sUbmi t sa.rne

to State's counsel for approval.

so ORDERED this 17th day of-January 1997.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILlNG
I do hereby certify that a full, tru0 ar-t:
correct copy of the foregoing was m~ii::.-'.~.

to: ,
~
,4U~pcb,

on ttlis ~l day of

$MM-Y¼'J ,191.L.

i.
G..i::)&..µ\
~.:4-R
- -~<D\...
-
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HARRIAGE SETTLEMENT AGRBEMEN'l'

We,

LIONEL KNUDSON and HILOOR KNUDSON,

rtOIPV

husband and wife,

hereby enter into the following marriage settlement agreement for
the purpose of changing the character of our community property and
for

the purpose of defining our mutual

rights

and "interests

concerning our property.
1.

Our community property includes the following:

Family residence loc.ated at 331 North Garfield, Moscow, Latah
County, Idaho more particularly described as:
Block 1, Lot 6 of Oylear's Addition

1986 Ford Tempo

Two Irrevocable Burial Trusts at Short's Funeral Home in the1
amount of $5,000.00 each.
West one Account#
West One Account#
West One Account#
First Security
#
First Security
#

0010615402
0100426145
0010070074
0281551186754
0281551186753

Personal property and household effects
2.

We hereby change the character of the above-described

community property to separate property by dividing the value into
two parts as follows:
LIONEL KNUDSON shall have as his sole and separate
property personal property and household effects now in
his possession; the community residence fully described
above; 1986 Ford Tempo; the irrevocable burial trust in

....,. MARRIAGE
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his name; all but $1,900 in the following bank accounts
West

One

Account

#

0010615402,

West

One Account

#

0100426145, West One Account# 0010070074, First Security

# 0281551186754, and First Security# 0281551186753

HILDOR KNUDSON

shail have

as

her

sole and separat,e

property personal property and household effects in her
possession; the irrevocable .burial trust in her name, and
$.1, 900 from the above cited bank accounts.

J.

We further specifically agree that the income,

rents.,

issues, profits, capital gains, and other earnings or increases on
our separate property as described above and the proceeds from any
disposition thereof constitute the separate property of the person
owning such property and are not community property.

The forgoin9

also shall apply to all property that may .be separately acquired
hereafter by either of us in any manner whatsoever.
4.
serving

This agreement shall not disqualify either of us fron1
and

acting

as

personal

representative,

guardian,

conservator, or trustee of the other's estate if so appointed by a.
court or if so designated or nominated by the other.
5.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement, either

of us shall have the right to transfer or convey to the other any
property or interest therein that lawfully may .be conveyed or
transferred during his or her lifetime or by will or otherwise upon.
death, and neither of us intends for this agreement to limit or
Page 2 of 4
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restrict in any way the right and power to give to the other or t,:,
receive from the other any such transfer or conveyance.

6.

This

Agreement

shall

be

construed

and

enforced

in

accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho even though one o:r
both of us may now be or hereafter·becomes domiciled in anotha~
jurisdiction.
If any provision of this Agreement or any right waived oir

7.

retained by it shall for· any reason be invalid or unenforceable,
the other portions of this Agreement nevertheless shall continue t,:,
full force and effect.
This Agreement shall take effect upon its execution by

8.

both of us.
DATED this

&_ day

'iic~(]

J/._J..d.o.u

of

'L/

HILOOR KNUO~N by her
_yuard_ian, B
ARA JACKMAN

;y: ~ec..Lt<_

)

)

County of Latah

ss.

}

-&:..

on this
day of ~ , 1993, before me, a Notary
Public in and for the State of Idaho personally appeared BARBARA
JACKMAN, guardian for HILOOR KNUDSON, known to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the forgoing instrument,
and
acknowledged to be that she executed the
me.
.. ..~.'.·•,',.;. -~• ·11 'l l ".i (J

~~~,., •

-.
.

. ~:>:--:r:~
'.:··--~.:::~

,. • • •,!1:.:_
--~

-

.; I;• - , ,.n- ..:·;t

.:

~:-.·..

Notary Public for I_d:al1~,,.~-·-- ·:: _. .. ,._: .·{
Residing at Moscow.'.··.. ;. ..'. 1.::1 · .· :My Commission Expires ;9./_23/93·., .- !'.:':
0

rj

! !
I,

1,

•

•

,

I

'I,

I

\. '

•

,

'It.•

t- • :"..;.,:·

'•,,.,.:I'
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STATE OF IDAHO
ss.

County of Latah

w--

on this
day of ~
Public in andor the State of Idaho
JACl<MAN, holder of LIONEL KNUDSON' s
known to me to be the person whose
forgoing instrument, and acknowledged
same.

, 1993, before me, a Notary
personally appeared BARBARA
Durable Power of Attorney,
name is subscribed to th,a
to be that she executed th,a

William c. Kirsih :· 'J' · l~ n ,. _, -.. .
Notary Public f9r ~Idaho-., .. . .. ,.
Residing at: Moscow.!.•,i,,;··\\·~. •._;
My CommJ.SSJ.On _EXJ?l~~~: ·, .. ./ ·1,
•

•

9-23-93

'a

f

\.al

\,

.J.. -·

'

'

...

·••.• '"'/..:· .,,
.. ·'· \~~ ·
•• \ •. l "\· J'ku'•,,,,,: •. •J

'-,l,':';,F.·

,._ IIJpf•~ \..-":'\:.

,....,
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ALAN G. LANCE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF OF HEALTH
AND WELFARE DIVISION
ANN COSHO

Deputy Attorney GeneralHealth and Welfare Division
450 W. State - 10th Floor
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036
Telephone:
(208) 334-5537

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

)
)

Case No. SP 94-00353

)

LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,

)
)
)

Deceased.

________________
COMES

NOW

the

State

of

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE
(I.C. § 15-3-804)

)
)

)

EXEMPT:

Idaho,

I.C.

§

Department

Welfare, by and through its counsel, ANN COSHO,

31-3212
of

Health

and

Deputy Attorney

General, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate.
This claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recoverthe amount of medical

assistance paid

on behalf of Hildor L.

Knudsen, as set forth at Idaho Code§ 56-218.

The Claimant has

paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of Hildor L. Knudsen in.
the amount of $41,600.55 as of December 24, 1994.
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 1

,.
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that the Claimant is obligated to make further medical assistancE3
payments, it reserves the right to supplement its claim in thi~l
proceeding.

/J

day of January, 1995.

DATED this

~

iUJ~-

COSHO
Deputy Attorney General
ANN

VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO
ss.

County of Ada
Dora L. Morley, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
that I am the Claimant's Estate Recovery Specialist; that I have!
read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate
and know the contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and
belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct.

,sft.c Mo?hy L n ~
Estate Recovery Specialist

'""~
ti
~..
,,.

SUBSCRIBE~~
1995.

I

~

•

~ ~ before me this

I ~OT A~

..~~

f; * fi >(J-·-C;,. :! §
~-:.

•
~.A•.

B Ll

.••

n
/1
/2)~1...<..rv, . v

~

\

:it-~

~•

-..,,-,;:••• ._....-:_c:, ,../
,..~,,,$ Op rn
,..., ~V,,. ......

,,

. ~

CtJ

day of January,

_

/1 "'·

~ { / 7.. ~

Notary Public for Idaho
· ·
kl.
Residing
at:
oi;1,,a--L

Commission Expi1'."es:

c;/2.3/l_cco

r

.

I

''•ttm¢'!.'fiTIPICATE OF MAILING

THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of
the foregoing CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage!
prepaid, on the
l,~ day of January, 1995, to:
William C. Kirsch
Attorney for the Estate
PO Box 9384
Moscow, ID 83843

Latah County Clerk
Magistrate Division
PO Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843-0568
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marks complained of by the Company, respondents insist that by such instruction
the court impliedly instructc·d the jury not

MILLER, Justice (concurring and dissen ting).

[ 16] As pointed out by the court in
Bandoni v. Walston, supra, that:

sufficient to warrant a reversal.

,,

I concur in the first four specifications
to consider the remarks, and that "lt must
presented in the majority opinion, bnt disbe presumed that the jury followed and sent to the fifth specification reversing the
obeyed'' the instruction. It is just a little judgm<:nt for the reason that the asstrte<l
difficult .to understand how respondents inflammatory and prejudicial remarks of
could be right in both instances.
respondent's attorney to the jury an: nut

BUDGE, Justice (dissenting).
"While a large discretion is allowed an
I cannot concur in the opinion as written
attorney in prese~ti ng his case, nevertheless, wh<:re, in doing so, he oversteps the in the above entitled case, therefore disbounds of propriety and fairness which sent.
should characterize ~is conduct as an officer
of the court, such conduct, wher<: not cured
"
by a
bar].
made
for a
ment

o,:m--~-."-.,-.-'"-,...~

proper instruction [as in the case at
may, if proper and timely objection is
[as in the instant case], be ground 191 P.2d 1009
nC!w trial or for reversal of th<: judgSTATE ex rel. NIELSON et al. v.
LINDSTROM.
by the reviewing court."

[17) It appears to us justice will best
be served by granting a new trial. That
will put the parties, respectively, bC1ck in

No. 7403.

Supreme C-011rt

or

Idaho.

April 1, 1W8.

•

the position they occupied at the time of
I. Paupers <::=:>40
the original trial and give each party a
Under common law, no r<:covery of
chance to present the case anew to the
court and jury, and, at the same time, will money paid by state £or old age assistance
avoid the danger of doing appellant a grave was allowable where payment was not made
by accident, fraud or mistake,
injustice.
The judgment is reversed and the cause
remanded with directions to grant a new
trial. Costs awarded to appellant.

GIVENS, C.

J., and

HYATT,

J..

2. paupers e:>40

The grant of old a~e benefits under
Public Assistance Law is unconditional as
far as the recipient is concerned and creat(!s
concur, no obligation on part of recipient to repa>'·

.-~
,,,

.·,

~-~
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Laws 1941, c. 181, § I (m); Laws 1947,

c. of Idaho and another, against Nels Lind-

237.

strom, executor of the estate of Frans G.
Magnus, deceased.

3. Paupers €==>3

From an order sustain-

ing demurrer and dismissing action without

The granting of aid to its needy aged is

leave to amend, the plaintiff appeals.

ii

and is a governmental function tending to

Re versed with direction.

promote the public we! fare.

Robert E. Smylie, Atty. Gen., and John

!

a well recognized obligation of the state

I·

A. Carve 7, Jr., J. R. Smead, and Robert B.
Holden,
Asst, Attys. Gen., for appellants.
The statute authorizing assistance pay-.

4. States cS=>I 19

ments to needy aged persons and rccov.,,·y

State laws providing for such recoveries

of such payments out of estates of needy

appear to ~c contemplated hy the federal

aged persons is not unconstitutional as giv-

statute.

ing or loaning credit

Stat. 136!, (1939).

of state.

LC.A.

§ 15-609; Laws 1941, c. ISi, § I(m); Laws
19-U, c. 119, § 2; Laws 1947, c. 237; So._.,cial Security Act, §§ I ct seq., 2(a) (7),
3(b) (2), as ame11dcd. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301
et seq., 302, 303(b) (2); Const. art. 3, §

The power of state legislatures is plen:iry
in the matter of succ<:ssion to property by
will or inheritance.

Bankers Trust Company v.

The determinatiun of eligibility of appli-

Kan. SH, ISZ P. 771, 773, L.R.A.1916C,

cant for old age assistance does not de- 551; In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 1945, Cal.
pend on whether applicant will leave an es- App., 161 P.2d 589.

Laws 1941, e. 181, §

I (m); Laws 1947, c. 237.
.MILLER,

J.,

~'

Bloclg-ett, 1922, 260 U.S. 647, 43 S.Ct. 233,
67 L.Ed. 439; State v, ]\[oilier, 1915, 96

Paupers Cc>43(1)

tate whe11 he dies.

,I

The right is created

by the Legislature, \vhich may at any time
aholish it.

19; art. 8, § 2.
5.

42 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (]) (B), 53

dissenting.

Recovery

provisions

are creatures of

r

i

J

I;

: l1·

statute.

As such, they have been generally

ii''

upheld.

State v. Whitver, 1942, 71 N.D .

l

664, 3 N.W.2d 457;

Hawkins v. Kansas

Social \-Velfare Board, 193.S, 148 Kan. 760,
84
P.2d 930; Department of Social WelAppeal from District Court, Second Jufare
v. Wingo, 1946, i7 Cal.App.2d 316, li5
dicial District; Clearwater County; A. L.
P.2d 262.
Morgan, Judge.
Action to recover old age assistance pay-

The Constitution of the State of Id,1·hn

ments by the State of Idaho on the relation

prohibits the loan of the credit of the state

of N .. P. Nielson, State Auditor of the State to

private

individuals

or

corporations.

11

I;
1

I

I

:

I

I

I

I;

[ I

I:.
i ',
i!
I:
'. '.
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There can be no recovery of money paid
for old age assistance under the common
Jaw. City of Worcester v. Quinn. 304
J'he prohibition of these constitutional Mass. 2i6, 23 N.E.2d 463, 125 A.L.R. iO].
provisions is primarily directed against the
combination of public funds or credit with
\Vithouc st:'llutory authority there can be
Const., Art. VITI, sec. 2; Const., Art.
V[IT, sec. 4; Const., Art. XII, sec. 4.

the capital of private persons, corporate or no recovery of money paid for old age as· · ·
h
h' · d si~tancc or relief. In re Humphries' Will,
natural. Th c act1v1t1es
cld pro 1b1tc
have generally involved the element of en· 125 Misc. 62, 210 N.Y.S. 253.

''

,Ii;
.

terprise, or profit-making private schemrs.
Atkinson v. Board of Commissioners of
Ada County, 1910, 18 Idaho 282, 108 P.
1046, 28 L.R.A.,N.5., 412; School District
No. 8 v. Twin Falls County l\fotual Fire Insurance Company, 1917, 30 Idaho 400, 164
P. 1174.

The loan of the State's credit is prohibit. ed to or in aid of any individual. Atkinson v. Board of Cot1nty Commissioners,
18 Idaho 282, 108 P. 1046, 28 L.R ..A.,N.S.,
412; i\lcD011ald v. Doust, II Idaho 14, 81
P. 60, 69 L.R.A. 220; White v. Pioneer
Bank & T. Co., jQ Idaho 589, 298 P. 933.

The making of payments upon applicatio-;;··
The term "loan" in the cited constitutior1al provisions has been construed to mean for old age assistance under the statutes,
a transaction which creates the customary coupled with the provisions for repayment
relation of lender and borrower. Bannock and restrictions as to transfer of property,
County v. Citizen's Bank and Trust Com- is contractu:il relationship. Const. Art.
pany, 193 , 53 Idaho 159, 22 P.Zd 6i 4.
VIII, Sec. 2: Hawkins v. State of Kansas,
3
Social \.Vcliare Board, 148 Kan. i60, 84 P.

)J

.

i'

f:
,.

f
·'

i

.,
f:
'

The above cited constitutional provisions 2d 930; Jn re Beningaso's £slate, l6j l\I isc.
have been held to be a bar to actions of the 459, 300 N.Y.S. 951; In re Blac:k's Estate,
Stat~ and other political subdivisious ouly 150 .Misc. 433,269 N.Y.S. 511; In the i\b.lwhen faith or credit is pledged. Indcpeud- ter of Katie Long, 242 App.Div. 781, 174
eat School District N,,. 6 v. Common N.Y.S. 427.
School District No. 38, 1942, 64 Idaho 303,
The mere acceptance of old age assist131 P.2d 786; Hansen v. Independent ance does not give the State the right to
School District No. 1, 1939, 61 Idaho 109, recover the payments. Tn re Humphries'
CJS P.2d 959; School District No. 8 v. Twin Will, 125 Misc. 62, 210 N.Y.S. 253 .
Falls County Mutual Fire Insurance Company, supra.
Samuel F. Swayne, of Orofino, for respondent.

SUTPHEN, District Judge.
The State of lJaho, on relation of its
Stale Auditor and Commissio11er of the De-

i
·.·': I
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partment of Public Assistance, brought this credit of the state shall not, in any manner,
action against the executor of the estate of be given, or loaned to, or in aitl of any inFrans G. l\<fagnus, deceased, to recover dividual, asociation, municipality or corpoamounts paid in old-age assistance to dece- ration.''
dent during his lifetime and does not in· [1] Under the c•)mmon law no reco,·volve in the slightest what should be taken
ery o( money paid by the State for oldii:ito consideration in the initial a ward of
age assistance was allowable where payold-age assistance; therefore, authorities
ment was not made by accident, fra u<l or
involving such question:; are not in point
mistake. City or" Worcester v. Quinn, 30 I
herein.
Mass. 276, 23 N.E.2d 463, 125 /\.L.R. 707.
The complaint, in brief, sets forth: Thus, any right the appellant may ha\'c to
that Frans G. }.fagnus d_uring his lifetime reco"cr in this action must be based upon
-:i.<le application for and was granted old- our statutes .
._,; assistance; that commencing in 1farch
1943 the Depar:ment of Public Assistance
paid him, in monthly installments each

Provision, however, for recovery against

the estates of recipients has been part of
the law of this State continuously since
month to and including july 1946, the sum
:March 2, 19-U, when Chapt~r 119 of the
total of $1,651 ; that Frans G. :Magnus died
L:-tws of 19-B bec:1mc effective. Section 2
testate August I, 1946, leaving an est:-tte: of such Act added Section 24-a to the Pubthat respo nd ent was duly appointed a nd lie Assistance Law of the State and read
qualified as executor oi the estate; that apas follows: ''Section 24-a. Recovery from
pellant duly filed claim \Yith the executor
recipients. On the death of any recipient,
for the amount of assistance paid; that the
the total amount of assistance paid. or re~
executor reje.:tcd the cl:-tim, and this suit
lief granted under this Act sh:ill be allowed
properly ensued as provided by section 15as a pre fer red claim against the estate of
609, T. C. A. Id:1ho Trust Co. v. Miller, 16
s11ch person and sh:i 11 be subject only to the
Idaho 308, 102 P. 360.
expense of the last illness, funeral expenses
The trial court sustained respondent's de- not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of admurrer to the complaint and dismissed the ministration of said estate. No claim shall
action apparently accepting respondent's be enforced against any real estate or percontention that the alleged transactions be- sonal property of a recipient while such
tween the State and deceased amounted to real estate is occ11picd by the recipient, a
a loan and that such a loan is unenforceable surviving spouse, or a dependent, but the

because repugnant to the inhibition contained in Section 2 of Article 8 of the Constitution of this State that:

"* * *

the

Statute of Limitations shall not begin to
run against such claim so long as the collection thereof is prohibited, as hereinabove

I

!,
l
I

I

I

I't
I ~·

J,I ~

-

-

--·

f,

----------------~
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/Provided. "Such claim shall be made by the 1945, Chap. 109; S.L.1947, Chap. 237) falls
-county or, in cases of cooperative assist- within the inhibitions of Section 2 of Ar::ance, by the State ori behalf of all partici- tide 8 of the Constitution of the State of
ip,ants contributing to such assistance." Idaho.
Chapter 119, 1943 S:L.
It is insisted an action cannot be mainBy an Act (Chapter 237, S.L.194i) the tained against the- estate of a deceased re1947 legislature repealed the above quoted cipient for the recovery of the amount of
section and in lieu thereat enacted the fol- assistance granted such recipient during his
lowing provision for recovery from estates Ii fetime. Old-age assistance began in Auof recipients: "Section 24-a. Recovery gust, L935, by the enactment by Congress of
From Estates. On the death of any rccip- the Social Security Act, Title I, Chap. 531,
ient of old-age assistance, the total amount Act of August 14, l935, 49 U.S.Stat. at
of assistance paid such rccipeint under this Large, p. 620, <12 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.
act may, in the discretion of the State De- Section 2 provided for old-age assistance.
partment, be allowed as a claim against Paragraph (7) of Subdivision (a)-a part
the estate of such person after reasonable of Section 2 of the Social Security Actfuneral expenses, the expenses of the last read: "(7) Provide that, if the State or
illness, and the expenses of administering any of its political subdivisions collects
the estate have been paid. No claim shall from the estate of any recipient of old-age
be imposed against any real estate of the assistance any amount with respect to oldrecipient while it is occupied as a home by age assistance furnished him under the
a surviving spouse, or against any personal plan, one-half of the net amount so collectproperty of less that $100.00 in value. The ed shall be promptly paid to the United
State Department shall ceni fy, to the State States."
Auditor the amount recovered from each

estate as above provided, and a proper distribution thereof shall be made by the State
Auditor in proportion to the amount of assistance contributed ~y the state and the
federal government for such assistance."
Chapter 237, 1947 Session Laws.
Thus, in view of the statute, the question before us is whether the granting of
old-age assistance under the terms and conditions of our Public Assistance Law (S.L.
1941, Chap. 181; S.L. 1943, Chap 119; S.L.

It will be 11otcd paragraph (7) did not

- make it manc..latory upon a state or any political subdi\•ision of a state to collect anything whatsoever from the estate of any
recipient of old-age assistance. That paragraph simply provided that if a state did
collect from the estate of a recipient of oldage assistance, then and in such case, onehalf of the net amount collected should be
promptly paid to the United States. Thus,
the state WilS left absolutely free to drtermine whether it would, or would not, col-

000189
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lect from the estate of a recipient, but if it state from the estate of a deceased recipidecid~d to and did collect, then it was made ent of assistance. A most generous thing
mandatory that one-half of the net amount for the Congress to do in this: It gives a
collected should be promptly paid to the state, for instance Idaho, a much larger

~~
~

amount of money to use in avoiding placing
About four years after the enactment of the aged and needy in poor-h()uscs, by
the Federal Social Security Act; to wit, granting assistance to those owning the
homes in which they live and enabling them
August 10, 1939, the Congress amended it.
By the amendment, paragraph (7) above to continue to li\•e in such homes until both
quoted, was omitted; but a provision of sim- husband and wife have passed on, after
United States.

ilar import was included in the amendment

the amount expended by the State or any
~

political subdivision thereof for the funeral
expenses of rhe J~ceascd shall not be considered as a basis for reduction under
cl a use ( B) of this paragraph."

Morgan v. Department of Social Securit_v, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, is cited

in support of the contention that a state
cannot recover from the estate of a de-

In other words, by that amendment, the

ceased recipient of old-age assistance. It
appears the opinion in that case also cov-

Congrcss still left a state absolutely free
to collect from the estate of a deceased re-

ered the companion cases of Laura M.
Camfield and \Villi am L. Jacobson v. The

.

I

l
:

i·

~

•,i;
I

l

which; of course, thq no longer require the
use of a home. The generosity of the Congress does not eml there. It also provides

in that by paragraph No. (2) of Section 303
(b) U.S.C.A. 42, it was and is provided as
follows: "Pro\'ided, That any part of the more money to meet the requirements of
amount recovaed from the estate of a de- the needy and destitute who are not the
ceased recipient which is not in excess of owners of homes.

..,.,

' ,,

C

I

,'

i

[
!.

cipient if it chose to, but provided that any D<.'partment of Social Security of the State
part of the amoulll recovered, not in excess of \Vashinglon. The question was· not preof the amount expended for funeral ex- sented to the Washington court in the Morpenscs should not be considered as a basis gan case, supra, as to whether the legisbture
for reduction under clause (B) of the same
paragraph.
The sole purpose of omitting paragraph
(7) above quoted, from the amendment of
1939, was that Congress intended that a
state should no longer be required lo pay to
the United States one-half of the net
amount of whatever was recovered by a

of the State of \-Vashington could, or could
not, under the Washington Constitution,
provide for the collection or recovery of
assistance granted a deceased recipient in
his lifetime. That this is true cannot be
questioned, because all three ot the above
named persons were very much alive, making application for and demanding assist-

I:·
i'

'.

,1
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ance under \Vashington's Senior Citizens
Grants Act, which the \Vashington court

provide for any relief whatever to the deserving. and needy, and that would be sim-

passed on.

ply absurd.

While the humanitarian purpose of our
Public Assistance Law, which grants as·
sistance to the deserving and needy, is not
directly attacked, it is, however, indirectly
~ttacked upon the ground-among othersthat the law is unconstitutional; becat1se, it
is argued in effect that the transaction by

[3] The granting of aid to its needy
aged is a well recogniz~d obligation of the
state and is a governmental function tending to promote the public wclfarr. Alameda County v. Jamsen, 16 Cal.2d 276, 106 ·
P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141; 41 Am.Jur. 690.

[4] Tht\S, its character as to all eligible
and through which Frans G. Magnus, now
recipients having been determined to be
deceased, was granted assistance, created
public rather than private, it follows that
a debt which amounted to a loan-hence,
the grantini:; _of such aid is not within the
was rcpt1gnant to the inhibition contained
constitmional inhibitions unless the recovin Sec. 2, Art. 8 of our Constitution proery features of the law above quoted made
viding that: "The credit of the state shall
the law subject to such inhibitions. Wilnot, in any manner, be given, or loaned to,
Iiams 1·. Baldridge, 48 ldaho 618,284 P. 203;
or in aid of any individual, association, muState v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 P. 771;
nicipality or corporation.'·'.
Alameda County v. Janssen, s~pra. Un[2] The grant of old-age benefits u nd er doubtedly the state has the authority to proour Public Assistance Law appears to be vide for public assistance for its needy
unconditional as far as the recipient is con- aged, and the governmental nature of the
cerned. It creates no obligation on his service determines its character as not givpart lo repay public assistance to which he ing or loaning the credit of the stale. Supwas lawfully entitled. There are no provi- pigcr v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 9l P.2d 362.
sions therein which condition the grant ou
The law (19-H S.L., Chap. 181 at Sec. I,
either the non-ownership o [ property or
S11bd.
(m) defines that: "(m) 'Needy aged'
the ownership of less than a prescribed
shall
mea11
any pcrsoi1 65 yi::ars or older,
minimum of properly.
whose income and sources of subsistence
If respondent is right m his contention
are insufficient to supply him with the comour Public Assistance Law is unconstitumon necessities of li[e commensurate wifa
tional, even though it creates no obligation
his needs and health, • • •"
on tlie part of any recipient of relief to repay any part o( the relief granted, it would,
The statute, in line with modern ideas,
of course, carried to its logical conclusion, makes it possibl~ in many cases to avoid
rnean the legislature would be powerless to placing the needy aged in inst\tutions and

000191
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contemplates the granting of assistance to
· those who may own the home in which they
live or other property as well as to those
absolutely destitute, if their income and
somces of subsistence are not sufficient to
meet the statutory standards. UnJer these
provisions the recipient of public assistance

difficult to see how the recovery feature,s
of the Public Assistance Law can be said
to be giving or loaning the credit of the
State.
The liability of the State is in no way increased by the presence of these recovery
provisions in the Jaw.

....

The State dQes not

is not required to liquidate all of his prop- oblig.1te itself to do anything more because
erty. Ofttimes the recipient continues to of such provi,;ions. Howe\'er, it does relive in his own home, which he is able to ceive the benefit of the provisions in quespreserve for use during his lifetime and for tion and should, it seems, be classed a recipthe use of his widow during her lifetime icnt of creJit rather than the giver thereof.
after his decease. This method of caring The conAict of interest here is not between
for the needy aged has pro\'en far superior
in many cases to placing the needy aged in
institutions. It has not only proven to be
mor<' cfficirnt and economical from the
State's st:111dpoint, but more humanitarian,
..., pro,·iding the recipient with a more normal
existence. freeing him of much of the stigma and many of the hardships and disagreeable features of life in an institution.

[5] These recovery provisions, supra,
have nothing to do with the determination
of the eligibility of any applicant for assistauc._..

\\'hcther he will or will not leave an

the State an<l its neccly aged.

It is between

t'

the State and the heirs, next of kin or other
distrib11tees of the estates of the deceased
rec1p1ents. "The right to dispose of one's

f·

l,

property by will, and the right to have it
disposed of by the law, after decease, is
created by statute, and therefore the state
may impose s11ch conditions upon the exercise of this right as it may determine."
Bankrrs' Trust Company , .. Blodgett, 260
U.S. 64i, 43 S.Ct. 233, 234, 6i L.Ed. 439,
quoti11g Id., % Conn. 361, 114 A. 104.
Respondent

s.iys,

however,

that:

"To

estate when he dies makes not one iota of sustain the repaym..:nt of old age assista11cc
difference. The benefit received by the re- by virtue legislarnrc plenary power to regucipient who leaves an estate is no more late descent and inh('ritance, is to violate
than that of the recipient who happens to Section 19 of article 3, of the Constitution
have none.
of the State of Td:iho because this (is)
class
legislation, placing burdens 011 the
In thr light of our determination that the

granting of aid to the needy aged by the aged-needy not imposed upon other recipState does not fall within the inhibitions of ients from lhe State."
the constitution against giving or loaning
The section of the constitution last rethe credit of the State to an indi,·idual, it is f erred to prohibits the legislature from

l

I

I

I
I

I

1·

t
I

1'

'I

\

l

i,·!
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passing local or special laws in certain enu-

it must clearly appear to be so."

merated cases, among which is listed:
"a fleeting estates of deceased persons

County v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 53
Idaho 159, at page 176, 22 P.2d 674, 680.

* * •"

and "changing the law of descent or succession."

The repayment of old-age assistance provision of our Public Assistance Law appears to be gen~ral rather than special in
its terms, as it operates upon all the aged
needy and their estates in like situations.

"A statute is general if its terms apply
to, and its provisions operate upon, all persons· and subject-matters in like situation.''
Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho 656, ISO
P. 35, 37; In re Bottjer, 45 Idaho 168, 260

P. 1095.

Bannock

The case, therefore, will be reversed and
the trial court directed to overrule respondent's demurrer to the complaint. Costs to
appellant.
GIVENS, C.

l-,

HOLDEN, J., and l\lc-

DOUGALL, D. J., conc 11 r.
MILLER, Justice (dissenting).
On August 14, 1935, the 74th Congress,
Sess. I, Ch. 531, enacted the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § JOI et seq.

Title I

ther.:of provided, "Grants To States For
Old-Age Assistai1ce."

When used in Title

"A special Jaw applies only to an individual or number of individuals out of a. single

I of said Act the term of old-age assistance
means money payments to aged ind.ividuals.

class similarly situated and affected, or to
a special locality. A law is not special sim-

Section I of said Title made an appropriation and the sums appropriated and made

ply because it may have only a local appli- available under said Act were to be used in
cation or apply only to a special class, if in matching payments with states which ~a·d
fact it does apply to all such classes and submitted pl,ms to be approved by the Soall similar localities and to all belonging to cial Security Board as established by Title
the specified class to which the law is made

VII of the Act anc! under state plan for

applicable.

old-age assistan·ce.

Mix

v.

Boa rel

of

CCJunty

Commr's, etc., 18 Idaho 695, 705, 112 P.

Section 2 provides for state old-age as-

215, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 534; Hettinger v. sistance and subsection (a) thereof is as
Good Road District No. 1, 19 Idaho 313, follows: "(a) A State plan for o_ld-age as318, I 13 P. 721; In re Crane, 27 Idaho 671, sistancc must (l) provide that it shall be
.at page 690, 1 Si P. 1006, L.R.A.l918A, 942."
Ada County '-v. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, at

in effect in all political St1bdivisio11s of the
State, and, if administered by them, be

page 403, 92 P.2d 134, 138.

mandatory upon them;

"The rule is that before a legislative en.actment will be held to be unconstitutional,

Other provisions of subsection (a) arc
enumerated.

•

•

•"

------------------~----~
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Paragraph (7} thereof is as follows: ner that assistance was no longer neces"(7) provide that, if the State or any of its sary.
political subdivisiuns collects from the esThe complaint in this case shows that it
tate of any recipient of ol<l-age assistance is an action in debt. It also shows that the
any amount with respect to old-age assist- dece:tsed (Frans G. Magnus) was paid the
ance furnished him under the plan, one-ha If aggregate sum of $1,651 for old-age assistof the net amount so collected shall be ance, and that no part of the said sum has
P.rornp!ly paid to the United States."
been repaid to the state, and that there is
From section 2, subsection (a) it mani- now due and owing the state of Idaho the
festly appears that the State plan for old- said sum of $1,651.
age
tain
der
for

assistance is mandatory and must conThe statutory provision under which the
certain prescribed requiremciits in or- action was commenccci and is so11ght to be
to entitle a state to "Grants to States maintained is as follows: "Section 2-.-a.
Ol<l-Agc Assistance under the Socia I Recovery From Estates. On the death of
Security Act." We pariicularly invite at· any recipient of old-age assistance, the total
tention to paragraph (7), which authorized amount of assistance paid such recipient

'illlllr1 state to i:ullect from the estate of a recip- under this act may, in the discretion of the
ient of old-age assistance any and all State Department, be allowed as a claim
;imounts paid under the pl.in. In other against the cstak of such person after reawords, any right :rnc! .iuthority of a st;,te sonable funeral expenses, the expense:, of
to collect from the estatl! of a recipient of the 1:ist illness, and the expenses of adminold-age assistance must come from and istering the estate have been paid."
throl1gh the provisions contained in para-

In the case of State ex rel. Dean v.

graph (7) afores.iid, anJ without such authr,rity a state is not entitl~u to file a valid

I3ran<ljor<l et al., 108 Mont. 447, 92 P.2u

claim against the estate of a deceased recipient or maintain an action for any am,)tlllt
wh;ltsoever, irrespectin! of the manner in
which an estate of a recipient of old-age assistan..:c was ;icquire<l, that is, whether the
recipient had Co\'erc:d up property or in-

· ,-I

273, 279, being a mandamus procecdirig- 10
rompel payment of full amount of monthly
oltl-agc assistance, it is said: "When the
whole subject of relief for the aged indigent is taken imo consideration, when the
history of federal and state legislation is
given proper effect, when the national

come at the time of making application for plans :ind the subsequently enacted state
assistance, or after being awarded assist- plans of the different states are understood,
ancc he had come into property and in- it would seem that none of the state plans,
come which he did not report and which including our own, were ever devised to
was sufficient_ to provide him in such man- stand or operate without the cooperation
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of the federal government.

[Authority J.

age assistance is no longer authoriz~d b:;

If this be true, and we think that it is be- the Social Security Act, anJ; which is

11:,:

yond question the outstanding theory of the

011ly source of authority of states and/o:

whole matter, then it is obvious that our
law must be construed, 11ot as a11 i1,d,•pc11d-

state against the estate of Frans G. i\bg-

their political subdi,·isions, any claim of the

ent Act, but in. co11j1rnclio,1 willt /he feder-

llUS,

al Act, that is, the two Acts must be administered togdlic-r as a 1111ificd code (If lows

action againsl Nels Lindstrom, the execu-·

enacted by Congress a11d tlzc stale frgislu-

sanctioned.

t11re for the complclc a>id co111prcl1e11sii 1c
control of t/,c subject." ( Emphasis ours.)

deceased, or the commcncc-rnent of an

-

tor of his estate, is a nullity, and cannot be

In support of the st,ttemcnt that any attempted recovery is a nullity because unau-

We have indicated that authority for any
activity by a state incident to reco\·ery or
the collection of payments from the estate
of a deceased recipient was embodied in section 2 of Title I of the Social Security Act
as originally enacted.

Section 2, of the

original Acr, was subsequently designated as
Section 302, and the provision contained in
paragraph (7) of section 2, as originally
enacted, was repealed and in the case of
Morgan v. Department of Social Security,
14 Wash .2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, 693, it is said:
"It is evident that there is a conAict hetwc~,i
the provisions of the FeJcral act and those
of the st.He statute.

thorized by the Federal act, we here mention that there is also, another reason why
no reco\'ery

:s

permissible and that is that

the act io11 was a direct action aJdresscd to
the original rather than the appellate jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, we arc con-

fronted with two propositions, (I)· that no
recovery can be had for the reason that
there is no authorization therefor by the
Federal act, :ind (2) that the court had no
jurisdiction in that the only right the court
had in the premises was under and through
its appellate jurisdiction.

In the portion of the

Tn the case of Bowen v. Department of

Federal act above quoted is found the fol-

Social Security, 14 \Vash.2d 148, 127 P.Zd

lowing: '(a) A State plan for old-age as-

682, 684, it is said:

sist;u1ce must

•

•

* (7) effective July

I, 1941, provide that th(; State agency shrill,
in dctcr_mining need, take into consideration
any other income and resources of an individual claiming old-age assistance.'"

''l\t the time the constitution [State] was
adopted, civil procedure was governed by
the practice act of 1881.

Code of 1881, p.

35 Section 1, chapter I, pr01·idecl that:
'The common law of England

* * *

,.

Accordingly, any former provision that a

(LC.A. 70-116) and the organic net aud

state or its political subdivisions might col-

laws of Washington Territory shall be tile

:I
.,.

lect .fro~ the estate of a recipient of old-. rule of decision in all the courts of this

1·
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Territory.' And § 2 provides that: 'There
s:i;ill be in this Tcrrit,.Jry hereafter but one

arising before administrative bodies are

form of action [I.C.A. 5-101] for the en-

stood at common law.

forcement or protection of pri\"ate rights
and the redress of pri\'ate wrongs, which

shall be called a cii·il actia11.'

* • •

. "It hardly requires argument to demonstrate that the court proceedings provided
for in § 9 of chapter 1, Laws of 19.J.1, the
senior citizens grams act, do not come within these provisions of the practice act of
1831. The cotirt proccdi11gs provided for

in th(1l oc/ ore 1101 co11rn1c11cL·d i11 any court.
Tire_\' /w,.·r t/rcir i11ccptio11 i11 tire dcparl111c11t
of social s,·curit_1·, and find th,·ir way la the
cor,rts thro11gh appcal-110/ by ?t·ay of the
issr1a11cc of s1111111ioI1s. [Emphasis ours.]

in

no sense civil actions as they were under-

"Colonel 0. R. McGuire, a member of the
American Bar Association's special committee on administrative law, in an article
published in 26 Georgetown L.tw J ourn;d,
574, 589, says: '• • * administrative
law is a separate and distinct branch of the
law.

It is not common law, equity, or ad-

miralty law

•

* * '"

The c;ise of illorgan v. Department of
Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d
686, 692, 708 deals extcusively with Title I

oi the Social Security Act, and the adoption
of the plan submitted by the state of Washington through the pro\·isions of initiative

"f"tirthcr than that, the functions now cx-

141, and in accordance with the r~quire-

erciscJ by administrative bodies under legislative authority were practically unknown

rncnts of the act and the approval of the
Soci.tl Security Board as provided ir) Sec-

to Amcrci.,11 jurisprudence at the time our
co11stit11tio11 was adopted; and, so far as we

tion 302 of the Act.
is said:

can asccrta in, they Wl're wholly unknown
to 011r tcrritori.tl jurisprudence. To say
that court proceedings arising out of the ex.:rcise of such administrative functions are
ci\'il actions in contemplation of the limita-

Contained therein· it

"A transcript of the mi1llltcs of the meet-

ing- of the Federal social sec1trity board at
which i11itiative 141 was cousider,:d, cont;:iins the following:
" 'Section Three, subsections (g)

and

tion on this court's jurisdiction, contained
in § 4, art. lV, of the constitution, would

(h), of this initiative me;:isure are in viola-

make

purposes

tion of the prO\·isions of the Social Secu-

which were never within the minds of th~
people in agreeing to it.' People v. Harding, supra [53 Mich. 481, 19 N.W. 155],

rity Act, which became effective, July I,
1941, in 'that the state agency may disre-

What pertinent authorities there arc on the
subject lend support to the view that court

termining whether an applicant is eligible
for old-age assistance; and may also be in

proceedings

violation of presently effective provisions

that

provision

,flowing

'e:-<press

from

controversies

gard certain "income and resources'' in de-
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-:.-.;; to allow recipients certain income and

recognized obligation of the state and is a

.sources, and independent of Grants-In- govt:rnmencal function tending to promote
.\id, which was not provided for in Title I

the public welfare.''

)f the Social Security Act, and that such

statement we are cited tc the case_ of Ala-

,eemingly

as

meda County v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276, 106

:ontained in ,ubparagraphs (g) and (h)
:ire in violation of the Social Security :\ct,
du.: evidently to the closely knit adherence

P.2d ll, 130 A.LR. 1141; 41 Am.Jur. 690.
Said case deals with an Act of the legislature of California of l929, providing finan-

to the coop<:rati\·e legislative effort of state
iind national governments in carrying out a
public purpos.: common to both. If the

cial assistance to needy aged who met certain requirements, and whose property did
not exceed specified values. Th.:re were no

board held that the provisions contained

matching funds available or in\'olved.

inconsequential

provisions

In support of such

in subparagraphs (g) and (h) which al-

is of no assistance in determining whether

lowed certain income and resources not al-

a state may col.lect any or all of th.: amounts

]owed by the Social Security A.:t to be dis-

paid a recipient of old-age assistance.

regarded in determining the amount of assistance to be awarded a recipient then

Assistance Act as the only legislation in-·
volv..:d, and that Section 24-a, Session Law.~

.-aid board would hold on the question of

1947, as th.: sole and only measure of deter-I

the validity of the state of Idaho to file a

mining the right of the State to recover any

preferred claim against the .:state of Frans

payments made to recipients of old-ag.:: as-

G. !vbgnus, deceased, or to institute a suit

sistance.

in the District Court against his cxccutor

account th;i.t payments of old-age assistance'

Said opinion does not take into

under the provisions of section 24-a, s1ipra,

is a cooperative function and that without

for the full amount of Grants-In-Aid law-

such cooperation the State would be power-

fully paid Magnus as a recipient of old-age
assistance, insttad of handliug it as a ck-

less to act.

or that the State might assume that any
such provision was legal since paragraph
(7) providing for recO\'ery as contained in
-the original Social Security Act had not
been lifted therefrom and is still contained
therein_

The majority opinion states that, "The
granting of aid to its needy aged is a well

,,

The majority opinion treats the Public

•here is no need to speculate as to what

partrnental matter in accordance with l.lw,

l

It

In the case of Bowen v. Department of
Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 148, 127 P.2d

6S2, a proceeding wherein the respondent
Bowen made a dcmand upon the Director
of the Department of Social Security of
the State of \.Vashington, to increase his
award of $34 a month to $40 a month and
demanded "a fair hearing" under the provisions

or

section 8, p. 7, of the act, which

provided that said hearing should be had
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not more than 30 days after the receipt of
notice. More than 30 <lays having elapsed
Bowen gave notice of appeal to the superior
court of Grays Harbor county. A motion
to quash the notice of appeal was interposed
by the department and the Supreme Court
in passing upon the matters involved said:
"To the extent, at least, that it is composed
of 'federal matching £unds' the fund from
which 'Senior Citizens Grants' are paid is
essentially a trust fund, for the proper expen<liture of which the state department of
social security is responsible to the federal
government."

visions of the Social Security Act and not
in accordance with the state Act allowing
income and resources in addition to the
payment of sums for old-age assistance,
but more particularly for the purpose of
emph:isizing a matter heretofore pointed
out, th:it is, that any controversy between
a recipient and the department of social
security must be determined in the first instance in the department an<l find its way
to the courts only through appeal and not
by war of issuance of a summons. In this
case the department had deducted ~l l from
each of the recipients because of home

, The fact that 24-a, Laws of 1947, author- ownership, combined living and the use of
izes a recovery of all amounts, without water without payment. The recipients
reservation, theretofore paid recipients of sought a hearing before the Pierce County
'old-age assistance, it is apparent that the \Velfare Department which rccommcn<lcd
'payment of assistance to recipients, which the deduction and the recipients being d:!-may subsequently be recovered, must be satisfied with the amounts of grants, rec_,charactcrized as a loan, otherwise there ommendcd by the County \Vcl fare Departcould be no provision for _recovery, a.nd ment, requested a fair hearing thereon
under those conditions, of course, would before the director of the state department.
be offensive to Section 2 of Article 8 of
The hearings were had, and thereafter the
the Constitution which inhibits the loaning director approved the recommendations o·f
of the credit of the state to any individual.
the Pierce county we! fare department, and
In the case of Burgdorf ct al. v. Depart- awarded each applicant a grant in the sum
ment of Social Security, H Wash.2d 209, of $29 each month. "The recipients, being
127 P.2d i09, practically the same ques- of the opinion that they were each entitled .
tions arc involved as in the case of Mor- to a grant in a greater amount, appealed
gan v. Department -of Social Security. I from the departmental orders to the supequote therefrom, not so much for the pur- rior court for Pierce county. After a
pose of showing that grar1ts-in-aid to reci- hearing, _the trial court reversed the departpients under the Washington Public As- mental orders, and remanded the cases to
sistance Act, as embodied in initiative 141, the department, with instructions that each
must be made in accordance with the pro- grant should be increased, an<l payment
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thereof in the incrcasccl amount be made partmcnt, 110 nC\11' evidence having been
retroactive to date from December 4, 1940. offered by either party."
From these jud):'mcnts the dcpanmcm of
The controversy gnw out of the fact
social security has appealed. The cases that each recipient sou~ht a grant oi ;S40
han· bcen consolidated for hearing before and there was deducted from said amount
this court.''
$i because of home ownership, and $3 bcThe jml)!t11cnts in thc cases ar bar were caus..- of comhin..:d (i,·in~.
CU•,.. 611 ldal,o

rcverset.l with instructions to enter judgments affirming the orders of the depart-

Further quotin):' from Halsell ct al. v.
Department of Social Security, supra:

mcnt.
[n the case of Halsell ct al. v. Dcpartml·nt of Social Security, I~ \Vash2d i09,
127 P.2d ii I, something of the same prop-

osition as contained in the case of Burg-

"• • • Ju accordance with the conch1sions of law, the court entered its decn:c remanding the proceeding to the department, with <lircctions to revise the

awards by diminatini;; therefrom the dcdorf v. Department of Social Security, ductions al10\"C referred to. From this dcllillll"' supra. was up for di:termination. The
crcc the <lcpartmcnt of social security of
Grays Harbor county wcl fare department
the state of \Vashi11gton has appealed to
recommemkd that a grant be made to l\Ir.
this court."
Halsell of $30 per month, and that a simi"The trial court was evidently of the
lar grant be made in favor of ~(rs. Halopinion
that the dcd1tctions a!io\·c rcfcrrc<l
sell. "The recipients, being dissatisfied
with the rccommcnc.l;ttion of the county

--------

to, made by the director, were not in ac-

cordancc with the provisions of initiati\·c
• • •
we! fare department, rc!]ucstct.1 a fair he:iring befon: the <lircctor of the department, Hl.
"\Ve ha\"C detcrmi11cd this question conwhich hearing was granted and the testimo11y reduced to writing. Based upon trary to respondents' contention. As statc<l
the rccon.1 so made, the director rendered

in our opinion in the consolidated cases of

his decision June 19, 1941, affirming the ~!org:in ct al. v. Department of Social
ac:ion of tile county wd fare department, Security, (14 Wash..2<l 136], 12i P.2d 686,
and awardin):' a grant to each recipient in

we arc convinced that initiative 141 by its

the amount of thirty dollars per month.
Feeling aggricvc<l by the <lccision of the

own terms must be construed in connection
with the F cdcral statute, an<l that certain

director, the
superior

recipients appealed to the

court,

where

the

matter

was

hearc.J upon the rccor<l made before the deG.~ 1u,\ 110-lli

provisions of the state statute arc not in
harmony with the Federal Jaws and must
be disregarded."
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The judgment appealed from was revers- grant an injunction against rates alleged to
ed with instructions to enter judgment af- be unreasonable or discriminatory. The
doctrine is applied in the face of statutes
firming the order of the department.
which expressly purport not to abridge or
In Vol. 42, Am.Jur., p. 698, sec. 254: alter existing remedies on the ground that
"The Federal courts have established such a provision cannot be construed to
a set of princi pies known as the 'primary continue rights which would be absolutely
jurisdiction doctrine,' developed in cases inconsistent with the statute.'' (Innumerconstruing the Interstate Commerce Act able amhorities are cited in support of the
[49 US.CA.§ let seq.], but given general foregoing doctrine.)
application to Federal administrative bodies
In support of the doctrine that an action
other than the Interstate Commerce Commay not be instituted in a district court bemission, and applied by the Federal courts
cause of a controversy arising before an adin relation to state administrative bodies.
ministrative department, we cnc the case
[\\"oodrich v. Northern Pac. R. Co.; 8 Cir.,
of Peterson v. Livestock Commission,
71 F.2d 732, 97 A.LR. 401.]
i\font., 181 P.2<l 152, 157, wherein it is
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction 1s held:
that the courts cannot or will not determine
"It is generally held that aStatute which
a controversy involving a question which
attempts to place the court in the place of
is ,..-ithln the jurisdiction oi an adminisa commission or board to try a matter anew
tratiYe tribunal prior to the decision of as an administrative body is unconstitutionthat question by the administrative tribunal, al as a delegation to the judiciary of nonwhere the question demands the exercise of judicial powers. A few of the many cases
sound administrative discretion requiring so holding are the following: Steenerson
the special knowledge, experience and ser- v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 353,
vices of the administrative tribunal to de- 72 N.W. 713; State v. Great Northern Ry.
termine technical and intricate matters Co., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N.W. 247, Ann.Cas.
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is es- 1917B, 1201; In re Hunstiger, 130 Minn.
sential to comply with the purposes of the 474, 153 N.W. 869; State ex rel. Dybdal v.
regulatory statute administered. The prin- State Securities Comm., 145 Minn. 221, 176
ciple is derived from a consideration of the N. W. 759; State Board of Medical Regisnature of the question and of the inquiry !ration v. Scherer, 2?1 Ind. 92, 46 N.E2d
and the action required for its solution. 602; In re Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262, 280
The courts will not take jurisdiction even N .W. 464, 125 A.LR. 259; Mojave River
ternporarily, pending an investigation be- Irr. Dist. v. Supreme Court, 202 Cal. 717,
fore the administrative tribunal, so as to 262 P. 724; Borreson v. Department of
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Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 425, 14.N.E.2d 485;
Referring to the c:-:.se of Alameda CounIn re Opinion of Justices, 85 N.H. 562, 154 ty v. Janssen, supra, that was an action in
mandamus to compel Janssen as Chairman
A. 217.
of the Board of Supervisors of Alameda
"Statutes providing for appeals somewhat
County to execute certain releases of liens
similar to that under consideration have
and cancellation of restrictive agreements
been held valid by interpreting them as not
with respect to real property of the recipigranting trials de novo in the full sense of
ents of financial aid granted under the prothat expression but as conferring authority
visions of old-age security act of the state.
for the court. to pass upon the lawfulness
In 193i the California Legislature amended
only of the order of the board or commissections 2224 and 2225 of the Welfare and
sion. Examples are: ;\·[organ v. DepartInstitutions Code, into which section 4 of
ment of Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156,
the Old-Age Security Act had been incor._,2i P.2d 686; Investors Syndicate v.
porated, to eliminate the provisions of such
Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N.E.2d 754; Lloyd
liens as well as the provisions making thev. City of Gary, 21-l- Ind. iOO, li N.E.2d
aid a debt of the recipient to the st.ate and
836.
county. Section 2225 was amended to pr<>"The only proper questions that may be vide that, "all liens and mortgages heretotried by a court on appeal from an order fore created under the provisions of said
such as the one here involved is whether chapter are hereby released and the board
the commission acted capriciously or arbi- of supervisors of each county • • •
trarily or without jurisdiction or authority arc hereby directed and authorized to exeunder the law. People of State of New cute and record appropriate instruments
York ex rel. X ew York & Queens Gas Co. of release." Janssen, as chairman of the
v. :'llcCall, 245 U.S. 345, 38 S.Ct. 122, 62 board of supervisors, refused to execute
said liens and releases on the grounds that
L.Ed. 337; State ,·. State Board of Equalit ,·iolated section 31 of article IV of the
ization, 56 l\lont. 413, 185 P. i08, 186 P.
California Constitution, prohibiting the
69i."
legislature from making or authorizing any
Since the majority opinion has been re- gift of public money and also that it do lat\\'ritten, there is included therein the case ed prohibitions in the United States am!
of City of \Yorceste-r v. Quinn, 304 l\fass. California Constitutions against the pas276, 23 N.E.2d -163. 125 A.L.R. 707. I fail sage of any law impairing the obligation
to see wherein said authority is of any as- of contracts. The court in passing 011 the
sistance when applied to the majority opin- question, construed the constitutional pro1on. I will rder to said matter later.
vision as follows [ 16 Cal.2d 276, 106 P.2d
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14]: "Section 31 of article IV of the Cali fornia Constitution prohibits the legislature from making or authorizing a gift

•'

of this court? Is it because of there being
a. public assistance a.ct, or because the legislature has seen fit to amend said act by

of public money or thing of value to any

including therein a provision for a re-

individual or corporation. The next clause,
however, provides that nothing in this section shall prevent the legislature from
granting aid pursuant to s~ction 22 of article IV which amhorizes the granting of
aid to indigent aged. Therefore the release of a lien by a county, pursuant to section 2227 of the \Velfare Cod~, does not
constitute a ,·iolation oi section 31, article
IV, if (1) it is a gift of public money or

covery of the amount of assistance paid a
rec1p1cnt, Section 2-l-a, supra, is not a
part of the substantive law of this jmisdiclion. But, to the contrary, is purely procedural, and, incidentally, is the first resort in an attempt to establish a collection
agency of the Public Assistance Act. The
majority opinion observes, "[f respondent
is right in his contention that the Public

thing of ,·alue, or (2) it is a grant of aid to
indigent aged under section 22 of ;rticle

IV."

.....

Assistance law is unconstitunonal, even
Lhough it cre:i tes no oblig:uion on the part
of any recipient oi relief to repay any part
of the relit:£ gr:imed, it would, of course,

It will be observed that section 22 of carried to its logical conclusion, mean the

rL

article IV of the Constitution, authorized
the granring of aid to indigent aged. We
have no such pro,·ision in our constitution
and it w:1s b<!cause the liens, mortgages and
contracts establishi:d an existing debt, that
Janssen, even in the face of section 2:2 of
article IV, aforesaid, and the legislation
that was enactt:d, rdused to sign releases of
the liens that had been incurred by the
recipients of aid to indig-ent aged. The
majority opinion recites, "Thus, in view
of the statutes, the question before us is
whether the granting of old-age assistance
under the terms and conditions of our

,,.I

• __

legislature would be powerless to provide
for any relief \1·hacever to the deserving
and needy, and that would be absurd."
Prom the forcgoi ng, it is made to appear
that section 2-l-a is superior to all other
phases of the Public Assistance Act. I
know of no one who asserts, or insists,
that the payment of old-age assistance, in
the first instance, violates the credit provision of section 2, article VII[ of our constitution. It is the enforcement or attemptcd enforcement of the recovery provision,
written into the Jaw, that is the "fly in the
ointment." \\"ithout such r·ecovery pro-
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Public Assistance law * * * falls with- vision no one would contend that the act
in the inhibitions of Section 2 of Article is offensive to the constitution. The ens of the Constitution of the State of Idaho." forcement of the recovery provision, howWhat brings the question to the attention ever, is questioned and objected to because
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its enforcement.of necessity shows that the

collected shall be promptly paid to the

payment of old-age assistance to a recipient
is in the nature of a loan. If it were not

United States.' * * • The only mattcr co,·cred by this provision of the act of

in the nature of a loan it could not be re-

Coni;r~ss and by our own statute which
incorpor:itcd it was to pro,·idc for the
«[lp•lrtwnm..:nt anJ distribution of sucl'\
proceeds as may be realized from th~ estate
oi a r~cipicnt oi :.id, and both en:tcrmcnt;

covered and the contention, as I sec it. is
that section 24-a, the recovery provision,
is unconstitutional and a nullity, and therefore incapa hie of enforcement.

I submit that before the State can recover from the cstate of :i deceased recipient of assistance there must exist an obligation on the part of the estate to pay
·-~ amount sought to be recovered.

In

~ e r words, a contractual obligation m
some form or manner between the State
and the decc:iscd recipient, during his lifetime must be cst:tblishccl.

In sµcak1ng of

said matter, rdative to the right of a
state to rcco\·cr from the estate of a deceased recipient of old-age assistance, the
Social Security Act of August 1~, 1933,
49 U.S.Stats. 620, Title 42, U.S.C..-\_

s§

left umouchcd any liability upon th~ part
oi the cst:itc of a recipient to reimburse
the city. .-\ stzttute is to be iair!y anJ reasonably construed and its scope is not to
be C'XtenJcd by construction beyond its
;:q,µarcnt limits. [ Citing ;wchuritics J.
"Both Congress and our own Legislature w~rc content to let th:tt liztbiliLy continue to r~st upon the principks <Jf common law an<l to share in the proceeds of
actions , .. hnc payments had heen made
throug-h ,1ccidcnt, fraud or mistake. The
mere right to share in one half of the net
the estate of a rcc1-

amount collected fr<:>m

.301-306 was mentioned in the case oi
City of \Vorccstcr v. Quinn, supra [304

pienc oi aiJ, without establishing any obligation upon the part of the estate to pay

:\lass. 276. 23 '.'J.E.2d 465), and therein it
is said:

;rnd without creatmg any new remedy,
must be construed to mean that the collect1on from the estate must be had by present
remedies under our existing Jaw. This

"This act of Congress provided for the
grant of F~dcr:il funrls for old age assistance to such States as should adopt an old
age assistance plan containing certain re-

..,,

eonclusion is also supported by the relationship existing between the Federal and
State go,·ernnients in the establishment and
maintenance of old age assistance. * * *

quirements, one of which was that 'if the
State or any of its political subdivisions collects from the estate of any recipient of
"Report No. 6l3 of the committee on
old-age assistance any amount with respect ways and means recommended the passage
to old-age assistance furnished him under of th~ social security bi,1 (H.R. i260). The
the: plan, one-half of the net amount so bill then contained s. 206, captioned 'Over-

,,
,·,'
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payments during life,' which provided that
'If any recipient, through error or otherwise, has received benefit payments in excess of the amount to which he is entitled,
and dies be fore such overpayments have
been adjust~d,' then his estate shall repay
a certain amount to the United States. In
the same report, at page li, it appears that

accident, fraud or mistake."
ours).

(Emphasis

If it is said that Section 24-a furnishes
the right of the State to reco,·er from
estates "the total amount oi assistance
paid" to a recipient under the act ( Ch. 237,
Laws 194i), and that the applicant for as-_
sistance was informed of the provisions
the purpose of this section was to secure
of the act and acquiesced therein ancJ therefrom the State one half of the Federal
to, there is then established the relationship
contributions paid to recipients from whose
of debtor and creditor_ and Sec. 2 of art.
estates the State has recovered on account
8 of the Constitution, extending credit to
of payments 'because those persons had
an individual,· is violated. And, again, if
been defrauding the State.' The commitit is said there is no violation of the cn:dit
tee on finance, report No. 628, recommended provision of the Constitution, where then,
the adoption of bill H.R. 7260 containing we ask, is the obligation upon the part of
said s, 206, and gave (page 29) the same the estate to pay. If the recipient of aid,
explanation of the purpose of this section during his lifetime, did not consult and

t
'

Ii

n

dcce,r.sed rccipic11t wlio had through error
or fraud received ov.:rp<1y111c11ts during his
life time. And the only purpose of our
Legislature in enac:ting that portion of
what now is section 4 of c. 118A relative
to reimbursement, other than from bond
or mortgage, from the estate of a recil)ient
o( ai<l, was a declaration of_ the public
policy of this· Commonwealth that when

~

would be paid to the national treasury.

reco\"ery was had one half of the proceed,

r.t!:
'I,

'i,,.'
~ t

~1ni' ., .
-

for rt'imbursi:ment from tl,e estate of a

!~.

- ': .
"
, .'

•

as did the committee on ways and means. agree, expressly or impliedly, to repay the
amount paid him, how can any obligation

It is cl.:ar t/iat Congrej·s merrly provided

•

I

[Citing authorities].
"Under that law there can be no re•
covery where payments were not made by

attach to the estate.

With these observa-

tions must we not conclude, that the only
recovery that is permissible "rests upon
the princil)les of common law and to share
in the proceeds oi actions where payments
have been made through accident, fraud
or mistake.'' There is another matter I
feel di~posed to mention, and which our
legislature seemingly overlooked in enacting Sec. 24-a, supra, and is unnoticed in
the majority opinion, and that is this: This
jurisdiction is one oi the eight community
property law states. All property acquired
after marriage by either husband or wife,.

. ':

·~

•i,4;, ~·

·.:;•
... ~ . {
•,I~

'.,.. '

(Sec. 31-907, LC.--\.) is community property,
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The demurrer to the complaint says that

Hu~band and wife are equal partners
in community estate. Kohny v. Dunbar,
21 Idaho 258, 121 P. 54-+, L.R.A.,N.S., l!Oi,

it does not state facts sufficient to constilute a cause of action. The trial court sus-

Ann.Cas. 19!3D, 492; Peterson v. Peterson, 35 Idaho 470, 20i P. 425.

_tained the demurrer without leave to amend
and dismissed :he action. In so doing the

\Vife's interest in community property

r

247
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court was right.

I

'

He had no original jur-

is vested interest of same nature and e."<- isdiction of the controversy and could entent as that of her hush.ind. !1-luir v. Pocatel10, 36 Idaho 532, 212 P. 345.

tertain the same only in his appellate capacity. Furthermore, Section 24-a., Session

'

Laws 1947, was void in that there is no
No distinction is made between husband
proYision for recovery under the Social
and wiie as to degree, quantity, and nature
Security Act which is necessary because
or extent oi interest each has in communof the cooperative functions and efforts
ity property. Ewald \'. Hufton, 31 Idaho
of go1·ernment and state laws. The afore3i3, Ii3 P. 247; Peterson v. Peterson,
mentioned state statute is not in harmony
.supra.
with the Federal social security laws and
Upon the death of either husband or for that reason must be disregarded as all
wifo, one-ha! f of all community property
acts of the Social Security Act, and the
shall go to the Sur\"ivor, subject to the
Public Assistance Act, must be administercommunity debts, etc. In case no testaed together as a unified code of laws enmentary disposition shall have been made
acted by Congress and the state legislature
by the deceased husband or wife of his
or her half O f the community property it for the complete and comprehensive con-

i iii....:.. ... ·,
111•~, ..... l!!lfl!!!!!!!!! .•

l=i=~_: ,.,-_,__
;

shall go to the survivor, (Sec. 14-113 I.C.

trol of the subject.

final analysis brings us to the fundamental

A recipent of old-age assistance cannot

proposition that the subject of relief in

create a liability against the community

its \·atious phases, as provided by law, was

1~

Ii

property without tne husband or wife, if strictly within the scope of legislative au.such there be, joining in the encumbrance thority. That branch of the government
.incurring such liability.

!

••

"The matter in the

A.) subject to the community debts, etc.

...

'

. -

very properly and necessarily assumed the

H
L

In the instant case the doctrine of prim- function of pro\·iding the amount to be exary juriscliction is particularly applicable pended for that purpose, and the manner
for the reason th,1c section 24-a, Session and method of distribution. The judicial
Laws 1947, providing for a recovery from department has neither power nor inclina-

j_(

,1;
r.

a recipient of old-age assistance places tion to usurp that authority. If inadequate
the discretion thereof within the state provision has been made for the meritori1W' . department, an administrative jurisdiction. ous necessities of the unfortunate people

:L
t

lI .

I
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1•-

k
-

li!-----·-

000205

GS lDA HO nEPORTS

248

,
ceased, for approval as follows:

The Department of Public Assistance of

State v. Brandjord, supra [ 108 Mont.

the State of Idaho granted and paid old-

ly."

4.:/i, 92 P.2d 279].

Plaintiff's action 1s instituted under the
ord shows that the first payment of oldage assistance was made in i\'Iarch 1943,
and that Magnus died about August I, 1946.
The Departmem of Public Assistance, evidently in construing section 24-a, supra
says, no cl.1im may be filed against a home
while it is being used as a residence by a
surviving spouse. There is nothing in connection with the application for old-age
assistance, or otherwise, that discloses that
said applicant in becoming a recipient,
either expressly or impliedly, contracts to

'

repay any amount paid him by the state.
Section 24-a. supra, in the instant case, is
retroactive, both as to the 194i act and,
likewise, to the Act of 19-13.

•

age assistance to said deceased, as per
the following itemized statement ( following

provisions of section 2+a, supra. The rec-

·~

•

*"

of the state, we may sympathize personally
but we are powerless to intervene official-

There is

is the monthly date and monthly amount
paid Magnus as per the creditors preferred
claim which is ;ittached to and made a
part of the complaint.)

"This c!aim 1s

made and filed as a µreferred claim against
said estate under the provision of Section
2, Chapter I 19, [daho Session Laws 1943."
It will be observed that the record discloses that the complaint was ~ul:Jsequently
amended to show that the ;1mount claimed
to be due and owing to the state of Idaho
was under the provisions of th.: Public
Assistance Laws as amended by Section·
-l, Chapter 237, Session Laws 19-17, and the

provision contained in the claim as being
under the Laws of 1943 was not stricken
therefrom.· The record also discloses that
the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs
complaint was argued and submitted for

nothing in the complaint, or the record, to
advise us as to whether there is a surviv-

decision. and sustained without ka \'e to

ing spouse in this case, nor, as to the nature

amend and the acuon dismissed s~prember

of the estate, if any, of which Magnus was

26, 19-!i. Thar there was a stipulation
allowing the am~ndment showing that the

possessed at the time of his death.

The

'"Creditors Preferred Claim," filed by the a~tion was prosernted under the µrovisions
Department of Public Assistance of the oi Sectio11 -l, Chapter 237, Sess1011 Laws
State of Idaho, In the .Matter of the Estate of Frans

l94i", nunc pro tune by intcrlincation and

G. Magnus, deceased, recites, ll'ithout the same having previously been

"The undersigned creditor of Frans G.
Magnus, deceased, herewith presents its

submitted to the trial court asking that
the complaint be reinstated.

claim against the estate of said deceased
with the necessary \·ouchers to l\els Lind-

We submit that the order of the trial
court sustaining the demurrer and dismiss-

strom, executor of the estate of said de-

ing the action should be affirmed.

''

.,.,,

,.
- • r--,--:.
'

'"'-·,-

-.
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knowledge of the real purpose of the public assistance program· and the administration thereof.
· (d) To recommend to the State Department of Public
Assistance such rules, regulations, policies and procedure, as
in the judgment of the Council, shaJl increase efficiency,
effect economy and generally 1mprove the administration of
public assistance.
_ _
( e) The Commissioner of Public Assistance shall pro-

-- ....· ·,.
_;-;:: · _: ·
''

1_:_,_._;_~::_~_:_:_:::_,-.li:_:.,;_t_{t

:~1!:~~;:~;~~~~;~~I:~~~~~:~~;~~:~;::~

•

.
. -,
~\.;'.'.
'.·. .·,·,:_: ~·:.'.~.- .
,

fair hearing before the State Department of Public Assistance as provided by Section 16, · Chapter 181, Idaho Session Laws of 1941; nor as preventing the State Department
of Public Assistance from administering the public ysistance laws of this state as a single state agency. .

;_;,~~,:·.r

SEc. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE - EMERGENCY. An
emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby
~,~..;;:£.·.'':-':- · · · · declared to exist, this Act shall be in full force and effect
.',q.')i~.::..-.... -.. · from and after its passage and approval.
?~~;>,·!··:~ ,.. '. . -

:_l_-.{.J,,'._}_;_:::_.-:-·,-

~~-.,1

~ir

i(-~. .

·)~~;;

__

Approved March 2, 1943.

.

,,:::..

,•~s: L. '43 .;:-uo-

·

·

~if1:,Jfc1st'
i.si ·
i:.;c: 32 Sec. 1 .,., · .

CHAPTER 09

·~tD,_ ~ .'.:;,.:: ,-_.

i

~

(H. B. NO. 191)

. ;,-.o;?;,:--·

~;J,.'-•,\·-·l/f?t·.

AN ACT

ff~\-'X•i}\. _ AMENDING SECTION 14 OF CHAPTER 181, IDAHO SESSION
''"trh~;r,;;:J,;/, ·. , LAWS OF: 1941, PROVIDING THAT PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
!/'!f/}_1.\/_:f,·;.~~:\, · . SHALL NOT BE GRANTED TO ANY. PE~_SON .A.SSIGNINQ

:91,&~;i..;;,;'.t>}~'-:
OR TRANSFERRING HIS PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE
~i';~~''.',~:,,;~;·,;,y .:·. !;OF . RENDERING H~MSELF ELIGIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE; · ..
;_~ _..,,&:{·\/·:.· FUR~HER_ AMEND.ING ~HAPT·ER 181, IDAHO .SESS!ON_.':
;· ·- - .

'·;,)<·,,

-ji~{ :: :.

.·-

. -LAWS OF 1941, RELATING.TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BY .... ' ·

:,\ADDiNG FOUR NEW SECTiONS IMMEDIATELY. FOLLOW--:_:; .. ;.
BE NUMBERED.. SECTIONS 24~a; ~24-b:<. ,·.
:..:~::;::?{ei'!./t..-~· -~ ·: .~24:~-\.tY{p: 2~-~, ·RESPECTIVELY;. PROVIDiNG ,-_FOR __::.R¥1-;-.'-( ~ . ·.
.
J!":J-;7'i:." ;· _ COVERY·FROM -RECIPIENTS OR THE ESTATES OF.RE-:·:-.:1.: ..
~IPI~NTS i°N. CERTAIN CASES AND. THE DISTRiBUiI9Nt ·.
·.
'0)1' SUCH. RECOVERIES; DEFINl~G FRA:t.JDULENT ,ACTS:_.'. . ·1
tfi:.?;;: .·.·. 1N ·SE~UR_I~~ PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND .PROvn;n_NG .· ;·

_

. ~;;·_.:"':_,-= ·. · .:I.'~G};_ECTION 24,

TO

: ·----- l~.1\f;/:_:;:.

:11& ,?~if:1:\ ~,

m

~-·;c.1~~4t~jit;$~1-·;::,tf,½t:t,J~ I:}t,)i.~i-;;iJ~:_x;.ittZj~~;;
. , .... . :·": :..a--~..,.
-~

:" -~
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PENALTIES THEREFOR; FIXING ·THE EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THIS' ACT AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 14, Chapter 181, Idaho Session
Laws of 1941, be, and the same is hereby amended to read
as follows:
.

.

SECTION 14. AWARD OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE.
Upon the completion of the investigation, the state depart.:
ment shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for
public asistance under the 'provisions of this act, the type
and amount of public assistance he shall receive, and the
date upon which such public assistance shall begin. Public
assistance shall be paid in the manner prescribed by the
state department. Public assistance shall ·not be grantedunder thi..s act to any person who has made an assignment
or transfer of property for the purpose of rendering himself ·
eligible for assistance under thi..s act.
SEC. 2. That Chapter 181 Idaho Session Laws 1941, be,
and the same is hereby amended by adding four new sections
thereto immediately following Section 24, to be numbered
Sections 24-a, 24-b, 24-c, and 24-d, respectively, and to read,
as follows:
·
SECTION 24-a.-Recovery from recipients. On the death
:i:.~.3
•. 11911
of any recipient, the total amount of assistance paid or re-. •ec.
2 (24u/
lief granted under this Act shall be allowed as a preferred . reoealed ·
S.L. '47 c. 23i i
claim ·against the estate of such person and shall l,e sub- , •e<:.
3 p. 586. I
ject only to the-expense of the last illness,· funeral expenses
not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of administration o/

·

'!' ~
\

j

said estate. No claim shall be enforced· against any real

estate or personal property of a recipient while such real.
estate is occupied qy the recipient, a surviving spouse, or a ·
dependent, but the Statute of Limitations shall not begin
to run against such claim so long as the collection thereof is
prahibited, iz..g hereinabove provided.
/ Such claim shall be made by the county or, in cases of.
cooperative assistance, b·y the state on behalf of all participants contributing to such assistance.
.
SECTION 24-b. Diftribution of recover_ies. The ~~a.~e .,_;iis.i:·,,3·~:·m1
Depart~ent shaU certify tq th~ .s_ta_te Auditor the amou?1-Lf1::e!1~-r'
recovered from each estate of recipients, and a proper _d'!,!17 ;··.-. ·s.L. •47 c. 2a1
tribution thereof shall be· made by the State Auditor in pr9.;'::~· ~-~c~!~~~~--
porticm -to the amount of assistance contributed by the'··. ,~'-!t-''-'.h.'/'
state, the counties and the federal government for such ,,· ·.- .' . ·..·
assistance.
·
·
· · ·· ·· ·, _. · ·. ···

I
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SECTION 24-c. Fraudulent Acts-Penalty. Whoever
knowingly obtains, or attempts to obtain, -or aids or abets
any person in obtaining, by means of a wilfully false statement or representation, or other fraudulent devices, assistance or relief to which he is not entitled, or assistance or
relief greater than that to which he is justly entitled, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned for
not· -more than s-ix months, and be both so fined and imprisoned in the discretion of the Court.,,,
Whoever sells, conveys, mortgages or otherwise disposes.
of his property, real or person,al, or conceals his income or
resources, for the purpose of rendering him eligible for any
· · form of relief, theretofore or .thereafter applied for and received, to which he would not otherwise be entitled, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned for
not more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned
at the discretion of the court. ,
·
·.-~ Every person who ·knowingly aids or abets any person
· in selling, conveying, mortgaging o·r otherwise disposing of
his -p1·operty, real or personal, or in concealing his income
or resources for the purpose of rendering him eligible for
any form of relief, theretofore or thereafter applied for and
received, to which he would not otherwise be entitled, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned ·not
more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned at
the <!,iscietion of the court./
·
. ·. ·
SECTION 24-d. EFFECTIVE DATE-EMERGENCY.
An emergency existing there/or, which emergency is hereby
declared to exist, this Act shall. be in full force and efject
from and after its' p_assage and approval.

Approved March 2, 1943.

CHAPTER 120
(H. B. NO.

158)

AN ACT
TO AMEND CHAPTER 20, TITLE 39, IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED, BY ADDING THERETO TWELVE NEW SECTIONS,
NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY SECTIONS 39-2021 TO SEC-TION 39-2032, INCLUSIVE, WHICH NEW SECTIONS AUTHORIZE THE DETACHMENT FROM'A .STATE HIGHWAY

000209

\

I
I
:i. los$.

73 IDAHO REPORTS

I

The loss 11111,t Le :i.ctual and nut
1

pru,rco::t i ,·e.

This uL,·i:11,·s <:011,i,kr:1tion or Jetcrmi11a1i1111 , , f wh.11 "'""1,l h;l\·c l,ccn thc :i.mount

if :ill,>w:il,k. Th.:rciorc, I
,rnlr in th.- atlirm:111ce oi thc judgmcnt ,li,:i.ll"" ::,;.: l h,· ,k,lu<:tiun.

ui ,lcd11cti"11.

[4. 5)
ch::-trnyrd

The ,·al11..- of the pa,ture nr i:-ra,s
W.:t5

tit:,·.,_•r

as in~onh. ",

rl·pnrh·il

c,1111:ur

an<! to :i.llnw the l,;,s cl:limcd w,111ld. in cfit:c:. all11w a doubk ,h:dm:ti1111. i11 a11 :1111111111t
in ,·xccss oi the .1ct11al ..:o~t ur lu,s ,us-

Tllu:-.t.\:•,

J.,

cu11..-ms..

tai:1cd.
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t..:r:1:.I E-:c\'ennc, i 11.T .. \. !.!.I.!; S1,·,·cr,u11
v. (um111issio11a

11

I knee

In,~

t: ..111111i,sin11,·r

"
:(.

claimed were dcci,kd a,h·,·r,cly tu the L1x('ayer 1n llarl•l\\' v.

·----;m•--•m1'111
r

it iollnws that iur in~umc t.lx 1111rpuscs
th..::rc was no l,,s,.

S:mil.1r si111atill11S

..I,
''.,

n:r .. \.

J~:::::·:~:·::~:~:d P•Ollo W•II•"
l'm!a pN,·i~i,111 ui Xation:11

1

~ :·~f .

~-1~

2;:i

SQci~- (

S,·i:11ri1y .\i:t prnd,lini: for re1l111:tion f~ _ ,, 1-

pa~·m,·uts tu ;::itl: oi pro rat:i :1h:are

-~f
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NI:WLA.ND v. CHILD
C:te

:urni~h,d,

~3 l,Jobu 53U

in amo11111s reeo\'c~nl by

Cnited States
State with

>9

n·spc..:t
wh.:11

to uld-:i;:c: a,;:,:an..:,:
prac:1cil

,,pna::,;n

of

~tate pl:111 was sue!l th;it pru r:.1:1 ,:-..;.~, ,,i

,:11c

:eeon·rics

i;-01·c·~r1mr:::

frdcral

si,t;inc~ prorisiu11s

of

Public ,\ssi,tancc

I.C. §§ St>-201

L.111·.

ct seq., :(>..21):,

:<>-

:;

5. So,;l;il Securtty and Public Welfare ~31

il

In

was

1·icw ui ia..:t th:it ~r:1111i11g ui ;iiJ

to :he 11c·c:tiy aJ,:·:cl is a well

.:ontril,1111u11s

,t::te

.,IJ!il!:iti,m oi the ,tatc an,) is a i,:u1·cr11-

~-.::,_:,:c:

:11r:nal innc:iun te11Ji11,; tu pru1111Jt,: p11Llic

rc<lncc,l

:i,,11r•:::1;:-:y.

L:t\\.

\\.·;,:-.

::.,:

ii

:?O:-.

.::c,litnl Ill ::s ac·euunt in ,-,:1,,· :1::h! ;;.::J ::s
:'uhli~ .\::~:~tJ.11.:c.:

,I'

rccol!r1izeJ

;j·,'

j
ij

1'111,lie :\,,i,ran..:e

a
a

.::ficall~· pro, :,:c for pa:;mc:111 ui ;,~o ~:ita

l...1w ior li.:n 11].><.)n the r,·al property ul

,hare Jirrc: :o i,·dcral :.:0,·,.·rnir.,-:,1. ::,,.·:al

n·c:picnts is cCJ11St1t11tiu11:dl~· jus1i1iaLI.: 1,y

11__,ec11r:::-· .-\..::. ~~ I ct ;,·•1., .:,li,,~-- a,
:,:ncmkJ, 4..; C.S.C.:\. §§ .i'll c: ,,·•t, _;_.J,_1,;

:he puulic purpos~ uf pr11m1Jti11i: the curn-

i

:o a1:a..:k on J.:-fOllnd t!'::it it •.!:d

f!L'.

~pe-

pru1·i,iu11

w.:'i.,re,

mon

wcli;,rc".

of

J.C.

g

!

Sij...:!IU, 5t>-2.?-k1;

c~,nst. ar:. s, ~ 2.

· ~).
:?.. Con,t11ullonal Law C::8,

6. States C::,119

The ri"ht to own ;,r.d <':1_1•')' ;.:-:,·:i1e

l'al,lic · a,si,1:1111:c: law is sal'cd from

,'~"pcr:y is iund:1mcntal. ~11,! :, ,m,·

0:

:!1c

~.,1::!i.:1 with .:1111,titution:11 proYi,iun that

::;i111ral.

:::.:':11s

i:r,dir CJi "t:itc ,hall 11111, in any m~1111cr.

·Ji ir.:c
·.:<)II~.

inhcrcnr
111,·11.

i11.1li, 11~1,lc

:in,!

whi.:h pre-c·x,,:,·,i ,·,.::,::tn-

(u11,t. ;.rt. 1,

s~

l, l.i

I

1.C.

1 ::r,-

!,c

;:1n·11,

ur lo:l!lnl tu, or i11 aid oi any

111di,·id11:d, !J~· f.1ct that ~uch a»i,1a11cc is
fur pul,lie puq,u,.: vi pru111u1i11~ the cum111,>11

w,:I fare.

J.C.

~§ :&-2 IU, 5t>--22·fa.

Cun,1. art ..~. § :!,
,·:1joy pri\·;1t,· prn('t"TIY, alth1J11:,:h

:i

11:,::ir:d,

.i,,

:(

7. P:auper1 ~3
En-11 as tu p;u1pa~ :iml indiK,:nts, th,·re

:::hc·rcnt aml :nalic·nahle r::;:u ui ifl'< ::icn, 1s nu C1J!lsti1111i1 mal or cum,non-la,v Jnty
i~ rnl>,iccl 111 :c:af1111alilc li1:m:11io:1 and :t\!11· fl'>lirtJ.:' up,111 the state to prv,·iJe support,

!::.:iun br the ~1:11c in tho:

i1111:r1:fl; u: the

l,111 any ul,lii;a1:on ui ~tat,: in such respect

,t,:11111un wdi:in·, .ind :my ~tallltt· imv;;ing:

is moral rather th:111 .1 ma:1.J.itury one, ant.I

a :imira:ion u;,.,11 ~11ch r:::?u 11111;1 l,,· ,up-

rii:ht tu recl'i,·c s11.:h a»i~1;111ce is a crea-

H

ture of ,tatutt·, \\·hit·h inay Le ,::,ctcn,lcJ,

i"'~t.-.1 hy 1h;1: p11rJ11J~l'.

l. 13; 1.C

~

(Jn~t. art. :.

:,,-..,;..;4;1.

,!i111inish,·d. co111li1i,,11,..,l or .11.Jruga1~·1l

~. Social Security .and P11bllc: Welfare ~43

One is not

rt·1111ir,·d

,r ab~,llutdy ,:,·;titut,:

;i~

ti>
:i

the lcJ.:"i,l:111m:.

1,y

LC'. §~ 5~2 IO, Sf,- 224:1.

la· a ;1~·;'.,t:r 8. Social Security and Publlc Welfare c:=22

prc-rcqu1,::~ 10

~eceiJ>t oi payment~ un,lcr th~· oid-aJ;"·: as-

In

,·ii:w ui

fact

that slate has no

m:111,la1,,ry ol,li~:1tiun, eithl'r constit111io11al
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or hy cum mun l:i w. to pr,l\·id..: ,111•1 1"r: t0

its citizo.:ns. one whu

bSl'rtS

ri,:ht

Iv .1,•

12. Ci>nstltutlon.,F Law ~208(16)
Socl:il S~urlly :and Publlc Welfare ~31

In ,·icw oi fai:t that old-~..:.: pro\'isious
sistancc u11dl·r st:1tut,·~. mu,t c.-111ply 11 ith
uf
P11hlic
.\;si,1:111ci: L,w cont,·mpbtc that
,111 rca,un;ihl,: :ind no11di,crimi1utory c.mditio11s inip,Jscd liy tho.: k~i,l:itin: :,uthu~:ty_ 1wnly .11;,·,I p<'r,,111 ~h:111 rcccil'e :issist:rnce
:1,·,:11r.:i11i:- 10 i11di,·id11:1I nc:l·d:i, with rcg:trd
LC. §~ :rl--210, 5o---2~h
to r,·,,111rc,·, ., ,·.1ibhle to him from wh:it9. Constitutional Law C:·tl
,.1'.:r ,,,ur,·,·. i11.:ludi11..:-, hy p,·rtincnt rcguThe pri,~po.:cti1·c l1<·irs oi r.-cipi,·nt ,,i
l.ttit111, prr~,,nal pri1p,-r1y or such person,
old-:igc as,.i~t:lllcc, ha1 :11..:- 11,1 1·,·,tl·,I 11::apr11l'i,i1111 i,,r li,·11 11p1111 r,·:d prop..:rty of
c~t in pr11pa1y lli th..: r,·(ipi,·nt. h:11·" :111
r,·.:ipi,·nt ,, 1 ,,ld-:11.:,· ;1,,i,t:111.:c is not disn~ht rn c11n1pL1i11 ,Ji lint pr11,-i:--1t,n tit' \1:,1 ..
-~:111111:.t,,ry .,, iol'111c,·11 p,·r,ons owning real:1L!'c a,~i,1:111c.: l:1w. LL. ~~ 51,-..:tn. ~..,_
ty a11,I :h,.,l. ,1\\'11i11!:' ,111iy pas,111:ilty, since

22~:i.

t!:..: l'•·~-,,oal::· 11w11,·d ha, h..:..:n t:ikcn into

10. Constitutional La"' ~191
Social Security and Public Welfare C:11

,,,J.

:\pplic:nrnn oi li,·n prm·,,i,,11~ oi
:\L!'C
:1110.:0.:

i

;i,si,t;inc,· pr11l'i~i11:1, oi 1'111-li,· .\-,:,:•

I.aw to rl·cipirnb ,ii :ii.I pri"r

:,1

l·o1n,1. .trL

1. ~"
J'.
I'

I J. S1:ltut1n C:,,7(1)

.\1:1,·11>111:,·111 ui 1• 1_~1 1,1 r11blic

.'ij

A~i~t-

:111,:,: L.1w. 1':,J1"1di11!,!' i11r (jl'II :1L!'ai11:;t rc:iJty

.-~\
;iml·ndmo.:m pro,·i.lim: i,,r li,·11, ,·:rn11,11 ,·.,n- o:' rn·:pil'lll, oi a~~i~1;1n.:,.•, ~ing by its·_: If
stitt1ll' .l rctr,1,pl'Ctirc i11v:1,ior1 11i a ,.<',:~d tt':m, :1p1•l:,:il,lc alik..: to :itl p.:-rsons _· .;l·
rli.d1t. :--ince n:~ipit:nt.s qf i>Jd.a::.: .1'.'.':,;i~Lll!(...: rhro1ui..:l-:11ut 11~~ ,t:1.h:. "dt,1 e<)1tlc within the
c;in ,1op11rc no ,·.:~t~,I ri;.:ltt thereto.
r,·;p,·.:::'"c , 1:t,~l·S thcr,·in pro"iJ,..J for," . \·

I

u.:.

~~

:r,-2\0. :tl--22-fa.

and 1,,·i:t!,!' h:t _..,t up,111 a n·a,,,nahl.: cl:issi- .·· ....1\
1i,·.11i1111 wit l1i:1 :1111h,1rity oi tile l,·gislaturt, '. .

II. Constltullonal La"' ~208(1)

I

-:< \

i; ll"t 1·i,,L.1i1·.; ,,i .:nn~tit111in11al inhi~ition'·.._
The lq:-i~l:tturc h.1s lm1:i,I ,ti,,-~I'.'·
:IL;:1111,1 !,,,·:.! "r ~p,·,·1;il law;. I.C. §§ 10- ·
tin11:1ry pf)\\"l'f to n1:1kc i.:L1,'.'-itl1...·:1t1011, l,cI I 13, ll'-11 P. 56-.!HJ, 0:(}-:2~. So-2.?-la;, "".._
pcr,,,:i, and property i11r ;di p11rp11~,-~ wh1,·:1
..
'
C,,11,1. ;Ir{, J. ~ l').
'. 1
it may lawfully ~,·ck 10 :1.:c11111pli~h. anLI :-,J
• • •• ,., I
l,,ni: as rite ..:las~iri,·;iti1111,; arc 1,a~,·d ,111 ~,111:c I.&. Saelat Security :and Publlc Welfare $:132.: :_-. ~.:11
• 1
<::jl
l'rt1,·i~i,1n ,1i 1'151 a111,·11<lm,:11t to ~b-: · ·~·1i
1.-;!irimatc gro11111l oi ,lirT,·rcnl·c !1,•1w,·,·:1

I

.c
f

. ___ ,,.

persons or ohjccts cbs~i,i,·,I. and l>e:ir

J.

';!.;

lie .\,~1,:;111.:c Law. n·L11i1·c to lien on ~~,: ·. :i

D(!f:- ~:

rca~onahlc relation to rhc k;:i,dati,·c pur-

ty ,,i r.-.·:pi,·111;. oi old-a~c assis1:mcc, is

pose, ;iml arc not ur1n·a,;,111altlc ,,r :irhi1rary,

they do not ,·iul;itc the .:on,ti1111iu11. l 011,:.

in .:,,1111:.:t wi:h. ,111.i 11':t~ not n•p,::i[,..J b.Y ·
prn\'i,ion ~111,~,·,111,·nth- ,·na.:rcJ ;it s:intc ~.:__ r.,-.

art. 1, § 2.

si,,a. 11r,n·idi11;: for n·,·u1·l·ry oi asmt~ .•

0

--1:{'
...

•

•

•

-~~~

1
I

......
~

000212

NEWLAND v. CHILD
t::r ...~:-1.d 7:; hl3ho ~:!O

p.1id :1J one not entitkd thereto,

by :ne.ins oi

The St:it<.: oi Lhiln is enjoined lJy our

a pr.::crrcJ claim a,::":iinsc his estate. ;ince
d11"i.:c.:nt .:';,,:s,:s oi
wi:!1.

recipients :ire J.:alt ,:011,t1tutio11 irom ltJ:min::- ib credit in th<:

~~ lt~l I IJ, 10--1 l l4. :6-ZI0, aid oi an,\' indi"id11:d.

l.C.

:!)-.:.!-t. :(,... 2,2-t;i: Con,t. art. 3, § 19.
15,

.\im:n,:mcnt to Puhli.: ,\,,i,t:ir.c.: L.iw
rr·"·,,'in~ :or ju,lr:mcnt ti,·n on rc:li'.y <>i

0:

In this case th.:

:i~r..:,•mc:it "E:--"hihit :\'' cr,·.11.:s a detinit,~

s 0 c1 3 1 ~curlly and Public Welfare C::31

rc.:i\':,:nt

I

Kibkr & TI,·,bc. \".1111pa, for arpdl;int:;.

cut1tr:1ctu.il r.:l:1tiun,hip 11.:tw<:cll the 1,:irtio.:s.

Th.: :i~rccmcnt ;;tat,·s th.,t it i~ ;:ivc11

ior the rurpo,c <>i "<Cl'.ltrity'' ior rc-im·

ohl-:i~c :issista11cc and ?ro,·i,l-

burscmcnt oi .ill ,ild :i;::-c :i"si,t:incc ;uy-

:or cc-~:iti.::itc oi total anioimt ,Ji lien
· 1 ·
·
L
,imc·l. r::,,:lnscs lc~1:' :lt!\·c 111:c:-:~ ::iat

rcc.:ircd aitcr Jul~· 1st. 1931 :in,1 :i
"nic,k.: :111d :i,:,i;..~1m,·m·· oi :ill •'ri,.ht. titlc
,.
-.
;incl intcrr,t'' in :irnl to dcscrd,.:d rc-:d prnp·

111~

lllllllll[lt1 :'::•J11ld t,,: ~uhject to rl'k:i~c.: 11:10:i ?J.Y·

;:ir,l\·;,;e,I b,·
:nr:11. :ind

vi,iun

:s

:s

(;i\\·

i,1r rel""'~ oi J. ;n,:r:·

not dd.:cti\'c 111 :hat ::0 ;iru-

:-:::.,k i,Jr rdo.:a;,: ui lien

oi sa.1:,iac:;.in pr,,,r tu

,\,:;11h

::i

ose

,,i ro:c:pio::11.

J.C. ~3 ](.. ;\IJ, l•J-111•. ~,,-..!10,
:11--..:.!~:1; ( 0:ist. :irt. .3, ~ l'J.

:,>-22•,

16. Co11tracl~ C::95(1, J}

I l

-l'

a
:f

:l'j

I I

' II
I!

I,

, Ir

1
a

·1

I
I
I

1110.:ms

1

m,·n: 0i a:::,mnt oi certiri,:itc. in ::::inr:cr

II

cr1y, hut n,lt l:mi:,·d to the ,kscrihcd propcr:y. The tr:tn<ac:inn under the prO\·ision~
o i Ch:iptcr H;". 19~ I S,·s~io11

)

L.,ws, thus

liL"L'am.: a ";,:curity" :r:,n~acii,m :11ul :is snch
;L

"'morr::::1:::(" nMn

,·.111c,·111l't1ts mad.:

the

l>y

pr...pcny ior th.: :icl-

th.: Stat<:

,,r

td:ih,>

i,1r

uld :i~I! :i;,i,ta111:c with m:11.:hc,l S1:i le an,I
FL·1kral f-1111ds.

tc:nq>t..:d

IQ

If the rrnp,~rty ,,·:i.s at~

b<: ~111,1 or ,li,rn'L'1! ,,i prior to

T" he ,·.,i,l:ilik 1,,·c:in,,• .,f ,lure;;, :rn ,k:\lh •Ji al'pdlanl~. ,'\ method oi iorcClllSllr<:
,,·0:; pron,kd. :ind .1 mcth,,.\ oi re-payment
11,:,t l111ly he oltt:t1nl·1i hv

.-1~;-c.:..,-:-'!:1...·nt r::u::--t

in lhc

tu the ;St;11c:

t'~c.: :ic:~c·,·111,·::1 i1,:d f mu~t lie 1111ju~:. un·

purp<Jrtcd l,11si110:ss tr:i11sa<:t10J1\, althmn;:h o!, .

..:,m~c:nn;.l,k. or ilk~;,!. :rnd it c;uu:r,t !),:

t,,111e<l nn,kr hn,111c:~s c,irnt•111:iio11, cr.::1tt:<I

C\'<:nt

oi ,lcath.

This

::i,·ans oi prc,;11r..: hr,nu,:lit to lic:ir. liut

prcdi.::it,·,I u;>-111 d,·mand,; which .,re !:i.w- the cm1om:irr ri:1:,tion~hip oi h:1111.:r :inol
i'.11. or the :hn:at to ,IQ th;ll whic:t the borrower. ,\rtidc ::;, :-;cc. 2. lilah,, Cm·

stimti•m; Chapt,:r Hi, I~·~ l :-cs~ion Laws;
H:1111101:k C.mttt~· v. Ci1i1.c11s Bank & Tru~t
Ii. Social Se<urlly and Publlc Welfare c=JI
Comrany, :., Idaho 1.:'J. Ii:, 22 P.:z.i 1ii-t:
In ,·icw 0i fact that ,lcm:111,l oi ;:ate
::51:111.: ,·. Li111btrum, 61:> ld:1ho 226, l?l P.2d
iur rkn u1M111 rc:il pr11pcr:y oi ,,ld-ai:e rc1009.
.::pil•nt :; la" :111. fair J.11<! just, there .::i.n
ln l,l;iho it is :ill -:stal,lish.:,I g-uarantcc l)t
be n-> ,:ur,·~~ ,Jr bn::in..:,,; ,:,,mp11l,io:1 in·
our constit11ti()t1 th:it c\'crr person h:is m·
"OiwJ :11 the ul11:i.i11i11~ •>t li.:11. l.C. H
;1lic11;1ult.: ri;;hts Jnrini,: his lif.:timc to :i.c,~.=l11 ~~ seq .. :r,-.,!0~. :1,-,!•J;".
~..:man,l:111: plrty h;is :i lq~:,1 right to t!o.

1, '

.....
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quire, possess anJ enjuy rirop.:rty. The requireJ cxl·cution of the "Exhil,it :\'' J~ a
conJitiun pn·Cl·1k111 to n•cc·i\'i11t." i11rtlll'r .,1,1
age :issist:incc a1·lt:r _l11ly 1st. lq:I, is in dcri,gatiu11 oi such cu11~llll1tiu11;il right.

Hy

R11l,cr: E. 5mdie ..\tty. Gen., :md \Villi:1111

If. Hak,·s. :\~~t. :\tty. Gen., for rc-

~pt,111lc:11t.

TiiL· r1i:ht to Ji~puse of 011c':1 property
:iilt r

,k:1th ;s a r1~h1 ,n·:itcJ lly statute, and

al!u,,·in;: p.-rsons rcn·i,·in~ ul,l a1:i: ;1~,:st·

the ll·;!islarnrc 111:ty i111pu~c such cunJitions

anct: to control ;inJ tnjuy thi.:ir uwn prt1pcrty, fac:lit:1tcs_ the public int<:rl'St and wclfan·, :ind .iiJs the indi!:l'III :q.:,·d ;1s w,·!1 :i~
a Jirec: grant oi mu11c·y. Uy l.,,.·in;; al,k tu

upun tho: l·X<:n:i,c ui the ri~ht as it secs,
:it. :::al<.: ,·., rel. :--:icl,011 v. Lindstrom,.
\•.q:,;_ 1,--; hLhu .:.:r,. !qi l' ..!,I \!)JI; Bankers·:._·

Trm: (u. \', Blud~t·t\. :!titJ l:.S. 6-17, 4J S.',I
r,:- 1.. bl. -:..i 1.>

sell the property ur uht:tin loans ,h,·rrnn, Ct. .;.1.3.

i'

it is possiiJlt: fur Jir<·Ct ;lid lo he ,·I :111i1L1tcd

to the nt.:nt rhat the recipient i, rda·,·,.J

Th, lt-p,ht11re ha, thl· right to classify :
pt·r,1111s :mJ uhj,·,t~ ior the p11rpo~e of ler-' I,:

l,y cxt:rcise of bis in:i.li,·n:il,J., right tu ,un·

i~l:ltion wh:,h cLls~i1i,::nirn1 will not

for

J.

timt:, :ind thi.: pul,lic trc:"11r:.· rclil·\'c1l

:\rti..:lc l. Sec. I,

i'

trol his own propl·rty.

I

)Jahu Cumtihaion;

l

_lansscn, 16 Cal.2J T.6, 106 P.2il 11. UO :\.
LR. I l·U, 1147; ll Am.Jnr., Cunst.uw,

i

i
I

I
!

l

j

1145, 1146 anJ 1147,

:\bmcd;i 1.",rnnty v.

~

3.l.::.

To achic,·c cons1it11ti011;il 1111i iormity re-

q111n:s th;1t a law OJJl'r:,ti- ;dike upun all "ho
come \\'ithin the scupe uf it5 provision~.
Such uni iurn,ity t.lucs not appt.·ar as to

all pcrsuns as a class whu n·ccin:J :h.:
variuu, typ,s of puLlic ;i~,i:-t.111cc.

a ;peci:il da,s i~ sini;lo:J unt,

1.

} lcrcin

e., thu5e rc-

cci\'ill~ "ulJ ;1~1: a~si,tancc'' who own ,l·;il
estate, ur some interest tho:rcin.
Jur., St:nnh:5 76, § S:; l3i~

Co. v. 01apm:111,

4:

,v

Su

.\m.

•

l'.2i.l 1009, :inJ casl:S citcJ
and special law5.

uP:,·\l

Fr:d1rn. 1' 1-'t1. JJ !d:d10 314, 193 P. 1013;·1_

l~l\16, ll Id:iho il9, 8-t'
P . .!:. 4 1..l.: .. \ .• >,;.~ .• 10'.>, 114 .·\111,St. 285{~
Bii:: \\·,,.,.I C.lllal Co. v. 1.'h:q1111:in, 1927, ~-;
J,l;dtu .,'il!, .;t)J l': 45.
•';

:5tatc , .. (;dlnw:iy.

l'ru\'lsiuns fur the rl',un:ry of mane,~,- J.

~r;111t,'\.I fur puhlic a,:;i,;ta11cc purpo:ics f~:,'
th~ nt;1tc ui the rc.:1picnt after Lkath ~"'_:
not \111..:Un>llt\ltl<ln:II J.~ 1,,·ini, ;1 Ivan

of tlici'-

!:-t:,to:'s crcLlit to an i11Ji\'icl11:1I.

State _Y~~.
L111t1~m,111. 1•.qs, ,~-; ltl;1l10 2.?6, 191 P.2cr .

lQ~.>: \\":tll!oeri.: ,._

L"tali

l'uhii,:

Wdfm;-,

Lv11m1:~,ivn, 1949, l l~ Ctah .:42, 203

P.2d'·. ,·

~1.i5.

uuJ C;rn;1I

IJ;1hu 3l:i0, 403 . .!6.3 P.

43; St;itc \'. Li111btro111, ~ ld:1ho :!.!6. 191
4

be

Crom v.~ ·

~et unk~, it 1s pal11alily ;irl,itr;iry.

illi t\)

To\ \'LOR. _T11~1icc.
:\1'1'.-lla111~ ar,· hu,:b:iml an,I

wife,

0 cm:ral rl'C1\11cnt:s oi vlJ·:t~c :is~i:;t:1111:c um.let the
state Public .-\ssi~t:incc Law, This la,v, ~

-~·..l . ..

ill
......,.

..-HUI:
.. ,111 .
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(

Cito! ns ;3 [Ju h,;, ;;,,

ac~,·,: in J()4J, creates the state De?artment

vcsti!;ation by the dcpartme11t of the cir-

oi l':zhlic .\,sist.ince as the agency oi the

cumstances ni the applicant, a dctcrniina-

st:uc gm·crnmcnt to cooperate with the

fclk~:il :;:,11-cr11mc11c in c:irryin~ out the

,,i icdcral :i.m.l state ac:s ;,crtai11i11~ :o p11l1li..: assistance, and prn\'iJin; the

purJ"Js,·s

tion 0£ eli~ihilit:·, and the type an,\ ~mount
oi public assist.111ce m case ,)i au :t\\·cml.
As ori!{inall)' enacte,l the act pr()\'i1kil

for rc:coHry oi any puhlic a~sisi:rncc paid

ten~;. conditions an.-! m..:a11s oi ,arryin~

to any pcrso1t who w.1s not c111itlc1l thereto.

into cril'ct the

public assistance t!i.:rci11

Jntl for rccn\'cry irom the estates •li ,lc-

pro,·:dcd i0r. The :i..:t pro,·,d,·s 1t-.:1: ··Puhlic

cc:iscd rr..::ipic111s 1111.tcr certain co11dit1,m~

a,;i;:ance

shall

be

aw:1r1k,l 111:,!a :his

;1-:: :o pl'r:-ons :1t1cl iamili..:s who do :'.Ot h:\\'e
··1.:0:n..: :i.n,i :1.v:1ilahli: resources sur...::cnt to
·--r,ro,·:,\c a rea,011:1hl.: st:1.11,l.u,l o: he:tlth
and ·,Hli-kin,:-". !.C. ~ .~6-..?0.~. an,! :·unlzcr,
that ,Jl<l-;ic:c :i,s1,t:11Kc ",hall h.: :i.wa~•k<l

in the ,liscrl.'!1011 oi th..: st;itl! deput·

lllC!ll.

111 1' 1~1. the ruhlic .-\,sistance Law was
amended hy atldi11~ thereto, § ~o-~.!h. l.C..
thc material parts ,ii which an: a, i,illqw;:

rl3 y~:ir<'. rnh.ic~t to ..:utai11 li:-:-.::ati,,n,.

~,:<:ti0n 51.)-2\1), LC. _pro·

vidc~:

"Et"11:c1i,·c July l, 19~1 all oid-;i~,:
assi~1;111cc aw,v<ic,t 1111rlcr tllis act ;,J

.I

pi.:rsons
iuternt;

o\\·lli111('
111

prnpcr:y

,ha II

h,:

-Thc- an1nn11t of .:l~Si:,t:.,11ct.: wh1.:":--.. a:iy

rcc,picnt ,hall he c!i1:ihk to r•·=ci,-c

with the folluwi11;: pro,·isi,ms tu bl!

,;ha.\\

cli'cctivc thcr,·a it..:r:

,\ctermini.:u.

111

accur-i,ncc

w::·:i the ruks and re:.;ulati<>ns •Ji the

:;1;;.:.; 1.kp,.rtmcnt, with due rq:a~,!

t<)

his rr<111:n:ments, J.ml tl1c cr,11,::ti,ms

"t:zl E.1ch rccipirnt or or ,1pplicam
for ,,1,1-;i~c assi~1;i11cc who) owns real
11r11p,·rty qr any imcr,·~ts in real pmpcr-

an~ rcso,m:l's a\'ailabl~ to him from

n1,•11L in the

whatc\'.:r ~,rnrcc, ;111u whidt ,.hail he

ctl hy the: st:1tc •lc:r,anmrnt by wh10:!1

:;u:::cicnt. when a,l<it:c.l to the i::c,m1c

the recipient shall a\.:rcc that :;uch n·al

a1:,: rl'~,mrcl'S dc1<:rminl.'.1[ to be ;-.\'ail-

prnpeny or any intcn·sts in real pr"JI·

abic to him. to rirO\·iilc him \\'::h :i

cny has hccn as~ii.:nccl as security ir,r

ri::i~,mahk ~ubsistcnec cumpa:il,k •..,.ith

th.: rcc0vcrr oi all oltl•agc ass1stanc,:

hca!th an,! his Wl'll-bcinit: •

lhcrc:iftcr aw:urkcl lo him.

The act iurthcr pro"i,lcs for J.n ,pt,li,,..,.ation by a. pmspccti,·e rccipii:nt, J.n in-

.,

>

tY sh;dl he n.·,1nirc,l to enter intn a;rcc-

• "

,,I

''·

cx~stini; in his cas.:. aml to thc ir:co111c

•

l

real pr,,perty 0r any

n·:il

:;uhjL't.:t t11 rL'Co\·cry.
~lt1.:!1 f\;~f1Yt:ry
shall he .,ccninpli,i1,·d in acc1iril:1m:c

he

I

I

t0

nee,::.- pl'npl.: wh,, ha,·c att:1ini.:d t:-:·: :11:-: nf

l.C. ~ :6--..?ll;-,

,111<!

m;umcr allfl inrm prc~crih-

•

•

•

"(h) Upon makin!; an aw:ir<f oi olo!aite assistance the state dep.1r1111c11t

... --:-=-~~

I
I

'

'

I
.I
1

I

'

I

'l
',,,!
j

t,

iI \
I

I

\

r-

l

.

~
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:;hall forthwith file such :tgrccment £or
n·.:urilini.:- with the county recorder of
the comuy in whid1 the n·al flr11p•·r1y
1h·:<critw.1 in su.:h a!tn·1·11w111 is ,it11al•·•I
;1111I the filiui:- :11111 r,·,·ur,Jini,: oi ,11.:h

the ~:11111· .. 1i'n·t
a, a li•·n hy j11,l;:11w11t un ,::1i,I n·al 1m•1!·
,·rty. From the rim.: ui 1ili11;;: 11i ,uclt
a;.:rn·tm·m :tll oi rh.: r,·:il pr,,p,·r:r
tlwn·in •h·,:.:rili<·d ,hall h,· ;111,I h,-.·,,m.:
ch:1 r;:.-,1 with :i 1:.-:1 i11r all .,,,i,1.111.:c
;,:!rl'<·nl<'nl ;h:111 h:1•·.:

I

'

·'

,,

r•·.:.·il'l·d l,y Ill<' :q,pli,·:mt :1,- lwn·:n
pr11,·i,!.-,I. "hid, 1:l·n ,hall ha••· l'r:uruy
111·,·r :111 1111r.·..:11rolnl ..:-m·n:nl,r:.n,·,·s.

:,
If

• • •••

;I

I,'1

visions of Tide 1 oi the ~ati:,1..11 Soda?
S,·.:uri1~· A.:t, 42 li.5.C..·\. § .301 ct seq~
\\'hilc rhis :1.:t it~,·li rnak.·, nn pr,,,·isinn
i11r rr,·11n·r~· irrn:. rlw l'r11prr1r 11r c:state\l
ni ,h-n·:i>i·,1 ri·c11'i•·111,:, it ,lors r,-.,nirc tb:tt
th.: fc,lnal ,:nwrnnwnt be n·imhur~cJ fori1, ,hare ,_,i any n·c,11·,·rit-~ m:uh• 11111ler
~, ...... l.1w l,r ~!1,_· pru\'i:--i,u1 111 ~,-~:i . ,n JOJ,
,11 1,,n·: :.. n
I h 11.! ,, whi,·h
rrun,1.·s that

-_.,.

1'=•~ :11<·111< :1,·,·r:m1~ :,, th•· ,1:1:,· iru:n the
11:11:un;il ;:•11·,·r::mr111. ,lull I,,· "r,·dn.:,·I! by

a.-~-~.. :
·.:·<•

,11111 ,·,111" .1h·11t 10 :h· pr11 r.1::1 ,h.irc ro
\\ 1::,h :lw l'11i:,·,l ~1:11n ",·,p111ahly ,mtitl- :·_ ·

•·•I.

I,,. :h,· .\.l111:ai,1r::1:1>r, of':_-_'
1h,· 11.-i .,1au1m1 r,·.:·••·•·r,·,1 d11r:a:: .111y prior- · ~:1, ,l,·:,·r111i11,·,1

sub-·.:._:·.::·

Tiw s•·,·1i11n al,o pr11•·i.inl j,1r c,·r,111.-:11:,,:1 hy 1h .. ,t.·p:1rtm,·nt. 111•1111 n·,1111·,t, ,,i I h•·
:01;,I :11111111111 p:1i,I ;i r,·.:ip1<·:11. and i,,r whi.-!1

•11:.in.-r l•y :h,· ~,arc 1>r .111~· ;,.,li;i,:i.l
,Ii• :,i1111 :lwr.·"i wuh r•·'i"' .. : h> 1>1,1-a~ • S,-..:
:.»1,1::th·,· i11r111,hni urn!.-r th•· :-:::11.: plan_~-,:;,~;

,,.

a li,·n is .:l:1im•·d. 10 rlw ,l:111• 11i 1111: .:erllli·

•

i~

tr:,n~ii:r ui the l'rll(fl'rlr ,,rior IU n••·ipi.-11:·,
ol•·:uh: aml for p:1ynwnt 11111 <Ji 11w ,·:olat•·,
of d,-cl'aS\'ll r,·cipi,·111~. :<uhj.·cr 111 :1 pr111r

1:
:1

,.\!
:1

i~

:,1-i

q
1.
'1

1··

'

I
j.

I,.
Ir

Ii,.
ii

H
:I

;1
11
~1

;,j
j
.I

•"

In :1,·:ual

11p•·r:1::.m.

und~r_,",'

:u:r,·,·n1r1U h,·1 \\ ,·,·n the ic.·,IL·r:1i ~u,J ,t:i~J,,-~.· ·

l"

u.
'(

•

.

c:oi:i:m11ti11n of $,JIJO. All rc&:1J1·,·r:,·~ :ire required to lie ,lq1u~i1,·1I in the Cuop1·r:tti•·c
\\"clfare F1111,J in rhc s1at.: tn·a~ur~·- This

inrul was cr,·:it,·il It~· th,· ,1;1rc lq:i~lamr,· ;u
a m,·ans o{ i11rthcri11:: 1h,· ._..,,..,,.ration hc:w1·c11 the !it:11e ;11111 frd.-r;1I ~· 11·,·rmth"lll :i
in math'rs of Jmhli.: a~,is1;111,·c. F.-.lnal
an,! ~,arc fmul!i appr11pri:11<·d :111,I :11·ail:1l,tc
iur pnhlic ;1s~i,1;111<',: arc •h·p11,ih'd 1lwr1·in
:iml paymcnrs ti> rc:cipicm:i :,re ma,lc rh,·re·

from.

,!th"

•h•·

1•r,, r:11:l ,h:irc

ot re--:;

r~• tlu· ir,l,·r:11 •.:u,·,·rnmc-nt is.";:.,
r.·•

.-r,·.li11·,I 111 it~ a.:.:1111111 in rh,· wdfarc fund)".
;11111 it~ ~11h~1·•1m·111 ,·,1111rih111i,,11~ rNUC:«f'
;,,.: .. r,li11::h·. Tlwr•· i,. t h,·n· inr,•. 111> merit;
i11 :1ppdl.,;11,· :itra.-1, 11p,111
~lat.:·

,1,..

J~,,;:;

th,· i,:rmm,I 1ha1 it ,lo,·~ '!111 $p,·.::iricaiif-N
pr,1\·i,I,• i11r l'a~ mrm ,,i rill' 11ro r:,t:i sha~:
,lir.·.:t t1> th,· inkral i,:,t1·•·rm111·1,"1.
1111

1•1:,i111i1T~ all,·::1· :har tlwy 1n·rl!'
m:,rri,·d al \ ·.il,I" ,·II. in \ ·:111.-.111
Co>ttnl)'~'
•
r,
l,lah11. ~r1111·mh,·r I. l'lil11 ; 1h:ll $C\"ti!:
chiJ.lr.·n •• ,·r,• l111n1 th•·

age,

[1 J F•·J,·r:11 i:r:1111~ to th,• !'l;ih·s (,,r ,1ld:tgc :issi:-tam:c

i:n,·,·ri111w1:t~.

..:-o,·,·r-!,·~

:irl"

111:idc 1111<lcr rhc p~o-

ri;ii:•·: t h.11 th,·,·. ar,· :-•1 :111,I ;"ll •n·:ir~ oi r .. •.
r,·~1w.-til"l·ly; and rlw~· ,,wn :,~ tlu:ir so!~·
,·111111:mniry 1•r,1p,·rry .:.-rt:1i11 n·:1I c~t:1~j

j
I
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?f.EWLAND v. CHILD
C.:~ :is:-: l1lnhu 5.!0

.::i:· oi Cal,lwcll, wli:.:h th,·y occ·~;;y as

f

out Jue proc.:,s oi law, in ,·i,ilatioo of art.

.ir :1L,m.:: :hat th<'~' made ;ip;>lica:;;:, to

I,§ 13, Idal,o Cnmt. The rit.:ht to own wJ

}

. Dc~;i.nmcnt oi Puhl:c :\,,::;tar,c~ anJ

c11.ioy pri,·atc property is il111cla11wntal.

-,

re :\\,·:1r,:cJ. ;i.n,l ha,·.: bccn r:iid,

,·,:.:-.1:::c is one

;i~1:1nc.:, se,·.:r;il yc;irs pri,Jr ~·J th~ : 0 :1
.,·n,;nicnt: :hat in J11:1<', \tl~I. t::t •!c·

le

oi the 11at11r;i.l, inh.:rc11t and i:1alicn-

t
C

·,d:int. ;is 1...\m1mi~~io11c~ of :~c Dc-; .. r:-

;il,k ri~hts ui ircc men. It is 1101 a ~iit oi
n11r co11sti1t1ti1111~. hcc.1usc it ,·:-.i:<t~·rl h,-i.. rc
Our constit111i,H1s ,·111hr:1.cc :me!

·:1t oi Puill:C :\:'::i;1;111cc. ,kn::111,kc '.:-::it

prn.:bin1 it :1.s .,11 cs:'c11tia! in our

l
t
I

,:11n,:,.p1i1111

oi ircl·d,un. 11 :\m.Jur.. C.u1;1i111ti,111:il
" .1~~.:c:i1cnt prnnd,·,I inr in the '.~': l L:l\\-. ~ .i.\3: ~l':11111 ,·. lhlb~. 111 T,·:-. . .l:<1 .
::c11.i::1,·nt. c~,·:1tin:; a l:.·:1 111'"11 :!,,·:~ ~-::ii .!.i5 :-;.\\' ..~u. l'J .\.I..R. l.1.'-!;-_ This ri:.:ht ,,i
r,· :is <..:,.;ur:t,· i0r :hl'. r"·l'.o,·...::--: ,)f pr,,perty, th11n~h 11i s1u;h 111_:.:!i ,,r,kr. IS
1W'.
. . b
.
:
i)"nl\·n:~ thvr~:tl!t.·r to
t: ;n:1,:.: 1,-, :.:-=~- n,n:~:h,·1,·-s ,11h_i~ct to r,·a,:<>11al,h: Iimita,·y e:-.cn1tc :tnil ,k!ivcr :0 the ,,cp:1:-:::-:c::t

.1 p:1111 <1t b,-::1~ ,k:1i,·il :::nh,·r a,,,,::c.:::·:~

1i .. 11 .,11,I

::,·r _T11ly I. l'-1: l: th:1.t t'c.cy we~<' wi·.:--,•:~

tu,·,1:1 ,1i th.:

1..:on!l' di rv~t>Ur1:l':i :l1

prnvid..:

;1 :-1.::1:-: 1·,:-..i:1i•..:

jJt,hni ,)i lwa!th :rnJ l\'cl!-h,· 111:.: :·,ir ,:-,7.·
:h·c~: .,:,d th:.!. hn::i11,c ,;: :'lll'h :1n:,·~.,::::

1:,: ,11rl1 .:,1m:ntl,i1111. th,·:: ,·x,·c:::ed ":'.d
'--::\"l'r\·1: ~h'-·

pll··.h!'iu~ ::,,.:ir ·-i:d
,':,; ;1r,,p.-~t\' .l:' ~cc·11d1y i,,~ tile rc·mh1:~:·:·
1l':~: .)I

a ::t:1t11t~

r,·_:.:111.u:1111

itlllhJ~in~

lndct·d.

lin1it:1tion

upou thl·

ri;!ht rn11,t In.: supported l,y ,11,:h p11r;ir1,c

St:Hc "· 0111:1"ch.:\'l'iaria, 27' ldah11 i'.r;,

,s S

15.! I' . .!~l: :?+,i L" ..S. 3-13 . .

(·1.

32.,. ti.!

!•)~I

,t:1.t11:c

i~ :i,uc~:-:

tp,\:l \';\r: 1JtlS ~·,~:~titu~:1)!1;d ~r1n1tab.

ri;::1::,- oi man thc

c..111111.

,·. 1·;ri111,h:,w, -I'>

\\"yn. 1.=.~. 53 J'.:?,l t. t1l'l .\.!..!~. ~-;~: 1,;

F::-~:A CI·...~' .• l•>ll>tlllltl'lll:l
'
' .
I r.aw,§

lwy :i~~c~: it y:,1bt,·s :irt. I. ~ I. ,Ji .r~:
u11:-i.:-.,:::1J11. ,v~!~h ~~c..:lart·~ ~1s 11uc 1,i :.-:-:
r:~ht

..

l,

.-.i7, ::2 11. .\33, ·+O L. R.. \. _;().!;

l'ul,!ic ~en-ice

The

i

ld:rh,, ;-~. 2:-2 11. ;-o;-; Drnuis ,·. ~111,n. ts
\\'.1,-h.

h,·::: :,:·:,·~ July i. l'.151.

n:1.l:c:1;,\l!c

:1ny

111 the i11-

,l;ltl'

\\'cl iarl'.

;J:_!:'l'"-'l1h.'t1t

:ii1 :t~~::o:!:tnt.:..: ;>:1yn1l·:1t:, r,:.:i..·i,·'-·:..: ·°J/

[2. 31

lty the

.:11111111 .. 11

[4 j

,,n __'

The 111tl-a~c ;i~si~t:1.ncc l;nv is to I>,:

,li,1i11g-11islic,I ir,1111 ~o-,:;i.llc,I "rnc,r bws"

'

'

rir ··iucli;:,nt st:1tntcs' in that th.: •>fd-a~·:
h~ :i~~l'::'tc,l lil'!l ;11:iccs :1 c!,nul 11p,m th,-::-

recip:l':ll 111:

itl~ wh:c:t rl·,;1r:c:, their r:::nt

1111c 111 l'lllitlc him 111

ltl .:011\'c·:·

.1

pa11p..:r or :1.h .. 11lt1tl'lr 1h·~tip;1y111<:11I~

1hcrc111ulcr.

11

'

I,

1:

•1:c:m:hc, or llt::,•rwi~.: ili~;,,,;c ,,i th,-::-

:O:tak

1r,1rcny. :\ppl·!!.,1115 forth.:~ a~~,rt I~.!
-~ ·•:t oi :he law:; t,1 •lcrriY.: :h,·m rii th,·::-

rel. [Tclpnu:y.:r ,•• :--hrny,•r, Ohio
.\p11., :;-,! \".E.'.?d 77-1; Lci~h v. Cont"r •li

;l;1

l'uhli.: lll•alth & Charitit·s of T.:1.wrcm:,·,

:/ ·t.

~~:r

;,t!tl

the ,·11j,,~·:11cnt :hcn·oi. wit:J·

l'lt

JIii ~hss. J-1.1, 37 N'.E.2,1 lOii; \\"arrcn

.,

I

i/
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County,.. Decatur County, 232 Iowa tilJ,

5

~'. \\" ..:.'i.J S-17.
[ 5. 61
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538

\\'e held

in

Sr:11e

c:<:

rd. \"icl,nn

r.:,1

'"· Liod~trom, 6S Idaho 226, 191

\11()(),

to

paupers :11i.l in,ii;;-cnts, thL·re is no con-

,1:mli,,n;il or .:un11:1v11-l;I\\" d111y n·stini; upon

.1,.

the ,1:111: tu pr,n·i,k ,upp0rt.

'I'•

T!w recipient

'.1

h:i, n" Yc,tL"d ri~ht to a,,1't:1110:.: payments..

:[.

1012, th:it "Th.: ;:r;intin~ of aid ro its
nccJ_,. al,:'ed is a well n·~m:ni~,·,l .,f,\i:,::.tinn

l)11 the• cu11tr~ry, his ri..;ht thnct~ i_s cmi~ely -:~'.\ \,
,'\ .:r,·at11rc o_l ,1;1t11tc. .-\, ;11ch 1t 1s subJect.
.'
10 b,·ini.: c:--t,·11,kd. Ji111i11i,h,·d • .:on,litioned

oi the ,talc anti is :i g,1n·r11mc11tal i1111c1i1111
tenJin!,:: to promote rhc puhlic w,·liar.:.''

or alir,,~.1tcd 1•1· th1: k).!i,larnrc.

.-\n)· !imu:ition upon the propaty n:.:hts of
n:c:pirnts in the :ippli.::ition ,1i thi: !i,·n law
is :implr 5upported I>~· a p11hlic p11rp,1sc,
n:imcly to promote th<' "common w,·li:1rc."
Pfl·:imlile. It is thi, ruhlic p11q1e1~,·

t,1

whi.:h

:ill lKndici:ui .. s mu~t luok to jn,tiiv th.:
p:.ymc111s they

rc,~i\'<',

It is

thi~ \Hililic

p11rpose which s:iws the entire p11hlic .1s-

j ·.:·

T LI entitle. ~ ._,

l.:..

him tu .,,s,·rt -;11c!1 ri1.;l1t. he· n111~t comply .-_
w11h ;ill r1·:i,,111;il,k a11d 111111,ii,,riminatory.•·~ ·,.

co111li1i ..:1, iu1i''"'-,i ;,y th,· ln:i,lativc author-.,.'i1,·. lln1111c L"v1111t\·. ,·1c.. ,.. :'\[\"hrc. 1-19 NcI>:~;i
,;i;11_ 32 ~ .\\' ::i1 ~r..::!: :-=cnl,,:1. ,·. Fair, ;o' .'
t

>hio1 .\,,p. _:1_

~~

.

'

\".1-:.!,l 1.l'>: Di\'isio11 of,

:\iJ iur :he .\::ed . .-to.: .• ,·. I !n~:rn. 1-U Ohio:.
~t. 1:--i,. 54 :S:.E.2.1 ;-~1: .\11111>.

S6 :\.LR.~,

~11..!: 41l .\111.Jur., !'C'11,iu11::. § i, p. 966.

si,1:1ncc bw from direct cuntlict with ~,·c--\\'h;1t ;ipp,·l!.,m~ arr,·~r entirely to~}':·~.

tinn 2. art. S. l.laho Con~t.. pruvidi11~ lhat

"The cretlit ui the s1:1tc ,lull not. i11 :iny
m;innc:r. hr g-ivcn, or lo:tncd to. or in aid

oi any i11<1i,·i,l11al,
>."icl:,011

,·.

•

•

Lin,btrnm,

•"

State ex rel.

supra;

.-\1:im,·,l:i

Cu1:11ty ,·. Janssc11, 16 Cal.1,l :!;'(,, ltxi 1•.::,1

O\'l'r'.,-.k i, :h .. .-:1ct th.,t tla·y ha,·e no ~,)t
ri~hts in (,1d ~1\!.t: hc:nerics or\.' ........

,·l'":--h·d

oth.:r iurm ui rdid. The state'-::'·,.;:
' h
b
• b : -~· '
a~. i,:-rant su,!i cni:nts, ut 1 .::...
. .~:.-1 ,._· t:
it i~ 11ut rn111iro:d to Jo su. In gn,nt- _ :

in

;111\·

.

m;1y. :1s 1t

11, Lio .-\.L.R. lHI; :olori.::in ,.. lkpt. oi

in).!' th-111 it may impu,c ,11,:h conJitions--/.;,;

Suci:il 5crnrity, 1+ \\'a;h..2,1 1.31;, 12;- l'.2J

a~ it dn·111, ;,rop.:r :111J _iu,t.

c,.')(",: Lus Angele~

County v. L., Fuc11k,

::!\}

Cal.1.J 8iU, 129 P.:?cl Ji8: l[d\'erini: ,.•
D;n·is, Jf.11 L".S. 619, Si S.Ct. ~11H, Sl I..EJ.

The "oblii:ation

of the stare·•

rcicrrcJ to in the Lindstrom ~a~c is h.> be
un.krstuoJ a~ :i mor:il r:ithcr than ;1 m:ind:1-

tory obli~ation. Thi: theory of th.: :\meric:in political system is that the citiz.:n sup-

ports the state, not the re,·erse.

En:n

:is

:1

It'

:l

per-;-·"':·.,

J.:ra111. ho: 11111st :iccept it'!';_'\

·-

s11h1t·~: !u the i:0111li1 iuni-."' Dimke 'f. ;'-!'(:. .•
.
~~
Finke
~!inn .•'•), -".15 :,,:,\\,
,:,, 1lt7=:,"'

,l',

pa).!'c ;,J,

J.il.•i.

[i. 81

~J11 :h:,,·1•1,

[9]

J.
-,-;,:·~o'
~-;.
--~

the s~;~-:

Th,· .:vnditi,m~ imrol'.:J by
lltl.:' ;ire :1vt ~" 011,·rvm :is tho:;c urdinani:,j'
t·
intpo~~·,l in pri\'ate len,lina:- tr:u1sacti~~On the cuntr:iry, the law pruYidc:i A f~~1..:..--..
:mJ '111111:111~· plan by which n.:cJr :i~. "'~;
vwn a humi:. 111;1y secure ol,1-a.gc assi~~~
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while contiuuin~ to occupy and enjoy :heir
home, r:ithcr th:m being required to ::i'lrt·
;;:\~e or sell it, and consume the proc~s in
li\"in~ expenses bciorc rccci\·ing :iid. ,\t

the real ohjcction to this lien law is that of
the prospective heirs.
"The conflict oi interest here is not

the same time it prcsen·es the pr'lpc~y as
a mc::111s oi reimbursing the wet fan: ::incl,
thus i;i,·ini; the recipients the s:itisiac::o:i •lt

between the St:itc :in1l its nce<lr :i~c·I.
It is ll\:twecn the State :ind the heirs,
11c:tt oi kin or other Jistributecs oi the
e,:;i.tes oi the <lcce:iscJ r,.:cipicnts."

p:iy111i: :heir own w:iy :is far :is th~:,- :ire
;ibk. ar.d with the least h;1rdship. I: :i:sl)

1,1..ho 2'.?6, 191 P..?J 11)()9, 1012.

State ex rel. ~ic!s0n ,·. Lindstrom, ll-i

rcdn,,·s :he amount which n111>t b.: cc:::::::u-

t:ic moral ob!ii::itio11 to ;,ru,·iJe ,uc~ :iid,

h is a :natter oi common knowlc,Ji;~ :!lat

[lOl

Appd!ants also contcnrl th:it, since

,vme st:itcs h:i,·e so bunkneu thcm~:,·cs their ,t:itus .u clig-ihlc recipients oi 01<1-a~e
w:th ,·arious iorms oi public :issistanc.: :in,i :i.ssist:incc w:is cstahlishcd :in,! rcco~nizcu
uiil·a!!C ,,cnsions that the threat oi :=-<-01- prior to the 1931 amendment, the a:,plic:i·
\",::1.::y

h:is iorcc:'1 :i. modirie:ition oi :hc:ir tion oi the new jiro,·ision to them w011lri

pi:ins. In :ill states the \Jurden oi sue:. :is- crmstitute retrnspccti\'e in,·asinn oi :i. ,·cstctl
si:t:1111:,: :,as bceome :i. m:ijor prrihlcm. \':ir- rit;ht. ,\s alreacl~- n'ltc•I, recipi.:nts can :ic·
iou~ methods oi rcco,·ery h:in: been ,icv-:!ed, quire no ve~ted riy;;ht under the statute. The
lei;i~laturc may mndiiy the conditimts 0i
;u:J rc~:-.;1ps none !l:is been entirely !J.tisassi~1:11h:c, or Jcny it :iltogcthcr, :i.t :i,ny
fact,,ry. .·\moug such plans some 5:..:cs
time.
h:i ,·e pro\"iued ior rcimhur~cment by ~t!:i.[II) It is :ilso contenclcrl th:tt appellants
t:\·es, k'.,;ally responsible ior the car~ 'li
their need:, ducrs. This, however, h:i, j,,:,:n :ire ,kniccl c1111al protection of the law. .\rt.

iv~11u ,!i:ni:ult oi ;ipplic:11:011 :111.J, in

!•Jm.:

1, § 1, l,l;iho Con~titntion, The contention

c:~c11mst:1nc,·s, 1111j11s1. lns:cau oi r,·qu:~:n;; is that they, :is owm:rs oi n·al pr,,pcrt~·. :ire
the rd:iti\'CS to pro\"idc the suppurt,

-=~

to iliscrimin:ited ag:iinsr, in. th:tt they :ire re,

re:mh11r~,· the s1:11c, our law limits rcc')'l·ery iuirc<l to gr:i.nt :i lien upon their proper!>',
to the estate, or the rc:il prnpcrt~·. o: the wherc:15 neeily :igccl who ha\'e

110

re:11 cs•

rcc:p1en1. The rclati,·es :ire :isl.:ccJ on::, :" 1:1tc, hut m:iy own personal prripcrty,
iorc~. to the c:tt<'.ltt oi $UC:l rnymcms, -:.h:it :ire ,zr:intcil :ii<l withrmt such rciuircmcnt,
they otherwise might inherit. ,\s w:is !'.Ii· :inu :ire therefore prcforrc<l. It is reco~stcu in 51:ite e."I: rel. Xiclson v. Linust~m, nizctl that the lcgisl:iture h;is bro:i<l dis·

._,
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rilU

oi

p1.:r~,111s

:ind

prnpcrrr

rur

all

pur-

,·1,· .. ,·. :0-lyhn·, 1~9·

lln,llll' l~,>1111ty

\\'. ;-_,:

P"~,·, ""hi,·h it 111:ll' b\\'iu 11_,· ~,·d, to :1c- :\, I,. <•i' 1. ,;:'.'. :\'.\\· . .:,1 _;i,_:: ln r,· l)pinion of
cumplish. So lllll:.;' as thc ,·l:":<i11..::i I i,,n, tile .Tu,ti..:,·,. ~3 :'\.If. 311.:. 1,q .\ • .:t~; .-\nart )Ja~1.·tl 11pon :--t>TllL' h·;.:-itl111:lh: :-:ru11n1l qi 110. ~o .\.T.. I~. ~11.!; ,\1111u. 1.!5 .-\.1-R. 712.
di 1f,·r.:11c·,:

'

)

lJ.:!W,<:ll

th,: p..:r;,JIIS ur ,1l•_r,·,:t<;

..:!:1~~iti,·d. :iro: nut i:11r,:1rn11:1l1I,· ,,r :irhitr:iry.
a11d h\.·:tr a r"l":1:-:011:ililc re!:ltii,11 tn ~ht.• lt·;-:l~·
]~1ll\·t· p11rpu"!1.\

su'"·:1 1.~!:1....:~li"1,::Hi,u:~

1·i.,l:11c th,· .:1111,1i1::ri11n.

L'u. 1·.

1!11 n11t

ll:,: \\',,,1,\

1...'.111;,I

[ 131 .-\ppdl;1111s furrh.-r .:nmn:d th:it the
l'. 1.'I .\,;ti, :i local :iml ,.p,·,·1al law l'iul:iti\·e

,,rt. 3.

~

lq. [J;d1n ('.,11>titt1ti,,11. Since
I,,· it,. :crm, it is ;1ppli,·alik :dil..: :o :ill pcr01111, thr,>1::.;hnut 1hc ,1;11,-. who .:t•mc within

ut

-t~ l.J:ih,, _;_-:11_ ~1,.i l' -l; ·
tit,· n--r•·,: 11·.: d;1,,,·, r hn, i11 pr, ,ndcJ ior,
h,1·.1·.: ,·. L'ity lli l',i,:;11.:ll,1, ;-n l,i:1h,1 3l.,.
;t11d. :h.: ,·1,,,.,-i1i,·a1i,,1t ht·i111.: r,·:i,nnahk·. :inJ
21:-{ l' ..?,l 1i'!~: S!.1to: ,·. E\'.111~. :-.1 l.l:1h,1
witlt.11 th,· :1111hority oi the lt-:.:1,!at11re, it
:iJ. :2-t3 l'.?,I ;-~-..:; :ti ;\m Jnr., =::1:11,:'.,·,.
(ll:lprn:111.

i~ 11 .. 1 :n .111~· ,,·n,c ;1 ln,:il ,,r ,p,:,;i.1 I law,
",cl1:11 tht· m,·.111111,.: oi :hi.: \·,,:::;tinn:on.

sss.11.,,.
r 12 I

Our pulili.: :i~~i-t:lllcC l:iw

("llh'TTl•

pla11.:s !h;ic :ill 11n:,iy :1~ui ,h:dl r,·..:1:11·,· :1s~i:it:,ru:v ;1~\.'.'11rdi11~ ·,., ~he i111~1'"idu:d 11\'l'd ,,i

,·.1d1. "with due rc-.::1nl

•

•

to

the

irn:urnc a11, I n·s1111r,.:, :l\·ail,.ld..: to 111111 : r .. m
wh:11,·1-.:r ~<111n·e". I.L. § .,.-,_,:1, 1• L'11,kr

it, pro"·i,,.,ns ;rnd 1111,kr 1h" n·-.:q 1;1\:.,u,
w Ii icl1 it ;i 111 norii,·s. p~r,011:d pro(krl y. as
""<.:II ;IS n·:d prop~rtr 1)\\"t11:d u~- Liu.- n.·t..:ipi1.·11t
·J

'I

~t:,i.- ,·.\: r.-1. :'\icl•,111 Y. Li11,btr,•m, supra.

[ 14 I
l:,,mpbi11t i; :il,11 ma,i,· tlt:it the
pr<1\'i,1,111, ,ii th<.: 111 .-1 ;1111,·11<ina·::1, §

:e>-

_:_;-l,1. 1.( .. :ir,: i11 ,·0111li.:t with. ;ui,; :h,·rdor,:

r .. l',·:tkd hy. Lhapt.-r :!~11 oi 1~:,· :-:,·s~ion
L111< ui \• _;1, which wa~ p:t,,,·d l,y ·.11.: ;:imc
1

,,·,,11,11 <> i the lq.;1, lar 11r,·. h111 ,1:i•,,·,p1..-ntly
(0 ~ ~h-~~--Cl,. r.c.
.._~h.;1p11.·r .!-'"· 1 q~: ( Lau,·s,

is 1:ik .. 11 into con,i<1 .. r:i1i,111 in ,kt,·r:11inill<:- :111w11,ls ,,·rt:1i11 >'l'l'lions ot th,· i''.d1lic .-\s-

th<: type ;rnd amu1111t ui a,,-i~t:1111: 1·, ~,i that :tll ~i>lan,c L1w. i11.:l11din!!' § .'r>-2.!J. !.C. This
;ire 1rc;1t,·d fairly and wi!hutl! ,li,..:ri111111a- l:t~! "·..:1i1111 is the ,111,: whi,·h or:;:11:;tlly protiun.

Th( classi1ic:1tiu11s ;ire nut

1,lc 1,, th" ,ibjl·i:tiuns made.

q

1111rr:t·

Star,· ,. ~ rel.

,·i,lc-d i,ir r.:co,·er:· ,ii p11hli.: ;1,,'.,:;11·,,-c ..ii>l:1i11t·tl

hy :i

:'\i,·lsun \', 1.i11,l~trum, ,~-; l,lahu .!.:o. \(I\ I'. 1h,·r,·1,1.

:!ti [1109; lla\\'kius ,·. :-1,11,· .. i l\a11s1s

~t>-

Cl1;1p1,·r

pt·r,,111

wh,1 \\';1:;

.:~,i.

r,,r

pr<1\'id,·;

cial \\'clfarc 1!,mnl. 14~ Kan. ;-,~1. :"4 11• .:,1

i-11.-lt a~~i,1:1m:c, p;1id

~·.m;

th,·r,·to. hy llll':1t1s oi

I.us :\n;;-,·I,·~ t:,11t11ty ,·. ~,·.:11r:1y Fir,t

11,,: ,•ntitl~I

The :1111,·ut!ment :1<!.k,! :,1 it by

Tt

the: :-n.·~•,·l~ry of

:\

:1• ,r ,·111itk-tl
prd,·~~···1 cllini

1~

1.1ln·l,1~:~ f r11 ,m :a

"'

1111,•

Xat. Bank oi T.u\' .\lll~l'I.:~. S4 C.,1..\pp ..:d

:1!,!':1i11~1 his ,·,rate.

:-i:-,

n·:1di11i,: ni tlw;c tw11 ~,·ctiun, :!::It th,•y

I'll P ..:!,I i~; \\"a!ll,.·ri: , •• L"tah 1 111,li.:
.:o., P ..:J ;arc not

\\"clfarc Comm., II~ L"t:1h ~~.!.

1

III

c,mrlict.

Tlh'y ,l,·:1I wid1 Jii•
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1,'t;Wl.AND v. CHILD
C~:e :is 7 J IJ:ihu 5J0

B0~:: arc,

b:-· Jltr,ss, spc·(i1i(ally "business co1np1d-

thcrdore. \'aliJ and etTcc:in•, ;;.::ci :here
5::uc,
is nu implied rcpc:il.
Swr,cth

;iun," :lnd for that r<·a::011 is u11ct1 iorce:ilik

D;ilton, 7~ lJaho 451. 243 l'.~J 5~.

111<·11! muse nut u11ly l>c obtained hy n1,a11-,

ft-rent

[15]

cla~scs

or

It is :ilsu

recipients.

cunt,ndL·J :h:1t ~ ,:',j..~-b

is Jeicctive in th:n no pron;iun :s :::a.de

therein iur the rcle:isc o i the !icn ::: .:.:a:ic u i
~atisi:i(tion thcrcoi prior to th<' -'.e;i::i. oi

This .:un1<·11tio11 is likc\\'isc "·iti1u11t mnit.

i;

llt the pressure bruugltt rn bt·~r. hut tl1c
:t!!n:,·mcnt i1°,·I i mu,t be m1j,1st. mu:<111-

e.:iu11:il1k, or ilk:,::il. The cs,o:11cc ui ,i11r,·•s

:s

the ,11rr,·11,icr :o unbwiul ur t111co11;,:in11-

:ibk ,k111;111ds.

It c:11111,,t hc pr,:di,·:11.:d :1po11

To this we th111k :: :s :id·
,k·m:inds which arc lawi11I. ,,r the 1hr<·.1t
ticw11t to say that it l,.::ng- ~iw:1 th,· :::cc: vi
:o Jo 1h:it whicl1 the Jl'ma1ulim: p:1rty lta~
'i<·n by juJ,;:n1cm, :int.i ,nh,c·.::i•m -: , ?ro.1 1.-;,:;tl r:)!'!tt to do.
Inland Empire !,,:V.uini,; for a .:,·rtitica!I.: by the C:<·;.:.:-::-:.cnt
:·:lll·ri<"S \', _11111,·•, 69 ld:illn 33.5, 21111 !' ..!d ,:l";
oi the t<,tal a111•J111l! ui the lic:1 -:::.:::icd
:::t:111,,rrl \'. F:vl,I. ;-o fd:1ho .331, 211:1 I' 2d
th,·rc11n,kr to tht: date ui the cc~:1ric:.:c, ;;.nJ
33::S: lb::1p B,1:hli11gs Corp. ,·. Xorthwc·~t

.,~:I

1j1

1fl,
I I
I I

i'

th<· rc-:ipicnt.

that:
•1 •

ll111ldi11g Lu .. l<'.4 \\'a,n. 1ilH. 4 P.:?d :n;-,
•

•

~ny pt:r~on de:iiin~ -.,·:::'1.

;-9 .\.L.R. 1i:l; R:11kr ·;. llarn<.:r. 1;-2 Or. 1,

I

I

I'

I

1•

. I
I
I

'.I

~')

the rccip1c11t may rely upun rnch c:c:::i-

139 l'.:?,l l.31J; .\11n111:1ti(}n. l\u~i11..:ss ( .. m.

the am.,11111 v: :::e

r,ul,inn. 79 .\.I..lt 655; 1;- :\m.Jur .• Durn,,

1\

t':-.:i~t1ng- lien .:i~:ilnst :he rt".:i.l i:~1::.:~ oi

~§ -I, G, ;utt.1 7;

.I

the recipient'',

}Ja:.,::c

L'Jll: as .:,·i<kncin~

the !q;-islaturc intcn<lcJ that it shc.-~:,i be

subject to n:k:isi: by th<.: dq1:irtmc::: :.;-;iun

17 C.J.S., Contracts.§ 172,

I:.

,I

:J:?.

:\s 1n· ha\'c not,·,I. the demaml

or the st:1te

for a lir11 upnn the rc:il property of ol<l-ag-c

payment of the amount oi the .:cnif.n:c. in
the manner pro\'iJc<l by bw ior the :,-!.-Jse r~cipil'Jlt:i is l:iwi11l, fair an<l just. Hence,
oi a juJi,rmcnt, un<lcr §§ 10-11 lJ .,:;.; 10- there is no Jurcss ur business cumpulsiuu 1u-

11 H, I.C. Cook v. ~lassi:y, JS IJai':ll ~,H, ,·uh·cJ.
220 P. 1088, 35 .-\.J_R. 2(-); ~lt. \"icw :..::.;~al
JuJi;m<·nt atiirmed.
Tel. Co. v. Intcrst:lte Tel. Co., 55 (c.;i.ho
Xu custs ;illuwcJ.
514. ~ P..:!J i'23.
[16. 17]

1-'l!tly, :ippcl!ants contcr.c :!:at

PORTER, C.

J.,

t.hc lien ai;rccmcnt was ob~incJ by the ,w:c A:; anJ KJ::J::TO:-:,

:u1J GIVE::-.!S, TilOll-

JI., \:Uncur.

I
'l'

!

I

>

'i--'

! ,-
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CHAPTER 49
(H,S, No, 451)
__ ·.;:,
~

••• • I

AN ACT
Ut,ATINC TO MEDICAL ASSISTANCE; AMENDING CHAPTER 2, TITLE 56, IOAHO
·_-,,. COOK, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 56-218, IDAHO CODE, TO PROJ.i VIDE FOR THE RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE; ANO REPEALING
'~•-· SECTION 56-224c, IDAHO CODE •

. 'l"/

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

SECTION 1. That Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code, be, and the same
l• hereby amended by the addition.thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be
kslovn and designated as Section 56-218, Idaho Gode, and to read . as
.follows:

1· ..

-~

56-218, RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. (1) ~edical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual
·vtio was
i;iicty-five (65) years of age or older when the individual
: r~ceived such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there
be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be
.-cbarged for such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that
. claim for such medical assistance correctly paid to the individual may
be established against the estate, but there shall be no adjustment or
·recovery_thereof until after the death of the surv1v1ng spouse, if
any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who
la under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and
totally disabled. Transfers of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate consideration are voidable and may
be:aet aside by an action in the district court.
1}'· (2) Except where there is a surv1v1ng spouse, or a surviving
~Ud who is under twenty-one ( 21) years of age or is bl ind or permanently and totally disabled, the amount of any medical assists.nee paid
~der this chapter on behalf of an individual who was sixty-five (65)
.,.ars of age or older ~hen the individual received such assistance is
·-a:claim against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship pro·- ceecliiigs and may be paid from che escace.
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the al!IQunt
· ~f tllyaid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient t;o the
bteiit that the need for aid resulted from a c-.dme committed against
-~• recipient.

·>·

"·. SECTION 2, That Section 56-244c, Idaho Code, be, and the same
hereby repealed.

is

Approved Harc:h 21, 1988.
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c. 50

IDAHO SESSION LAWS
CHAPTER 50
(H.B. No. 562)

AN ACT
RELATING TO MEDICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM;
CHAPTER 2, TITLE 56, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION Of A NEW SECTION
56-209e, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE A PROCESS FOR DETERMINING MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITI FOR MARRIED COUPLES; AND REPEALING SECTION
32-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO A WifE 1 S DUTI TO SUPPORT AN INFIRM
HUSBAND,

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1, That Chapter 2, Title 56 1 Idaho Code, be, and the same
is hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be
kno.-.m and designated as Section 56-209e, Idaho Code, and to read as
follows:
56-209e. ELIGIBILITY OF MARRIED CO~PLES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM, (1) It is the intent of the legislature
in enacting this section to reduce the number of situations in which
medicaid regulations as they apply to long term care costs, cause
either the destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of marriage carried out to prevent destitution. It is further the intent of
this legislation to protect the conmunity and separate property rights
of a married person whose spouse applies for medical assistance
regardless of whether they are living together,
(2) (a) In determining the eligibility of an aged, blind or disabled married individual or of a couple for medical assistance
under title XIX of the social security act, the amount of income
and resources to be counted as available to such individual or
couple shall be calculated in accordance with the community property prov1s1ons of chapter 9, title 32, Idaho Code, or should it
be to the advantage of such individual or

couple,

in

accordance

with the methods utilized by the federal supplemental security
income program under title XVI of the social security act,
(b) I/here both spouses are applying or are covered by medical
assistance, the same method of counting income and resources shall
be applied to both spouses and utilized to determine the liability
of each for the cost of medical care; however, for any month for
which either spouse receives a supplemental security income pay~
ment or a state supplement under section 56-207, 56-208 or
56-209a, Idaho Code, or for which an application is filed
sequently approved, the •ethodology of the supplemental
income program shall be applied,
(c) The presumption of the availability of income under eithe
the community property or supplemental security income method
be rebutted by either spouse.
(d) The department of health and welfare shall furnish to eac
medical assistance applicant who is aged, blind or disabled,
clear and simple statement in writing advising them of the

:.
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.hi, section.
y provision of this section or the
application thereof
nor circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall
1er provisions or applications of the section that can be
~ithout the invalid provisions or applications, and to
rovisions of this section are severable.
!. That
.d.
1

Section 32-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is

21, 1988.

CHAPTER Sl
(s.B. No. 1402)

._,

AN ACT
riE BEAN COMMISSION; REPEALING SECTION 22-2919, IDAHO
~NDING CHAPTER 29, TITLE 22, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION
SECTION 22-2919, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEPOSIT
URSEMENT OF FUNDS OF THE COMMISSION; AND AMENDING SECTION
IDAHO CODE, TO STRIKE OBSOLETE REFERENCES.

. by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
That Section 22-2919, Idaho Code, be, and the same

I' .
;I.

:i<
.,.,

l ,.

is

.ed.

·1·,1

•'r

2.

That Chapter 29, Title 22, Idaho Code, be, and the
amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be
ignated as Section 22-2919, Idaho Code, and to read as
y

DEPOSIT ANO DISBURSEMENT OF FIJNDS, (l) Immediately upon
moneys received by the commission shall be deposited in
eparate accounts in the name of the commission in one or
or trust companies approved under chapter 27, title 67,
s state depositories. The commission shall designate such
t companies. All funds so deposited are hereby continu,riated for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of
ls can be withdrawn or paid out of such accounts only upon
Jer orders upon such accounts signed by two (2) officers
Y the commission,
right is reserved to the state of Idaho to audit the
commission at any time.
or before January 15 of each year, the commission shall
t~e senate agricultural affairs committee. the house agri:1rs committee, the legislative budget office, the state
· the division of financial management, a report showing
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:_. A State plan for medical a.ssistance_muat.:, : .'. ., . .- -· . ·, ·· · 71'
_. . ::--·, :.:·><1> provide ~at _it shall be in effect in aD political subdmsioils or the State. arid. if ~'
·· · 'administere'! by the~ !:>e IIWl,da~~ upon them;
·· ··· ·. ·• ·.· · ./' ·'.' -,~~': ~.- .... : (2) provide f!)r financial Pm:t!c:ipation by the State _equal __ to not 1esa than 40. per ,
-,; centum oft.he non-Federal share oft.he expe.cditures. under the plan with. respect to 11
which paymenta under section -1396b of this title are ·authorized by this ilu~~
and, effective July 1, 1969, provide for financial participation by the State. equal.to ~
all of such non-Federal share or provide for distribution of funds from Federal or ''
State sources, for can-ying out the State plan, on an equalimtfon or other baais i
· ; .- which will usure that the lo.ck of adequate funds from local sources will. not result -~
·•· :·m lowering the amOWit,· duration, aeope, or quality·of care and services available f
; .,,,., imder<t,he p1an;...:,·... _.r~~ .. ,:;:·..;-, :'"~.
--::::· '·<•,•' J,,··.... ·.·: ..... ·". =<
.:/..... (3) provtde 1'qr'.~t1ng an.opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency ~
·:; , .. to any individ\.al whose claim for medical assistance under the plan ia denied or ia
not acted upon with reasonable promptnesa;
. ' • •' .
. . '•. .-~-''
· ., •..• .~ -I _•.· _ ·.. ,,...
_ · · ,.¥
- ·-. -.
(4) . provide W such methods of administration (including methods relating to the j
.
eatabliahment and.maiJltenance of personnel atandards on.a merit basia, except that ~
·. the Secretary shall exen:ise no authority with respect·to the selection, tenure of ~
•·. office, and c:ompeusation of any individual employed in accordance with such R
'" '' methods, and including provision for utilir.ation o! professional medical personnel ·in 0

•1 ·· · · (whiclievei-·&, 1ltili"'
~-: - :,, ~-. eentence"'or section
· · ·· and. ma!ntalnin
.
g he
recip1enai of medic·
·: ·....
(B) for the''estat
-., ·:-.r-

::.~:~::i::·t~~u::.
.',.·:.·.- ·'·_'_(C)

administered locally,

au~on ·or administration of

f

t.he plan) as are found by the Sec:reta.ry to be necessary for the proper and efficient l
•'·operation of the plan;)B) Cor t h e ~ and efl'ecave use _of paid Bllbprofessionalj·
etaff, with particular_emphas!s on_ the full-time or part.time employment._of recipient.a and other persons of low.Income, aa community service aidl!ll, in the adminis-" ,
tration· o! the plan.and for the·~- or nonpald or partially paid voluntetll"a In a aoe!al j
a: . service volunteer program in providing services to applicants and recipients and In
-: · aaaiBting any advisory C1lmmitteea established by the State agency, and (C) Uiat.,
·, · ·. each State or local· om~ or employee ,-who ia respoD811>1e for the ~ditme ~of 1_
BUbstantial amounta or funds under the State plan; each Individual who· Connerly ti
. ·waa such an omcer or employee; and each partner of auch an officer employee ~
.. ·. shall be" prohibit.ed _t'rom"c:ommitting any ad, in n!lation to any activity under thel
. ··· plan, the comrmssion of which,' in connection with any activity c:oneeming t.he United C
. ·. ·: States Government, _by an cimcer w:· employee of the. United States Governinem. an"'
Individual who was mch an ofllcer'"or employee, ·or a partner of auch an officer or f

,or this title p
. t.b.e c.ase or··/j

-

. employeelsprohihited!>Yaeetioii207or208ol'l'itlel8; '·' ·,: _..,_ .. : '.,f· ,rn,.1 f1
· . -· · <5> either provide r~ the eirt.abliahment.· ~ d~iptio~· rii ~ diiahl State-~
·. · administer or to supervise: the administration .af the plan; or _proride for thel
· establishment or designation of a· single State ageney to administer. or to supervise
. the administratio~ oC,the·plan, ·except that the determination ol eligibility for
medleal assistance under the. plan shall be made by the St.at.e ·or local ·agency
· ad.ministering the State· plan appro,ed undez- subchapt.er I or XVI of this chapterI
(Insofar u it relat.ea to the aged) i! the St.at.e ii ellg1ble to participate in the Statel
plan program establiahed wider' iubchapteJ: ~ o f ~ ch.apt.er, or by_ the ageneyJ
:-;·.·. : or apnc:ies administering the supplemental security ineome program utablished
under subchapter XVI or the State plan approved UDder_part A of subchapter IV .
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Secretary, of proriaions (conforming to such regulations) with respect to the
··(-1,furnishing of medical- usistance under the plan to individuals who are reaidents of
•. _ the State but are absent therefrom;
.
,_k (17) exeept as provided in subsections (l )(3), (m)(3), and (m)(4) of this section,
} · include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for an groups Md may, in
. ~ ,acconiance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, differ with respect to
,.,,inC{)me level&, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under the
~;v plan who are not receiving aid or aaeistance under any plan of the State approved
·under subchapter I, X:, XIV,.or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV of this chapter, and
:with respect to whom supplemental security income benefit. are not being paid
_
under subcbapt.er XVI of thi.e chapter, based on the variations between shelter costs
;in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of
cmedical assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of
atlcLthia subc:hapter, (B) provide for taking into account only such'income and resoureea
88 are, 88 determined in accordanee with standards prescribed by the Secretary,
; ~ 1 available to the applicant or recipient and (in the c:a.se of any applicant or recipient
-f,:,~.-wbo would, except for income and resources, be ellgilile far aid or asaistance in the
·-;~.form of money paJID&lts ,under any plan of the State approved. under subch.apter I,
~oh.X. XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, or to have paid with respect to him
lt):srsupplemental security income benefits under subchapter XVI of this chapter) as
/lb:would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his

l

·· .. :··

.·. y,·

>:~1=

_if religibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation
,'!if· or any such income or resourceB, and (D) do not take into account the financial
\3,i, ·r responsibility a! any individual for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the

,_.~·-pla.n unless such ·applicant or recipient is such individual's spouse or such individuk_·
·'1,~·al's child who is under age 21 or (with respect to States eligible to participate in the
~- State, program establiahed unde.r aubchapter XVI of this chapter), ia blind or
t~ .permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled 88 de.filled in BeC'tion 1382c
1 ,.of thia title (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such
\',lo :· program); and provide for flexibility ii! the application of such standards with
:tJJ?,,.-re.spect to income by taking into account, except to the extent preacribed by the
>f"..j~: Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of inBuranee premiums, payments made to
,./inc-·. the State under section 1396b(f)(2)(B) of this title, or otherwise and regardless of
:~:ati whether 81.lch costs are reimbuned under another public program of the State or
\,•. political subdivision thereoO incurred for medical care or far any other type of
-~i: remedial care recognized under St.ate law;
·,
· ..
f~;:. (18) comply with the proviaioll!l of section 1396p of this title with respect to liens,
~~- acljustments and recov_enes of medical ~ c e corTedly paid, transfers of aasets,
,~.._ and treatment of certain trusts;· -· · · ·
'· •
· · -.
>'"-'~'·' · · - ·.
.
.
q-,b!oh$:, (19) _provide such safeguards as may be necessary to· usure that elig2bility for
~,,,.care and services under the plan will be det.ennined, and such care and services will
be provided, in 11. ma.nner consistent with simplicity or administration and the best
interesbl of the recipienbl;
·
·
(20) if the State plan ini:Iudes ro~dical ~ c e in beba;1f of individuals 66 yeani
!~ ... of age or older who are patients In institutions for mental diseasee(A) "provide for having in effect SU!!h ~ t a or other arrangements with
State authorities concerned with mental diBeaseB, and, where appropriate, with
such institutions, as may be neeessary for cairylng out the State plan, includlng
· ·_ · arnmgeinents for joint plaruting and for development_ of alternate methods of
.
_ care. arrangement.a providing assurance of immediate reM.mil:tance to institu; 'f1:t,;·; ''.,' tions where needed for individuals under alternate plans of care, and ammge~ ~--:-.: ·•• ments providing for
to patient.II ad facilities, far ftumahing information,
un,.~ · .. and far making reports; 1'· 1 • ••,. .... •• .. • •
•• • •• ,
· ·:
·
~
·"'<B(prcwide for an individual plan for
such patient to 88BW"f! that the
,! institutional care provided to him ia in his best int.erests, illcluding, to that end,
•1'. :: aasurances that there will be· initial and periodic 1'e9ietr of his medieal and
•:
other needs, that he will be given appropriate medical treatment within the
. ~-.· :-,:: · .institution; and that there -will be a periodic. determination of his need for
· -::,,.-,·. ,-'."continued trealment in the institution; and :•
.,
.,_
.
tu:. ,, ::: <C> provide'for the development of alternate ptaaa of care, maldnr maxunurn
ti:.. ,. ::' utilization of available resources, for recipients 65 years of age or older who
;; .1
would otherwise need care in such institutions, including appropriat.e medical
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~~a,,,ape-pregnant ·wamazi. l'l!lllde:ntl In-, . z.· CaplllJ am111111t ---·~:; . ·:- 11 ., ,. - •
' . · ~ residences of Of!lee of Mental Retar-,,_. - Medimld regulatioD estahllahlDg maximum co. ~ ar Of!lee _of Mental Health, and thoee _ .. payment far in-patient hospital lleJ'V!res at 60'I,
_, lll)llble to pay; oote bvm pregtlllllt. woman's
of payment lta1e maka far flnt day al !JI.
was auftldent f01' pharmaellt and oth- palient hOaJ)ltal eare, did not violate_ Mednld
. · csre pn:,vfden, res!denta WBn! idenW!ed by · atawte requiring eopaymenta to he"."nomL..J Jn
· .,;41 at CO!lll!ll1lllty rea1dentei, and statement of . _ IJII.OUl1t~; ·Congress adopted by leglsl&tlve reen~ to pay waa sufflclent. Sweeney v.
actment and nititication, regulatory deftnition
: ~ C..U (N.Y.) 1998, 996 F.2d 181W.
_
. promulpted by 8eeretary of Health a.nd HumaD
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401~ \ "· Whiteman.

for Medicald redplent.e' pmcr! !Jon
-~, clnip, in wliicb a v ~ method uaed ~ e d · · Hoepltala e!tahllahed that they would be !1'cslcul•tlnn 'Med!Clld n,clplenta not ~ ~t~
_,~qidred to make CDp&yment. constituted_ vioJaUon W1!!l'e alio'lled to iaka effect, U required f01'
··ttdf_regalmklll requirlllg at.ate to determlne aver-_ temporu-y remaining order, hoepltala could not
: ~ or typical payment fCIJ' a eervlce; lnduakm
deny aervtccs to eligible benutlc:wte. due to
- ~.fllll ~ al peno01 ~ Medlcald pre-_
their blablllt;y to pay required capay amount, but
.: , icnplioii uaiatance WU rwquired In determ1lling ,. W'0UJd be baned from auing atate lrom ciamqe,i
d--,.. Nebruka Pharmai:lsbl .ua'n, Inc. v. if It lmlled out that propoeed copay requirement
- IINebnllb l)ept. ~ Sodal Sen-feea. D.Neb.1994, . W1111 eueutve. Kamw BOIIP- _Aaa'n v. Whfte..
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· {: (1) No lien may be impo&ed against the property-of-any-individual prior to hia death
·:' on account of medical ll88istance paid or to be pald on his behalf under the State plan.
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No lien may.be Imposed under paragraph (l)(B) on such individual'• home if--: ..

~ : ~ = ! ~the:St.ate'
~ ~ ~ d e r ~ ~.~~~'.~"~;~w~le
program establillhed under
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~ - , to participate In
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CU) with respect to whom the State· determines, after notice and opportunity
for a hearing (in accordance with procedures esta,blillhed by,~ State), that he
~ . . • cannot reasonably be expected to be discharged from the meiiical institution

8Ubchapter.
of this
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~ " ~ !I" not eligibll: .to partidi-.te ~- ~ pro~),_is b~,~~ ~~ ,s ~efined
-~::msed:ion~ofthiatitle,or .. ;.,. ,... , .....,,·--.-, .. --·~·" __ ., _ . .
-~~1 1.•• · (C) a idbling of BUcli lldvidual
bu ~ ~ty--blt.enatin aiich1ho"me :who
,f•f waa residing in auch indivldual'a-home for~ period of at least one year ~te!Y
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Aclj111tment or recovery of medical_ UBistance. correctb': paid under 8 State plan
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};.J, (1) No ad,ju.stment or-l"ellONl'J of 1111 medbl ..iatance comctly.paid 011 behalf of
Jiid lin. indMdual under the State plan.may.be made,es.cept··that.tbe State ahaU seek
011- f&(ljustment .. or recmery of any medical.asaiatanee·-COffl!Ctly.paid on behalf of an
'1 individual under the Stat.e plan In the cue of the fallowiug individuals: - .-.
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(A) In the ease of an individual 'described in· aubeection (aXlXBl ot this aec:tion,~ ·
.... ' .•·. the State shalt aeek adjustment or recovery from the Individual's est.a~ or upon aal~'
· ·:.;"of the property mbject to ·a 'lien imposed on account ot medical aaalatance paid 'on ·
.
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In the eue-.ot _an. inctividual who was 66 years of.. age or older .when· ~11
' " -1 ··individual- recemid nch --medical uaiatance, the State aba1I aeek adjustment-_or
.:, '--~-~:recove:rt!rom the individual's l!llfAte, but only tor medical.asaiatance corisistmtrof'-- .
. ~ ... ·· ·.: ;· · (I)' r i ~ tadlity lieriicea, ·home and co~unity-based se:vices,1and relat.e:1
·
h ~ and ~ption dnigaervi~, ~ ., :: :.·?. ·.. ,, . -·: --+· · ., .. ,,., .. JI~>. 8;. ~!.'>Pti!'1 ~th~ St.ate, any i ~ ~-servi~. under t~~ ?~te pl~.;~;. - (C)(l) In tlie
ilf'an individual who ·has received (ar ia entitled! to l'f!leive)
. benefits under long-t.erm care iwrurance policy in connection with which 8SlletB o:~
. resoun:es are disreprded in the manner described in clause (il);eitcept'as provide,I
· : in such clause, the Stace BhaD seek ;uijuatment ·or recovery !roni the! btdiridual~1
... ·· =rtyon ~tlofintermedical lllllliltan~ ~d-,o~ behalf ~f the individual,!°'~~:
· i '.~ .:·:·.u:(B)
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appJy in the cue of an indmdual who n!Ceived medical
aaaiatance under a State plan of a St.ate which had s State plan amendment
_.. approved 88 ol May 14, 1993, which prov:ided tor the disregard at any useta or_
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(I) to the extent that payments are made 1111der a long-t.en:a care lnauranc!°
·; __ : · • polley;-;or ·::' ___..,::&lr '.'.:t: .. • _ . • • · :..,;_ ,.; 'i.. , .. : ;_ ·_ . : ,. _I ·:: ·, •.·;:1~;..
became an individual has received (or ia entitled to ireceive) benefits
~-~~ policy. ::··-_, -·.::
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. ·c2) -Any·acQustme~ ··or· recovery" under paragraph (l)'raay be In8'fo only alter, th11•
.. ,.~ea~-~!µi_e_in~~1!;'-l:'11.~~ s~use~ !f ~y, an~-o~y at a t:mie-;:-_ . 1. · .-.-:::.:i.f_
1
(A) -when
liait riot;~ "child who 'la 'wider age 21,"or _(wftJi·respect ti,
Stat.es eligible to participate. in the State program· established widerl aubchapter_
XVI ot this c:hapt.er) ia blind or permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect to · · · Stat.ea which are liot"etigible to participate in such program) is blind or' disabled iii:
.:· ; :· "defined i n - ~ 1382c ot_this tttle; and·. ,,4: ;: .· ..--~ ~
.... •1 . ·:-,: .-,~,
·····:it1i·
· . • ., ··,-· 4 CB) in'the -caae·;ot i.· Hen on' an individual's home under subsei:tion (a)(l)(B) ol this
• ·.-..!;.sectlob,
,.u.;,:;r...i. •• ;i"UL;,~: ~ ... ; ! .J: ·1·-~·. ·:.;.?:~1~n -~ .· .··<· .; ·-~··n.~~~(.
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(i) no

sibling

of th_e Individual (who was residing in the individ~'s home !of

: ··· •· - . a,.period ·of at leaat one year immediately before the date of the individual's,
-~ _'-_ ._ <~on~~-~~~cal~~n),:~d.:~~·;·::~ :·" ··- ~: ·· --.)
(if) no 10D or daughter of the individual (who was residing in the individual',!._-.
home tor & period of at least two year&, ill!ln~tely before 1the idate of -~~ •
. · .. - individual'& admission to the medical institution,· and who establishes" to du__.. -·- · >,:atfsfa.c:tion:of the State that he or she prov:ided care to such iiidividoal .~c\·
. permitted auch individual to reside at home rather than In an /lnatitutionl,
. ,,•:·. ts lawAilly residing ID 1111ch .home ,who ~-- br.~y. reaitiei ir(~.cll home ·o~~l:
-.:;·_. :-,eontlnuous·.,basia since the .. date .. at the- individual's admission t;o the medic.1d
_.i_.: lmtiblti~--~?;'_-:_:>0 .~::.".,~ ·;!.~.:..:~ ~::,s.-~':i~.·:::;,.;:,-•··: · ·, •;,;:.:: ._·_ . .',;~,::.
· · · (3) The State agency· shalhiatahliah proeeda:rea (in accordance with Slllndarda SJ:ll!Cli.
fied by the Secretary). wider which the agency shall waive the application _ot. ~S:
·aul>aed;ion (other ·than·-paragraph (l)(C)Hl such application Vl'Oald w·ork.an .. widu?
.• bardahip·~--~~:.1~n
~ ~t~~-estab.~~ ~-the Secretary.I..;\'., ::~jf~
(4) For purposes of this iiuliaeedon, ·tlie term _"est.ate.., _with respect ~-s· deceased
.. indivi~ual- . .
_,_·,•c,; ::·.: : ,:; _:_:·: .. (";:~.•1J!_~-f·
: :,:-: ·.'.:· (Ar-ahall include all rea1·ind peraonal property and other 111111ets ~uded within
·_ · ··,: the Individual's estat,e, as defined to~ purposes ol State probate Jaw; i ~ ···: )a!!il?_J. , . . (B) may includ~ at, the. C?PtiO~ of the State (and ~ ~ude, in th!! case ~Jl:m
. individual to whom · paragraph' · (l)(C)(i) • applies), any· other real and · peraom~ ·
•. property and other assets in which·the individual bad.any legal title or interest~! "the time of death (to the extent ot auch.,interest), illcluding·auch a.sse1ta,'conveyedJt
a survivor, heir, or aasign·of the deceased individual through joint teuaaey, t,enallC,_..
in common, smvivorship, lire estate, living trust, or othu anangem.ent.,I:.,.: ..., .~i!l!t I
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(U) in the case of periods.of ineJisibilitY determmed under dause,(ii):. by .the
1110Dtlw.ot.iD.eligibil,ity
applieable
to the illdividaal mul~ clawle', .(i)
u . ,·
., · :·"··number
- . ult ofof
ll1ICh
,11__;,:_.1 . •
. .... .
.. . .... ., .•• , •••.• ,...... • • ~- . J .. •
• •
·.. ,..;··. rm . ""w a o ~ J~:.··.:-~.t 4·:-;1t::-. ••.:'.:f~~ ~~.
;.jJ .!::.~: .!..!: ·:·: ,!..! Hl~_-il.,~::.fl":1
(2) An iDd1Yidual 9hall not be iaellgible tor medical aaalatance by reason of paragraph·.
(1) to the extent tha~ '· -.. ;--,.:; ;:_:-~.J;:·!:1ru ;:;; ;:..1!!11··: .• ;.::_:;.·;,· ;.·'.; ·::~· t;,;;,:.·- .::c:.:·~:.,~'ii!.·1!J!t-)t
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the .._,etidra~1~r~ ·....;; 1• :h'ome''iind witto·tlie homi,:wai triiiat~" .

';'.-.:~: ~t~·~:f~4~,:~;\f~J~~:~~:~~::.~!;:~: ?;£~~;~~: ;::!i-:tC;;;~,_ .:
1

(Ii) a child ahucb.indmdual wbo.(D la·Wlderage 21,.or(ll) (witb ~~-~·~··
_... .. . St.atea ellgihl.! to partlcipat.e µi. ~- State program estab~ ander aubchapter ,
·: . ·:. XVI of. this ~> ia 'blfnd.'or'·permanentlj' _and-to~ di.sabled.• or:. Cwitla~ -,:
.. _. ... : . respect to'Statea which" are.Ji~t eligible'to·~pate In mdl program) ii blhid,· r~
. " • or dfaabled II def!ned fluediOD 1382c a.(thia title:
::··. '" •' ' . ,1·f-'_';,,~.,_,~;

,

(lil)

a

an,ifni'oi'such indi\liqual wh~·ha.i;';t.'-·~1:y:~ in·~-h~~r:Ja-1.'r
0

· · who was residiag in aiich fndivfdaaJ'a home· for a period al at least one· year"lf~
· ' · · · · immediately before the dat.e the fudivfdual beeomes·Bll inlltitutlonaued individ- :fl\
.:i: : .,:.~ aal;
;:.:1.e,.11 )": ..!•~,r:;i. ::i. u.-:.r;. ,S:.-r-:1·.:..i;..,_;.;:, :-.. ;;.,. -· .•_., ..:!: .- ':l!;,j (
. /..
., .,
. U•> a sou or daughter of such ladividwil (otber than a 1:hild desmbed fa ,
·'
· clauae'(bl) 1mo·was·remdin1fin eueh lndividul'a home tor·a petjad;cit at leaat~'~
two years immedlat.el:, before the:dat.e the bidmdual become• an imt1tutio~- ~'.'
ized individual; and who· (ia: determilled by the- Stat.e) pl'V\'lded
to such'\;
... . indivi~ ~ ~.IIUCh iadividual to reside at hon:ie.~er_tb!IJl 111:~such an iDstitution or Cacilitv;
. ., • . ,•· ..~~..•,.._ fI.-··-'
..-. ,__....,".....,..,.,...
·1111
1a
(B) the uaeta.. ...,, "~•· ••• ·••· I -• ,
-~ ·
•
•
·'.; ••· :-·:,,.:;, -::;..,:
t!1°

•or,.~;
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ea:re

(I) wen· tranaferred to tbe. iDdiYtdaal'a ·apaue or to aaotber tor. ,the -~~
bene.8.t _ol the ladividual'a apouae, ·
.
.
. . ; -,~ , •
;~'.:
, ·. · . : • · ·· (U) were •tnmlfen-ed .hm the indtvidwil'a spouse: to· 1110ther tor the
beJ1e8t~the iadividual'aapouae,. 'c• .. :•~~i :;,,i.:;,;;,';, '.•'.w I! •.\.'.~a·::1~:-:·. _:;1i1Ji:::
··:·:: ··=-: (ill) 'ftre:tranafl!ffed·. to.·,.or.;to:,a .trust (lncludiag ·a:Jz'!Jat deacribed tiif.
·· .. ·~:: subeedion,(d)(4).of.·tbia .aec:tioa) establiahed::aoleJy for.th-I! benefit. 01,::,!,!la?.
.. : . =·· . iDdividua.fa child deaeribed In subparagraph- CA)(ji)(ll), ar ~-; .;,·... , ;/ ;~r.:-r:w~b,;;;'.
~ (ht) ftl'9 tralllferred" to a trust Ciacludlng a ·trust deaaibed bi aubaec:tMln-5
(d)(4) of thla eectfon)" establlahed solely tor the benefit. of an mdtridual under E6,·-: -. :-- :-years_ot.aae -~OJia,~ (3!1 ~~.)n ~ n -~~)(3L~-~-~tlej~f
· .-~. .. (C) a aatialactory. ibcnri.ag· fa;made to tbe State (ID I.Cl:ordaula1 with .ngulatio1uiji
promulgated· by tbe· Secntar.,) . _ (I) tbe' tndtridual int.eaded to· dispose, ot t:ie.
· -uaet.s either at lair market value, or. for otber valuable consideration. (ii) the. asse~~
·· were tranalemid eicluiively ·lt?i' .:a: purpoae· ·other:::than. 'to: quiwty1· tor.. inedl~:a!.;
· aiatance or (iii) ill aasetii trinsfem!d tor leaii'tlwi f'air·mane1: value bave beiii'
... •returned td the"iiidfvidaal•' or'·,:·: '~.:.·-~::.::;::-i-r,.!.U :-··!J~:.;,., .•:, • ,.J.:,'., ,-.~. :;: ,
~:
......
• ,.
•.&...
• ... ~ ..... we.,
.~. -~·:.: ·•·,i" ·!ii •· •.,
.J 'il'i,••. ···,-:I·...... ',,(:;.,:.·;;,
·:!f!4l/
(D) t.he State determinea, wider procedures 'establi8hed by tb,e Stat.e (hi: acc,,ro.:_;_
•. dance with a t a n ~ a ~ by th~ Secretary), ~t_the den~ri:1f eligl1,ijity'wo,ild•
• .',WGl'k aif Wldlie]i.ai'da.bip ila'det.ermined 011 the buia of criteria 'establlahed by i;he
,. ,,,_Seeretary;""•.. •••• •~• •:,,c....-~·-· Ja. 1:;.
~
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.. ~3) For purposes of thi3 subsection, hi. it; ~e ~t ~ ~ass~t ~):i'·~ iii°dividual In
.common vyith another ~·011 or pe.r!l0118 in. ,a 'joinqenancy, tenancy in common,;~
aimilar arrangement, the asset (or the afJ'ected portion"of 1111ch aaaet) aball 1be considered
. to'be ~erred by auch individual.when any action ia taken, either-by such _indivictual
_jir by any :othe, person; that n!duces or -~~t.es such individual's ownership ~r coritrl'.ll
"~f lftJdf.~(~

J

•

.• • ,

'·~·,.~' ,·..

•

:_t. 1,._ -1~-. , ~,·

- ~'-'

I

~4~:.;~:~-~.i:t.\~/: ~,·\~~ ', ~:1,J;;~~~;~·-/f;.-.~

~--~-

\; ,(4) A ~ta~. (incl1:1ding a Stat.e which baa elected. treatment under eiection 1396a(J:} o!
, this title) may not.-FO"ide_!~ ~ period.of ineligibility for IUl il@vidual ilcie tiitfansler
of resources !or less than fair
eice~ In accordance _with. t.hiB liub"seci::lon.

market ~ue.

._In the case of a transfer by the apouse cir an individual which results rm ·a.perio:i o!
ineligibility tor medical ·aasistaace under a·state plan for auch lndividLUII, a State shall.

uaing a reasonable methodology (as specified. by the Secretary>, apportion such peri,,d of
· Ineligibility (or any portion of such period) among-the individual and the indivul.aal's
: spouse ii the spouse otherwiae:becomea eligible t~. medical 111!8istancr~ under. the Btate
plan., , · :··,·. .-..- .. •,. ·: · •' . ·.:;• · ;·- ·-'· :~·.,· c:::. ,;:.:-..:. :e::,·i ..:.:·: :'-..:--,!1~-!"-"! . :.
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In this Sllbsect.ion, the· t.erm "resources". has .the meaning given IIUCh ,term in
1382b of this title,.without regard to the exclwlion desaibed in subeectlon (a){l)
f..
-.:..ti iBa~.~,i:-:i:i 11.t 1i:· :":!•:n::•l ~i!.; ;.c"r ~.:::!~ .: ;;·:.-.i~_;t1i".'~~-~ ... , .. ,:- f
:-ei1~e~t"iif
.:i,;'i~c.;,i"~:; ·::::" ;_ .,,,. :-- ,·.i·')'~i' ,,;;;-:'; - (i" ·',
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For porposes of det.ermiiling an Individual's eligibility for,· or amount o(. benefits
a State plan arider thia"ihibcluipterfirubject to'paragrilph (4),·the rules specified in
-aph' (S) shall apply· to 'a_ trust established by such individual. · ,. · . :. ·· .: · . . .
~".'f}l. ·-.~;r-~.::.,_;.\,."
. '•'-•r",,.. , ,T!' '=<),.:•..- • .. -~••: 'IC~,. ,; •• • . ~ , · , -·, ..
A) For 'purposes ·orthui· iiutiiedion, an individual shall be. corisldl!N!d to have
shed a trost if wet.a of the Individual were Wied to form all or part of the corpus
trust iind if any of the following indmduals established suclJ b'u8t other than by
t

:

.- -•

"'; • : , - : , - •

..

I •••

(I) The individual.

·!".: -:.:::

".f.;

' ~ .'_';', : •

•• '•

..

.: ' ' .'\i}tt?,?::

.:

··• '' ' ..,•.:,! .',, · · ~;'.,·-, '•",-·.· .-.,~·-

.TbEi° !ndivfdual's - ~ . ·. ::'.; :.,; · ' '.-

(ii)

I

·•

··

I

(lli) A~;:_hlcluding'a'~uzt'or ~ttve ~. ~-lepl autllority to
:t in place of or oil behalf of the Individual or the lndtvidual's spouse. ,
(Iv) A person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the direction
• upon the request of the individual a? the indtvidual'a.apouse. .. C• :' •·• j .r.
In the cuie of a trust the corpus of which includes assets ol an individual (as
1U1ed under" subparagraph {A))· and BSSeta ol any other person or persons, the
'ona of thla subsection shall apply. t,o the portion of the trust attributable t,o the
of the individual. ·; ,:.:,;::·.•:::.:::, ::·;: .. ,
.. · ,.t; ..~;,·.1. •·..· _:;.·. ·:~: ..:i:··:! · .
Subject t,o paragraph (4), this suhaection shall apply without regard ·to,:..;.
(i) the·purpoaes for which II tiuat'ia establls}ied ·: ::·.::': .,L :':' '-·'
.
·,-~
.,
·,, ...•..• , · . · . · · . ' : , ..- .. ,,d ... "-J.
whether the trustees have or eurdae any discretion under the trust,
••,....K>·or~ restnctions 'oii when
i1iay'
. . or 'w!ietha'
.
. .distributions
.
.. .
. be
• .. ··-made from the

ust,

.

_..

. !-;: ·~-:·-.;~':•. · .. ,:

-~;1!.J:ru c; ... !1

.f~t~~~~~-~~~~,~~~~~~?.~.~~~~;,. ;.;,,...?.

>: .- .

A)• In the csse ol a ~ l e trust--., ... :·;::: ,; .. ·, -~ ...,r.:,. i· · :-;-m,·!.!'~:!. ·.i; ..

the

tJie

(I)·
corpua ol
t:nitt;shall be cori.Bidered reiioarces available t,o the
~ ::. ?J4;r.:· .. :,_' ,·, __ i~..:.:J!I::'l"··-!'.r.:.:4 i:Lil;-r:::,;:t ·,-:, :::1 .:·-~.::~,!t! •]'.;!'":..'.!

(ti). payments

from the trust t,o or for the benefit of' the individual

.. ,-:

individu• ..

:· ,·,·

shall. be

insidered!ncomeoltheindfvidual,~,!i:'...:.:.i~ 1 (.:.:••. ;:.:-·... ;.,_-1;·· ~ ·-: :· L'·
(iii) any other payments from the trust iihall.be consldered·uaeta disposed ol by
,e individual for Purpo&eS of subsection (c) of this section.
·-..--. In ·the cue ol an irrevocable t:i.iat.
(I) if then!' are any circumstances under ~hich payment from uie"t7wit -;;,uld be
JMie to or foi: the benefit ol tbe !ndfv.ldual, the portion of the corpua from whicb, or
.e lncom.e pn the .~ue. from which, payment to the indlv:idual could be made shall
1 considered resources ~ e to_f:he ~dh::id~ ~~ ~t:8 ~L~-~~ ~on
. the corpua.~.. inCQ1:U~[-" 1 . ... :\:..:;b~u 1;,1 ~..,_ ... ,.:.t-":1.:,,i;-.... , rli' ,1• -;,·,:·.······ _..,._-..
(I) t,o
for the bencl'ii"of 'the lndivid~ .siu;,n' iie'
of
·individual.and
.··r. i·--:-~:r -!°"!::r;:,-;.;·,"'.'·~.:=- • :,.:·; ~-- ·.-·J·:tt-::i~·:,. -~:·. ··:·l ! ·-:. · · .
, .: .. (ll) for any other purpose. shall be conaidered a transfer:of uaeta by the
' :·· individual liulijec:t t<> subsection (c) ol this. aed:ion; and ::: 1-' • '· ·.· • · ·
-.~·-.--..--r~ .... . '
(Ii) any portu>n of the trust from whic!i, or lily Income on tlie. COIP,III from which,
, . payment, could ~der aey cimunatancea be made to the individual llhall be
,DBidered,
of the ·date of establiahnient ol the trli.st (or, I!' lat.er, the date on
bicli payment 'to·· the !nclMdail was' forecloaed) to be :uaeta -clfspoaed by the
•iividuaUor purpoaea of 81lbaection (c) of this section, ,and the ~~:o( the tnlat
,an be determined for purposes ol such· &11baec:tlon by indwting the amowit !)f any
.ymenta made tram such ~OD ol the tnlst afterhi sucli date.
l r·
! ••
.;!",!:.:....1 •,.•,.._.., •• :
·l'hla aubaec:tion shall not apply to.any of the following trusta: ,·,;:,:. ,l · ,i · ;:-: :, ·
(A)··.A triiit'con~ir the aaaets'·or ab lndividual"under age 65 who. ia disabled
s defimed in' section' '1382c(a)(3): of°l;hil'tit!e) and ·which is est.abliahecl'for the
·•.-olaueh-tndfvfdaal by a·parant;:grandparent, ~-~_oltbe.illdlvidual,
, 11 ,...,.ut if the Stats will recme all amountB ~ 8 ' *1!.~ trulltupon the.death

or

'

•

~,,;;.i";

•

'

I

:_.·.

i

"j}i'.,',;,\:.:·.· , ~=~i}t~;·
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I

· or auch individual

up to an· amount equal to the total medical aaaiatan~ paid on
· behalf of the Individual under a State plan under this auhchapter. :.u:;-: -.~,,·:: ,0 ,. --,,,,:ij
I
•
, 11(B) A b'ust establlahed in a State for the benefit of an individual if- 1 •• •· 1
(I) the trust la compoaed only of pension. Social Security, :ind. oth~ _in~'.
··>- ~the indtridual (~ ~~~--~me_ln,~~
\i; .. ~~r- .. :,.1•,,c; ; , :;,
· .:..··. '' (ll) the Stats will receive an amcnmta ~ In the tnst upon the death'.
of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical, Ulliatm:e paid .oi1
behalf of the individual under State plan
this BUbcha·pter, an.ii ·.• · -. --t_ ·
~
J
.
. (ill) the State makes medical asaistance available to Individuals described b1·
'J, · aection 1396a(a){l0)(A)(ll)(V} of thla title, but does nofmalte such 8116UJtanoi·
available to Individual.a for nuning · facility services mider sec:tioh
· 1S96a(a)(10)(Cl of this title.-··
· · · ,t,~,. _, .. :i
:·,;!;
(C) A trust containing the 8811eta of an Individual who ia dl.aabled (as defined h
aectio~ l~a)(3) of this Utle) that :meet.a the _fo~ ~-~~~~-Ii:~~- · , r),
;.;_;;
(() The trust !s estahlWied and managed by a nonprofit BR~n.~ . _."' .. : .
(II) A separate account la maintained tor each beneftclar:r of the trust, bt:.t,
for purpoaes of inve.stment and management ot 1'lmda, the trwrt.1 pools tbei111
~
. . . :: ,-._::··':--..:r:,.·~ .. -· ·· _--.,,·,l.' -._.... :- .··~· -~:·i\ft~· ·. ··1·~-~~·,. · (WJ kccunta In the trust 111'8 estabUahed solely for the bene& of !ndlvidtu:ls
who are di&abled (as defined In aection 1.38'«(a)(3) ot this tttle) by the pare:ut,
grandparent, or legal guardian ot such individuals, by l!llch trldfviduala, .or b) _a

-JJ

~J~.

.

.

.

a

.

". I

.• ..:

.

..

under

..,.( • ;

-·

.

,.

. , , .... ,, '. I

.•

II

'

.......

~-!it . ,

·i;,

court..·..

. ,· ·:·.····· ·: .... ·

. ··. •::: ·-:· ·. . -~ .- : :· ; -./.-· .. c,\

To the extent that amounta remaining In the beneficiliey'B ,account upon
the death otthe ~ciary are not retained by the trust, th,e trust pays to the
State from such remaining amounts In the account an amoun1( equal to the tot.al
· · amomit of medical auiatance:pakl on behalf of the benetlcla:-y under the Stnte
plan under this subchapt.er. .· · ·
·
.
> · · ·' ·
(Iv)

.. -

• .•

~. •. .•. .

·

. • l•

,

, .

.•

• .

I. -, -

(5) The State agency &baJl estahliah procedure& (In accordance wit.b atandards spod~ by the Secretary) under which the agency waives the applieat!on of tbfa auhaectlon
with respect to an Individual If the !ndtvidual establlahes thllt such, application wtuld
work an undue ba.rdahip on the lndfvidua1 u determined on
buia" of ¢teria
estal)llahed by the Seeretary, ':·. _' :-1:: 'icl:'_ :-,; ,,~·:1: '. ': :'~j ,:--• .!'• _'!;'.+I; :i'.; I
(6) The term "trust" includes any legal lriatnment or devfce that ls, afmilar to a tl:ust
but Includes an umwty only .to,imch extent .aru:Hn sudl manner· aa_,jthe _Secre1.iry

the

:~o:t!~na . ··.·:~, -~
. --·· ,-.

'_r, ·:,: .:::-~:~~:-:~}~;:~:~_:'._~-~:·,:~~~::~;~~)~;~--~/-~~., .

~·.. .- ·._·--: .:~~--·.r 't':"i,:-1!; .··.--::.;..- ;,i.il~:.:.;: . :.:ta.,··_.u.~.-~n~_:r..; £.,..: : .. -~

< Inthiaaecdon,.thefollow!ngdeftnitfonaahallapp)T- ::. ,;;,.. , -·.: ··.,, {-- ., .. :::-:
.'.: ': ., . (1) The term '"aueta", with respect to 'a:ii"fndividual,' incJudE!S "all income anc
· , .. ruourcea of the Individual and"af the Individual's apouae; !ncluding:·any lncon:.e 01
reaources which the !ndfvidual or such indfvtdual'B spouse iB ent1Uedito but "does no
receive becaQ8e of acijon- :. ·:,;:;;;;.-;:;,:: :i,u ;.; :i~:. ,,. ,- ·,.:: :r:\ ·,, ~ y-. ;_,
(A) by the Individual or such ln.dividual's BpOW!e, · :,,;; _;,. •.-!:J.-,:,;r..' ·

,.-••i

~:

01

•'

·

.-},\

r•.,

,

,,

•• •

~

'f

,..

~.t

;-•j'..)

, .. •' •-•

•

I~

, .,~

•,,;

~r •·•

CB) by a peraon. including· a ccwt or administrative body, with 1eg:o
. authority to. act In place of or on behalf of the indlvidual or· liuch Individual'

.~:·.: -"::• r,. - ~

'9".·:, • •:~:·••:: -~·.-: ~·;· :~ :.~:;::~.~:..:• ~f•lo o::••:• ~ :; ~ ,: •. ~;;,:••'~•" -~~?.>;.I •. •,• •
any penon. Including any court or adminimative body; acting :at tl:

. ~- - ,,:., .. : ,(C) .by

.r,, · • .:,direc:t:ion or.upon the request .of the Individual or ·weh Individual's

·:. ·t1:t1e.·"" ·:·· ._.. ·_;:-.·~.;:~·:!•: ·:~ ~-lt.~
·":.:.---=· -~ -::i:~::,:r,.:,ii. ~~. (3) The term "lnstitutioiiauied "fu~---meana· an indmdual.-wbo' 1a·--u: ~
Uent. in a nursing facillt;y, who la:an Inpatient in a medical imtitlltion and wi
,., -·:: Nlpect to wbo~ payment ia .made ~ on a level of care ~ e d in .a nlll'Bi:
,, : radlity, or who II deac:ribed in-section J396a(a)(10XA)(lil(Vl) af tbia' title. . : ..
·. .;. .. . .
.,
. . .
:
. . . .
. : } ·~· ·":···
· · --~- '·· (t) · The term "noninatitutionallr.ed individual" -meana an lndmdaal receM!llJ ai
.-.: . ·'·of the services specified in subaection (c)(l)(C)(il) of thl.a eeetion;,I.: )i .T"l!:".•J .: ·"
1

..

,

l)IOUB•

~~n-'1• nf th
;.~:.:~~r·~;;.!f!·, ·:, ..' .:.,.;:{~:

:.. .:::=. ·-'(2)"The term''.'ln~. bu the~~ irve~ ~ch t.erm'.in

.

.

:::-,:::

..
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· (5} ·The tenn ~esources" has ilie meaning given such term in section 1382b or
··is title;: without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual} tD the·
---r, , •
-du.siori described in subsection (a)(l) of such section. -·
. . . • . • •i.,,

.• :

:•• ·,.·

.

·.:·•.

J,·"'

4, 1936, c. 681, Title XIX, I 1917, aa added

.. -

'. ... ,• ...

~ i

< ,_ +. ·;,), :

Sept: 3, ·1982, Publ...97--?A8. Title U

{I

1m>. 96

·o, IIDd amended Jan. 12, 1983, Pub.I.. 171--448, 11tle m. f "309(b)(2n (22), 96 Stat. 2410: Dec.
7, Pub.L. · 100--203, Title IV. t 4211(h)(l2XA>. 101 Stat. 133IO-a77; Dec. 22,'' 1987, Pub.I..

i i

(

·, TitJe IV;.f 4211(h)(J2)(B). aa amended July I, 1988, Pnh.I.. 100-360, Til.le IV, § ,Ul(l )(8)(1).
:. 800; July 1, 1988, Pub.I.. 100-360, Title Ill, I 30.1Cb), 1112 Slat. 7~ 0d. IS, 1988. Pub.I..
·, Tille , VI,. I 608(d)(J6)(B), 102 Stat. 2417; Dec. 111, 1989, Pub.I.. ,01-;i9, Tule VI,
e)(l). 103 Stat. 2271; Aug. 10, 1993, J>u.b.L. 100---M, Title XID, ff 13611(1) to (c), 13612(a) ~

< · · .. ·,, ..,-; ·, .. :. ·.: ·.·· :-:;,;;,;;,_-.;.,_ .--,,:;

Stat.622to628.) .:- .·· . -.,
: .
--·.•j:,r.
L .•r.·,-,!~ ,i'1~.,,· · ·
,
• ;.,,:(
•· .,,,,
.,. ·• - --- "!:.1 ,'1 1,,J... ~:::-,"."'~~~ot~'.:;\G":\J,.q
-. . ...•
• .. ,,,,. HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES ,__ . ,,,:,~·_;1;;-, ,:,: :,,.:.,
n Nata e.nd Lepalatne Reporta -~ · ,,
·-"(B) the l'8IOUJ'ee8 were tnn&tem!d (I) to or
A..:-ta. H~- R.cport No. 1~111 and 6-om (or- to anotha for Ule 80le b=dlt ol) the
Anference Report No. 103-213 see 1993
lndividua!'s spouae. or (ii)· to ·the lndtvidual'a
-le Cong. and Adm. Nl!WII, p.
cbild dtllrlibed in lllbpangnph(A)(U)(Il);":
-- .
,-Subsec. . · (cX2)(C)...
Pub.I..".· · 1 ~
,wnw
I l3611(a)(2)(C), IUbstitu~ •uaeta• 'ror "re.tmenclmenta. Subiiec. (b)(I). Pub.L.
t 13612(1); lowered threshold age to 56 ·. ~~ ~ ~d~ cl(~;;., '.;,:~;;'"',. ;~ .:· .. ' ,!
Subsee. , (cX2><D). -• -Pub.I.. . l ~
for Individuals from whom the State will
t 1S611(a>m(I)), pnenlly · amended.: mhpar.
1dlald emte recoveries, Lnd expanded
(D). Prior to amendment su.bpar. (D) read aa
mediald eentces for whJch rerover., it
foDowa:: : ·)..,. ":: :: ·~-·.. :, ·.:.·. ,:; :.---.:: , ~ . _., :: ... J
ougilt, Including 'esate recovery· fnlm
·lies loair-tenn care lnsul'IUlt'e. ' u(D) the Stare det.ermines that denial of ellgibility wvulc:!,nri: .Ill undue hardahip! · - · · •: •. (bl(3).,. Pub.L.. I 03--&l. I l3812(b),
~'.(3>.:.: : .
SuDlll!C.
(c)(3).
Pub.I..
.• (bX4). Pub.L. JW-68, § la61.2(c),
I 136ll(a)(2XE>, generally amended par.(3),
~- (4).
Prior to amendment par. (3) read u follows:
·- (c)(l).. Pub.I.. lto--66, § 136ll(aXI),
"(3) In this 1111bsection, the term 'hlstitutioll-'
'y rmaed pu. (]). Frio!' to the amendalJRd fndfvidual' meaml ID Individual who la .Ill
'1) read u follows;
inpatient ill a 11ursing facility, who la an ill~
.,, _ __,,.nler to meet the requirements of dellt in & medicaJ fnalitution IDd with respect_ to
1""'lecUon
(for purpoeea of aection •.. whom paymem la made bued on a level of c:Bn!
:· l )(B) a( thla title), the State plan must
provided ill a _IJllJ'IIDI( . racility, or _who, la defor a period of Ineligibility for n11J1W11r
acribed in iiection l396a<aX1 OXA)(IO(Vl)" of thla
avlcea 1111d !or a level of c:Bn! In 1
· .sdtutlon ·equlvalent to that of nUl'llillg
-:°
,r,,tcea and for ae:rvices under seetlo.n
§ ·13811(aX2)(F), added provis101111. relating to
of thia atJe in tile caae of an lnstitudonappartfonment o1 period of ineligibility amonpt
Jividual (u d~ed in .pa.nigrapb
spomea.. ::> ':":'l... .
~- - :.• : . ,:.. :. '~":. ~.1J ~
wilose spouse. at any time during· or
Subsec. <dl. 'Pnh.I.. 1m..u, f 136ll<h), added
, 30-month perlod immediately before
whaec.(d).
,,
-:
the lndtridaal becomes an inadtutional. .
. . • ,.
.
'•'".-'"I·. - ..)
v-idual · (If the individual la entitled to
Suh6ec. (e). · Pub.I.. I ~ f 1381l(e), added
.aalatanee llftder die State plan on 911ch
subaec:. (e). - .. · · ·
-.i , . ; .;
If the !Ddfvidua.l la POt so endUed, the
individual applfea tor auch llllllilltaru:e
Effecttft i>aia .,-.-~ ~~:
lnadtutlonalW!d Individual cilspoeed of
· '"·'' .- '- ·• ,,...,
!or less thac &Jr market value. The
,· 1993 Acts." Section 13811(e) ·of Pub.I..· 108-M
lnallgibility il\aJI begin with the IDOlllh
pnmded that: .. _
a. . . ,!· : ·: ._
1111ch rl!IIOlll'Ct'1I were transferred and
· "(I) The amendmet11J1 made· by 'We ·ll!dion
le!' of months ill 1111ch period &hall be
[imendl.ng !lllbaec. (c:) and enading aubaecL ·(d)
he leaser of· _, ··• ·,
&nd (e) of thia aectiOll and amendillg aecdon,
30 !IIOllths,
1396a and , l396r-o of thla tit.le] . ab.all apply,
,Li~~-=::·

I

I

... :...,.

0

378.

.·~·.. - .'

... ..'

: ' . .:~ ··;.

.. .' ._.
.· :·

.

-

.

· .· A@:

.... : ·:· -r--·· •;;;-,·.,.
I

I

or

100.:00:

~tis:~/-:· ;~X~>i;' -·. ~b.L'. .·:.;:'i~,

ra»

<' ·- ·. :_.,_; ..

"or

._ ,,:

(i) the total uncompenaated value·

of

<IUfflll! 1o lnDs.fured, divided by (ii)
cmt, to a private patient:at the.

nee

~pt u provided In t.hia sul!a&c:t:i®. to paymerits llllder title XIX of the Social Security Ad

. CWa. mbdiapterl for alendar q_uartera beginthe application, ol nW'llillg facility serIWl8' on or after October l, 1993, without regard
the Stat.a, or, at. State option, ill the
to whether or 11°' flnal :regulll1ou to cany ovl
jty in whith the mdividual ia inatitu- · · 111ch ametldmenta have been promulgat.ed by
~~ ·,~.,,:,.·,,.:,. ·:· .,
•::.
auclida&e.
..•.
-:, .- (c:)(2XA).
. .Puh.L.
103-a,
· "(2) The ameadme11ta made by this eeetlon
)(2)(A),_ 111badwted ."uaeta" for '.'re- (1111endillf IIUbaec. (c) 111d UIICti.Dg 111baecs. Cd)
. , .. _
and (e) ot tllia aection and amending aectiou
, ,· (c)(2J(B). ,:
Pub.L.
IQ3..68, - J396a 111d 1396H of l4ia title] shall not apply12)(8), generally amended par, {2)(B),
•, ..- M(A)° t.o.;,ectieal uaiatan~iiprfflPid~"for eer,IDeDdment JIii"; C2XB) niad u followa: .... vices ~:bef!!:re.~ 1, 1~;,;,: ·_: ·
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HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

ri'ewialon Nota and Legislative lleporu

. i,,

community spouse, as defined in section
1396r-5(h)(2) of this title,.".
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.I... 101-239,
§ 641 l(e)(l)(B)(ii), struck out cl. (iii)
which contained material relating to
transfer of resources to person other
than a spouse for less than fair market
value .
1988 Amendment&. Subsec. (c)(l).
Pub.I.. 100-485, § 608(d)(l6)(B)(i), substitutcd "period of ineligibility for nursing facility services and for a level of
care in a medical institution equivalent
to that of nursing facility services and
for services under section 1396n(c) of
this title in the case of an institutionalized individual (as defined in paragraph
(3)) w ho, at any ume
,
d unng
· or 11.rn::r
-"-- th e
30-month period immediately before the
date the individual becomes llI1 institutionalized individual (if the individual is
entitled to medical assistance under the
State plan on such date) or, if the indi\1dual is not so entitled, the date the
individual applies for such assistance
while an institutionalized individual" for
"period of ineligibility in the case of an
institutionalized individual (as defined
in paragraph (3)) who, at any time during the 30-month period immediately
before the individual's application for
medical assistance under the State plan".

Senate Report No. 97-494
'~d · House Conference Repon No.
(97-760, see 1982 U.S.Code Cong. and
· dm.News, P· 781.
•·., i983 Act. Senate Rc:pon No. 97-592
/f~d House Conference Report No.
-'97-986, see 1982 U.S.Code Cong. and
.Adm.News, P· 4149.
,&::,i987 Act. House Report No. 100-391
U,arts I and ll) llJld House Conference
"• · port No. 100-495, see 1987 U.S.Code
. 'Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2313-1.
'. y~."i988 Acts. House
Report
No.
05(1) (II)
d H
c nf
(\')lo; 100-l
•
an
ouse O erence
. ·~~port 1~61, see 1988 US.Code Cong.
· :and
p. 803.
,,.. Adm.News,
.
;t, Senate Report No. 100-377, House
Conference Report No. 100-998, see
•· 988 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p.
77_6. ·
-~1.989. Act. House Report No. 101-247,
House Conference Report No. 101-386,
and Statement by President, see 1989
· U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 1906.
l:i:l,: ·.
J982 Act.

~calloDJI ·

· :Pub.L
100-203,
Title
· IV,
'§i42ll(h)(l2)(A), Dec. 22. 1987, IOI Sta t.
J330-207,
provided
that
subsec.
"(c)(2)(B)(i) is amended by striking out
"skilled nursing facility, intermediate
· caie facility" and inserting "nursing fa.
P.!!cility, intermediate care facility for the
._ mentally retarded" in lieu thereof, and
Wnl>u.b.L
I 00-203,
Title
IV;
421l(h)(12)(B), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat.
~1330-207, as amended Pub.L 100-360,
ti J JV § 4 1(/)(3)(1) J J 1 1988 102
--ASuii.·
, _it e •803, 1 provided' u that
Y ' subsec.
'
•(c)(2)(B)(ii), is amended by striking out
~ ~lied" each place it appears, which
-.amendments could not be executed in
of complete amendment of subsec.
. c) by Pub.I.. 100-360, § 303(b).
•
i:,.
endmeata .
989 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(l).
_fub.L. 101-239, § 641 l(e)(l)(A), inserted
-=.zg.!'. whose spouse," following "an institu~onalized individual (as defined in para-~Ph (3)) who,".
~$'ubscc. (c)(2)(B)(i). Pub.L 101-239,
,ff~ll(e)(l)(B)(i), substituted "(i) to or
~l?t (or to another for the sole benefit
~ r,i}'. !he individual's spouse, or" for "(i) to
..ror: to another for the sole benefit of) the
~1-.., .

'!lt

. . . . liiew

s:,
-.,,,'
411

. ~:;-.
i

42 § 1396p

Pub.L. 100-360, § 303(b), substituted
provisions establishing a period of ineligibility for institutionalized individuals
who, at any time during the 30-month
period immediately before the individual's application for medical assistance
under the State plan. disposed of resources for Jess than fair market value
for provisions. for denial of medical assistancc for any individual who would
not be eligible for such assistance except
for such disposition.
Subsec.
(c)(2). Pub.I...
100-360,
§ 303(b). substituted provisions that an
individual shall not be ineligible for
medical assist:snce by reason of par. (I)
to the extent that the resources transferred were a home and title to the home
was transferred to certain individuals,
the resources were transferred to (or to
another for the sole benefit of) the com·
munity spouse, or the individual's child
who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled, a satisfactory showins was
made to the State that the individual

163
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.,.,,·, .

~!

_,. i

000234

·• -'\r-

42 § 1396p

SOCIAL SECURITY

intended to dispose of the resources cither at fair market value or for other
valuable consideration, or the resources
were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical
as.sistance, or the State determines that
denial of eligibility would work an undue hardship for provisions which empowered States to est.1blish periods of
ineligibility in excess of 24 months in
any
in which the uncompensated
value of disposed of resources exceeded
$12,000 or the propeny was disposed of
for less than fair market value.
Sub=. (c)(2)(A)(ii). Pub.L 100-4 85 _
d)( 6)(B}( ') d
1
§ 608 (
ii • esignated e:iti5ting
provisions in part as subcls. (I) and (II),
respectively.
Subscc. (c:)(2)(A)(iii). Pub.L 100-4 8 5,
§ 608(d)( I 6)(B)(iii), substituted ·the in-

been so eligible if the State plan requirements with respect to disposal of re:·
sources applicable under paragraphs '(I)
and (2) of this subsection had been_ applied in lieu of the provisions of section
I 382b(c) of this title.
· ·.
Subsec.
(c)(4). Pub.L
100-360,
§ 303(b), added par. (4).

"who" for "and" preceding "has lawfully.

dividual becomes an institutionalized in-

resided'._

=

I

1,

r

i,,
1.:

'
II

.

,.

. I
l

Ch. 7 ·

dividual" for "of the individual's admission to the: medical institution or nursing faciliry".
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv). Pub.L 100-4 85 ,
§ 608(d)( l 6)(B)(iv), substituted "the individual becomes an institutionalized individuaJ" for "of such individual's admission to the medical institution or nursing facility".
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub.I- 100-485,
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(v), designated aisting
provisions in pan as cl. (i), added cl. (ii),
and struck out ''or the individual's child
who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled"
following
"section
1396r-S(h)(2) of this title,".
Subsec.
(c)(3). Pub.L.
J00-485,
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(vi), qualified definition
of "institulionalized individual· to pro-vide that inpatients in medical institutions must be those with respect to
whom payment is made based on a level

of care provided in a nursing facility.
and included within the definition persons
described
in
section
1396a(a)(I0)(A)(ii)(VI) of this ride.
Pub.L J00-360, § 303(b), substituted
definition of the tenn "institutionalized
individual" for provision that in any case
where an individual was ineligible for
medical assistance under the State plan
solely because of the applicability to
such individual of the provisions of section J382b(c) of this title, the State plan
could provide for uie eligibility of such
individual for medical assistance under
the plan if such individual would have

Subsec.

(c)(S). Pub.L.

100-485,

§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(vii), added par. (5) .... :.

J 987
Amendment.
SubseC:'
(a)(l)(B)(i).
Pub.L
100-203, ·
§ 42Il(h)(l2)(A), substituted Hnursing
facility, intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded" for "skilled nursing
facility, intennediate care facility''. ·
)

1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b)(2)(B).
Pub.L. 97-448, § 309(b)(21), substituted

~-,

Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.L 97-448,:
§ 309(b)(22), substituted in subd. (I)
"can~ for "cannot" and deleted from
subcl. (IV) the: introductory word -~ ·
Fifectlve Dates
.- •
1989 Act.
Amendment by Pub.L
101-239 amending subsec. (c)(l) and·
(2)(BXi), (ii) and striking subsec
(c)(2)(B)(iii), applicable to transfers oc-.
curring after Dec. 19, 1989, see section
64 I l(e)(4) of Pub.L 101-239, set out as a·
note under section 1396a of this title;!
1988 Acta. Amendment by Pub.L 100-485 effective as if included in the'.
enactment of Pub.L 100-360, see section
608(g)(l) of Pub.L. 100-485, set out as a
note under section 704 of this title. · 1
Amendment by· section 303(b) of·
Pub.L 100-360 applicable to resources ·
disposed of on or after July 1. 1988,
except that such subsection, as · so
amended, shall not apply with respect to
inter-spousal transfers occurring before
October 1. 1989. and to payments under
this subchapter for calendar quarters be-ginning on or after July J, 1988 (acept
in cenain situations requiring State legislative action), without regard to whc:U!·
er or not final regulations to carry out ·
such amendment have been promu.1gated by such date (with an exception
for resources disposed of before July 1,
1988), sec section 303(g)(2), (5) of Pub.L
100-360, set out as a nore under section
1396r-5 of this title.
..
1987 Act. Amendment by Pub.L ·
100-203 applicable to nursing facility

764
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CHAPTER 67
(H.B •. No. tl7)
AN ACT

- ,':AID E!,ICI!ll!,ITY FOR KARRIED PERSONS AND TO

PENALTIES
3FER OF PROPERTY; AMENDING SECTIONS 56-209e AND 56-214,
~. 10 CONrORN WITH SECTION 303 Of PUBLlC LAW 100-360.
d by the Legielature of the State of Idaho:
1. That Section 56-209e, Idaho Code, be, and the same
ded to read as follows:

is

e, ELIGIBILITY OP MARRIED COUPLES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
MEDICAID PROGRAM, (1) It is the intent of the legislature
ing this section to reduce the number of situations in ~hich
regulations as they apply to long term care costs, cause
~k~he destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of mar·ried out to prevent destitution, It is further the intent of
;rsratton section.to protect the community and separate prop1te, in!ofa~ch rights are not specifically preempted by
law, of a married person whose spouse applies for medical
:e regardless of whether they are living together.
Ca) In determining the eligibility of an aged, blind or disI
married individual or of a coqple for a,edical assistance
· title XIX of the social security act, the amount of income
resources to be counted as available to such individual or
e ahall be calculated in accordance with the community
propprov1s1on~

of chapter 9, ~itle 32, fdaho Code, or 9hould it

, the advantage of such individual or couple, in accordance
the methods utilized by the federal supplemental.security
~ program under title XVI of the social security act,
Where both spouses are applying or are covered by medical
tance, the same method of counting income and resources shall
•plied to both spouses and utilized to determine the liability
ach for the cost of medical care; ho~ever, for any month for
either spouse receives a supplemental security income payor a state supplement under section 56-207, 56-208 or
9a, Idaho Code, or for which an application is filed and subntly approved, the 111ethodology of the supplemental security
1e program shall
be applied.
The presumption of the availability of income under eicher
ommunity property or ,upplemental security income method may
butted by either apouse.
?he department of health and welfare shall furnish to each
~ 111edical assistance a·pplicant who ia aged,
blind or dia, a cle&r and simple statement in writing advi1ing them of
rovi1ions 0£ this section,
Ci.) The provisions of paragraphs (a) through -(d) of chis
~bsection shall continue co aeply on and after September 30,
,!?89. to aiarritd couples who are living together,
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I

(ii) Be innin
Se tember JO 1989 eli ibilit for an ma
ried erson livin in a medical institution whose souse doe
not live in a medical institution
shall be determined
evaluatin
income first b
attributin such income to th
indiYidual or individuals in whose name or names such
is
aid
and if such attribution exceeds the maximum
bility limit, secondly by attributin
income
with the .convmmit
ro ert
rovis1ons of
32, Idaho Code.
(iii) Be
Se tember 30
1989
the

determined
income was

a
on and after Se tember
to cou les se arat
because one 1 souse entered a medical institution for·
continuous sta on or before Se tember 29, 1989; and the r
visions of section 1924 c of the social securit act sha~
a l
to cou les se arated because one l
medical institution for a continuous sta
ber 30 2 1989.
(3) If any proYision of this section or the application
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity
not affect other provisions or applications of the section that
given effect without the invalid provisions or applications,
this end the provisions of this section are severable.

SECTION 2. That Section 56-21.4, Idaho Code, be, and the
hereby amended co read as follows:

same

56-214. AWARD OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE -- INELIGIBILITY UPON TRANSP
OF PROPERTY. Upon the completion of the tnvestigation, the sta
department shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for pu
lie assistance under the provisions of this act, the type and amou
of public assistance he shall receive, and the date upon which su
public assistance shall ·begin. Public assistance shall be paid int
manner prescribed by the state department.
ill Pub~tc-asststance Aid to dependent children shall not.
granted under this act to any person who within six (6) months r1
to applying for or at any time during which such assistance ,
received, has either made an assignment or transfer of property f
the·purpose of rendering himself eligible for assistance under th
act, or who has divests!!!_ himself of any interest in property witho
adequate consideration which interest or proceeds therefrom could re
sonably be expected to contribute to the support and maintenance ,
such person and his family, except that any person who is ineligi~
for public assistance due solely to such assignment or transfer sh~

'.
~

l'

.

., .
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a showing that such person has caused such property
'or transferred back to him; or
a showing that the person to whom such property is
transferred has, subsequent to such assignment or
subsistence and medical care costs eaclusive of any
ir support, of such person or £amity, according to the
assistance standard, equat to, or in excess of, the
of the property ao assigned or transferred; or
s a showing that the subsistence and medical care
:uch person, according to the department's assistance
.·bsequent to such assignment or transfer, equat or
market value 0£ the property so assigned or trans-

ility for old age assistance under section 56-207 1
lr aid to the blind under section 56-208, Idaho Code, or
manently and totally disabled under aection 56-209a,
,all be determined by continuing to consider as available
that was transferred prior to July l, 1988 1 until such
.lly accounted for under the provisions of section
the social security act as such section read on June 30 1
ibility for medical assistance under section 56-209b 1
hall continue to apply the regulations of the director of
nt of health and welfare concerning transfer of property
ations read on October 29, 1988 to transfers that occur
1 1 1989, to persons other than to the spouse of the perg or applying for medical assistance, and to interspousal
t occur rior to October l 1989.
provisions of sec~ion 1917 c

of the social security

act

by public la~ 100-360 and further amended by public Law
s hereafter amended shall apply as of July l, 1989 1 to
assets other than to the epouae, and as of October 1,
sfers betveen spouses, except that such provisions shall
her to transfers that occurred before Jul l 1988 or to
at have been fullz accounted for under subsection 3 of
ny provision of this section or the application thereof
on or circumstance ia held invalid, such invalidity shall
her provisions or applications of the section that can be
without the invalid provisiona or applications, and to
provisions of this ,ection are severable,
h 27, 1989.
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I l.'.'>-1-106. C.1hoon v. S.-.ot.cn. 10'.! lil-'lho -~:!.
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Effect o( fraud 1md ev~ion.
U,r unnot.ti..d plll"!y ;ind. ,u:-n.rtlinclr. an .. ~.

l-"r;:aud upon 1hr rourt.
T1mrhn,.... of ,1n1on.

tJon ....-lun11 °:ippropn:1r.,o >ction ia.~111rut U'.r
fl"rf)rlr:ll<>r of th~ fr:iud" -..·u ;a\'lllfobll! undu
thu .....-!Jon. C: .. hoon \'. S.-.t1ton. l!T.? :ldllho !'>-1:!.

r::J r;()7 ()'.llll).
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PiJJ

n-oJ>"nr<i for f.ulufl" of !hr ~n,on~I , .. p,..,..,n,
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l!.annxll )Cut. l.;f.- lOJ i;.,, IU l<i>ho 91;, 741
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l.'i.39. Thom.a. V. John IIJJ\C'Oell 3.41.1L.

c...

.~.

t
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llJ ld.aho ~. ~•l P.:!d ':34 •CL A~

19'.'\~I

,n!·=1..1on (1.1rnuh,,d ,n thr -S1.>r.--

U-1-201. ~nl"rul ddlnitionll. - Subjoo to .1ddition.al dciiinitioru
conLJin,-d m lhe 11ubMcquent ch:ipkr.1 which arc :ipplic:iblt! to lfp('Cific
chaptc-N or pan-i. 3nd unlt:K-" the contt."Xl othcN·i.~ requirn. in thi.11, code:
1lJ "Applic.:1t.ion· means .:a "'·nttcn r,_,qu~t ta thl. ~tr:1r for :an <>rdcr of
inform:il probotc or appointment undcr piirt J of ch.ipt.er 3 of th1~ c-odc.
12> "Augmented L'lll.Jtc· m1.•:in.<1 the t."fft.ate descnbi..-d in &«tion 15-~!-202 of
thi..i code.
1J, "Jkndiciary." .J.'I it relate~ la trust bcncticiari~. includt.'11 ii pcnion \lo'ho
h;Lot .:iny pre.iMmt or future mtt.•r1.~t. v,~u.-d or contin~l'nt. and n!Ao i1,cludCA
thL· o\lo·ncr of ~n intcrc$t by .:1S111t,,rnmcn t or al.her tn:uu{cr .utd iu it relates lo
;1 ch:iritabll' tru11t. include:1 any pt.'r.lOn entitled to cnforn:! the lrullt.
1-11 ·Child. include.'! any indi,·idual cntitlt.-d to LJkc WI a child uncler thia
cod~ by intcst.1tc ~uccc.uion from thl' P,M't!nt whOfl.C n..f.1Lioru1hip i11 invoJ,..c.-d
and i:xdude11 any pcrll011 "''ho ill only a sl4:pchild, a fo11tc:r child., .1 grandchild
or any more remote dl.!l&Ccnd.1nt.
<M ·claims,· in re11pcc:t la ciit..-it1..-s t>( dL.'CC.'dcnta .:ind proc.cct.ed pcr110na,
indudcJ1 liabilitic11 of the dL.'('(.-dcnt or protectc.-d pcnion ,.•hcthcr ari11ing in
ronlract, in tart or otherA·i11e, ;and li.abi)itiL.'ft of th~ cllt.11': which :1ri1ie at or
after the dcnth of the dL'<'L-dent or .::ifter the appointment of a conJM:·rvat.or.
1
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1::--;n--n1e,t l'R< m,,n: <'om:

l :1- l -·IO 1

-l-1

'!l'.!l ·\\"ill- 1:- :1 tl':-L:imenlary in:-trumcnt and includ1!s codicil :ind :iny
'.,•,-1:1m1·nt:ir, in,-trunwnt which merely appoints an e:-c1..·cut11r or rcvrikl':• ,,r

~·-·n·'"-~

:in111her will.
:1:l, -~ ..-par:ltL· prnperty· includes all property of eithl.•r thl.· hu:;b.ind ,,r
:h1..· wif1..• ownL'(i by ltim nr her before marria~c. and th;H :1c4uin-d al1.cr.,·ard
•.·1thl'r ll\' ~ift. 114..'<\UL':-l. dc\"isc or descent. or that which either he or ~h1..·
:1cq11irl',: with pr•1CL'1.:<l" 11fhis or her scp:uatc property, by w:,y ofm11ncy•; ur
,itlwr prnpL·nv.
, ;i-4 1 ·1 '.,,mm unity pro~rty- incluJcs all nther property acquiri.-d ancr
:n:1rri:1i.:c hy t.•ithl:r husband or wife. inc!udin~ the rcnL-1 :ind profas of the
-epar:ne pn1pt"rty of the husbnnd :rnd wifo. unless. b:: the instrum1..·nt by
whiL·h :my ~uch property i:; acquired by the wife. it is pruvidL-d that the n!nl.,;
.,nd prnfit,, thcn-uf b.: applied to her sole nnd s~p.:1r-:1tc use. Rcnl prn)'.)('·rt_v
C1J0\'1•y1..-<l h"· one i 1' ~p<1usc to the other shall be pn.-suml'd to bc the ,-o)c :rnd
·l·par:l\e C":-t:1te ofth1• )..'T:mtc-c. lt.C .. ~ 1:,-1-~01. as added b:,- 19'71. ch. 1.11.
~ I. p. :!:J:l: :1m. 1971. ch. l:?6, ~ 1. p. 487: am. 197:?. ch. :.!01. J l. p ..',JO: :1m.
197:l. ch. lt:i7. ~ :J. p. :J19: ;1m. 19S:.?. ch. :?8.i;, ~ :!. p. 719: .:1m. 1997. ch. 113.
~ I. p. '.!71.;
l'ump,1 .. r·~ nae~ TI...- brult..1"1 numrr~I
: • :n ,1.:,.::vu:on I:.!• •·.:u 1n-r1c-J b)' lhr
.-n:-.1,d"'r
~~,an t 11( ~ I. 1~·~~. ch ~"'5 LI r.im"-1 ;u
.1

MIi'

a

'.a

1:,.:,-JIJ. l;,,;,-4:!5, l~-i-1j(Jl;

..-c1,on .1 " ,-....n,,111...J ... \ I :;.:,..JOJ,
_.;,,-ct:on:: ..,(:-I. 1~'97. ch I l J to rnni11tl.-J .:u

I 1:,.;i.,.,n
Sc-c-. la _.._ rr(. Th.,. ......"tlon u ~(r.t-r-...d w
:n :~ .',.Jtl. :;,1.\•.i()I
Cic...J in: llo,:an ,. ll~munn. IOI l,faho
-91. •i~I l':!J 'JOI}· l~loO': <:~haan v:. S..11tan,
11r,.: ld.,hu :.-4:!. ,;..1J l';!d •illo • 1~1 ,; Spc-ncPr.-.
IJ.,ho ~-,,~, :,,;.,11 I\.Ank... lOl.i Idaho 316 • .;;1:1
f•::,I IO~ .Ct. .\i,11 l'.l~.: 01-'"'>n \'. Kirkh:im.
Ill l,bho '.U. :·!o I'~ '!17 •CL App. \~i.G1:
:-'nl(...-1y ,. :--.-,J.-m,.n. (:!';' IJaho 817, 9()-;' l~:.:.d

lntc-,.....~ p.,r,ol'L
\ \ ~ lan(IJ~l:"I.' oi .. p~~)· ..,t1!.omrr..l"'
.1 <11,·oF"Ct' pnx,-r<lini: •t.al"1 ~".a\ .. n.,· ,:~11:1
..-1fp h:&d for 3 lhll,.... a( prop,-r.~· (ho)\ T:U '101
d1~lavd dunnc U'll' c!i,-,,rn, u1.11 wu • ,p,..-.f·
1eA!ly ,,_.l'VNi" llolli! I.hat I.hr &C"fflrnl •"''Id
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,_,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

The issue presented in this case is whether the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare may recover Medicaid assistance!
from the estate of a recipient's spouse when the recipient died
possessing an estate.

The petitioner/appellant is the Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department").

The

respondent is Barbara Jackman, the personal representative of the
estate of Lionel Malcolm Knudson (hereinafter "Jackman''}.
Jackmar. is the adult niece of Lionel and Hildor Knudson, both
deceased. 1
Hildor L. Knudson (hereinafter "Hildor"} received medical
41 - ,

assistance ("Medicaid") from the State of Idaho for about twentytwo months prior to her death in October, 1994.

The value of her

estate, after funeral expenses and legal fees, was paid to the
Department pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218, which permits the
Department to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of a
recipient.

Hildor's spouse, Lionel Malcolm Knudson (hereinafter

"Lionel"}, died in November, 1994.

Unsatisfied with its recovery

from Hildor's estate, the Department is attempting to also
recover from Lionel's estate.

The Department's attempted

The Department is mistaken in identifying Jackman as
Lionel and Hildor's daughter. Compare Appellant's Brief, p. 1.
with R. p. 6.
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recovery is contrary to its regulations, state law, federal law
and federal regulations.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The Department brought a Petition for Allowance of Claim
against the estate of Lionel Knudson for recovery of Medicaid
payments made on behalf of Lionel's spouse, Hildor Knudson.
pp. 19-20.

R.

Jackman objected that, because the Department had

already collected from Hildor's estate, its claim against
Lionel's estate exceeded its authority under state and federal
law.

After a hearing, William C. Hamlet, Magistrate of the

District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the
County of Latah, found the Department was not entitled to recoVE!r
,,.,.,

from Lionel's estate.

R. p. 158.

The Department appealed to the

District Court, which reviewed the record and supplemental briefs
before hearing oral argument.

R. p. 175.

District Judge John R.

Stegner affirmed the magistrate's Memorandum Decision.

R. p.

176.

c.

statement of the Facts

Hildor L. Knudson, wife of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, lived the
last few years of her life at the Moscow Care Center, Moscow,
Idaho.

In December 1992, an application for Medicaid was filed

on her behalf with the Department.

The eligibility process for a

married couple involves the reporting of income and resources tc,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2
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the Department and complying with the Federal Spousal
Impoverishment Act (FSI).

Under FSI, the community spouse is

allowed to keep various items of exempt property (one's home,
car, and personal belongings) and a Department-determined portion
of the couple's assets.

42

u.s.c. §

1382(a} (l} (B).

The

institutionalized spouse is allowed to keep only $2,000 of nonexempt resources.

Id.

Hildor was found eligible for Medicaid as of January 1,
1993.

Both state and federal rules required her, as the

institutionalized spouse, to transfer her interest in all but
$2,000 of her non-exempt resources including her interest in
community property to Lionel, the community spouse, through a
•tit.,

separate property agreement entitled a "Marriage Settlement
Agreement."

42

u.s.c. §

1396r-5(f} (l); IDAPA 03.05618,07.

Interspousal transfers of exempt resources are not required, but:
are expressly allowed.
16,03.05.693.01.

42

u.s.c. §

l396(p} (c} (2}; IDAPA

Hildor and Lionel entered into a Marriage

Settlement Agreement on March, 1993.

R. pp. 63-66.

The

Agreement was recorded in the County of Latah, Moscow, Idaho andl
forwarded to the Department.

Hildor received Medicaid payments

for her nursing home care from January 1, 1993 until her death on
October 27, 1994.

R. p. 25-40,

In February 1993, Hildor was found to be an incapacitated
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~11_,

and protected person in Latah County Case No. SP-93-0004.
48-49.

R. pp.

Barbara Jackman, Hildor's niece, was appointed guardian

of her person and conservator of her estate.

Id.

When Hildor

died, Jackman notified the Magistrate Court.

Then, pursuant to

Idaho's procedures for small estates, Idaho Code 15-3-1201,
Jackman collected Hildor's personal property by affidavit.
pp. 67-68,

R.

Jackman paid Hildor's funeral expenses and her legal

fees and then forwarded the remainder of the estate ($1,638.03)
to the Department.

R. pp. 70-71.

closing inventory.

R. pp. 58-59.

Finally, Jackman filed a

Lionel Knudson died on November 11, 1994.
not a recipient of Medicaid.
November 28, 1994.
representative.
$40, 798.35.

R. p. 149,

He was

Probate proceedings were begun on

R. pp. 10-12.

R. pp. 14-15.

R. p. 10.

Jackman was appointed personal

Lionel's estate was valued at

In January, 1995, the Department filed

a Petition for Allowance of Claim against Lionel's estate for
$41,600.55.

R. pp. 19-20,
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,,i.,,

ISSUES PRESENTED

1.

Does Idaho Code §56-218 permit recovery for Medicaid

costs from the estate of a surviving spouse when the recipient
spouse dies possessed of an estate.
2.

Whether the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare

regulations allow for recovery of Medicaid costs from a surviving
spouse's estate when the recipient spouse dies possessed of an
estate.
3.

Does Federal Medicaid law allow the state to recover a

recipient's Medicaid costs from the estate of a surviving spouse
beyond a tracing of the recipient's assets owned at the time of
death.

4.

Whether Respondent's attorney fees and costs are to be

assessed against the Department.
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I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court makes an independent appellate review of the
magistrate's decision, but should give due regard to the district
court's ruling.

Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 840, 864 P.2d

1126, 1127 (1993),

If the magistrate's findings of fact are

supported by substantial and competent evidence, the findings
should be upheld.
law.

Id.

This Court freely reviews questions of

Id.
The Department has not challenged any of the magistrate's

findings of fact.

Appellant's Brief, p. 7.

This matter presents

issues of federal and state law. 2

•1111t,

II.
IDAHO CODE § 56-218 DOES NOT PERMIT RECOVERY FROM THE ESTATE
OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE WHEN THE RECIPIENT SPOUSE DIES POSSESSED

OF AN ESTATE.

A.

The Department has collected from Hildor•s estate for
the Medicaid payments made on her behalf.

Jackman, as custodian of Hildor's estate, complied with
Idaho Code§ 56-218 by paying to the state a11 funds remaining in

her estate at death following payment of funeral and estate

2
The Department asserts that Jackman may not raise the
federal question. Appellant's Brief, p. 7, n. 5. Jackman
prevailed before the magistrate and district court and seeks no
affirmative relief. Jackman argued the issue before both lower
courts and may properly raise the issue before this court. IRAP
§§ ll(f), lS(b); Walker v. Shoshone county, 112 Idaho 991, 739

P.2d 290 (1987).
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administration costs.

R. p. 149.

Idaho Code 56-218(1) states.:

[M]edical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf
of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or
older when the individual received such assistance may be
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for
such aid paid to either or both ....
At death Hildor had an estate valued at $1,902.30.
59-59.

R. pp.

She had no interest in jointly owned property or property

subject to a right of survivorship that would pass at death to
her husband or anyone else.

R. pp. 152-153.

Just prior to her

death she did not have an interest in any "life estate".

Id.

All of her estate, after funeral expenses and legal fees, was
paid to the Department of Health and Welfare within a reasonable
time following her death.
the Department.

R. p. 149.

R. pp. 70-71.

The funds were accepted by

Nothing of Hildor's estate passed

to Lionel or other successors or heirs.
Idaho Code§ 56-218 authorizes recovery "from the estate, or
if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse".
Hildor had an estate from which Idaho has recovered all that

remained following payment of her funeral costs.

Idaho is not

permitted under this statute to recover from the estate of the
surviving spouse since the recipient had an estate.
B.
The clear language of IC§ 56-218 preconditions
recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse on the
absence of a recipient's estate.

This case presents a simple issue of statutory
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7
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interpretation, which always begins with an examination of the
literal words of the statute.

Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121

Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992);

Local 1494 of th~

Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Couer d'Alene, 99 Idaho
630, 596 P,2d 1346 (1978).

As explained in Magistrate Hamlett's

thoughtful Memorandum Decision, the clear language of I.e. 56218(1) does not permit the Department to recover Medicaid
payments from the estate of the recipient's spouse when the
recipient died possessing an estate.

R. pp. 151-154.

Because

Hildor died possessing an estate of $1,638.00 which the Deparment
has already collected, it may not further collect from Lionel's
estate.

....,

Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) specifically limits the Department to
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient unless there

is no such estate:
[M]edical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf
of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or
older when the individual received such assistance may be
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for
such aid paid to either or both .•••
(emphasis added).

This language is also reflected in the

Department's own regulations which provide that "If the deceased
recipient has no estate, recovery shall be made from the estate
of his surviving spouse."

IDAPA 16.03.09,025.15.

This language

is unambiguous and, as held by the Magistrate and District court,
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does not allow for recovery of Medicaid payments from the estate!
of the surviving spouse if the recipient spouse died possessing
an estate.

R. pp. 153-154, 176.

This Court has repeatedly held that it "must assume that the
legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute."

~atter

of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 822, 828 P.2d at 851;
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991).
The language of Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) may only be logically read
to allow the Department to recover from the estate of a surviving
spouse only if the recipient left no estate.
given to every word and clause of the statute.

Effect must be
Matter of Permi1~

No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852; Wright v. Wille~,

.... ,

111 Idaho 474, 725 P.2d 179 (1986).

Since the statute is

unambiguous, this Court must follow the law as written and then~
is no occasion for the application of the rules of construction.
State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 191, 824 P.2d 120, 121 (1991);
Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 804 P.2d 308 (1990).
The Department argues that the language "or, if there be nc:,
estate," is archaic and does not have its clear meaning.
Appellant's Brief, p. 13-14.
for this proposition.

The Department cites no authority

The Department refers to similar languag€~

in various non-Medicaid statutes of New York and Pennsylvania,
but fails to recognize the clear meaning of the language in each
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example.

Id.

In all of the statutes, the language designates to

whom benefits would be paid upon the death of a covered
individual. See NY Vol. Amb. Ben. §10; NY Work. Comp. § 15;

NY

Vol. Fire Ben. §10; United States Steel Corp. v. Workers
Compensation Appeals Board, 536 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1988) (Appendix A).
All have nearly identical language.
language is exclusionary.
money goes to them.

~

In each example, the

If there are surviving dependents, the

If there are

11

no such dependents," then the

money goes to the estate of the deceased and "if there be no
estate" to whomever pays the deceased's funeral expenses.
Contrary to the Department's assertions, none of these statutes
contemplate an "order of priority'' in which part of the benefits
would be paid to the dependents, some to the estate, and some to
the payers of the funeral expenses.

All of these statutes

condition the payment of benefits to each subsequently-named
party on the absence of the prior party.
56-218 1 s use of

11

Each is similar to IC§

if there be no estate" as a qualifier.

Even if the Department's interpretation of§ IC 56-218(1) is
plausible, it cannot be preferred to the clear meaning of the
statute:
A well-settled rule of construction is that the words of a
statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary
meaning, in the absence of any ambiguity. Higgins v.
Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 (1979); Nagel v.
Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 (1965). The plain,
obvious and rational meaning is always to be preferred to
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any curious, narrow, hidden sense.

Id.

Walker v. Hensley Trucking, 107 Idaho 572, 573, 691 P.2d 1187,
1188 (1984).

There is no ambiguity in IC§ 56-218(1).

"A

statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise
more than one interpretation of it."

Matter of Permit No. 36-

7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852.

The proper reading of

the language of IC§ 56-218 is consistent with the Magistrate and
District Court's interpretation of IC§ 56-218.

The Department

may not recover from Lionel's estate.

c.
Neither the history nor the purposes of Idaho's
Medicaid laws supports the recovery of Medicaid payments
from the estate of the surviving spouse.

....

1.
Idaho has historically not authorized spousal
estate recovery .

The Department contends that the history of estate recovery
of old-age assistance payment in Idaho supports the ability of
the Department to collect from the estate of a Medicaid
recipient's spouse.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-10.

by the Department supports this contention.

Nothing cited

The o1d statutes

discussed by the Department are not Medicaid statutes.

See

Chapter 119, 1943 S.L. (Appellant's Appendix F).
Moreover, to the extent the authority cited by the
Department is analogous to Medicaid law, it refers only to
"recovery against the estates of recipients."

State ex rel.

Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009
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(1948) (Appellant's Appendix E).

All of the authority cited by

the Department indicates that it has never had the authority to
recover from the estates of recipient's spouses.

In Lindstrom,

the statute discussed by this court provided that "on the death
of any recipient of old-age assistance, the total amount of
assistance paid such recipient • • • may . . • be allowed as a
claim against the estate of such person . . . "
191 P.2d at 1013.

68 Idaho at 230,

Similar language is used in the statute

reviewed in Newland v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 535-36, 254 P.2d
1066, 1071-72 (1953) (Appellant's Appendix G), which led this
Court to hold that "our law limits recovery to the estate, or the
real property of the recipient."
1070-71.

73 Idaho at 539, 254 P.2d at

Jackman has never contested the ability of the

Department to collect from the estate of a Medicaid recipient.
The old cases and statutes also undermine two keystones of
the Department's arguments.

First,

the primary thrust of the

Department's arguments is that the recovery provisions would be
nonsensical if the Department might sometimes be unable to
recover Medicaid payments.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18.

This

Court in Lindstrom made it clear that such provisions have never
created an expectation of recovery from every recipient, only an
ability to recover where authorized.
P.2d at 1015-16,

68 Idaho at 232-33;

191

Second, the Department has argued that the "if

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 12

000259

there be no estate 11 language is only a corollary to the
provisions requiring that the Department may not recover from the
home (or other exempt assets) of a deceased recipient while they
are still being used by the recipient's surviving spouse.
20-22.

R. pp

This analysis is belied by the existence of similar

delayed recovery provisions in the old statutes that make no
reference to recovery from a spouse's estate.
2.
The purpose of Idaho's spousal impoverishment statutes
is to protect the estate of the surviving spouse.
Speculation about the intent of the legislature in enacting·
IC§ 56-218 should not override the statute's clear language.
Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 824, 828 P.2d at 853;
Unity Light
(1961).

&

Power Co. v. Burley, 83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788

To the extent, however, that this Court considers the

purpose of the statute, it should affirm the holdings of the
Magistrate and District court.
The Department asserts that the legislature specifically
passed IC§ 56-218 to allow recovery from the estates of

recipient's spouses, but the authorities the Department cites
support the contrary.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-12.

The

Department does not refer to any of the legislative history of IC
§ 56-218.

Id.

Neither of the session laws cited by the

Department refers to an intent to maximize the state's ability to
recover Medicaid payments or to allow recovery from the estates
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of surviving spouses.

Appellant's Appendixes H, J.

To the

contrary, both session laws explicitly state that the legislature
wished to protect spouses's estates:

"It is further the intent

of this legislation to protect the community and separate
property rights of a married person whose spouse applies for
medical assistance regardless of whether they are living
together."

S.L. 1988, ch.50, § 1, p. 74; S.L. 1989, ch.67 § 1,

p. 107.

III. THE DEPARTMENT'S REGULATIONS DO NOT ALLOW FOR RECOVERY FROM
A SPOUSE'S ESTATE IF THE RECIPIENT DIES POSSESSED OF AN ESTATE.

The Department's own regulations adopted to enforce IC§ 56218 explicitly forbid its recovery from Hildor's estate.
Idaho Administrative Code,

In the

the Department has adopted provisions

for recovery of medical assistance "pursuant to Sections 56-218
and 56-218A, Idaho Code" through "the filing of liens against
property of deceased persons, and the filing of liens against the
property of permanently institutionaiized recipients." IDAPA

16.03.09.025.

These provisions are contrary to the Department's

position in this case in several respects.
First, the Department's regulations reflect the language of
IC§ 56-218 in placing a condition precedent to recovery from the
estate of the surviving spouse.

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15 states:

"If the deceased recipient has no estate, recovery shall be made
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from the estate of his surviving spouse."

If, as the Department

contends, the statutory language was poorly drafted and contrary
to legislative intent, surely the Department would not have
adopted essentially the same language.

Because Hildor had an

estate from which the Department recovered, it may not recover
from Lionel's estate.
Lest the Department claim any ambiguity in its regulation,
another provision is even more clear.

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20

states:
Limits on the Department's claim against the assets of a
deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections 56-218 and
56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a
surviving spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited to
the value of the assets of the estate that were community
property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separate
property, and jointly owned property. Recovery shall not he
made until the deceased recipient no longer is survived by a
spouse . . .
(Emphasis added).

No part of Lionel's estate was community

property or jointly owned property or Hildor's share of separate:
property.

R. p. 152.

Judge Hamlet found that "Hildor had no

'legal title or interest' in any part of Lionel's estate at the
time of her death.
to this finding.

Id.

The Department has explicitly acqui.esce,d

Appellant's Brief, p. 7.

The Department is

barred from recovering from Lionel's estate by its own
regulation.

Further, this regulation reflects the Department's

understanding that it lacks the authority under IC§ 56-218 to
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recover from Lionel's estate.
The Department's regulations highlight the important
difference between the tracing of assets from the recipient's
estate and a direct claim against the separate property of a
surviving spouse.

IDAPA 16.03.09025.03(c) and IC§ 56-218(4) (b)

define the recipient's estate to include only that property and
assets "in which the recipient had any legal or beneficial title
or interest at the time of death. 11

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.18 defines

"assets in estate subject to claims 11 to include only those assets
"the deceased recipient owned or in which he had an ownership
interest.

11

The Department is entitled to trace these assets that

the recipient owned at the time of her death into the estate of a
surviving spouse.

The Magistrate specifically held that Lionel's

estate contained no such assets of Hildor 1 s.

R. p. 152.

The

Department cannot make claim to separate property of the
surviving spouse.

IV. FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW DOES NOT ALLOW IDAHO TO RECOVER
MEDICAID BENEFITS PAID TO THE DECEASED SPOUSE FROM THE ESTATE OF
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE.

A.
Idaho is required to comply with the federal
government's Medicaid regulations as a condition of
participating in the Medicaid program.
The Medicaid program is optional to the individual states.
Under the federal Medicaid Act (42

u.s.c.

§1396, et seq.), states
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that subsidize medical treatment of the poor are provided federal
funds to defray the costs.

As a condition of participating in

the program and receiving these funds, states are required by
federal law to promulgate legislation that complies with the
federal mandate.

See 42 u.s.c. § 1396a(a) (18);

McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).

Harris v.

This Court held in McCoy v.

state of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110
(1995) at 112 that:
Each state's participation in Medicaid is optional, but once
a state voluntarily elects to participate in the program, it
must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act and
applicable regulations.
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n. I

(1985).

B.
Federal statutes and regulations allow states to
recover Medicaid only from the estates of Medicaid
recipients.
State medical assistance programs must comply with federal
Medicaid statutes in order to receive federal grants of money.
Specifically,

42 u.s.c. §1396(a) (18) mandates that state

programs comply with the provisions of 42 u.s.c.

§1396p with

respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of Medicaid
correctly paid.

The relevant portion of 42 u.s.c.

§1396p(b) (1) (A) reads as follows:
(b) ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN.
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State
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plan may be made, except that the state shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the
case of the following individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection
(a) (1) (B), the state shall seek adjustment or recovery from
the individual's estate or upon sale of the property subject
to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the individual.
(Emphasis added.)
The clear meaning of this federal statutory provision is
buttressed further by federal regulations found at 42 C.F.R.
433.36 (h).

The relevant portion of these regulations reads as

follows:
(h) Adjustments and a recoveries.
(1) The agency may make
an adjustment or recover funds for Medicaid claims correctly
paid for an individual as follows:
(i)
From the estate of any individual who was 65 years or
older when he or she received Medicaid; and . • .
(Emphasis added.)
Neither 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b) 's plain language nor that of
the regulations state that recovery may be made from the estate
of a surviving spouse.

To the contrary, the plain wording of 42

u.s.c. § 1396p(b) and 42 C.F.R. 433.36 (h) allow for recovery

only from the estate of the recipient (individual).

Congress

has provided that recovery of Medicaid costs can only be made
from the estate of the individual/recipient.
The United States Supreme Court in K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-192 (1988) stated that
"(i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous, such language
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must be regarded as conclusive, and 'that is the end of the
matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"'
(Quoting Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)).

The federal statute expressly

limits the recovery authority of the Department.

Even if the

state of Idaho has authority not preempted by the federal
statute, IC§ 56-218 should be interpreted to not conflict with
the clear language of 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b).

c.

Congress specifically rejected legislation that would
have allowed Idaho to recover from the estates of surviving
spouses of Medicaid recipients.

Congress specifically rejected a provision in the federal
law that would have allowed states to recover from the estate of
~~~

a surviving spouses.

This proposed legislation, which was

rejected, was part of the 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
which contained amendments to the Medicaid recovery statutes and
was passed in August 1993.

See, H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, 103rd

Cong., 1st Sess., 208 (May 15, 1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 535.
The language rejected read as follows:
•.• (c) (i) The program provides for the collection
consistent with paragraph (3} of the amount not to exceed
the amount described in clause (ii} from
(i) the estate of the individual;
(ii) in the case of an individual described in
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,,___,
subparagraphs(B) (ii) from the estate of the surviving
spouse; or ...
Subparagraph (B) (ii) refers to an individual who receives
nursing home or other long term care services and is married at
the time of receipt of said care.

It reads as follows:

(ii) in the case of such an individual who was married at
the time of death, when the surviving spouse dies.
This statute would have clearly authorized states to recover
from the estate of a surviving spouse.

Congress could have made:

this authorization mandatory or optional.
knew the issue.

Congress obviously

Instead the final bill allows only for recovery

from the estate of the recipient of Medicaid.

D.

courts have limited states•s ability to recover

Medicaid payments from the estates of surviving spouses to
·lllj,,

the tracing of assets owned by the recipient at the time of
her death.

Federal statutes regarding recovery of Medicaid from estates
have been in place since 1965.

The vast majority of the language

these statutes have not changed since originally enacted.

Little

litigation occurred in this area, however, because i t has only

been since OBRA 1993 that states have been required to have
recovery programs.

The 1993 amendments also expanded the ability

of states to trace assets of recipients that transfer to spouses
upon the death of the recipient.

In several recent decisions,

courts have held that states may only recover Medicaid payme.nts
from the estates of recipients and traceable assets in which the
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recipient had an interest at the time of her death.
In the Matter of Estate of Budney. 541 N.W.2d 245 (Wis. App.
1995), the Department of Social and Health Services for the State
of Wisconsin made a claim to recover it's Medicaid costs from the
estate of the surviving spouse of a Medicaid recipient.
112-114.

R. pp.

The Court of Appeals held that the state statute

authorizing recovery of medical assistance benefits from the
surviving spouse's estate exceeded the authority provided b~· the.
federal Medicaid statutes.

The Budney Court held:

Because the statute does not counter the initial blanket
prohibition by specifically authorizing a state to recover
medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of a recipient
from a surviving spouse's estate, we conclude that§
49.496(3) (a), STATS., which allows such recovery, exceeds
the authority provided by the fed·eral statute. Accord
Matter of Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y. 2d 388, 604 N.Y.S. 2d
908, 624 N.E. 2d 1003 (1993) (Federal law does not expressly
provide for recovery of Medicaid payments on behalf of a
predeceased spouse from the secondarily dying spouse's
estate) .
R. p. 114.

The logic of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision i.s
supported by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit's holdings in Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 (9th cir.
1997) and Citizen's Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.3d 1003 (9th
Cir. 1989).

Although both cases concern the interpretation of

the term "estate" in the pre-1993 federal Medicaid statute, the
relevant portion of both decisions is not changed by the
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,,_,
substance of the 1993 amendments.
The Ninth Circuit rulings make clear that "under 42

u.s.c.

§

1396p(b) (1), states • . . may not recover medical assistance
amounts 'correctly paid on behalf of an individual' except, as
relevant here,

'from bis estate.

(emphasis added).

111

Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925

Federal Medicaid law expressly limits "a

participating state's ability to recoup benefits."
F.2d at 1006.

Kizer, 887

To the extent a state statute "seeks to reach

further than§ 1396p(b) (1), it cannot stand."

Bucholtz, 114 F.3d

at 925.
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that, under the then
existing definition of estate in the federal statute, the
•11 1~.,

California Department of Heal th Services could not recover
Medicaid payments from recipient's property held in the form of
revocable inter vivas trusts.
887 F.2d at 1008.

Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 928; Kizer,

The 1993 amendments expanded the definition of

"estate" to allow states to recover a broader range of assets in
which the recipient had an ownership interest at the time of
death.

The 1993 amendments did not make any additional

provisions for recovery from the estates of surviving spouses,
except for the tracing of property interests of the recipient
which transferred to the spouse upon the recipient's death (i.e.
community property, joint tenancy, and property held as a tenant
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•1-..,'

in common.)
Recent United States District Court opinions confirm that
states may trace assets the recipient owned at the time of her
death, but may not make any other recovery from the estates of
surviving spouses.
Cal. 1994)

In Demille v. Belshe, 1994 WL 519457 (N.D.

(R. pp. 127-142), the United States District Court for

the North District of California explained:

·1111,1.,.

The federal statute allows the state to recoup its expenses
only from those persons who are holding real or personal
property in which the deceased recipient held a legal
interest at the time of death. See [42 u.s.c. §]
1396p(b) (1) (requiring state to recover from decedent's
"estate'') and§ 1396p(b) (4) (defining "estate"). The amount
of expenses the state may recover from such persons is
capped by the amount of decedent's interest in the property.
§ 1396p(b) (4). In other words, the federal statute only
contemplates that the decease4 recipient's assets will be
trace4, not that other persons can become liable to pay over
their own assets.
R. p. 133 (emphasis added).

V.
FAIRNESS AND REASON DENY THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM TO RECOVER
MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM THE ESTATES OF BOTH RECIPIENTS AND
SURVIVING SPOUSES.

The Magistrate and District Court's holdings preserve the
ability of the Department to recover Medicaid payments from
recipient's estates, while preserving the integrity of the
surviving spouse's property rights.

The Departments objections,

even if persuasive, are almost purely policy arguments which are
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not so compelling as to overcome the language of the statute:
This court has stated that when the language of a statute is
definite, courts must give effect to that meaning whether or
not the legislature anticipated the statute's result. Unit~
Light & Power co. v. Burley. 83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788
(1961). Moreover, "the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature
alone . . . . It is the duty of the courts to interpret the
meaning of legislative enactments without regard to the
possible results." Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 369 P.2d
1010 (1962).
Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 824, 828 P.2d at 853.
A.
Jackman and the Knudsons have acted in good faith and
in accordance with the law.

The Department's ad hominem attacks on Jackman and the
Knudsons should not credited.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-18.

The

insinuations are false and the arguments are newly raised on

'"I•

appeal.

The Department has never previously questioned the

legality of the Marriage Settlement Agreement, Hildor's
application and eligibility for Medicaid, Jackman's management of
Hildor's estate, or Jackman's management of Lionel's estate.
Hildor and Lionel's estates have been managed in strict
accordance with state law and the Department's regulations.
The Department has admitted that the Marriage Settlement
Agreement between Hildor and Lionel was not only legal and
proper, but required by law.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3.

and all interspousal transfers are permitted by Medicaid.
U,S.C, § 1396p(c) (2) (C).

Any
42

Further, federal and Idaho law require
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the institutionalized spouse to transfer her interest in all but
$2,000 of non-exempt resources to the community spouse followinsr
the state's agency finding Medicaid eligibility or lose Medicaid
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f) (1) and IDAPA 03.05618.07.

eligibility.

IDAPA 03.05618.07 reads in part:
... The long-term care spouse must state in writing, his
intent to transfer the resources to the community spouse,
within the protected period, before he can be Medicaid
eligible ..... Resources not transferred to the community
spouse by the end of the sixty (60) day protected period are
counted available to the long-term care spouse, toward the
two thousand dollar ($2,000) resource limit, effective the
date of entry into the facility.
The Department, having required Hildor and Lionel to enter into
the Marriage Settlement Agreement, should not now castigate them
for doing so.
The Department contradicts itself in casting aspersions on
Jackman's management of Hildor's estate after recognizing that
she acted ethically and legally.

Compare Appellant's Brief, pp.

2-4 with Appellant•s Brief, pp. 16-17.

Jackman was legally

appointed Hildor 1 s guardian and conservator prior to her death.

R. pp. 60-62.

The Magistrate specifically found that Jackman

properly and legally collected and distributed Hildor's estate.
R. p. 149.

It is absurd to suggest that Jackman was not acting

for Hildor's estate in reimbursing the Department for Medicaid
payments made on Hildor's behalf.

Payment was tendered to the

Department because it was entitled to recover from Hildor's
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estate under IC§ 56-218.
The Department's contention that Jackman "manipulated" the
Knudson's estates is irrelevant.

The Magistrate concluded that

Jackman was able to pay Hildor•s debt to the Department because
she did not use the statutory allowances to drain the value of
Hildor's estate into Lionel's estate.

If the Department were not

set on collecting from Lionel's estate, it might commend, rather
than condemn, the actions of personal representatives that
provide for the reimbursement of Medicaid payments from the
estate of the recipient.

The United states Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit recently held that there is "nothing sinister"
in people "utilizing the options that our sophisticate system of

·•11.-

property law" makes available to Medicaid recipients and their
spouses to protect their estates.

Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 928.

See also Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1008 ("Congress wanted to encourage"
the shielding of assets from recovery by use of joint tenancy
and, even if such action is taken "merely for reasons of
'shrewdness,' there is nothing improper or inappropriate.")
B.
The Department's ability to achieve reasonably expected
recovery of Medicaid payments does not require confiscatin~1
spouse's estates.

Medicaid is a medical assistance program for low income
members of our community.

There is almost always a significant

spend down depleting both community and separate property
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resources prior to a spouse being found financially eligible for
Medicaid.

Potential recipients are required to private pay for

their care costs that arise during the spend down period.

Both

federal and state law require the transfer of assets to the
community spouse as a condition of the receipt of Medicaid.
The result of the eligibility process is that once Medicaid
eligibility is reached the state's expectation of there being an
estate of any substance to recover from is small,

The reality is

an expectation to recover from the recipient's personal needs
account (the up to $2,000 personal exemption) and any interest
the recipient retained in her home, if any.

There is really very

little else the recipient can legally possess and be eligible for
Medicaid.

The eligibility rules established by Congress and the:

State purposefully and intentionally limit the value of the
recipient's estate,

Certainly Idaho's legislators anticipated

the de minimis nature and value of the recipient's estate and
enacted legislation with this in mind as reflected in I,C. § 56-·
218 (1).

The Department's arguments about the amount it could expect
to recover from a recipient's estate are contradictory and
confused.

The Department has argued that every recipient will

have an estate, but that it will be insignificant.
Brief, p. 13.

Appellant's

It has also argued that, because recipient's
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estates will normally "pass automatically to the surviving
spouse," there will never be a recipient's estate.
Brief, p. 15.

Appellant's

It has also argued that single recipients and

recipients without estate planning will leave substantial estates
for recovery.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18,

Whichever of thesei

arguments is accurate, if any are, the Department has given no
reason for this Court to conclude that the legislature did not
foresee and desire this result.
The Department's arguments about the potential for abuse of
the recovery provisions and the effect upon those who do not plan
their estates are similarly ineffectual.

The legislature in

passing the spousal impoverishment provisions enunciated a clear

,,1...,,

preference for the preservation of recipients' marriages.
Although the Department worries that the proper interpretation of
IC§ 56-218 may encourage fraudulent marriages, it overlooks the
impact that its interpretation of the statute may have in
encouraging divorces to protect the separate estates of spouses
from recovery.

similarly, many state laws, including the areas

of probate and taxation, have different effects on those who do
or do not plan their estates.

The Ninth Circuit recognized this

fact and dismissed its importance in Bucholtz:
[P]eople who engage in proper estate planning often achieve
results different from, and better than, those obtained by
those unwilling or unable to do so. Those results often
flow from the form of holding title to property.
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114 F.3d at 928.

c.
The vast majority of Idaho's sister states do not
attempt to recover Medicaid payments from the estates of
surviving spouses.
The premise of the Department's arguments is that a Medicaid
recovery statute is absurd if it does not provide for recovery
from the estates of surviving spouses.

Not only is this premisEi

unfounded and contrary to the clear language of the statute, but.
it is also contrary to the judgment of the overwhelming number c,f
Idaho's sister states that do include surviving spouse's estates
in their Medicaid recovery scheme.
All states participating in the Medicaid program have some
type of program to recover Medicaid payments from recipient's
estates.

The overwhelming majority of these states make no

provision for recovery from the estate of the recipients
spouse. 3

Alaska Stat. § 47.07.055 (1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-

76-436 (Michie Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. stat. Ann. § 26-4-403.3
(West Supp. 1996); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-83g (West 1992);
Del. Code Ann. Liens§ 5003 (Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
414.28 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 49-4-147.1 (1994); Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 346-37 (Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann. § 249A.5 (West

3

Respondent was unable to locate the Medicaid estate
recovery provisions for the states of Alabama, Arizona, Kentucky,
Michigan, and Vermont. Of the 44 state statutes reviewed, 3.3
limit recovery to the estate of the recipient of Medicaid.
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Supp. 1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:153 (G)

(Supp. 1997); Me.

Rev. Stat. Ann. Human Services 22 § 14 (West Supp. 1996); Md.
Code Ann., Health-General§ 15-121 (1994); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
118E, § 31 (Supp. 1997); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-13-120 (1993); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 473.398 (Vernon Supp. 1997); Mont. Code Ann. § 53-6143 (1997); Neb. Rev. stat. § 68-1036.02 (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 30:4D-7.2 (West 1997); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2A-4 (Michie
1997); N.Y. Social Services Law§ 369 (McKinney 1997); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 108A-70.5 (1994); N.D. Cent. Code§ 50-24.1-07 (Supp.
1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5111.11 (Page 1996); Okla. Stat.
Ann. Public Health and Safety 63 § 5051.3 (West 1997); Pa. Stat.
Ann. Public Welfare Code, § 1412 (1996); R.I. Gen. Laws. § 40-8,11_.

15 (Supp. 1996); S. c. Code Ann. § 43-7-460 (Law Co-op Supp.
1996); Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116 (1995); Texas Probate Code Ann.
§ 322 (West Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-13 (Supp. 1997);
Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-327; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.20B.080 (West
Supp. 1997);

w.

Va. Code§ 9-5-llc (Supp. 1996).

Of the few states that make any reference to collection of
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient's spouse, most
limit recovery to the tracing of assets owned by the recipient at
the time of her death.

Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code§

14009.5 (West Supp. 1997); Ind. Code Ann. § 12-15-9-5 (Burns
Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.15 (West Supp. 1997); Nev.
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Rev. Stat. Ann. § 422.2935 (Michie 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
414.105 (Supp. 1996); Wyo. Stat. § 42-4-206 (1997).

The

remaining statutes are ambiguous, may not provide recovery in a
case such as this, or exceed the authority granted to the states
under federal law.

Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 35, para 3-9 (Smith-Hurd

Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-709(9)

(Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 167:16-a (Supp. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 286-23 (Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.496 (West 1997).
Wisconsin's statute, one of the handful that clearly provided for
spousal estate recovery, was invalidated by the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals in Budney.
VI.

(R. pp. 127-142).

JACKMAN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS.

As a personal representative defending the interests of
Lionel's estate, Jackman is entitled to attorney's fees and costs
from the estate whether she prevails or not.

IC§ 15-3-720.

The

Department, even if it prevails is not entitled to attorney's
fees because Jackman's defense is not frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation.

IC§ 12-121.

Because the Department's

position is contrary to the clear language of state and federal
law and the Department's own regulations, Jackman should be
awarded reasonable attorney's fees and expenses.

IC§ 12-117(1).

A.
Jackman is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from
Lionel's estate.
Idaho Code§ 15-3-720 provides that a personal
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,,.....
representative who "defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good
faith, whether successful or not, . . . is entitled to receive
from the estate [her] necessary expenses and disbursements
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred."

Jackman is the

personal representative of Lionel's estate and any expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in this action are incurred in good
faith.

The Department's insinuations of a lack of good faith are

newly raised and have not been reviewed by a fact-finder.

The

record as it stands, however, contains copious, uncontested
evidence of Jackman's good faith.
Jackman has defended Lionel Knudson's estate against the
Department's claim in fulfillment of her fiduciary duty to the
estate.

Jackman's opposition to the Department's claim is in the

interests of the estate.

Unlike instances where Idaho courts

have denied reimbursement of expenses to a personal
representative, Jackman is not litigating any issues to her
personal benefit to the detriment of the estate or any other heir
or devisee.

The Department's suggestion that Jackman would best

fulfill her duties to the estate by forfeiting the entire value
of the estate to the Department's claim is absurd.

Regardless c,f

the ultimate outcome of this litigation, Jackman is entitled to
her expenses and attorney's fees from the estate.
B.
The Department, even if it prevails, is not entitled t;o
attorney's fees and costs from Jackman.
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The Department may only recover attorney's fees if Jackman
has opposed its claim unreasonably and without foundation.
12-121.

IC§

As discussed earlier, Jackman's actions in this matter

{and the actions of the Knudsons) were intended to comply with
state law and the Department's regulations.

The Department has

not challenged the Magistrate's findings as to the propriety of
the Marriage Settlement Agreement or Jackman's management of
Hildor or Lionel's estates.

The Department has only challenged

the denial of its claim against Lionel's estate.

Jackman's

denial of the Department's claim is based on the clear language
of Idaho statutes, the Department's regulations, and federal law

.,

and regulations.

Jackman has prevailed on this issue before the

Magistrate and the District court.

Jackman's claim cannot be

held to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation and the
Department cannot recover its attorney's fees.

c.
Jack.man is entitled to an award of attorney's fees
against the Department.
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) provides that a citizen prevailing in

a civil proceeding against a state agency is entitled to costs
and attorney's fees if the state agency "acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law."

The Department admits that

there are no factual disputes in this appeal.
p. 7.

Appellant's Brief,

The Department's pursuit of its claim against Lionel's

estate is contrary to the clear language of state and federal law
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and the Department's own regulations.

The Department's position

was completely rejected by the Magistrate and District Court.
Because the Department has acted without a reasonable basis in
law, Jackman is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees.
CONCLOSION

Based upon the above, the decision of the Magistrate and
District Court denying the Department's claim should be upheld.
The language of IC§ 56-218 is clear and unambiguous and allows
the Department to recover Medicaid payments only from the estate
of the recipient if the recipient dies possessed of an estate.
Under federal law and regulations, the Department may only
recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient.

The

Department's Petition for Allowance should be denied.
DATED this 4th day of October, 1997.

WilTamc.Kirsch
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the_ day of October, 1997 two
true and correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed,
Postage prepaid, to the following:

w. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
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shall exllll only if the· earning capacity or the volunteer ambulance worker has
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to the schedule contained in section ten of this chapter.
·
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· Ambulance Workers' Benefit. Law I 30.
··
· · ·
§

10. · Permanent: partial dj&ahility benefits

·. · · ........ ·

In the case of disability partial in ch.ar~ter, but ~rtDM)~D~.Nl quality,
the volWlteer ambulance worker, iJ\jured in the line oC duty !l~.aJJ. ~fl.paid one
hundred fifty dollars for each week for the period specified ~.AA -~~-~vision,
provided, however:, that when the volunteer ambulance worker is injured in the
line or duty on or after the effective date or this chapt.er ~ aiif~c{l!mng June
thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety, and provided further that wtie~ -the v<>lunteer ambulance worker is
in the line or duty on oiifter.'July first,
nineteen hundred ninety to and .including June thirtieth,. nineteeD .hWldred
ninety-one such payments shall be two hundred eighty dollars.for each week,
and provided -further that when the volunt,eer arnbp]ance worker is btjured in
the line or duty on or after July first, nineteen twndred.. JW1«:ty-:0ne to and
including June thirtieth. nineteen hundred ninety-two sue~ Mymenw.shall be
three hundred fifty dollars for each week; and provided Curth~ _t}la~ ~en the
volunteer ambulance worker is il\jured in the line or duty on or: .~r. July first,
nine~n hlll)~ed ninety-two such p~yment.s shall be four ~'ll.1~.~~Ao~lars Cor
e11ch week as Col19ws; ..
'•I•
:: •,•
a.·. Loss of member.

1.

µyured

Member lost
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~u~~_er:_ofweeks
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Foot ......... .' ................................... ·. .';:·.. :·205

.~~.;::::: ::::: ::: :: :::::::: :::: :::::: ::: :: ::-::::·:·:: :-: :1:

~~:;/:!~~::: : ::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::)::'-/;: :_::

Second finger ......... .' .......... : ............. :·:--:;·; ·. :: ·:·: 30
Third finger ........ ·............................ ,·:·: . . ·: . .-. : 25
Toe other than great toe .......... _. ............ : .......... 16
Fourth finger ..... : ....................................... 15
If-more than one phalange or a digit shall be lost, the period.shall be. .thr ~-·ee
as for the loss of the entire dlgil IC only the first phalange shall be
I
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."' .......... ____ ........... -~-period s~. ~e ('ne-hal_r the period for loss of the entire digiL The period for
~oss l>r _l~s~.-~.r ~.se ..?f two or- more digits, or one or more phalanges or two
more d1git.s, of a liand or foot; may be proportioned to the period for the loss o'f
use or the hahil'br foot. occasioned thereby, but shall not. exceed the period for
tlie·Ioss ·ora liand·or foot. If an ·arm or leg shall be amput.at.ed at or above the
wrist or ankle, the period for such loss shall be in proportion to the period for
the loss.of.the. IU"JD..Or leg.; In .the case of loss of binocular vision or or eighty
per cenwm. or .~Pre. of the vision or an eye, the period shall be the same as fo1:
the loss oHh~_eye,
b. Loss of hearing. In the case or the complete loss of the hearing of one
ear, ·sixty weeks; for the loss of hearing of both ears, one hundre~ fifty weeks.
c. TQtal loss· of use. In the case of permanent total loss of use of ».
member;·the"compensation'shall be the same as for the·Ioss of the membet.
_d. Parual, loss or partial_ loss of use. Except as above provided in this
subdivision;· in. the· case of permanent partial loss· or loss of use of a member
the period shall be for the proportionate loss or loss of use of the membet:
CompensatJon· fi)r pennanent p ~ loss of use of an eye· shall be awarded oh
~e. ~ls ·of ~tll!Orre«:~ loss of vision o~ co~cted loss'of vision resulting from
1 ·•
an UlJUl"j'which ever IS greater.· ··
,- .
. •

be, ~-

t,hirtieth,. nineteen hundred ninety-two such' payment shall
_hundred
fifty dollars for each, week; and provided further that when the volunteer
ambulance worl,(er is injured in the line of duty on·or after July fint. nineteen
):iundred · ninety-two such payments shall be four hundred dollan for each
week.
.,_...·' .. ... ...
'.'
· • (2) If the percentage of lose of earning capacity is fifty per -- centum, or
greater I but less ~an: seventy-five per cenfum, he Or she shall' be paid, one
hundred dollars .!or- each week, provide<t however.-that the vohiiiteer ambule.nce worker is injured in the line of duty on or after the effective date or this
chapter to' and· including ·June· thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety, provided,
however, that when :µie volim~r ambu~ce worker is injured in the line or
duty on or after :July first,''nineteen hun~ ninety to ;and ·including June
thirtieth, nineteen hundred ~ety.:One, 11Uch '_paym~nt. shall be one hundred
~ghty~six_ dollars and ~E:1!ty-ii~ cents for each week, provided, however, that
when the volun~r. am,bulan~e worker is.injured in the line of duty ori-or after
J'.u)yfirst, nineteeii,himdred_'.ninety;-0ne to and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundrecf..ninety-two, .s~ch payment.~ be two hi.mdrecl'.'thiity-four
cents for. each, weeli(_'provided,. however,· that.when the
dollars ,and
volunteer ambu1ance worker ia iJuured iri't'.he
of duty on or after July first,
nineteen hundred ninety-two,-such payment'ehall be two hundred sixty-eight
dollars for-~-week. ;: ,: . .' _','· :·.• ·.
,.. . . _..
. . ·: ·. ·_;. : ·· ...
(3) If the pel"Clentage of loss of earning capacity is twenty_-~ve.wcent.um, or
greater, but less than riny per centum; he .or she aha1l ~ paid. thirtY. dollars
, .. ,., . ;,;. ; · :· .
.
. .. . . ·.. : .
for each week. "· ., , .. · ·.·

or

-~~~e~~t.

fifty

.In the case
;~~~s 'racial ~~ head disfigurem~nt,
mcludmg a ilisligurement continuous in l~gth which is partly in the facial area
and also extends into the neck region
described in 'this 'paragraph; the
volunteer -i!.iribulance worker : shall ,be ·paid· in. a ltunp ·sum · a proper and
equitsbl!""'aMo\mt, which shall be determined by the workers' compensation
board. If the earning capacity of the volunteer ambulance worker shall have
~n irnp~.ed •. or. may in the future be impaired,· by-any serious disfigurement
m the ~gion ·above the ilf:e~o clavicul:ir articulations· anterior to and including
the region of the -~terno clei.do· mastoid muscles on either side, the volunteer
am~ulance worker·-shall be paid-in a_ lump Suin a proper and equitable amount
_which shaU-_-_!>e·determined by such··board. ·Two or more serious disfigw1!ments,. not -e~n!iJl!JOUS in length, resulting from the same injury, if partially in
the facial area- and -partially in such neck region, -shall be deemed to be a facial
disfiguremanL .. ,An award, or the aoregate of the awards;to a volunteer
ambulance worker under this paragraph shall not-exceed twenty ·thousand
dollars._ _.... .
·
f. . 'Fota!· -or-partial loss or ,loss of. use .of more than one member.· In any
case m which there shall be a loss or loss of use of more than one member or
parts .~-~..~o~e ~~ o~ !'°ember set forth above in P:U-~graphs a to e, both
mclus1ve, or Uiis subd1v1S1on, but not amounting to penninent total disability
th~ periods for loss or loss of use of each such member·or part thereof shali
nm consecutively..
. ..
' 'g. ~
In all other cases of permanent partial disability the
volunteer ambulance worker shall be paid for each week, during the continuance thereof,-as follows:
(1) ltthe percentage of loss or earning capacity is seventy-five per centum,
or &:ea.tl!i:,.he. Qr .she shall be paid one hundred fifty dollars for each week,
proVIde4,.l\9.Wey~r,._that the volunteer ambulance worker is injured in the line
of_ d~ty__ o!:1._.or ..~ the effective date of this chapter to and including June
thirtieth,._!!1!1e_~~-n _hundred ninety, provided, however, that when the volunteer
a.mbulanc~_\\'_<_>r~.e!.is injured in the line of duty on.or after July first, nineteen
hundre_~ !'11!!_eo/ -~ _and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety-one
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(4) ir the percen~ge
of earning- capacity ia leas tJuiri tinirity•flVe per.
... · . :·: · ·· · - ·. ·. ·
cent.um, he or she· shall not pe_ paid any '11'.eeklf benefiL

·me~g

of this . paragraph, shall
. · Permanent partial disability,-, within the
exist only if-the earning capacity or the,volunteer ambulance.worker has been
permanently and partially lost 88 the result of the injury...The workers'
compensation board shall determine · the :degree or such disability and such
board may reconsider: such, degree on Its own motion or upon application or
any party ininteresL
·
· - :· .
: ·
.. : .... .....
2. An award· made to a clailnabt. under this section shall in case of death
arising from causes other than the ir\jury be payable t.o and for the benefit of
the persons following:
.
a. If there be a surviving
and'~~-- cluld of the deceased' under the
age'ofeightienyean;'tosuchspouse;· (•:.- ... . ..
. .·.-:, '. "·:. ·.·.:.·.::
b. If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or: children or the
deceased under the age or, eighteen yeru,, on~half shall _be.,payable to the
surviving s])Ouse and the other ..~alf_ 11 to. ~e surviving . child or .children.
c.. If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under the age or
eighteen_ years, but no .surviving spouse,· ,then to such child or children.
d. If th~ be n~ surviving spouse and -n~ surviving child -~r children of the
deceased under ·the age or eighteen ,years,· then to such depeiid~nt· or dependents as defined in section seven '.of ·this article, as directed· by the workers'
compensation' board;:' and if there shall be no' such dependent.a; 'theri to the
estate of such deceased in an ' am_ount ' n'ot exceeding; reasonable funeral
~nses provided in su~ivision one of .sectio~ s~ep
~s ~articl~. or, if
there be n6 esi.aie,-·w tht: pei-ovu ·u~ pc..~on~ p~:r....~g L~e·fbne..l"'Q.J ~n~ of
such deceased in an amount· not exceeding reasonable funeral- expenses as
orovided in such subdivision one.
. ,': -,
' 000284
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fUCh P7;;-;~nt shall~ two h!!!!d!-~d ~ighty dollar!! for ~?rh WPPk. :1nrl nrnvirle<l
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the volunteer ambulance worker is -~~d · in th1 line of
) on or after July first, nineteen hundred runety~ne to and including June
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candi"date for rehabilitation; such rehabilitation shall constitute
~ treatment· and care as provided in this chapter.
w. Other cases. In all other cases in this class of disability, the
compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the
difference between his average weekly wages and his wage-earning
capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable
during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to
reconsideration of the degree of such impairment by the board on
its own motion or upon application of any party in interest.
4. Effect of award. An award made to a claimant under subdivision three shall in case of death arising from causes other than
the injury be payable to and for the benefit of the persons followin~
·
a. H there be a surviving spouse and no child of the deceased
under the age of eighteen years, to such spouse.
b. H there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or children
of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, one-half shall be
payable to the surviving spouse and the other half to the surviving
child or children.
The board may in its discretion require the appointment of a
guardian for the purpose of receiving the compensation of the
minor child. In the absence of such a requirement by the board the
appointment for such a purpose shall not be necessary.
c. If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under
the age of eighteen years, but no surviving spouse then to such child
or children.
d. If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or
children of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to
such dependent or dependents as defined in section sixteen of this ·
chapter, as directed by the board; and if there be no such dependents, then to the estate of such deceased in an amount not
exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided in subdivision
one of section sixteen of this chapter, or, if there be no estate, to the
person or persons paying the funeral expenses of such deceased in
an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided
in subdivision one of section sixteen of this chapter.
An award for disability may be made after the death of the
injured employee.
4--a. Protracted temporary total disability in connection with
permanent partial disability. In case ()f !empcr~-y :otal <lisabiiity
and ~- )anent partial disability both resulting from the same '
~

~

COMPENSATION

§15

Art. 2

injw-y if the temporary total disability continues for a longer
period than the number of weeks set forth in the following schedule, the period of temporary total disability i? exc~ of su~h
number of weeks shall be added to the compensation penocl provid-_
ed in subdivision three of this section: Arm, thirty-two weeks; leg.
forty weeks; hand, thirty-two weeks; foot, thirty-two weeks; ear,
twenty-five weeks; eye, twenty weeks; thumb, twenty-four ~eeks;
first finger, eighteen weeks; great toe, twelve weeks; second finger,
twelve weeks; third finger, eight weeks; fourth finger, eight weeks;
toe other than great toe, eight weeks.
In any case resulting in loss or partial loss of use of arm, leg,
hand, foot, ear, eye, thumb, finger or toe, where the tempo~ary total
disability does not extend beyond the periods above mentioned for
such injury, compensation shall be limited to the schedule contained in subdivision three.
s. Temporary partial disability. In_ case of _temporary partial
disability resulting in decrease of earrung capacity, the co~~nsation shall be two-thirds of the difference between the mJured
employee's average weekly wages before the accident and his wage
' earning capacity after the accident in the same or other employment.
5-a. Determination of wage earning capacity. The wage earning
capacity of an injured employee in cases of partial disability ~hall
be determined by his actual earnings, provided, h~wever, tha_t if _he
has no such actual earnings the board may in the mterest of JUSti~e
fi.x such wage earning capacity as -shall be reasonable, but not m
excess of seventy-five per centum of his fonne~ ~ll. time act~l
earnings, having due regard to the nature of his mJury and his
physical impairment.
5-b. Non-schedule adjustments. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, in any case coming within the provis~ons of
subdivisions three or five of this section, in which the nght to
compensation has been established and c<_>mpensation_ has been
paid for not less than three months, in which the contn~uance _of
disability and of future earning capacity ~annot ~ ascertam~d "'.1th
reasonable certainty, the board may, m the mterest of J~shce,
approve a non-schedule adjustment a~eed to between the claim~nt
and the employer or his insurance earner. The board shall r~qu~re,
before approving any such agreement, t~at t~ere be an e~mmation
of the claimant in accordance with section nineteen of this chapter,
and such approval shall only be gi~en when it is fo~d !hat ;he
adjustment is fair and in the best mterest of the claimant. The
r d may, in such case, order all future compensation tfl ¥

T"~,
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loss of use of each such member or part thereof shall run consecutively.

3. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is twenty-five
per centum, or greater, but less than fifty per centum, he shall be
paid thirty dollars for each week;

(g) Other cases. In all other cases of permanent partial disability
the volunteer fireman shall be paid for each week during the
continuance thereof, as follows:

4. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is less than
twenty-five per centum, he shall not be paid any weekly benefit.
Permanent partial disability, within the meaning of this paragraph,
shall exist only if the earning capacity of the volunteer fireman has
been permanently and partially lost as the result of the injury. The
workmen's compensation board shall determine the degree of such
disability and such board may reconsider such degree on its own
motion or upon application of any party in interest.

1. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is seventy-five
per centum, or greater, he shall be paid ninety-five dollars for
each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is
injured in the line of duty on or after January first, nineteen
hundred seventy-eight to and including June thirtieth, nineteen
hundred eighty-three, such payment shall be one hundred five
dollars for each week provided, however, that when the volunteer
fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after July first,
nineteen hundred eighty-three to and including June thirtieth,
nineteen hundred eighty-four, such payment shall be one hundred
twenty-five dollan for each week provided, however, that when
the volunteer fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after
July first, nineteen hundred eighty-four to and including June
thirtieth, nineteen hundred eighty-five such payment shall be one
hundred thirty-five dollars for each week, provided, however, that
when the volunteer fireman is injured in the line of duty on or
after July first, nineteen hundred eighty-five such payment shall
be one hundred fifty dollars for each week;

2. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is fifty per
centum, or greater, but less than seventy-five per centum, he shall
be paid sixty-three dollars and thirty-three cents for each week,
provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is injured in
the line of duty on or after January first, nineteen hundred
seventy-eight to and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred
eighty-three, such payment shall be seventy dollars for each week,
provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is injured in
the line of duty on or after July first, nineteen hundred eightythree to and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred eightyfour such payment shall be eighty-three dollars and thirty-three
cents for each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer
fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after July first,
nineteen hundred eighty-four, to and including June thirtieth,
nineteen hundred eighty-five, such payment shall be ninety dollars for each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer
fireman is injured in i.hc line of duty on er ::.fter July first,
nine ) hundred eighty-five such payment shall be one hundred
'
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2. An award made to a claimant under this section shall in case
of death arising from causes other than the injury be payable to and
for the benefit of the persons following:
(a) If there be a rnrviving spouse and no child of the deceased
under the age of eighteen years, to such spouse.
(b) If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or children
of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, one-half shall be
payable to the surviving spouse and the other half to the surviving
child or children.
(c) If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under
the age of eighteen years, but no surviving spouse, then to such
child or children.
(d) If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or
children of the ·deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to
such dependent or dependents as defined in section seven of this
chapter, as directed by the workmen's compensation board; and if
there shall be no such dependents, then to the estate of such
deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses
as provided in subdivision one of section seven of this chapter, or, if
there be no estate, to the person or persons paying the funeral
expenses of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable
funeral expenses as provided in such subdivision one.

,

3. An award for disability may be made after the death of the
volunteer fireman.
(L.1956, c. 696; amended L.1956, c. 697, §§ 2, 3; L.1958, c. 9, § 2; L.1959,
C. 502, §§ 5, 6; L.]960, C. 781, §§ 4, 5; L.1962, C. 175, § 4; L.1965, C. Jll,
~§ 4, S; L.1968, c. 933, § 4; L. ! 970, c. 2!!3, §§ 4, S; L- 1Q74, c. S~4, §§ 4, 5;
i L.1977, c. 675, §§ 84, 85; L.1978, c. 597, §§ 4, 5; L.1982, c. 346 i_ 2;
000286
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things. that damages for wrongful death
are not recoverable against DOT as a matter of law. The Court or Common Pleaa of
Montgomery County &118tained DOT'a preliminary objectionB, and, for the reasons
below, we affirm.
Appellant& argue that the trial court
etffd in it.a analyaia of the sections of the
Judicial Code pertaining to aovereign immunity (Code), 42 PLC.S. H 8521-8528.
Specifically, appellanta asaert that future
loss of eaminp and earning capacity and
Jou of COIUIOrtium are recoverable in a
wrongful death action.
Section 8628(e) of the Code provides:
(c) fwe,

of damagu recoveralJ/t.
Damages &hall be recoverable only for:
(l) PBSt and future loas of earnings and
earning capacity.
(2) Pain and sufferiDg.
(8) Medical and denial expenses including the reasonable value of re1111onable
and neceMUY medical and dental services, prosthetic devicies and necessary ambulance, hOBpital, professional nursing,
and physical therapy expenses accnied
and anticipated in the diag11oaia, care and
recovery of the claimanL
(4) Losa of consortium.
(6) Property losges, except that property
losses ahall not be remverable in claims
brought pursu111t to section 8522(b)(5)
(relating to potholes and other dangerous
conditions).

The Superior Court of Penmylvania stated in McClintori "· While, 285 Pa.Superior

Ct. 271, 277-78, 427 A.2d 218, 221 (1981):
In a survival action, the rause ariaes out
of the injury, not out of the death. The
utate ia substituted for the decedent.,
and it., recovery ia based upon the right.II
of action which were posseaaed by the
decedent at his death. The eat.ate may
recvver for the loss of decedent's past
and future ea.ming power, for the decedent's pain and suCCering prior to death,
and for the CQllt of rnedieal aervices,
nUl'lling and hospital care provided to
decedenL The elltate may not, however,
recover iuui:iG} C'Ap,,iEI~ :i:::e, ~bv~t!!·
ly,
yecedent could not have brought

Clio u SJ6 A.lei SIS (Pa.Cmwltlt. l,U)

an action for wrongful death." (Emphaais
added.)
Accordingly, we aft1r111 the order of the
trial court and remand the cue to the
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery
County for further proceedinp Oli the re
maining count...

In footnote No. 6, the McCliriton court
in comparison:
Jweoverable damages under the Wrongful Death Act have been held to include
'the present worth of the deceased'•
probable earnings during the probable
duration of the deceued'n life, which
could have gone for the benefit of the
children, parent, huaband or wife as the
cue may be; the value of such servkea
aa the deceased would have rendered to
the named beneficiaries, and such gift.a
aa the deceased would have been reasonably expected to have given the benef'1ciaries. The Wrongful Death Ad itself
alao apecifically provides for the recovery of medical expenses and funeral expenaes. The cost of the tombstone and
the eost. of administration of the estate
have also been held to be proper items of
damage.' (citations omitted.)

stated,

were not identical in initial action in whi<:h
claimant wu detennined to be entitled to
diafigurement benefita on weekly baaia and
in subsequent proceeding in which claim1111t'11 estate aought unpaid disfigurement
benefits, ao that doctrine of res judice.ta
was inapplieable.
Reveraed and remanded.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28th day of J1111uuy,
1988, the order of the Court of Common
Pleu of Montgomery County in the abovecaptioned matter is affirmed and the t'.ll.lle
ia remanded to that court for proceedinp
eonaiatent with thia opinion.
Jurisdiction relinq11iahed.

1. Worbn' ComperwaUon Pli06
Eat.ate of workera' compensation claimant, who was not sumved by dependent
spouse or child at time of death, was
baned by statute from receiving previollBly
awarded compenaation benefit.II for disfigurement in excess of reaaonable funeral
expense&, which are limited by atatut.e to
$1,600. 77 P.S. ff 618(22), 641, 641('1),
&61(7).

z.

The damages whi~h appell.a.nta seek in
Count I. paragraph 34, of their complaint.,
which would be included in a wrongful
death act.ion, are not enumerated in 42 PL
C.S. t 8528(c) of the Code.

UNITED STATES STEEL

CORPORATION,
PeUUoner,
v.

Therefore, Judge Albert Subera in the
inst.ant case correctly stated, "we conclude
that Section 8528(c) clearly is limited in
scope to the type of damages properly recoverable in a Survival Act.ion, not a
Wrongful Death Action." The types of
damagei; which are recoverable in Section
8528(c) of the Code are recoverable by the
decedent's estate beause they an: clearly
expenses incurred by the decedent, for
which the decedent could bring suit had the
decedent survived.
Finally, appellants incorrectly state that
loss of consortium is "an item of damage
recoverable under it.a Wrongful Death Stat·
ute .... " The Superior Court of Penm1yl·
vania recently held in Linebaugh v. !Alir,
351 Pa.Superior CL 135, 139, 605 A.2d 303,
305 (198'3), "a surviving spouse cannot
maintain a 8€parate cause of action for loss
of consortium resulting from the death of a
•muse but musl instead recover damages
for loss of the deceased spouse's aociety m

Pa. 615
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an act.ion for these expenses at the time
of his death. (Citations omitted.)

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AP·
PEAL BOARD (KAMINSKY),
Reepondent.a.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued OcL 5, 1987.
Decided Jan. 28, 1988.

11 ~ -

)

'

Eatate of workere' compensation claimant wa.e awarded benefits for facial diafig11ttment sustained by claimant du.ring
coune of employment. The Workmen's
CompeMation Appeal Board affinned the
referee's order, and the employer appealed.
11ie Commonwealth Court, No. 1671 C.D.
1984, Colins, J. held that: (1) estate of
claimant, who waa not survived by dependent lpouae or child at time of death, was
larnd by 1tatute from re<:eiving previously
awarded compensation be nefit.11 for diafig.
llrement in exce&11 of rel80nable funeral
expenaee. and (2) subject matter, parties,
and capacity of parties auing or being sued

Worken' Compenaatlon ~1789
Subject matter, parties, B11d cap,a.city of
partiea suing or being 11ued were not identical in initial action in which workers' compeneaUon claimant was determined to be
entitled to du,figurement benefit., on weekly basia and in subsequent proceeding in
which claimant's eatau, after claimant'a
death for nonwork-related reason&, sought
award of unpaid disfigurement benefits, ao
that doctrine of rea judicata was inapplicable. 77 P.S. H 513, 641.
3. Worken' Compensallon ~1791
Any question regvding entitlement of
workenr' compensation claimant's estat.e to
award of disfigurement benefit.II wu not
ripe for consideration during time of initial
proceeding in which elaimant had sought to
establish entitlement to disfigurement benefit& on weekly ba.eia. 77 P.S. ff 618, ~l.
Paul A. Robb, Robert C. Jones, Pittsburgh, for petitioner.
William Lowman, Ronald Zera, Ada Guyton, Daniel D. Ha.rahman, United Mine
Workel"B of Amerim, Dial # 5, Belle Vernon, for respondent.II.
Before MacPHAIL and COLINS, JJ.,
and KAi.iSii, Senior Judge.
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!.JNS, Judge.
ited Stat.ea Steel Corporation (employ·
·re appeal& an order of the Workmen's
oenution Appeal Boanl (Board) which
ned the order of a Referee awarding
IDl!n'1 eompe!IMtion benefita to the ell·
of its fonner employee, John C. Ka(f (Kaminaky) for a facial disfigure1uatained by Kaminaky during the
·.e of his employmenl
February 8, 1979, a Referee iasued an
· awarding Kaminsky 200 weeka of
l!Dl&tion for a facial disfigurement
1 reeulted from a depreaaed fracture
e 1kull which he sustained on JUJ1e 7,
while in the course of hil employment..
;Dlky waa receiving workmen'• eom1tion benefita for total disability for
iea he had 1ustained in the same acctwhich reaulted in the disfigurement..
!fore, the Referee's order deferred the
ation of the employer to make payof the disfigurement benefita to the
,anl I An appeal wu taken by the
oyer challenging only the amount of
,eQUtion awarded. ln that appeal, the
oyer did not challenge the suspellllion
1figurement benefits for so long aa the
iant wu receiving workmen's compenn benefits for total diaability, the fact
the injury had in fact oecurred or that
figurement had been 1ustained by the
ianl On July 26, 1979, the Board
fled the amount of compensation
h was awarded for the disfigurement
200 weeks to 180 weeka. The dectof the Referee waa aff1m1ed in all
r reapecta. Neither party appealed the
,ion of the Boud.
uninaky died on November 14, 1981
t.o callll!II unrelated to his work-related
-y. He had received weekly benefita
t.otal diaability from the date of his
-yon June 7, 1972 until the date of his
h. Becauae he had continued to reoncurrenl paymenl of benefi1, for 101&1 diolity and dlofi111remenl benen1s is pn:>IC1"ibed
Secllon l06(d) o( The Pennsylvania Worli..
n't Compenullon Act (Act), Act of June 2,
15, P.L 736, ,u amaukd.
P.S. I Sil.

n

«1ion l06(c) of lhc Acl provides:

)

ceive workmen's compenaation benefits for
total disability until his death, Kaminsky
never received payment of disfigurement
benefit.a pursuant to the Referee'• awanl,
u modified by the Board.
The instant matter was initiated by the
filing of a claim petition on or about April
28, 1982, by Kaminaky'a estate. The e.tate
aaaerted that it wu entitled to the payment
of the 180 weeks of compensation awarded
for Kaminsky'& disfigurement which he did
not receive during his lifetime. The Referee'& decision on the matter was circulated
on December 12, 1982. The Referee
awarded the estate payment of 180 weeks
of compensation and denied payment of
statutory funeral expenaes. On appeal, the
Board afflfflled the decision of the Referee,
dilmissed the appeal and ordered payment
to the estate. The Order of the Board is
now before this Court for our review.
Our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether constitutional right.a
were violated, an error of law wu oommit,.
led, or whether neceasary· fmdinge of fact
are supported by 1ubatantial evidence.
Section 704 of the Administrative Agency
Law, 2 Pa.C.S. I 704.

A.U

,u ,,.,.emwlth.

Section 306(g) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 541(7),
provides that payment of such benefit.a,
after the death of the claimant shall be
made u follows:
Should the employe die from some other
cause than the injury, payment of compenaation to which the deceased would
have been entiUed to under section
306(c)(l) to (26) shall be paid to the following peraona who at the time of the
death of the deceased were dependents
within the definition of claUBe (71 of section 307 and in the following order and
amounta: (footnote• omitted)

(7)

If there be no dependenbl eligible

to receive payments under thia section

then the paymenta shall be made to the
estate of the deceased but ·in amount not
exceeding reasonable funeral expelllles
aa provided in this act or if there be no
estate, to the person or persons paying
the funeral expenses of such deceased in
an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenaes as provided in this act.

(22) For acrious and permanent diofigure-

At the time of his death, Kaminsky waa a
widower and had no 1urviving dependenta.
Therefore, subsection (7) of Section 306(g)
of the Act applies in this case. That subsection limit.a any amount payable to an
estate, of previously awarded disfigurement benefits, to reasonable funeral eJ:·
penaea. As indicated in Section 307(9) of
the Act, 77 P.S. I 561(7), reaaonable funeral expenses are limited to One Thousand
Five Hundred Dollen ($1,600.00). The
clear language of the statute dicbltes that
the estate of Kaminsky should receive an
amount not in eJ:~es of reasonable funeral
upenaes in an amount of One Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00). We are
guided in our decision by our rules of statutory construction which dictate that when
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous we may not disregard the letter
of the law in pursuance of its epiriL See
Section 192l(b) of the Statutory C,onatruc·
lion Act of 1972, l Pa.C.S. § 192l(b). The

menl of the head. neck or face, of such •
characler as 10 produce an urw11h1ly appear·
ance, and such as Is nOI usually Incident 10

ll1t employmen1. 1ix1y-Lir. and 1W<>lhirds per
cennun of wa,es nol 10 cxaed two hundrrd

(I) The employer raises two issues on
appeal. We shall address them aeriatim.
First, the employer avera that the Boan!
erred III a matter of law in awanling payment of compensation benefita in excess of
reasonable funeral ei:penaes to the estate
of Kaminsky, where Kaminsky was not
survived by a dependent spouse or child at
the time of death. We agree.

Before this Court is a question of law,
namely, whether Section 306(g) of the Act,
77 P.S. § 541, precludes an award of benefit.a to Kaminsky'a estate in exceae of reaeonable funeral e1tpenses. During his lifetime, Kaminsky was awarded benefit.a purauant to Section 806(c), 77 P.S. § 618(22).1
For •II dioabili1y rcsulling from pcnnancnl
injuries of the following classes. the compen·
oation shall be exclmively as follow,,:

.

.

.

.

.

,

"'"

Pa.
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language of the Act is clear and we mUBt
follow it.a mandate.

We further note that this Cou.-t in the
case of Black y. Bill11 Penn Cot-poration.
72 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 628, 467 A.2d 192
(1983), discUS8ed Section 806(g) of the Act
and the amendmenta thereto, with particularity. The Court noted:
Prior to the 1972 Amendment.a to this
1tatute, the death of the claimant from a
cause unrelated to the compensable injury, terminated all reaponaibility for the
continuation of payment. . • .
nie
amendment.a here cited gave certain statutorily-defined dependenta the right to
receive the payment.a, and, if none of
these dependenta 1urvive, then the estate
may make a claim. The legislature, how. ever, has clearly and unambiguously cht>sen to limit the amount of the estate's
claim.
Id. at 632, 467 A.2d at 198--94 (citations
omitted).
The Court in Blade, went on to cite the
language of the Act whlch limited the estate's awanl to reasonable funeral expenses. We adopt the reaaoning set forth
in Black and reverae and remand this mat,
ter for the computation of reasonable funeral expenses.
(2) The second i.saue addreued by the
employer involves the applicability of the
doctrine of re1 judicata to the instant prc>ceeding. The estate claims that the employer is barred by res judicalA from eh.al·
lenging the right of the estate to receive
Kaminaky'11 disfigurement beoefita. The
estate, in it.a brief to this Court, aaserts
that the Decision and Order of the Referee
cireulated on February 21, 1979, awarded
compensation benefit.a to Kaminaky's represenlAtives in the event that he did not
survive. Therefore, the estate concludes
that the employer, by its failure to appeal
that Decision and Order, despite the fact
that the award may have been contrary to
the Act, results in the employer being
bound by that awanl. We disagree.
.evenly.five wttks.
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I.
IT IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO GRANT
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO GIVE A
WINDFALL TO A RECIPIENT'S HEIRS.
It is basic to the policies underlying Idaho's public assistance laws that each
person is, to the extent possible, responsible for his or her own needs, including
medical care:

Declaration of policy. - It is the policy of this state that each
person, to the maximum extent possible, is responsible for his or her own
medical care ....
Idaho Code§ 31-3501. Therefore, iL must be presumed that, absent a clear intent to
the contrary, the legislature does not intend to provide taxpayer funded medical care to
a person, while that person preserves his or her assets for the benefit of relatives or
heirs.

II.
JACKMAN'S ERRONEOUS AND DISTORTED
REFERENCES AND ARGUMENTS DO NOT

SUPPORT HER STRAINED INTERPRETATION OF
THE STATUTE.
Jackman has raised many minor arguments without support, or with strained
interpretations of statute and rule. Even if these arguments had merit, which they do
not, they entirely miss the central issue which is whether the spousal recovery
provisions of Idaho Code§ 56-218 are to be given effect. Jackman's arguments are

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - I
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briefly discussed in the order presented:

A.

No One "Required" Hildor Knudson to Convey Her Property to Lionel.
Jackman repeatedly states that the Department "required" Hildor Knudson to

convey her assets to her Lionel. Respondent's Brief, pp. 7, 24, 25, 27 etc. Jackman
then asserts that since the Department forced Hildor to convey her property to Lionel,
it cannot now complain that she had no property at her death. This characterization,
however, is a distortion. Idaho's Medicaid program is entirely voluntary. No one may
force another to apply for or receive Medicaid. Indeed, some families choose to fund
nursing care for their loved ones on their own rather than incur the estate
reimbursement obligations that accompany Medicaid benefits.
No one "required" the Knudson's to obtain Medicaid benefits. Rather, the law

permits couples to obtain Medicaid benefits for the spouse needing nursing care while
the at-home spouse keeps the couple's assets for his or her own support.
Furthermore, real property is an excluded resource for a Medicaid applicant who
states an intention to return home. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(l). Even for those choosing
to make a spouse eligible for Medicaid benefits, there is no requirement that the
applicant convey away the family home, which is normally the couple's primary asset.

. APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 2
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B
Jackman's Partial Payment, Which Came after Lionel's Death, Was Not
Accepted as Full Payment by the Department.
Jackman contends the Department received and accepted the balance of Hildor's
estate. Respondent's Brief, p. 7. This is incorrect:
Hildor Knudson died October 27, l994. R. p. 67. Lionel died just two weeks
later on November 11, 1994. AboulJune 30, 1995, nearly eight months after Lionel's
death, Jackman offered lo disburse $1,861.30 upon affidavit from the Department. See
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Willard Abbot. R. p. 146. This offer was rejected by the
Department, although by return mail on July 7, 1995, the Department did say it would
accept the sum as partial payment. R. pp. 143-147. About August 22, 1995, the
Department issued a receipt to Jackman's attorney for receipt of the sum of $1,638.03.
R. p. 70. At no time has the Department accepted payment from Jackman in
satisfaction of its claim against Lionel's estate.

C.
The Department A&cees That the l&gislature Intended to Protect the Surviving
Spouse, but this Doesn't Extend to Heirs.
Jackman contends that the legislature intended lo protect the estates of the
spouses of Medicaid recipients and cites the following:
It is further the intent of this legislation to protect the community and
separate property rights of a married person whose spouse applies for
medical assistance regardless of whether they are living together.
Respondent's brief, p. 14 (quoting S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § I, p. 74). The Department is
in complete agreement that this statute was intended to protect the assets of the spouse
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRJEF - 3
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remaining at home. Nothing in this statutory language, however, manifests any intent
to protect a deceased spouse's

e.s.tate, so that it can be gifted to relatives, after the

taxpayers have shouldered the cost of the other's nursing care. The statute protects the
healthy spouse - it doesn't grant a windfall to the heirs.

D,
The Assets from Which the Department Seeks to Recover Were Community
Property.
Jackman quotes the language of IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 contending that 1.he
Department's rules prohibit recovery from the spouse's estate (Respondent's Brief, p.
15):
20.
Limitations on ~tate Claims. Limits on the Department's claim
against the assets of a deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections 56-218 and
56-21 SA, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse of a

predeceased recipient is limited to the value of the assets of the estate that were
community property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separate property,
and jointly owned property. Recovery shall not be made until the deceased
recipient no longer is survived by a spouse ....
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 (underline added). Jackman contends that since the marriage

settlement agreement made all of the couple's property Lionel's separate property, the
Department has no claim to his estate. Respondent's Brief, p. 15. This argument,
however, is disingenuous and carefully ignores the context of this section and another
section of the same rule that follows by only a few paragraphs.
All of the assets in Lionel Knudson's estate .were the community property of the
couple - until they were transferred through the marriage settlement agreement to
facilitate Medicaid eligibility. Section 24 of the same rule states:

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 4
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24.

Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A

marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt aeainst the estate of the
deceased recipient or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement
agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate
consideration.
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24 (underline added); see also IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04 (Rules
governing countable property for eligibility for aid to the aged, blind and disabled [which is
the basis for Medicaid eligibility in cases such as this] pennit a marriage settlement agreement,
but the Department's rights to the transferred property are retained).
Subsection 20, quoted by Jackman, is merely intended to protect a spouse who marries
later in Hfe bringing substantial separate property into the marriage. The Department only
pursues its spousal estate claim against property that had been the couple's community
property or separate property in which the nursing home spouse had an interest.

Jackman's Incorrectly Argues That Federal Law Does Not Permit Spousal
Recovery When io Reality, the Law Merely Does Not Require Spousal Recovery.
E.

AJthough Jackman spends considerable effort claiming that Idaho's spousa.l
recovery law is pre-empted by federal law, pre-emption should not be an issue here.
Respondent's Brief, section IV (beginning on page 16). Initially, this was Jackman's
sole claim. R. p. 49. This argument was rejected by the magistrate (R. pp. 150-151)
and was not appealed to the District Court. Contrary to Jackman's arguments that pre-·
emption is merely an alternative basis for decision and they are not seeking affirmative
relief, a decision based on this claim changes the entire nature of this dispute. The
magistrate held that Idaho law is not pre-empted, but under these particular
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circumstances, does not apply. Jackman is asking the court to nullify an act of the
legislature on the basis of federal pre-emption. Such remedy is far greater in scope
than that afforded by the 1ower courts. It should not be in issue here.
To the extent that federal pre-emption is in issue in this matter, the Department
incorporates by reference and adopts its briefing and argument on this issue presented
to the magistrate division and found in the record at pages 72-89. To summarize that
argument, while federal law does not clearly

require spousal estate recovery, nothing in

the law forbids it.

F.
Jackman's Argument That Congress Rejected Language That Would Have
''Allowed" Spousal Recovery Is a Clear Distortion.
As part of her pre-emption argument, Jackman contends that Congress
specifica11y rejected language that would have "allowed" spousal estate recovery.
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. This same argument was made to the magistrate and was
shown to be a distortion of language taken out of context. R. pp. 85-86. Despite clear
knowledge of her error, Jackman repeats the same argument here. again without
including language plainly needed to give meaning to the quoted language. The full
Congressiona1 language rejected, is quoted below. Those few portions quoted by
Jackman are in bold italics. The essential contextual language has been underlined for
emphasis:

(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTATE RECOVERY
PROGRAMS.-Section 1917(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)) is amended(A) in paragraph (})APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 6
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(i) by striking "(b)(l)" and inserting "(2)", and

(ii) by striking "(a)(l)(B)" and inserting "(a)(l)(B)(i)";
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking "(2) Any adjustment or recovery under"

and inserting "(3) Any adjustment or recovery under an estate recovery program
under"; and
(C) by inserting before paragraph (2), as designated by subparagraph
(A), the following:
"(b)(l) For purposes of section 1902(a)(51)03), the requirements for an

estate recovery program of a State are as fol lows:
"(A) The program provides ror identirying and tracking (and, at the
option of the State, preserving) resources (whether excluded or not) of
individuals who are furnished any of the following long-tem1 care services for
which medical assistance is provided under this title:
"(i) Nursing facility services.
"(ii) Home and community-based services (as defined in section
1915(d)(5)(C)(i)).
"(iii) Services described in section 1905(a)(l4) (relating to services in an
institution for mental diseases).
"(iv) Home and community care provided under section 1929.
"(v) Community supported living arrangements services provided under
section 1930.
"(B) The program provides for promptly ascertaining"(i) when such an individual dies;
"(ii);,, tl,e case of such a11 i11divid11al who was married aJ the time of
deaJ/1, wl1e11 the s11rvivi11g spouse dies; and
"(iii) at the option of the State, cases in which adjustment or recovery
may not be made at the time of death because of the application of paragraph
(3)(A) or paragraph (3)(B).
"(C)(i) 11,e progl"Dtn provides/or tlze collectio11 co1isiste11t wit/,
paragraph (3) of a,, a1110111it (11ot to exceed tl,e amo1111t described ill clause
(ii))Jro,n"(I) the estaJe of tlie i11divid11al,·
"(JI) in tire case of a11 i11divid11al described i11 s11bparagrapl, (B)(ii),
from 1/,e estate oftl,e s11rvivi11g spouse; or
"(Ill) at the option of the State, in a case described in subparagraph
(B)(ili), from the appropriate person.
"(ii) The amount described in this clause is the amount of medical
assistance correctly paid under this title for long-tenn care services described in
subparagraph (A) fumished on behalf of the individual.".

139 Cong. Rec. H2997-0l.
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When read in the proper context, it is obvious that the rejected language would
have

required all states to perform spousal recovery. Nothing in the language suggests

that states are not already permitted to engage in spousal estate recovery.

G.

Spousal Estate Recovery Does Not Encourage Divorces.
Jackman contends that spousal estate recovery encourages divorces to protect

separate estate assets. She, however, offers absolutely no support for her argument.
Idaho has been doing spousal estate recovery since 1988 and there is no evidence to
support a claim that it has encouraged divorces.
As noted above, IDAPA 16.03.09.025.020 protects the separate property a
spouse marrying late in life brings into the marriage. Therefore, no divorce is
required. Only those assets which~ the community property of the couple are
subject to the spousal estate claim. Since the at-home spouse retains the couple's
property for his own support, there is no motive to divorce to protect that property.
Should a couple divorce and split their property unevenly, for the sole purpose of
avoiding the Department's claim, the Department would view the transfer as voidable
pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-2 I 8( I). 1
Just as in this case~ it is after the death of both spouses that the dispute arises,
1Undersigned

counsel is aware of one case in which this did happen. In a First District case, the
spouse in the nursing home, apparently upon advice of counsel, stipulated to a decree of divorce vesting all
the couple's property in the at-home spouse, approximately six weeks before his demise. The Department
contended the transfer was not for adequate consideration ond imposed liens on lhe renl property in question.
Because a disabled (adult) child survives (delaying recovery under Idaho Code § 56-218( l )), no recovery has
yet been made.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 8

C:\WCCITBMNl!PL YB. WPI)

000300

___

-··--- ............-. .......,

....,;_

-----·~-

and the dispute is between the Department and the heirs, not between the Department
and the benefitted couple.
III.

JACKMAN'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§
56-218 IS ONLY POSSIBLE BECAUSE SHE
IMPROPERLY MANIPULATED KNUDSON'S
ESTATES.

A.
The Present Circumstance Could Not Have Arisen Without Ignoring Established
Procedures and Priorities in the Idaho Code.
In her brief, Jackman states that she collected Hildor's personal property by
affidavit, paid expenses and forwarded the remainder to the Department. Respondent's
Brief, p. 4. The facts in the record show that this is possible only if she acted outside
the authority granted her, and in violation of her fiduciary duty to Lionel's estate.
While often repeated, the sequence of events is important: Jackman signed a
marriage settlement agreement for both Hildor and Lionel Knudson on March 8, l993.
Hildor died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died two weeks later on November
11, 1994. About two weeks after Lionel's death, on November 28, 1994, Jackman
obtained appointment as personal representative of Lionel's estate. About June 30,
1995, nearly eight months after Lionel's death, Jackman offered to disburse $1,861.30
upon affidavit from the Department. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Willard Abbot. R.
p. 146. This offer was rejected by the Department. R. pp. 143-147. About August
22, 1995, the Department issued a receipt to Jackman's attorney for receipt of the sum
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of $1,638.03. R. p. 70. On August 29, 1995, Jackman filed an inventory with the
court showing $1,861.30 in the conservator estate. R. p. 58. Jackman's signature on
the document is dated two months prior to the date of filing. R. p. 58.
The rights and powers of a conservator, after the death of the protected person,
are very limited. Idaho Code § I5-5-425(e) provides as foJJows:
(e) If a protected person dies, the conservator shall deJiver to the
court for safekeeping any will of the deceased protected person which
may have come into his possession, inform the executor or beneficiary
named therein that. he has done so, and retain the estate for delivery to a
duly appointed personal representative of the decedent or other persons
entitled thereto. If after forty (40) days from the death of the protected
person no other person has been appointed personal representative and no
application or petition for appointment is before the court, the conservator

may apply to e".{ercise the powers and duties of a personal representative
so that be may proceed to administer and distribute the decedent's estate
without additional or further appointment.
Idaho Code § 15-5-425(e) (underline added). Therefore, once Hildor had passed away,
Jackman had no power to deal with her property, other than to retain it for delivery to a
duly appointment personal representative. After forty days, she could petition to
become the personal representative, which was never done.
Jackman did, however, obtain appointment as· personal representative of Lionel's
estate. Thereafter, she had a fiduciary obligation toward Lionel's estate. Idaho Code §
15-3-703(a). When Jackman, in August, 1995, obtained Hildor's bank account by
affidavit, she could do so onJy as a "successor11 to the estate. Idaho Code § 15-3120 I (a). A successor is a person, other than a creditor, entitled to possession of estate
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property by will or pursuant to the probate code. Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(46).
Therefore, Jackman could obtain the money as heir under a will or through intestate
succession, or she could obtain the money as the personal representative of Lionel's
estate. As conservator for Hildor, she had no rights other than to retain the money for
the personal representative.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-2-401 and 402, Lionel had the right to at least the
first $7,500 from Hildor's estate. Since Jackman had a fiduciary obligation toward
Jackman's estate, she had a duty to apply any sums she obtained from Hildor's estate to
Lionel's estate. Un]ess she violated this fiduciary duty, she had no right to deliver
Hildor's money to the Department. 2 In fact, by operation of Jaw, the money Jackman's
attorney sent the Department in August, 1995, was Lionel's money, not Hi]dor's . 3
In order to put this malter in the present posture, then, Jackman had to ignore or
violate Idaho Code§§ ]5-5-425(e), 15-3-703(a), 15-2-401, 15-2-402, and 15-2-801.
Had Jackman abided by these laws, this case would never have come before the court.
In point of fact, Hildor had no estate from which any recovery could have been made

As personal representative of Lionel's estate, Jackman had the obligation lo maximize the value of
the estate - whether the estate would later be paid lo creditors or heirs. Her personal stake as nn heir could
not play into this obligation.
2

3Whilc

the probate code permits renunciation and the homestead and exempt property allowances
may be subject lo renunciation, such renunciation must be in \\Tiling and must be done \\ilhin nine months of
the death of the decedent. Idah<> Code § 15-2-80 I. There was never any renunciation here. Even had Lionel
renounced. at least the $3,500 exempt property allowance would have gone to one of Lionel and Hildor's
children before being subject lo the Department's claim.
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by the Department.

B.
It's Not Okay to Manipulate the System in an Attempt to Reap a Windfall at
Taxpayer Expense.
Jackman contends that the fact that she "manipulated" the system is "irrelevant"
because there is nothing wrong with shrewd estate planning. Respondent's brief, p. 26.
This case, however, is not a case of shrewd estate planning. This is a case where the
personal representative manipulated the estate to make it appear that money was being
paid from Hildor's estate, when in fact, it was not. This was done for the soJe purpose
of taking assets that had belonged to Hildor and Lionel Knudson and passing them to
others, while leaving the public holding the bag for Hildor's nursing care. Nothing in
the law makes such an action morally or legally proper.

IV.
CONCLUSION
Under Idaho's probate code and Idaho Code § 56-218(1), all estate and property
of a deceased Medicaid recipient passes lo the surviving spouse. Those funds are
intended for that spouse's support and use. After both spouses have passed away, the
law anticipates the public. will be repaid, to the extent possible, from the remaining
estate. Jackman's manipulation should not be rewarded.
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DATED this 29 day of October, 1997,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing document were
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Attorney at Law
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Moscow, ID 83843-9384
DATED this

Q'iS" day of October, 1997.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The issue presented by this case is whether there is any
limit on the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's recovery of
Medicaid payments.
28, 1992.

Hildor Knudson was institutionalized on June

She received $41,600.55 in Medicaid between January 1,

1993 and her death on October 27, 1994.

The value of Hildor's

estate, minus funeral expenses and her legal fees (a net
$1,683.03), was paid to the Department.

Lionel Knudson, Hildor's

spouse, died in November 1994 without having received any
Medicaid.

His estate was valued at $40,798.35.

In January 1995, the Department filed a claim against
Lionel's estate for the unrecovered balance of the Medicaid
payments to Hildor.

Barbara Jackman, the personal representative

of Lionel's estate, objected that the Department's claim exceeded
its authority under state and federal law.

The Department's

claim against Lionel's estate was denied by the magistrate· judge
as contrary to state law.

The Department appealed to the

district judge, who affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.

The Department appealed.

The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the

order denying the Department's claim.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

The Court' !I holding is based upon a misunderstanding of the
Medicaid system and will lead to unforseen, inequitable, and
absurd results.

II.

The court erred in holding that federal law does not prohibit the Department from recovering Medicaid payments :from the
estate of the recipient's surviving spouse.

III. The Court erred in holding that state law authorizes the
Department to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of
the recipient's surviving spouse.
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ARGUMENT

I.

The Court's holding is based upon a misunderstanding of the
Medicaid system and will lead to unforseen, inequitable, and
absurd restL1ts.

The Court's: decision to allow the Department's claim is
based on a misunderstanding of the Medicaid system, particularly
as laid out by federal law.

With all due respect, the Court

misperceived how the system currently works and did not
adequately consider how the Court's holding will disrupt the
system in the future.
It is easy to see how such confusion arose.
system is extremely complex.

.,

The Medicaid

The United States Supreme Court

described the Medicaid statutes as "among the most intricate ever
drafted by Congress" and stated that their "Byzantine
construction . . . makes [them] almost unintelligible to the
uninitiated."

Schweiker v. Grey Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981)

(citations omitted).

Because the magistrate and district court

decisions focused upon state law, both parties emphasized state
law in the briefs submitted to the Court and neither party set
out an overall picture of the Medicaid system at the federal or
state level.

Where the parties referred to the federal system,

Jackman relied on specific technical arguments and the Department
made several misrepresentations.

Both parties also ignore:d the

fact that both the federal and state law have independently
changed in signi:ficant ways over time and that federal
regulations, state laws, and state regulations have often not

,.,,
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kept up with changes in federal law.
Before interpreting Medicaid statutes and regulations, one
must understand the Medicaid system as it works for institutionalized individuals in Idaho.

Medicaid payments are not a loan

and couples do not cheat the system simply because the State may
not fully recover Medicaid payments made to one spouse.

The

federal law ensures that a married couple will spend most of
their assets on the needy spouse's medical care before an institutionalized spouse receives any Medicaid.

Further, states may

later recover Medicaid payments from whatever assets are retained
by the recipient.

Thus, even without a provision for states to

recover from the limited assets a community spouse is allowed to
retain, Medicaid statutes already require a couple to expend a
substantial portion of their assets on an institutionalized
spouse's medical expenses:
Middle-class individuals in need of long-term care must
dispose of their assets exceeding poverty limits either to
pay for the:ir care or, in the alternative, to qualify for
public assistance. Thus, unlike the affluent (who can
provide for their own health-care needs) and low-income
individuals (who qualify for public assistance), middleclass indiv:iduals must forfeit any wealth accumulated.

through a lifetime of hard work and savings to pay for longterm care. This forfeiture is a harsh result for an individual who has saved for a lifetime to provide for the
future and who has paid taxes to support government programs
like Medicaid.
Amber R. Cook, Estate Planning with Medicaid: Qualification and
Planning for the Elderly, 99
A.

w.

VA. L. REV. 155 (1996).

How Medicaid eligibility currently works.

Federal Med:Lcaid eligibility laws are complex but generally
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work in a straight-forward way.

In 1998, the institutionalized

spouse must have a monthly income below $1,502 and non-exempt
assets below $2,000 to receive Medicaid.
{10).

42 U.S.C. § 1396a{a)

In determining how much assets an applicant has for

eligibility, the process ignores actual ownership (as between the
spouses) of the .assets (though the institutionalized spouse will
ultimate have to transfer actual ownership of all but $2,000
worth of the non-exempt assets). 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S(c) (1) {A).
Instead, a "snap-shot" is taken of all assets owned by either
spouse, jointly c::>r separately, on the date the spouse is admitted
to an institution (the "snap-shot" date).
5 (c) (1) (B).

S(c) (2).

§

1395r-

The question is then how much of the "snap-shot"

assets are "attributed" to each spouse.

,_..,

42 u.s.c.

42 U.S.C. § 139Sr-

The community spouse is attributed a "community spouse

allowance" which is equal to one-half the total assets or $87,350
(in 1998), whichi:!ver is lower {but not to be below $16,200 (in
1998)).

42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S{f).

"Snap-shot" assets beyond.the

community spouse allowance are attributed to the institutionalized spouse.

42

u.s.c.

§

1395r-S(c) (2).

This complex system is easily illustrated.

For example,

assume one member of a married couple is institutionalized and
applies for Medicaid.

If the couple has non-exempt assets worth

$20,000, $16,200 will be attributed to the community spouse
{i.e., the Community Spouse Allowance (CSA)) and the remaining
$3,800 will be attributed to the institutionalized spouse.
REP. No. 36(I), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 360-361 (1997).

S.

Thus, the
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institutionalized spouse "has" assets exceeding the eligibility
limit by $1,800. Id.

If the couple has non-exempt assets worth

$100,000, $50,000 will be attributed to each the community spouse
and the institutionalized spouse (because the CSA will be onehalf of the total and the remainder be the other half). Id,.

If

the couple has non-exempt assets worth $200,000, $87,350 will be
attributed to thi~ ·community spouse (as the maximum CSA) and the
remaining $112,000 to the institutionalized spouse (as the
remainder).

Id.

Again, the institutionalized spouse's non-exempt assets must
be below $2,000 before he or she is eligible for Medicaid.
Individuals who E:!Xceed the resource limitations on the "snapshot" date typically "spend-down" their assets.

Applicants

generally spend-down assets by paying for their own medical care
until they becomE~ eligible for Medicaid, meeting current ongoing
expenses of the community spouse, investing in exempt assets
(i.e., making improvements to the home, buying a car, or purchasing funeral plans), paying of one's mortgage or other debts, and
making gifts.
Applicants can, and do, dispose of assets by making gifts,
but they do so at a price.

Disposal of assets (except for

transfers between spouses) for less than fair market value during
the look-back period is penalized by a delay in Medicaid eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (1) (B) (i).

The look-back period is

defined as the 36 months prior to the first day when an

individ-

ual is both instj_tutionalized and has applied for benefits. Id.
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(For certain tntsts, the look-back period is 60 months.)

Id.

The number of months of delay is determined by the value of the
transferred assE!tS divided by the average state nursing home rate
determined by the Department, approximating the value of a.
month's institutionalized care.

42

u.s.c.

§ 1396p(c) (1)

(E).

Thus, the penalty is a delay which is about equal to the a.mount
of time the individual could have paid for his own care w:i th the
transferred assets.

There is no penalty, however, for transfers

to the individual's spouse {or for the transfer of one's home to
one's child who is under 21, blind or disabled).

42

u.s.c.

§

1396p(c) (2).
B.

How the current eligibility laws, estate recovery, and
asset transfer penalties evolved.

Before moving from the current eligibility system to the

,w

current estate recovery system, it is helpful to examine how the
federal provisions as to eligibility, estate recovery, and asset
transfer penalti,es were developed in reaction to these provision's interaction over time.
From Medica.id' s creation in 1965 until changes were made in
1988, the attribution of income and resources for Medicaid
eligibility purposes was simpler than the current system.

When

one spouse enter1:id a nursing home, each spouse was treated (for
eligibility purposes) as a separate household.

H.R. REP. No.

lOS(II), 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 66 (1988) reprinted in 1988

u.s.c.c.A.N. 889.

Income was considered to belong to the spouse

whose name was on the instrument conveying the funds.

Id.
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Similarly, resources held solely by the institutionalized spouse
were attributed to him/her.

Id.

Resources that were jointly

held were also considered to belong entirely to the institutionalized spouse, cm the theory that he or she had an unrestricted
right to use them.

Id.

If assets were held solely by th,e

community spousei, however, they were considered to belong solely
to him/her and there was no obligation on the part of the
community spouse! to contribute any amount toward the cost13 of the
care of institutionalized spouse.

Id. at 889-890.

When Congre,ss created the Medicaid program in 1965, :Lt
included a strict restriction on the ability of states to pursue
recovery of Medicaid payments:
A State plan for medical assistance must (18) provide that . . . there shall be no adjustment or recovery (except, in the case of an individual who was 65 years of
age or older, from his estate, and then only after the death
of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when he
has no surviving child who is under age 21 or is blind or
permanently and totally disabled) of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of such individual under the plan.
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97,
79 Stat.

347

§:

1902,

(1965).

Originally, Congress allowed states to deny Medicaid eligibility to applic,:l.nts who, within the previous 24 months, grive
away non-exempt assets, but did not allow states to penalize the
transfer of exempt assets.·

S.

REP.

No.

494 (I), 97th Cong . , 2nd.

Sess., 38 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 814.

Thus,

an elderly individual who needed nursing home care could give
his/her home away (whether to a family member, friend, or
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complete strangeir) and "assure that the home will not be part of
his/her estate, and therefore will not be subject to any recovery
action initiated by the State after the individual's death."
at 815.

Id.

Also, the penalty for transfer of non-exempt assi:!ts was

a 24 month delay in Medicaid payments, regardless of the value of
the assets.

Id.

In 1982, Congress changed the law to penalize the transfers of
any assets (whether exempt or not for eligibility purposeB)
except where an individual transfers title to his/her home to a
spouse or a minor or handicapped child.

Tax Equity

Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 97-248, § 132,

&

Financial

96 Stat. 324 {1982).

Congress also replaced the old estate recovery provision with the
following language codified in 42 U.S.C.

...,

§

1396p(b) (1) (19~12):

{b) ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN .
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State
plan may be made, except (A) in the case of an individual described in subsection
(a) (1) (B), from his estate or upon sale of the property

subject to a lien imposed on account of medical as:,dstance pai.d on behalf of the individual, and
(B)

In th.e case of an individual who was 65 years c,f age

or older when the individual received such medical assistance, f:rom his estate.
Id.

The House Committee that wrote these provisions made it

clear they were intended to ensure that all resources of "an
individual will be used to defray the public costs of supporting
that individual in a long-term medical institution" while
protecting "the legitimate rights of the recipient, the reciRESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 9
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pient's spouse and his/her dependent children."

S. REP. No.

4 94 (I) .

The normal effect of these provisions was that an individual
would have to spend-down all of his non-exempt assets and any
gift of his assets would be penalized by a delay in Medicaid
benefits (which would mean the individual would have to spend on
nursing home care during the delay an amount equal to the value
of the gifts).

H.R. REP. No. lOS(II).

The individual could retain

exempt assets and the state could recover their value from the
individual's estate - except for the family home which the
individual was free to transfer to his/her spouse or minor or
disabled child.

Id.

Because the home is the primary exempt

asset and married individuals could be expected to use the
opportunity to preserve the home for their family, the Health
Care Financing Administration assumed its regulations implementing the 1982 statutes would only result in estate recovery from
unmarried recipients.

See 47 Fed. Reg. 43644, 43646 (1982).

In 1988, Congress recognized that

11

the leading cause of

financial catastrophe among the elderly is the need for long-term

care" because "the expense of nursing home care [$2,000 - $3,000
per month in 1988] has the potential for rapidly depleting the
lifetime savings of all but wealthiest."

H.R. REP. No. lOS(II),

100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 65 (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
888.

Because Medicare does not cover the costs of long-term

insti'tutionalizat:ion and "private insurance for nursing home
costs is not genE!rally available," Congress concluded that the
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Medicaid program is the only viable source of payment for nursing
home care for most of the elderly.

Id.

Congress further recognized that the old resource and income
attribution rule:s were leading to unintended and unwanted
results.

For example, it was quite common for the bulk o:E the

couple's income and resources to be jointly-owned or owned by the
institutionalized spouse so that they were attributed to 1:.he
institutionalized spouse and had to be spent-down before he/she
received any Medicaid.

See H.R. REP. l0S(II).

Under such. circum-

stances, the community spouse (usually an elderly woman) could
keep the couple's house but was otherwise "unjustly impovE~rished"
(i.e., left with little or no income and resources).
900.

••

Id. at 899-

On the other hand, if the bulk of a couple's income and

resources were solely owned by the community spouse, the insti.tutionalized spouse would immediately qualify for Medicaid -· no
matter how wealthy the couple had been - and the community spouse
would retain all the couple's income and assets without contributing anything to the costs of his/her spouse's medical caLre.
Id.

congress responded to these problems by passing the J.Vledicare
Catastrophic Cov1erage Act (MCCA) which (among other things)
amended the Medicaid statutes to essentially create the current
eligibility and asset transfer regime described earlier he:rein.
The primary relevant changes were replacing the original method
of resource attr:ibution with the current model of piling together
all the assets and then taking out the Community Spouse Resource
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 11
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Allowance befor,~ requiring a spend-down.

Medicare Catastrophic

Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303(a), 102 Stat.
683, 756 (1988) .

MCCA also replaced the 24-month look-back and

penalty for assE!t transfers with a 30-month look-back and a
penalty proportionate to the amount transferred with a 30-month
cap on the penalty.

Id. at§ 303(b), 102 Stat. at 761.

Finally,

MCCA expanded the ability of individuals to transfer thei:r home
to the community spouse without penalty to include the ab.ility to
transfer all assets without penalty (which made sense because who
was the actual owner of the assets no longer mattered for
eligibility attribution purposes).
759; H.R. REP. 105(II) at 896.

Id. at§ 303(a), 102 Stat. at

MCCA did not, however, cha.nge the

estate recovery provisions.

Congress again dealt with these issues in August 1993.

Based

on concerns that individuals were hiding assets for eligibility
purposes, Congress passed broader definitions of assets, E!Xtended
the look-back period to 36 months, and lifted the 30-month cap on
transfer penalties.
Pub.

L.

No.

103-66,

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
§§

13661-13612,

107

Stat.

312,

To

622-6251 •

the estate recov1ary provisions, Congress added a mandatory and an
optional definition of "estate 11 and changed the language to read:
(b) ADJUSTMEN'I' OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN.
(1) No adjui;;tment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly pilid on behalf of an individual under the State
plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recc>very of any medical assistance correctly paid on

behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of
the following individuals:
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(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a) (1) (B), the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate.
Id. at §13612(a
added) .

&

c), 107 Stat. at 627-628 (1993) (emphasis

As Congressman Henry Waxman has noted, "once you wade
through the maze of Medicaid eligibility rules and trust and
estate law, the issue goes to some very fundamental questions"
about who should pay for the long-term health care costs of the
elderly.

Medicaid and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation: Hearings

before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 334 {1993)[hereinafter Hearings].

The answers to these questions must come

first from Congress and second from the legislature.
The preceding history of the Medicaid statute reveals some! of
•II'

these answers .
First, Congress knows and accepts that Medicaid is the
primary payer for the long-term care costs of the elderly.
REP.

105 (II) .

H. R.

The vast majority of the institutionalized ,elderly

- no matter how publicly responsible - have no choice but to rely
on Medicaid unle:3s they simply forgo medical care.

Id.

Congress

has thus provided Medicaid for such individuals while consistently seeking to ensure "that individuals with substantial personal
assets pay a fair share for nursing home care and certain other
medical services before they qualify for Medicaid."

Hearings at

19 (statement of William Toby, Jr., Acting Administrator, Health
Care Financing Administration) (emphasis in original).

This is
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achieved through the asset attribution process, the spend-down
provisions, and asset transfer restrictions.

Id.

On the othE~r hand, Congress has decided it is unfair to
require a spouse to contribute all of his or her assets to pay
for the medical care of an institutionalized individual.

It is

fair for them to contribute some assets (unless the couple is too
poor to do so).

Thus, Congress enacted the MCCA allowing un-

penalized spousal transfers, attributing assets without regard to
ownership for eligibility purposes, and requiring a spend-down
while protectinsr the community spouse resource allowance.
Further, Congress has never passed any provision allowing states
to recover payments from the estate of a recipient's spouse ("nor
made any exception to the general prohibition against state
Medicaid recovery except from recipient's estates).
C.

The un.forseen, inequitable and absurd results of the
Court's holding.

The above-mentioned goals of the federal Medicaid system are
generally realized in the system's day-to-day application (though
there are always anomalies).

The system anticipates (even

expects) that many elderly individuals will engage in estate
planning to maximize the extent they benefit from the system
while minimizing their costs.

Further, the system pursues:

fairness by maximizing the amount an individual must pay for
his/her own care, but limiting the extent others (spouses and the
public) must pay.

The Court's decision upsets this balance and

creates unfair, even absurd, results without adding to the

RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 14

000324

~1-~

furtherance of the system's goals.

Consider the followin9

hypotheticals:
Example 1:

Spouse receives Medicaid.

Kelvin farms :Eor a living. He inherited the family farm from
his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000.
He, wife, and
daughter workc:d the farm until Kelvin retired. At that point
he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
Wife is diagnosed with Al:2:heimer' s disease and is required to enter a care
center. Kel v:ln and wife private pay for care at roughly
$4,000 per month.
A year later wife applies for Medicaid and
is found eligible. Wife lives in the care center for an
additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a
month).
At wife's death her estate is valued at less than
$2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules.
Kelvin
lives an additional ten years and at his death his estate
consists of his farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter who has
continued to lease the farm.
The Department seeks recovery
of the $300,000 for wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the
farm) .
Result:

Under the Court's decision, the Department will be

allowed to recover the $300,000 from Kelvin's estate under state

Example 2:

Gift of farm to daughter, spouse receives Medicaid.

Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm
from his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000.
He, wife,
and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. At that
point he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
Wifi3 is
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease and is required to enter a
care center.

At that point Kelvin gifts the farm to h:Ls

daughter. This gift of Kelvin's separate property carries
with it a period of Medicaid ineligibility from 36 months to
88 months depending on when Kelvin and his wife apply for
Medicaid.
Kelvin and wife pay for 36 months of long term
care (roughly $144,000) depleting their cash resources.
Thirty-seven months post-gift Kelvin's wife applies for Medicaid and is found eligible.
Wife lives in the care center for
an additional eight years (at a Medicaid cost of $240,000
($2,500 a month).
At wife's death her estate is valued at
less than $2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules.
Kelvin lives an additional ten years and at his death his
estate consists of his personal effects.
Result:

The Department is unable to obtain recovery of the
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - .Page 15

000325

$240,000 for wife's care from the farm but can recoup min:Lmally
from Kelvin's estate.
J.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c).

See also Peter

Strauss, Medi.caid Revisions in 1993 Budget Act, N. Y. L. ~r. , Sept.

30, 1993, at 3, 7.

The very wealthy can afford to get around the

asset transfer and estate recovery provisions, but poor and
middle-class individuals cannot.
Example 4:

Formal post-nuptial agreement.

Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm from
his parents.
The farm is valued at $300,000.
He, first
wife, and dau9hter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. At
that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
First
wife dies. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and second wife·
enter into a j:ormal post nuptial agreement preserving the
separate nature of each spouse's estate.
Within a few years
of marriage se~cond wife is diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease
and is require~d to enter a care center. Kelvin and second wife
private pay for care at roughly $4,000 per month. A year
later second wife applies for Medicaid for second wife .and is
found eligiblei.
Second wife lives in the care center for an
additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a
month).
At second wife's death her estate is valued at less
than $2,000 ae1 required by Medicaid eligibility rules.
Kelvin lives an additional ten years and at his death his
estate consists of his farm.
Kelvin's heir is his daughter
who has continued to lease the farm.
The Department s•:eks
recovery of the $300,000 for second wife's care from Kelvin's
estate (the farm).
Result:

Under the Court's decision, the Department will be

allowed to recover the $300,000 from Kelvin's estate.

The

Court's decision ignores treasured principles of community
property law by making Kelvin's separate property liable for his
second wife's Medicaid payments.
Example 5:

Kelvin divorces second wife.

Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm
from his parents.
The farm is valued at $300,000.
He,
first wife, and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired.
At that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
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First wife dies. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and
second wife enter into a formal post nuptial agreement preserving the separate nature of each spouse's estate.
Within
a few years of marriage second wife is diagnosed with 1Uzheimer' s disease and is required to enter a care center.
Kelvin and second wife private pay for care at roughly $4,000
per month. A year later Kelvin divorces second wife a.nd their
property is divided according to the post nuptial agree:ment.
second wife, now ex-wife, applies for Medicaid and is found
eligible.
Second wife lives in the care center for an additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 {$2,500 a
month) .
At :second wife's death her estate is valued a.t less
than $2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. Kelvin
lives an additional ten years and at his death his estate
consists of h:is farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter who has
continued to lease the farm.
Medicaid seeks recovery of the
$300,000 for ex-second wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the
farm).
Result:

Unde:r this Court's decision, state law would preclude

recovery other than from second wife's estate for her Med.icaid
costs.

Hasn't the Court created a powerful incentive for di-

vorce?
Example 6:

Kelvin predeceases second wife.

Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family f:arm
from his parents.
The farm is valued at $300,000.
He,
first wife, and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired.
At that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
First wife die~s. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and
second wife enter into a formal post nuptial agreement preserving the se!parate nature of each spouse's estate.
Within
a few years of: marriage second wife is diagnosed with Alzheimer's diseaLse and is required to enter a care center.
Kelvin and sec:ond wife private pay for care at roughly :$4, 000
per month. A year later Kelvin dies.
His estate is probated
according to his Will {reflecting separate nature of each
spouse's property) with the farm passing to Kelvin's daughter
and second wif:e, now widow, receiving her statutory spousal
share.
Second wife applies for Medicaid and is found eligible.
Second wife lives in the care center for an additional
ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a month).
At second wife's death her estate is valued at less than
$2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules.
Result:

Under this Court's decision, state law would preclude
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recovery other than from second wife's estate for her Medicaid
costs.

Why should whether Kelvin's daughter inherits the farm

depend upon who - Kelvin or his wife - dies first?
Example 9: The second wife's inheritance
Kelvin farms for a living.
He and his wife lease a farm
from Kelvin's parents. Wife is diagnosed with early Alzheimer's disease a:nd is required to enter a care center. Kelvin
and wife private pay for care at roughly $4,000 per month. A
year later wife applies for Medicaid for wife and is found
eligible. Wife lives in the care center for an additional ten
years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a month).
At
wife's death her estate is valued at less than $2,000 as
required by M•:!dicaid eligibility rules.
Kelvin remarries and
he and his second wife live together for twenty-five years.
The second wi:Ee and Kelvin accumulate an estate valued at
$500,000 due to second wife's inheritance of a family farm
from her parents a year before she dies. Second wife has a
son who leased the inherited farm from second wife and second
wife's parenti;. At Kelvin's death his estate consists of this
farm. The Department seeks recovery of the $300,000 for first
wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the farm).
Result:

Under the Court's decision, the family farm of the

second wife is liable for Kelvin's first wife's care costs.
Again, how can this be reconciled with Idaho's community property
laws?
In conclusion, the issues raised in these hypotheticals do
not make the Court's decision erroneous by themselves.

They do,

however, counter any notion that spousal estate recovery i.s a
moral imperative or follows logically from Idaho's probate: law or
the Medicaid sch1:!me.

There are just as many, if not more, good

policy reasons to prohibit spousal estate recovery as there are
reasons to allow it.

If Congress and the state legislature has

made a clear policy choice in favor of spousal estate recovery it
would not be for the Court to deny it.

If, however, federal or
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state law is contrary to, or ambiguous in regard to, spou,sal
estate recovery, the Court should have no qualms about prohibiting it.

At the very least, it should be clear that Medicaid is

not a loan and couples do not cheat the system simply because the
state may not fully recover Medicaid payments made to one spouse.
II.

The Court E1rred in holding that federal law does not prohibit the Department from recovering Medicaid payments from the
estate of t:he recipient's surviving spouse.

Federal law provides the parameters for state recovery of
Medicaid payments.

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (18) (state Medicaid

programs must comply with the provisions of 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p

with respect to liens, adjustments, and recoveries of Medicaid
correctly paid).

This Court held in McCoy v. State of Idaho,

Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110, 112 (1995):
Each state's participation in Medicaid is optional, but once
a state voluntarily elects to participate in the pro9ram, it
must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act and
applicable regulations.
Hildor Knudson received Medicaid payments from Janua1y 1,
1993 until her d,eath on October 27, 1994.

The payments for

medical services Hildor received prior to October 1, 1993 are
covered by 42 U.:S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (A) (1992) which prohibits

states from recmrery Medicaid payments made to a recipient who is
institutionalized except "from his estate."

The payments for

medical services Hildor received after October 1, 1993 are
covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1998) which also
prohibits states from recovery of payments made to an individual
who is institutionalized except from "the individual's estate."
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Thus, the Department is prohibited by federal law from recovering
any of the paymEmts made to Hildor except from her estate.

The

Department cannot recover from Lionel's estate.
The Court finds two reasons why 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (A)

does not limit a state's recovery of Medicaid payments to the
estate of the reicipient.

First, the Court concludes that the

statute is only a limitation on the types of medical assi:stance
which can be recovered and does not limit from whom these payments may be recovered.

Second, the Court concludes that the

definition of an individual's estate includes the income and
resources of the individual's spouse - thus recovery from an
individual's estate includes recovery from the spouse's estate.
A.

Federal law does limit from whom Medicaid payments may
be recovered - a state may only recover from the recipient's estate.
1.

The language and history of the federal statute
demonstrate the illegality of spousal estat:e recovery.

Since the Medicaid program was created in 1965, federal law
has consistently prohibited recovery of properly paid Medicaid
payments except from the estate of the recipient individua.1.

The

original 1965 statute specified that "a State plan for medical
assistance must . . . provide that

. there shall be no

adjustment or recovery (except, in the case of an individual who
was 65 years of age or older, from his estate . .
97 at§ 1902, 79 Stat at 347 (1965).

"

Pub. L. 89-

In 1982, Congress summa-

rized the state of the law as follows:
Under current law, States are barred from imposing any lien
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against any recipient's property prior to his death because
of Medicaid claims paid or to be paid on his behalf unless
placed as a result of a court judgment. In the case of
individuals under age 65, no adjustments or recoveri,es can
be made for Medicaid claims correctly paid. In the case of
individuals over 65, adjustments and recoveries for correctly paid claims can only be made from his/her estate after
the individual's death and only (1) after the death of his
surviving spouse; and (2) where there are no surviving
children who are under 21, blind, or disabled.

s.

REP.

No.

494 (I), 97th Cong., 2nd. Sess., 38 (1982) re_printed

in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 814.

Remember that Congress also

summarized the law as allowing an elderly individual to give
his/her house to his/her spouse and "by doing so, the individual
assures that the: home will not be part of his/her estate ,md
therefore will not be subject to any recovery action init:Lated by
the State after the individual's death."

Id. at 815.

It could

not be clearer, that at least as of 1982, states could not
..,

recover Medicaid payments from the estate of a recipient'

f3

spouse.
When did CongJ:ess change this language to allow recovery from
the estate of the recipient's spouse?

Never.

In 1982, Congress

changed the relevant provision to read:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical. assistance c:orrectly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be
made, except -·
(A) in tl:Le case of an individual [who is an inpati,ent in
a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded or other medical institution, if such
individual is required, as a condition of receiving s:ervices
in such institution under the State plan, to spend for costs
of medical care all but a minimal amount·of his income
required for personal needs], from his estate or upon sale
of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of
medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual, and
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 65 years of age
or older when the individual received such medical a:ssistance, from his estate.
Tax Equity

&

Financial Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 97-248,

§

132,

96 Stat. 324 (1982) (bracketed portion reflects incorporation of
referenced language from§ 132(a) (1)).

Congress also reworded,

but retained the limitations on when recovery could be made only after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse and only
when there was no surviving child under 21, blind, or disabled.

As codified. in 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (1992), the above

language was the law of the land until October 1st, 1993.

Note

that Hildor received Medicaid payments from January 1993 through
October 1994, so about half of her payments are covered by this
language.

R. pp. 25-40.

After October 1, 1993, the applicable

language as codified in 42 U.S.C.

§

1396(b) (1) (Supp. 1998) reads:

No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on bellalf of an individual under the State plan may be
made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or re,covery

of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of a:n
individual under the State plan in the case of the folL::>wing
individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual [who is an inpa.tient
in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility :for the
mentally retarded or other medical institution, if such
.individual is required, as a condition of receivin9
services in such institution under the State plan, to
spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount
of his income required for personal needs], the State
shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's
estate or upon sale of the property subject to a l:len

imposed on account of medical assistance paid on behalf
of the individual.
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of
age or older when the individual received such medical
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assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery
from the individual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting of (i) nursing facility services, home and community-based
services, and related hospital and prescription drug
services, or
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services
under the State plan.
(C) (i)In the case of an individual who has received (or
is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-tertr1 care
insuranc,a policy in connection with which assets or
resources are disregarded in the manner described in
clause (:ii), except as provided in such clause, the State
shall se«ak adjustment or recovery from the individual's
estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of
the individual for nursing facility and other long-term
care services.
(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an
individual who received medical assistance under a State
plan of a State which had a State plan amendment approved
as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of
any assets or resources (I) to the extent that payments are made under a
long-term care insurance policy; or
(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled to receive) benefits under a long term care! insurance policy."

Omnibus Budget R econciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66,
1

§1361.2{a),

1.07 Stat. 627-628

(1993).

The 1993 amendments did not

change the limit on when recovery could be made (only where there
is no surviving spouse or dependent) and added a requirement for
states to waive :recovery where it would "work an undue hardship."
42

u.s.c.

§ 1396p(b) (1-3} (Supp. 1998).

As will be discussed

later, a definit:Lon of the term "estate" was also added.
U.S.C.

§

42

1396p(b} (4) (Supp. 1998}.

Again, as oJ: September 30, 1982, federal law unequivocally
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prohibited spouHal estate recovery.

S.

REP.

No.

494(1) a.t 814.

Where in the legislation since then is there any change allowing
states to recover Medicaid payments from the recipient's :spouse?
Nowhere.

The change on October 1, 1982 did nothing more than

amend the generall prohibition against any recovery of Medicaid
payments to add an exception to allow recovery from the estate of
individuals who receive benefits prior to age 65 if they received
such benefits because they were institutionalized.

42 U.S.C. §

1396p (b) (1) (A) (1992).
The effect of the 1993 amendments is bit more complex, but
similar.

The law still retains the general prohibition against

any recovery of properly-made Medicaid payments.
1396p(b} (l} (Supp. 1998).

42 u.s.c. §

As to individuals who received Medicaid

prior to age 55 because they were institutionalized, the permissive exception is changed to a mandatory requirement (i.e.,
states are required to recover the payments from the individual's
estate or through use of a lien).
(Supp. 1998).
were

55,

42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b} (1) (A)

A:s to individuals who received Medicaid after they

states may recover all payments from the individual's

estate and are n~quired to recover some types of payments (those
for long-term care) from the individual's estate.
1396p (b) (1) (B) (i--ii) (Supp. 1998).

42 U.S.C. §

As to individuals who receive

Medicaid under special state provisions that coordinate eligibility with long-term care insurance policies, states must recover
payments for long-term care services (except where the state plan
was approved before May 14, 1993) from the estate of the i:ndividRESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - .Page 24
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ual.

42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (C) (i-ii) (Supp. 1998).

Thus, States are prohibited - with no qualifiers - from
recovery of Medj_caid payments except from certain recipients'
estates in every version of the Medicaid statute that has ever
existed.

It is difficult to conceive how the statute's language

could more explicitly limit from whom (and by what means) a state
may recover Medicaid payments.
2.

'l'he federal statute's I.imitation upon from whom
(and how) states may recover Medicaid payments is
:c·eflected in the case I.aw.

Case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and other courts is premised upon the conclusion
that the federal statutory language limits from where a state may
recover Medicaid payments.

In Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923

(9th Cir. 1997), and Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d
1003 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that, prior t:o being
amended in 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) limited recovery to the
recipient's estate.

The issue in each case was what assets are

included in the :recipient's estate.

In Kizer, the court held

that a recipient's estate did not include property the recipient

owned in joint b,mancy and that a state could not seek to recover
Medicaid benefits from any person who succeeded by survivorship
to such property.

887 F.2d at 1006-1008.

In Bucholtz, the court

held that a recipient's estate did include an ownership interest
at the time of dE~ath in community property or property held as a
tenant in common,. but did not include property in an inter vivos
trust.

114 F.3d at 925-927.

To the extent a state statute
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,__,.

"seeks to reach further than

§

1396p (b) (1), it cannot stand."

Id. at 925.
One might, of course, distinguish these cases on the ground
that the statute was amended in 1993, but such a distinction is
without merit.

First, a large portion of Hildor's Medicaid

payments were made prior to the effective date of the 1993
amendments.

Second, the key language ("No recovery . . . except

. . . in the casie of an individual . . . from his estate") relied
upon by the Ninth Circuit in Bucholtz

remained essentially

unchanged ( "No r,ecovery . . . except . . . in the case of an
individual .
amendments.
U.S.C.

§

. from the individual's estate) by the 1993
Compare 42

u.s.c.

§ 1396p(b) (1) (A) (1992) with 42

1396p(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1998).

Cases after the 1993 amendments also hold that the language
of 42

u.s.c.

§ 1396p(b) (1) prohibits states from collecting

Medicaid paymenti; except from the estate of the recipient.

In

Demille v. Belshe, 1994 WL 519457 (N.D. Cal. Sept.16, 1994), the
United States District Court for the North District of California
noted that the general rule created by the statute was no recovery except from individual's estates and held:
The federal statute allows the state to recoup its e~penses
only from those persons who are holding real or personal
property in which the deceased recipient held a legal interest at the t:ime of death. See [42 u.s.c. §] 1396p(b) (1)(requiring 1:itate to recover from decedent's "estate") and §
1396p (b) (4) (defining "estate"). The amount of expens,es the
state may re!cover from such persons is capped by the .amount
of decedent's interest in the property. § l396p(b) (4). In
other words, the federal statute only contemplates th,:it the
deceased recipient's assets will be traced, not that other
persons can become liable to pay over their own asset:s.
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1994 WL at *7.

similarly, in Matter of Estate of Budney, 541

N.W.2d 245 (Wis. App. 1995), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held
that a state statute authorizing recovery of medical assistance
benefits from the surviving spouse's estate exceeded the authority provided by the federal Medicaid statutes.

541 N.W. at 246.

There appears to be only one case even vaguely supportive of
the Court's conclusion that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b} (1) does not
limit a state's recovery of Medicaid payments to the estate of
the recipient.

Ironically, Matter of Estate of Imburgia, 130

A.D.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987}, was decided prior to both the
1988 and the 1993 amendments to the statute and considers mainly
the deeming of assets between spouses.

Further, the Imburgia

analysis was explicitly rejected by a higher court, the Neiw York
Court of Appeals, in Matter of Estate of Craig, 624 N.E.2d 1003
(N.Y. 1993).

In Craig, the court held that federal law generally

prohibited recovery of Medicaid, made a narrow exception f'or the
recovery from the estate of the recipient, but did not "provide
for recovery of Medicaid payments on behalf of a predeceased
spouse from the ;secondarily dying spouse's estate."

1006.

624 N. E. at

The court also noted that the 1993 amendments to the

statute "gives the States, at their option, the power to recover
against a spouse"s estate, but only against the recipient's
assets that were conveyed through joint tenancy and other specified forms of survivorship."
B.

Id.

The court erred by combining 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(e) (l)'s
definit~ion with 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b) (4)'s definition of
estate .
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The Court's second basis for holding that the Department's
claim against Lionel's estate does not violate 42

u.s.c.

§

1396p(b) (1) is the Court's conclusion that an individual's estate
(as defined by the statute) includes all income and resources
owned by the individual and his/her spouse, including any income
or resources that the individual and spouse were entitled to but
did not receive because of action by them on their behalf.
plugging the 42 U.S.C.

§

By

1396p(e) (1) definition of assets into

the 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4) definition of estate, the Court
reasons that recovery from Hildor's estate includes all of
Lionel's estate, particularly resources he acquired from the
marriage settlement agreement.

This analysis is faulty in

several respects.
1.

T:b.e Court's analysis of the definitions ignores
the effective dates of the statute.

The 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(e) (1) definition of assets does not

apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the: date
of the enactment of this Act" (August 10, 1993).
13612(e) (2) (B).

P.L. 103-66, §

Hildor transferred all of her interest in the

Knudson's assets to Lionel on March a, 1993.

R. pp. 63-66.

Thus, the (e) (1) definition of assets explicitly does not include
any of Lionel's estate.

Additionally, both the 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(e) (1) definition of assets and the 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4)
definition of estate only apply to Medicaid payments "for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993."
66,

§

13612(e) (2:i (A).

P.L. 103-

Thus, even if the Court's analysis of the
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definitions of E!State and assets is correct, it cannot be applied
to Lionel's estate and, even if it could, it would only apply to
those payments made on Hildor's behalf after October 1, 1993.
2.

'l~he Court's analysis defies the structure c:>f 42
U.S. C.

§

13 9 6p.

Subsection (b) (4) 's definition of "estate" is specif:ic to
"this subsection" (i.e., subsection 42

u.s.c.

§

1396p(b)) ,

whereas subsection (e) (l)'s definition applies generally to "this
section" (i.e., all of 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p).

When interpreting

statutory definitions, as with statutory provisions in general,
general definitions are superseded by specific definitions.
State v. Jones, 34 Idaho 83, 199 P. 645 (1921); Herrick v.
Gallet, 35 Idaho 13, 204 P. 477 (1922); In re Drainage Dist. No.
1, 40 Idaho 549, 235 P. 895 (1925).

'•1""'

Subsection (e) (4) 's defini-

tion of "assets" applies to that word's use in section 1396p as a
This broad definition is displaced, for purposes of

whole.

subsection (b), by subsection (b) (4) 's very specific definition.
3.

The Court's analysis ignores the legislativ-e histiory of the definitions.

The structu:ral wall between the (b) (4) definition of "estate" and the (e) (1) definition of assets is not a mere technicality.

The two provisions were distinguished throughout their

legislative history.

Subsection (b) (4) was enacted as part of

section 13612 "M«~dical Estate Recoveries" of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation A<::t of 1993.
628.

P. L. No. 103-66; 107 Stat. at 627-

subsection (e) (1) was enacted as section 13611 "Transfers
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of Assets; Treatments of Certain Trusts" of the Act.

Id.

Congress intended subsection (b) (4) (B) to allow states the option
of recovering assets in which the recipient had a legal title or
interest at the time of death, including assets held through
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.

H. R. CoN. REP. No. 213, 103rd

Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N . 1524.
This was an explicit response to Kizer and other cases denying
state recovery of such assets.

Patricia Nemore et al, OBRA-93

Provisions Concerning Medicaid Transfers of Assets, Treatment of
Certain Trusts, and Estate Recoveries, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1199, 1206
(Feb. 1994).

Congress had an altogether different intent in

enacting subsection (e} (1). H.R. CoN. REP. No. 213 at 1523.

Subsec-

tion {e) (1) was intended to effect how assets of an individual
and his/her spouse are treated for the purpose of Medicaid
eligibility.

Id.

Nowhere in the legislative history of these

subsections is a:n expressed intent that the asset definition
would expand the range of estate recovery.
4.

T:b.e Court's combination of the two definiti,ons

1eads to absurd resu1ts.

The cooperation, without the combination, of the two definitions results in a logical scheme.

As Congress intended, the

broad definition of assets in {e) (1) works to prevent the hiding
of income and re:~ources for the eligibility purposes - applicable
at the time of the "snap-shot" - and ensures that individuals are
penalized for the improper transfer of such assets.

Patricia
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Nemore et al, 0EIRA-93 Provisions Concerning Medicaid Transfers of
Assets, Treatme.r:tt of Certain Trusts, and Estate Recoveries,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1199, 1200 {Feb. 1994) {the definition was also a
direct response to recent caselaw) .; H.R. REP. No. 111, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess., 206-208 {1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
533-535.

The expanded definition of estate in {b) (4) was intend-

ed by Congress to prevent an individual from making an otherwise
prohibited transfer of an exempt asset (upon death of the individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship,
life estate, or other arrangement) without the individual being
penalized or the state being able to recover the value of the
asset.

Id.

The Court's combination of the definitions adds little to
the meaning of the statute and leads to absurd results.

"Plug-

ging in" {e) (1) 's definition of "assets" to (b) (4) 's definition
of "estate" would make 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p{b) (4) (A) read as fol-

lows:
. "estate," with respect to a deceased individual (A) shall include all real and personal property and

other [income and resources of the individual and of
the individual's spouse] included within the individual's estate as defined for purposes of State probate
law.

(Emphasis added.Ji

What income and resources of an individual's

spouse are included in the individual's estate as defined for
purposes of Idaho probate law?

At most, the individual's one-

half interest in any community property.

Not the spouse's half

of the community property, and certainly not the surviving
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spouse's separate property.
The (e) (1) definition of assets also includes "any income or
resources which the individual or the individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action" by the
individual, the individual's spouse, or anyone (including a court
or administrative body) acting on behalf of, in place of, the
direction of, or upon the request of the individual or the
spouse.

42 U.S.C.

§

1936p(e) {1) {Supp. 1998).

Under Idaho

probate law, what, if any, "income or resources which the individual or the individual's spouse is entitled to but does not
receive .

"are included in the individual's estate?

Respon-

dent hesitates to suggest an answer because the question itself
seems absurd; unfortunately, the question will have to be answered in the implementation of the Court's decision.
Idaho, of course, has adopted the option in 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p{b) (4) {B) which would, under the Court's analysis, define
estate as:
any other real and personal property and other [income and
resources o:f the individual and the individual's spouse} in
which the individual had any 1ega1 tit1e or interest at the
time of dea't:.h (to the extent of such interest)

{Emphasis added.)

Again, what is the extent of the recipient's

legal title or interest in the surviving spouse's half of their
former community property or the spouse's separate property?
There is no such interest.

Again, it seems absurd but becomes

necessary to ask: what is the extent of an individual's legal
title or interest at the time of the individual's death in income
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or resources thE! individual or the individual was entitled to but
never received?
The structure of the statute, the legislative history of the
statute, and the! absurdities that result from combining the
(b) (4) definition of estate and the (e) (1) definition of assets
demonstrate that the definitions were intended to be and must be
kept distinct.

Thus, an "individual's estate" cannot include the

individual's su:rvi ving spouse's estate - even in the confusing
world of federal Medicaid law.

Moreover, because of the date of

the transfer of assets between Hildor and Lionel and the effective dates of the 1993 amendments, Hildor's estate cannot include, for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.

§

1396(b) (1} (A}, Lionel's

estate.
In conclusion, the language of the federal law is clear.
has been clear for 33 years.

It

States may only recover Medicaid

payments from the estate of the recipient.

States may not

recover from the estate of the recipient's spouse.

With cLll due

respect, the Court erred in holding otherwise.
III. The Court e:rred in hol.ding that state l.aw authorizes the

Department ·to recover Medicaid payments from the esta.te of
the recipient's surviving spouse.
A.

The Co111rt erred in interpreting Idaho Code§ 56-218.

Under Idaho law, the Department must seek recovery of
Medicaid payment:;; from the estate of the recipient "or if there
be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse. IDAHO CODE§ 218.
Hildor had an estate (and the Department recovered part of the
payments to Hildc:,r from it) .

Thus, the Department cannot recover
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Medicaid paid to Hildor from the estate of her surviving spouse,
Lionel.
I.C.

§

The Court appears to concede that the plain meaning of
56-218(1) would prohibit the Department from recovering

Medicaid payments paid on behalf of Hildor from Lionel's E~state
because Hildor had an estate.

The Court concludes, howevE~r, that

the plain meaning of the statute is not controlling because it
would be contrary to clearly expressed legislative intent and
would lead to absurd results.
1.

The plain meaning of

I.e.

§

56-218 is not absurd.

The primary premise of these arguments is that, because
Medicaid recipients will almost never have "no estate," the
provision for recovery from the spouse's estate would be rendered
meaningless by a literal reading of the statute.

Although it

would be highly unusual for an individual to die without an
estate, it is not theoretically impossible - particularly if the
individual has institutionalized for a very long time.

Further,

because, until the statute was amended in 1995, an individual's
estate was not d,efined by the statute, property that transferred
automatically to another's ownership upon an individual's death

at least arguably would not be included in the individual's
estate.

It is at least rational, therefore, that the legislature

could have enacti~d the "if there be no estate, the estate of the
surviving spouse'" language on the premise that such circumstances
could, in fact, arise.

It should be noted that the Department

itself argued at various points in this litigation that, for the
purposes of the statute, Hildor had no estate - so at least the
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Department did not think such a concept was absurd.
R.

App. Br. 15;

pp . 8 7 - 8 8 , .
Even if the legislature expected that it would be practical-

ly (if not theoretically) impossible for an individual to die
without an estate, it does not automatically follow that providing for such circumstances in I.C. § 56-218(1) would be absurd.
At a' time when the legislature was enacting other new provisions
regarding the attribution of assets between spouses and n~garding
transfers between spouses (i.e., spousal impoverishment provisions), the legislature could well have intended the "if there be
no estate" catch-all to provide a deterrent from artificial
creation of such circumstances (or even a deterrent from attempts
to create such circumstances).

This may not be the most reason-

able interpretation of the statute, but this does not make it an
absurd interpretation.
2.

T:he legislative intent of § 56-218 was not to
allow Medicaid recovery from the estate of the
recipient's surviving spouse.

The Court r,efers to the "legislative intent to recover from
the estate of a surviving spouse" without clarifying where, such

intent is clearly expressed.

In fact, the only clearly e:x:pressed

legislative intent was that stated in the companion bill to the
bill that created I.e. § 56-218(1):
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this section
to reduce the number of situations in which medicaid regulations as th•=Y apply to long term care costs, cause either
the destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of
marriage carried out to prevent destitution. It is further
the intent of this legislation to protect the community and
separate property rights of a married person whose spouse
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applies for medical assistance regardless of whether they
are living together.
1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.

so,

§ 1, p.74 (creating

209e); 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 49., p.73.

I.e.

§ 56-

Given this c:xplicit

language of the legislature, it is at least as, if not more,
reasonable to conclude that the legislature wished to narrowly
restrict or prevent, rather than facilitate, recovery from the
estate of a surviving spouse.

The plain language of the statute

and the expressed concerns of the legislature should not be
overwhelmed by a merely implied
If, when I.C.

§

legislative intent.

56-218 (1) was enacted, the legislature had

intended that the Department freely recover Medicaid from the
estate of the recipient and the estate of the surviving spouse,
the legislature could have easily so stated.
·lilljjlll,

amended I.C.

§

56-218 (1) in 1998).

(As it did when it

During oral argument before

the Court, the Department expressed a belief that the legislature
borrowed the language it used from a similar statute in Oregon.
This only reinforces the point that, if the legislature had
intended the statute to mean that the Department could first
collect Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient and
then recover the balance from the estate of the surviving spouse,
the legislature could have enacted language clearly expressing
such an intent.

At the time

I.e.

§ 56-218(1) was enacted,

Oregon's statutes provided for the recovery of general assistance
from "the estate of the deceased recipient or if there be no
estate or the estate does not have sufficient assets to satisfy
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the claim, the estate of the surviving spouse."
411.795

(1987)

OR.

REV.

STAT.

§

1

It is the Court's construction of I.C.

§

56-218(1),

rather

than the plain meaning of the statute, that is contrary to clear
legislative intent.

First, the Court effectively nullifies the

"or if there be no estate" language.

Under the Court's construc-

tion, the only time the Department will not seek recovery of
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient's surviving
spouse is when the Department's claim is fully satisfied 1:rom the
recipient's estate.

When the Department can fully recover from

the estate of the recipient, the Department would not makei a
claim against the surviving spouse's estate even without the "if
there be no estate

11

language.

Further, thie spousal impoverishment law was intended to
avoid the necess.ity for couples to divorce in order to protect
the community and separate property rights of the community
spouse.

By exposing all of the assets of a surviving spouse to

potential recovery, the Court's interpretation once again encourages divorce to protect such assets. 2

Although at the time I. C. § 56-218(1} was enacted Oregon law
provided for recovery of Medicaid payments using the same "from the estate, or
if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse" language, Oregon law
now allows for recovery of Medicaid "from the estate of the individual or from
any recipient of property or other assets held by the individual at the time
of death including t.he estate of the surviving spouse" and limits such
recovery from persor.ls other than the recipient to the extent and value of the
Medicaid recipient's: legal title or interest in the property or assets
transferred. OR REV. STAT. § 414.105 (Supp. 1996).
a
Ironically, the Department has denied that there would be an
incentive to divorce under the Court's interpretation of I.C. § 56-218(1), but
concedes that at lea.st one such divorce {although apparently executed clumsily
and perhaps unsuccessfully) has already occurred. App. Reply Br. , p. 8.
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'h....

B.

The Cc>urt erred in ignoring the Department' s rei;ula tory
limitcltions upon estate recovery.

The Court' 1:1 holding does not address the ef feet of the
Department's regulations upon its ability to recover Medicaid
payments from tl:Le estate of the recipient's surviving spouse.
These regulations are relevant both as aids to the interp:retation
of I.e. § 56-218(1) and as independent barriers to the Department's recovery.
In the Idaho Administrative Code, the Department has adopted
provisions for recovery of medical assistance "pursuant to
Sections 56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho Code" through "the filing of
liens against property of deceased persons, and the filin9 of
liens against the property of permanently institutionalize~d
recipients."
·•~

IDAPA 16. 03. 09. 025.

The regulations providei for

recovery of Medicaid payments from the recipient's estate, or
upon the sale of property subject to a lien, but makes only a
limited provision for recovery from the estate of a surviving
spouse.

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.09; IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15.

IDAPA

16.03.09.025.15 states: "If the deceased recipient has no estate,
recovery shall b,e made from the estate of his surviving spouse."
Under this regulation, because Hildor had an estate from which
the Department n~covered, it may not recover from Lionel's
estate.
The other ri:gulatory reference to recovery from the estate
of a recipient's surviving spouse further limits, rather than
expands, the Department's authority to recover from the estate of
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.,....,

a surviving spouse.

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 states:

Limits on the Department's claim against the assets of a
deceased reicipient shall be subject to Sections 56-218 and
56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of ;a. surviving spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited to the
value of the assets of the estate that were community property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separ,a.te
property, aLnd jointly owned property. Recovery shall not be

made until the deceased recipient no longer is survived by a
spouse . . .
(Emphasis added).

Even if one accepts the Department's argument

that this regulation still allows recovery of assets in the
estate of the surviving spouse in which the recipient ever had a
community property interest, this does not expand the Department's recovery from a surviving spouse's estate beyond circumstances where the recipient had no estate.
The Department's regulations explicitly refute any attempt
to use broad definitions of estate and assets to make resources
of the surviving spouse part of the estate of the recipient.
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.03(c) defines the recipient's estate to
include only that property and assets "in which the recipient had
any legal or beneficial title or interest at the time of death."
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.18 extensively defines "assets in estate

subject to claims," but includes only those assets "the deceased
recipient owned or in which he had an ownership interest.

11

Thus, although the Court does not address the issue, state
regulations impose an independent barrier on spousal estate
recovery in Idaho, even if it is otherwise allowed by fedeiral and
state law.· Also, it seems highly unusual, if as the Court held
the state law only creates an order of priority between recipient
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and spousal estate recovery that the Department's regulations do
not reflect this meaning.

Similarly, it also seems stran,ge that

the Department would have adopted regulations that not only do
not incorporate, but also directly contradict, federal law as
interpreted by t:he Court.

Perhaps the Department's regul,ations

demonstrate that the Court erred.
C.

The Cc1urt' s holding will cause undesirable results.
1.

'l~he Court's interpretation of federal and state
law creates unnecessary conflicts between t:he two.

Read together, as properly constructed, the federal and
state statutes and regulations would allow the Department to
recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient:, which
would include the tracing of assets in which the recipient had a
legal title or interest at the time of her death.
,_,

All thE~

applicable law can be consistently and reasonably read to limit
recovery from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse to
such tracing.

The Medicaid system would continue to work undis-

turbed without spousal estate recovery, though the Department
would obviously be denied some revenue.
on the other hand, to allow the Department's claim a9ainst
Lionel's estate requires defiance of the plain meaning of federal
and state statutes and regulations.

The Court's holding uninten-

tionally disrupts community property and probate principleis.
Court's holding leads to absurd and unfair results.

The

Finally, the

Court's holding creates direct conflicts between state and
federal law that could have been avoided.
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For examplei,

42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) requires the Depart-

ment to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient.

As the Court interprets 42 U.S.C.

tion of "estate" and 42 U.S.C.

§

§

1396p(b) (4)'s defini-

1396p(e) (l)'s definition of

"assets", the estate of a recipient includes "all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual' s spousE~"
including income or resources which the individual or spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of actions by or for
them.

Although Idaho has adopted (as of 1995) the 42

u.s . c.

§

1396p(b) (4)'s definition of "estate" for estate recovery purposes, neither Idaho's statutes or regulations include within such
estate the broad definition of assets from 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1}.

To the contrary, the Department's extensive and detailed

definition of
16.03.09.025.18

"assets in estate subject to claims" in IDJ~PA
does not include all income and resources of a

recipient's spouse or all income and resources to which the
individual or spouse is entitled to but does not receive because
of actions by or for them; rather the regulatory definition
includes only th,:,se assets "the deceased recipient owned or in
which he had an ownership interest."

Thus, if the Court's

interpretation o:E the relevant federal law is correct, the
Department is in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (18) and 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) by under-seeking estate recovery.
Similarly, the IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20's limitation of claims
against the estate of a surviving spouse to "the value of the
assets of the estate that were community property, or the deRESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 41
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ceased recipient's share of the separate property, and jointly
owned property" would also conflict with the Court's interpretation of federal law.

As the Court construes 42 U.S.C. § 1396p-

(b) (1), the Department is required by federal law to seek recovery of Medicaid payments from all income and resources of the
individual and the individual's spouse.
Of course, Respondent's point is not that the Department
should be more aggressive in pursuing estate recovery.

To the

extent, however, that the Court's interpretation of federal and
state statutes allowing recovery from surviving spouse's t~states
bring the Department into violation of those statutes, those
interpretations should at least be reconsidered.
2.

The Court's holding upsets traditional precepts of
community property and probate law.

It has already been explained how the Court's holdin9
disregards distinctions between community and separate property
and creates an incentive for married couples to divorce.

It is

not uncommon for elderly couples to get married late in life and
it is particularly unfair in those circumstances that the community spouse, married only for a short time to the institutionalized spouse, should be expected not only to contribute assets for
the support of the spouse in the nursing home, but also de:prive
the heirs of any expectation of receiving property from his or
her will.

After all, there is no taxation upon estates unless

the estate is worth more than $625,000 and other types of public
assistance an individual may receive, even if recoverable from
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the recipients eistate, are not recoverable from the estat,e of the
surviving spouse!.

Ken Coughlin

&

Harry s. Margolis, Cong.ress

Gags Attorneys, Provides Capital Gains and Estate Tax Rel.ief, and
Tweaks Medicare,

ELDER LAW REP.

3

(Sept. 1997); I.e.

§

56-224.

To

require that ther community spouse's estate be subjected to in
essence 100 percent taxation from the state for the illnei:;s of
the spouse is cc,ntrary to the cherished role of inheritance
elsewhere in Idaho's law:
Older people expect that the money they have saved all their
lives will have value in funding their retirement and in
securing the lives of their children and grandchildren.
People will not save for a lifetime in order to see those
savings go down the drain in a matter of a few months or a
few years, just to save the government some Medicaid dollars. It denies the essence of the middle class view of
American life and the American dream.
Joel C. Debris, .Medicaid Estate Planning by the Elderly: Jl Policy
._._,

View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24
PROB.

& TR.

3.

REAL PROP.,

J. 19-20 (1989).
Implementation of the Court's holding will be di.fficult
at best.

Enforcement of the Court's decision will cause chaos.

The

tracking of assets over decades of time will easily consume the

Department and create it's own inequities with some surviving
spouse estates e:3caping estate recovery with others not.

Track-

ing of surviving spouse situations would be a nightmare.

As an

example assume that the surviving spouse remarries and takes her
husbands name.

Or the surviving spouse moves out of state and

takes these resources with her.

What resources will be used and

how will the State of Idaho track this individual's life and

..,

.
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death?

Then there is the problem of enforcing Idaho's surviving

spouse estate rEicovery rules that most certainly clash with the
estate recovery and probate rules of every other state in the
nation.

Of course, the Department could simply not follow-up on

the full range c,f spousal estate recovery authorized by the
Court, but that would be contrary to the policies that purport to
justify any spousal estate recovery.
Conspicuous consumption and an unforeseen increase in
Medicaid costs could result from the Court's holding.

It is not

too far fetched for the surviving spouse, once realizing that the
assets of the recipient as well as his separate property assets
in existence at his death will pass to the state for repa)nnent of
the recipient's Medicaid costs, to intentionally leave little for
recovery.

There would be little incentive to save or spend these

funds in a reasonable manner.

Realizing that you can spend your

estate but not pass it to your heirs will result in the dEipletion
of savings and in many instances result in earlier eligibility to
Medicaid.

Just how will the Department determine, track, and

recoup the numer,ous gifts and transfers for less than £air market

value remains to be seen.
In estates where a recipient's Medicaid debt exists i.n
conjunction with the surviving spouse's estate and closely
consumes the suriTiving spouse's estate the Department will
increasingly be :required to determine whether or not a Will
exists, file the probate, assume the duties and responsibilities
of personal representative, collect, manage, and close the estate
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 44
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of the survivin9 spouse.

There would be few reasons for a

relative to assume the responsibilities of a personal representative and endure the hassles of probating the surviving spouse's
Will solely for the state's benefit.
In conclusion, the Court erred in holding that under state
law the Department may recover Medicaid payments from the estate
of the recipient's surviving spouse.

The·court's holding con-

flicts with the plain meaning of the statute, is contrary to
legislative intemt, conflicts with the Department's own n~gulations, and will lead to undesirable results.
CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully requests that the majority opinion
be withdrawn and a substitute opinion issued that affirms the
Magistrate's order denying the Department's claim or that a
rehearing be granted upon the relevant questions.
DATED this 20th day of July, 1998.
Wil~r~
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIF~ OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on theo,£2.' ~ay of July, 1998 two truei and

correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed, Postage
prepaid, to the following:
W. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
P.O. Box 83720

Boise, Idaho
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56-218

section are severable. [1941, ch. 181, § 14, p. 379; am. 1943, ch. 119, § 1, p.
228;am.1951,ch.246,§ 4,p.520;am.1974,ch.233,§ 8,p. 1590;am.1978,
ch. 74,§ 1, p. 148;am. 1981,ch. 121, § 1,p. 207;am. 1989,ch. 67, § 2,p.
107; am. 1995, ch. 214, § 4, p. 742; am. 1996, ch. 50, § 8, p. 147.]
Compiler's notes. Sections 1613(c) and
1917(c) and (d) of the Social Security Act,
·referred to in this section, are compiled as 42
U.S.C., § 1382b and 1396p, respectively.

~

id

i

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAW

Section 3 of S.L. 1995, ch. 214 is compiled
as § 15-5-409a.
. Section 7 of S.L. 1996, ch. 50 is compiled as
§ 56-210.

et

56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective until
July 1, 1998.J - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with
federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual ~ho was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual
rec.eived such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if-there be no
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid
paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical
assistance correctly paid to the indiv:idual may be established against the
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U .S.C. 1382c. Transfers
of real or personal property by reciP,ients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district
court.
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child.who is
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently an.d totally
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c, the amount of any medical assistance
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings an~
may be paid from the estate.
·
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the re<:ipient.
·
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent'
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir,. or
assign_ of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.
(6) The department may file a lien against the property of any estate
subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against real
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for whom medical
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56-218

assistance was paid under this chapter, file the lien in the same general form
and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3Xa), Idaho Code, in the office of
the recorder of the county in which the property of the estate is located. The
lien shall be recorded, indexea, and extended in the manner provided in
sections 56-218A(3)(a) and 56-218A(5), Idaho Code. In order to perfect a
security interest in personal property, the department shall, within ninety
(90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the
individual for whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file the·
security interest in accordance with chapter 9, title 28, Idaho Code. Failure
to file a lien or a security interest does not affect the validity of claims made
pursuant to this section.
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers for the following circumstances:
(a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for
other family members; or
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the
deceased individual to public assistance. [LC., § 56-218, as added by
1988,ch.49,§ l,p.73;am. 1994,ch.329,§ 1,p. 1059;am. 1995,ch. 105,
§ 1, p. 336.]

i
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.

Compiler's notes. For this section as ef.
fective July 1, 1998, see the following section
also numbered§ 56-218.

I.

56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective July 1,
1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal
law medical assistance pursuant to. this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate; or if there he no
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid
paid. to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district
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(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is
under twenty-one (21) y~ars of age or is blind or perman~ntly and to~ally
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C-. 1382c, the amount of any medical .assistance
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55f
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and
may be paid from the estate.
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(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient.
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
-· individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent
of such interest), including suc:h assets conveyed to survivor, hei:r, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a
debt with'preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.·
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property of any
estate. subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against
real or personal property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days
after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for
whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file a notice of lien in
the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3) (a),
Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section
45-1904, Idaho Code. Failure to file a notice of lien does not affec;t the
,..., validity of claims made pursuant to this section.
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers for the following circumstances:
(a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for
other family members; or
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the

a

deceased individual to public assistance. [J.C., § 56-218, as added by.
1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch. 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch. 105,"
§ 1, p. 336; am. 1997, ch. 205, § 2, p. 607.]
Compiler's notes. For this section as effective until July 1, 1998, see the preceding
section also numbered § 56-218.
Section 10 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 read: •Notwithstanding the effective dates specified in
section 1 through 9 of this act, nothing in f;his
act shall take effect unless the secretary of
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Comr.russion that he has received a sufficient appropriation to provide for the development of the
technology required to implement the pr1Jvi-

sions of this act. If the certification is not
made by the twenty-first day after the adjourrunent sine die of the First Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, this
act shall be null and void."
The Secretary ·of State has so certified to
the Idaho Code Commission and thus the
Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed
herein.
·
·
Section 1 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 is compiled
as§§ 45-1901 through 45-1910.

56-218A. Medical assistanc,e liens during life of recipient. [Effective until July· 1, 1998.] - (1), The department may recover and may
impose a lien aga,inst the real property of any individual prior to his death
for medical assistance· paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf
of an individual:

'-.
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03.09022 -- 03.09024
.,

(RESERVED) ,

03.09025. LIE~S AND ESTATE RECOVERY. Pursuartt to Sections 56-218
and 56-218A 1 Idaho Code; this subsecd.on sets forth the
provisions for recovery of MAt the filing of liens
against the property of dece<ised persons t and thei filing
of tiems against the property of
permanently
institutionalized recipients.
(7-1-9S)T
01.

MA Incorrectly Paid. The Department may, pursuant
to a judgment of a court1 file a lien against the
property of a living or deceased person of any age
to recover the costs of MA incorrectly paid.
(7-1-95)T

02.

Administrative
Appeals~
Permanent
institutionalization
determination
and
undue
hardship waiver hearings shall be ~overned by the
fair hearing provisioris of IDAPA 16 t Tit:le 05,
Chapter 03,
"Rules Governing Contested Case
Proceedings and Declaratory Rulings".
(7-1-95)T

'
03.

Definitions. The following. terms are .applicable to
Subsection 025 of these rules:
· ·
(7-1-95)T
a.

Authorized
representative.
The
person
appointed by · the court as the personal
representative in a probate proceeding or, if
none; the person identified by the recipient
to receive notice and make decisions on estate
matters.
(7-1-95)T

b.

Equity interest in a home.
Any equity
interest in real property recognized under
Idaho law.
(7-l.-95)T

c.

Estate.
All real and personal property and
other assets indluding those in which the
recipient had any legal or beneficial title or
interest at the time of deatht to the extent
of such ihterest,
including Stich A1SSets
conveyed to.a survivor; heir, or assi9nee of
the deceased recipient through joint bmancy,
tenancy in common 1 survivorship; iife E~state,
living trust, or other arrangement.
(7··1-95) T

d.

Home. The dwelling in which the recipi1~nt has
an ownership interest, and which the recipient
occupied as his primary dwelling prior to, or
subsequent to• his admission to a medical
institution.
(7--1-9S)T

e.

Institutionalized recipient. An inpatient in a
nursing facility (NF). intermediate care
facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR),
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or other thedical .institution, who is a
Medicaid :tec:l.pisht sUbject to post-eligibility
treatment of ittc!oine in IDAPA16. 03. os; Rules
Governing Eilgib:l.1:1.ty for Aid to the Aged;
Blind ahd Disabied (AABD) •
(~7-i-95) T

~

.I .

f.

Lawfully residing; . Residing in a manrb-r not
contrary to or forbidden by iawt and with the
recipieht;s knowledge and consent.
(7-l-95)T

g.

Permanehtiy
:l.rtstitution~lized.
An
institutionaiized recipient of any age who the
Department has determined cannot reasot1ably be
expected to be discharged from the institution
and return home,
(7-1-95)T

h.

Personal property;
Any property not real
propertyt including cash, jewelry, household
goods, tools; life insurance policies, boats
and wheeled vehicles.
(7-l-95)T

L

Real property. Any land, including buildings
or immovable objects attached permanently to
the land.
(7-l-95)T

j.

Residing in the home on a continuous basis.
Occupying the home as the primary dwelling and
continuing to occupy stich dwelling as the
primary residence.
(7-l-95)T

k.

Termination of a lien.
The rele,ase
dissolution of a lien from property.

or

{7-1-95)T

1.

t.Jndue

hardship.

waiver of all or a

Conditions

that

:justify

part of the Department's

claint against
art estate,
described
in
subsections 025.25 throtigh 025. 29 of these
rules.
(7··1-95)T
m.

Undue hardship waiver. A decision made by the
Department to relinquish or limit its claim to
any or all estate assets of a deceased
recipieht based on good cause.
(7-l-95)T

04.

Notification to Department.
All notif:i.cation
reg-arding liens and estate claims shall be directed
to the Department of Health artd Welfare; Estate
Recovery Unit, Towers Buildingt Sixth Floor; P.O,
Box 83720i 450 W, State St. Boise#
Idaho,
83720-0036.
(1-J-95)T

OS.

Lien Imposed During Lifetime of Recipient, During
the lifetime of the permanently institutionalized
recipient I and subject to the restrictions set
forth in Subsection 025. 08 of . these rules, the
Department may impose a lien against the real
r
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property ol: the rec:l.p:l.eht .for.MA cbrtectly paid on
his behalf: The lien ~hail be filed Within ninety
(90) days of the Departinent 1 s final determination,
~ft~t notice artd bppbtttih!ty· !of· i hearing, that
the recipient is pe:tmanehtly lhstittitionali~:ed. The
lien shall be effective ftoftt _the.·b~gihning of the
most recent contintiotis period. oi the recipient's
institutionalization; but hot:. before July 1. t 1995.
Any
lien
imposed ~hail
tHssoive
Upot! the
recipientis discharge from the medical institution
and return home~
(7-1-95)T
06.

07.

Determination of Permanent Institutionalization.
The Department must determine that the recipient is
permanently ihstitutionalized prior to the lien
being imposed. An expectation or plan that the
recipient will return home with the suppott of Home
and Community Based Services .shal~ -not, in and of
itselft justify a decision that he is reasonably
expected to be discharged to return horne. The
following factors shall be cortsidered when making
the determination of permanent institutionalization~
(7-1-95)T
a.

The recipient must meet the criteria
!CF/MR level of care and services as
in Subsection~ 180,03 and 160i08
rules; and

fc,r NF or
set forth
of these
(7-1-95)T

b.

The medical records, including information set
forth in Subsections 180,02 and 180.01 of
these rules; shall be reviewed to determine if
the recipient's condition is e~pected to
improve to the extent that he Will not :require
NF or ICF/MR level of care: and
(7-1-95)T

c.

Where the prognosis indicated ih the medical
records is Uncertain or incondltisive, the
Department may request additional medical
informatiott, or may delay t:he determ:ination
until the next titilization control review or
annual
Inspection
of
care
review 1 as
appropriate.
(7·-1-95) T

HQJ:ice
of
Determination
of
Pe:r·manent
Im~titutionalization and Hearing Rights.
The
Department must notify the recipient c,r his
authorized represent~tiv~, in writing1 of its
intention to make a det~rmination that the
recipient. :i.s permanently institutionalized, and
that he has the right to · a fair hear:lng in
accordance with subsection 025:02 of these rul~s.
This
notice
shall
include
the
foJ®.owing
information!
(7··1-95)T
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The notice shall ihfo:rmthij recipient that the
De~atttnentts
deci~ioh
that
he
cannot
reasortab1y be expected td be discharged from
the medical inst:U:titibrt to return home is
based upon a review of the medical records.and
plart of ea.re; but that this does not preclude
him
from returriihg home kith e1ervices
necessary to support NF or ICF /MR l,evel of
care; and
(7-l-95)T

b.

The notice shall inform the recipient that he
or his authorized representative may request a
fair hearing prior to the D~partmentts final
dete±:m.ination
that
he · is . permanently
institutionalized, The hot ice shall include·
information that a pre-hear!~g conference may
be scheduled prior to a fair hearing~- The
notice shall inciude the ti-me limit's and
instructions for requestihg a fair hearing;
and
(7-1-95)T

c.

The notice shall inform the recipient that if
he or his authorized tepresehtative does not
request a fair hearing within the time limits
specified; his real property I ihcludi.ng his
home, may be subject to a lien, cont:ingent
upon the restrictions in Subsection 02S.08 of
these rules.
(7-1-95)T

.

08.

'i6, 03. 09025, 07. a.

a.

J!IIM,.

'·

rbA.1.

Restrictions on Imposing Lien During Lifetime of
ReC!ipient.
A
lien may be imposed on the
recipient's real property; however, no liert may be
imposed on the recipient's home if any of the
following is lawfully residing in such home!
(7-l-95)T

a;

The spouse of the recipient;

b.

The recipient's chi1d who is under age
twenty-one (21), or who is blind or disabled
as defined in 42 U,s.c. 1382c as amended; or

(7-1-95)T

(7-1-95)T

c.

09.

A sibling of the recipient who has an equity
interest ih the recipient's home and who was
residing in such home for a period of at least
one (l) year immediately before the date of
the recipient; s admission to the m,edical
institution, and Who has beeri residing .in the
home on a ccntihtious basis.
(7-:t-95)T

Rest:rictions on Recovery on Lien tmposed puring
LifE~time of Recipient. Recov-ery shall be made on
the lien from the recipient's estate, or a:t any
time~ upon the sale of the property subject t:o the
lierit but only after the death oft.he recipient's
000364
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surviving spouse,
whent

... ·

:l.f any;

.:i?A 16. o:L 0902s. 09

and only at_ a

time

(1-1-95)T

a~

The recipient has ho · sUr\ti ving dhild who is
tinder age tWetity~one (21);
(1-1-95) T

b.

The :tecip:i.et1c has no Slirvi ving child of any

age who is blind or disabled as defined in 42
1382c as amended: and
(7-l-95)T

u.s.c.
c.

In the case ot i lien on a re~ipiertt 1 s home,
when norte of the foliowing is lawfully
residing in such home who has lawfully :resided
in the home bi:1 a continuous basis sihce the
date of the recipient's admission to the
medical institution!
· (7-l-95)T
i,

A sibH.ng of the recipient; who was
residing in the recipient's home for a
period of at least one
(1)
year
immediately before the date of the
recipient~ e acindssioh to the me.di cal
inetitutiont or
(7-t-9S)T

i:I..

son or daughter of the recipient; \tlho
was residing_ irt the recipient's he>me for
a period of at least two (2) years
immediately before the date of . the
recipientis admission to the medical
institution; and who establishes: by a
preponderance of the e-v-idence that he
provided necessary care .to the recj.piertt,
and the care he provided allow~:!d the
recipient to remain at home rather than
in a medical institution.
A

(7-1-95}T

10.

Recovery Upon Sale of Property Subject t() Lien
Imposed During Lifetime of Recipient, Should the
property upon which a lien is imposed be sold prior
to ·t:he ·recipient.' s death1 the Department shall seek
recovery of all MA paid on behalf of the recipient,
subject to the restrictions in Subsection 025.09 of
these rules. Recovery of the MA paid bn behalf of
the recipient from t&e proceeds from the s,ale of
the property does not preclude the Department from
recovering additiortai MA paid from the recipient's
est~te as described in Subsedtion 025.14 of these
rul,::is.
(7-l-95)T

11.

Filing of Lien During Lifetime of Recipient. When
appropriate; the Department shall file, in the
off :lee of the Recorder of the county in which the
real property of the recipient is locat,ed, a
verified statement, irt ~riting, setting forth the
following:
(7-:L-95)T
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a.

'i'he ·. ham~ and
recip.lerttJ etnd

bi

The

1ast

know11

address

iiatne atici address of the official or agent
of the Oepa:ttment fiiirig the lien; and
'

c.

A brief description of the MA received by the

ci.

The amount paid by the Department, as of a,
given _dal::ei abdi if. applicable, a st:atement
that the atno~nt bf the lien ~ill inc~ease as
long aEi MA benefits are paid ort behalf of the
recipient::,
(7-1-95) T

recipierlt# and

13.

Termination of Lien Imposed During Lifetime of
Recipient. The lien shall be released as provided
by
Idaho
Code>
Upon
eatisfadtion of the
Departmertt;s ~laim. The lien shall dissolve in the
event of the recipientis discharge from the medical
institution a11d return home. Such dissolution of
the lien does not discharge th~ Underlying debt and
the estate remains subject to recovery under estate
recovery provisions in subsections 025 .14 l:hrough
025.30 of these rulesi A request for release of the
lien shall be directed to the Department of Health
and Welfare; ~state Recovery Unit, trowers 9u.:Llding,
Sixth Floor, P.O. BoJt 83720, 450 Wl State St.,
Boise, Idaho, 83720-0036.
(7-,1-95} T

14.

Estate Recovery.
Pursuant to Sect!orts 56-218 and
56-218A; Idaho code, the Department is requ1.red to
recover the following!
(7-1-95)T
a.

The costs of all MA correctiy paid on or after
July 1, 1995, on behalf of a recipient who was

permanentiy instituti~naiized; and

_,

(7-1-95)T

Renewal of Lien !mposed DUrina Lifetime of
RecipienL
The Iieni or any ext¥nsion thereof,
shall be ren~wed every five (5), years by filing a
new verified sbil:.emetlt as required in subs.ection
025 .11 of these rules,· or as required byC. Idaho
law.
(7-1-95)T

\.__.

_

(7-l-95)T

12~

.,.,.

.

of the
('7-l-95)T

(7-1-95)T

b.

The costs of MA correctiy paid on behalf of a
recipient who received MA at age fift·y-five
(55) or older on or after Jtily 1, 1994t and
(7-l-9S)T

c.

The costs of MA correctly paid on behaif of a
recipient \tlho received MA at age. sixty·-five
(65) or older on or after July 1j 1988.
(7-:L-95)T
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RE?covery f:totrt !set.ate of Spouse.
If the deceased
rE!Cipient ha~ ho·. e~tate, recovery shall be made
from the ~state ot hi~ eur~!ving spdUSel (7-l-95)T

16 .. Liett Imposed Against Estate of beceaEied Recipient.
The Department . may impose a lien , agaittst all
p1:·operty of the estate of ah applicable rt:cipient

to _secure its ciaim against the estate. To perfect
a lien the Department shal1 1 within ninety (90)
days after the Departmertt is notified1 in writing1
of the death bf the MA recipient~ file a lien in
the same gene:tai f orril and manrter as prov.ided in
Subsection 025.11 of these rules, Failure to file a
liert does not affect the va1id!ty of claims made
against the estate, A request for reie~se of the
lien shall be directed to the Department of Health
and Welfare, Estate Recovery Unit; Towers Building,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 83720, 450 W. State St.,
Bo.iee 1 Idaho 1 S3720-0036,
(7-l-9S)T
17.;

Nod. ce of Estate Cla.iirL
The bepattment o- shall
notify the authorized representative of the amount
of the estate dlaim after th~ death of the
recipient, or after the death of the surviving
spm1se. , The notice shall include instructions for
applying for an undue hardship waiver.
(7--1-95)T

18.

Aseiets in Estate Subject to cla.i.ms. The authorized
representative
shall
be
hotified
of
the
Department;s claim against the assets of a deceased
:tec.:l..pient. Assets in the estate from which the
claim can be satisfied sha11 include all real or
personal property that the deceased recipient:, owned
or in which he had an ownership interest~ including
the following:
(7-1-95)T
a.

b.

Payments to the recipient under art installment
conttact ~hall be included amohg the assets of
the deceased recipient, This includes , an
installmeht contract on any real or personal
property to which the deceased recipient had a
property right~ The value of a promissory
note; loan or property agreement ts its
outstanding principai balance at t.he da.te of
death of the recipient i When a promissory
note, loan, or property agreement is St!cUred
by a Deed of Trust, the Department may ri!quest
evidence of a reasonabie and just Underlying
debt;
(7-l-9S)T
The deceased recipient> s ownership intert:!!St in
an estate; . probated Qr not probated, is an
asset of his estate wheii!
(7-t-95)T

.

,.-
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,. ,')

· bocumertt:s · show the deceased recipient is
~iig!bie devise~ br doriei·dt'ptbperty
of afiothef deceased person/ ·..br,· (1-1~95) T

-rt

'

ii~

'

.

,'

The · decet:tsed red.pieht: redei -Ved income
from property of another person; .or
(7-"l-95)T

iii.

State intestacy laws award the deceased
recipient a share irl the di~ttibution of
the property of another estate •.
(7-1-"95)T

c.

J\hy trtlst iJ.1s.trume~t which is designed to hold

d.

Life insurance is considered
has reverted to the estatei

e.

Buriai insurance is considered an asset when a
furteral home i~ t:.he primary beneficlary or
when there are tinspent . ftinds in the burial
contract. The furtds remaining after payment to
the ftineral home shall be considered assets of
the estate; provided no contingent bene:Eiciary
is designated.
· (7-4-95) T

f.

Checking and savings accounts which hold and
accumulate funds designated for the deceased
recipient; are assets of the estate, including
joint accounts whicihacctimulate funds 1:or the
benefit of the recipient1
(7-i-9S)T

g.

or td distribute funds or property, real or
personal1 ih which the deceased recipient has
a beneficial interest is arl asset of the
estate.
~
(7-l-9S)T

In . a

art

conservatorship s:U:uation,

asset when it
{7-l-95)T

if

a

court

brder under state laW specificaily reiqUires
funds be made av-aiiabie for the ca:re and
maintenance of a recipient prior to his death;

absent evidence to the contrary; Stich funds
are an asset of the deceased recipient's
estatei even if a court has to approve release
of the funds.
(7-l-95)T

h.

19.

Shares of stocks• bonds and mtitual funds to
the benefit of the deceased recipient are
assets of the estate. The current market. value
of all stocks; b6rlds and muttial furtds lnust be
proved as of .the month preceding settlement of
the estate cl~im1
(1-1-95)T

Value of Estate Assets1 The Department shall use
fair market value as the value of the estate
assets.
{7-l-9S)T
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20.

LimH:atiorts - on - E!:itate claltns i - '· Limits on the
Department's elaitrl against the ass~ts bf a deceased
r1:!cipient sha.11 be subje_ct to Sections 56-218 and
56-218A 1 Idahd Cdd~, A dlaim i1diri~t ~he ~state of
a surviving spouse of a predeceased recipient is
limited to the vaiue bf th~ asset§ bf the estate
that were commuhity property. · or the deceased
rE!cipient I s share of the separate property, and
jointly owned property. Recd-V-ery shall not be made
until the deceased recipient ho longer is survived
bi a spousei a child who is tinder age twenty-one
(21)1 or a blind or disabl~d chiidt as defined in
42 U.S;C, 1382d a~ am~rtded attdj When appiicable; as
provided in Stibseetion 025. 09 of· these rules. No
recovery shall be made if the recipi~ttt received MA
a~1 the result of a crime comtrtitted agaihst the
redipient,
(7-1•9S)T

2i.

Expenses DedUdted from Estate1
The following
expenses shall be deducted from the available
assets to determine the amount &vaiiable to satisfy
(7.:.l-95)T
the Department's claim:

I

"-_:--,,i

""

a.

Burial expenses; which shall i.nclt.tde only
those reasonably nece~sary for embalming,
transportation
of
the _body,
cremation,
flower~, clothing; and services of the funeral
director and staff shall be deducted,
(7-1-95)T

b.

other legally enforceable ahd necessary debts
with
priority
shail
be __ deducted.
The
Department's claim is classified and paid as a
debt with preference as defined in Section
15-03-805i Idaho Code, Oebts of the deceased
recipient which may be deducted from the
estate
prior
to
satisfaction
of
the
Departmentts claim must be legally enforceable
debts given preference over the bepartc,lent;s
dlaim bnder Section 15-03-805 1 Idaho Code.
(7-1-95)T

22.

Interest bn Claim. Tb$ Departmentts claim does not
bear interest except as otherwise provided by
statute or agreement,
(7-i-95)T

23.

Excluded Land. Restricted a11otted land; owned by
a deceased recipient who was an enrolled member of
a federally recognized American Indian tribei or
eligible for tribai tnetnbership, which cannot be
soid or transferred without permission from the
Indian tribe or an agency of the Federal
Governmenti
will riot be subject to estate
recovery.
(7-1-95)T
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24;

Marriage ·.. s~tt:.1emsnt .. Act:teemiertt · · or other such
Agreement, ;··'·.·A ·trtarriage settlement· ·agreement or
ot:he:t such agreement: Which eeparattH:I assets for a
lnctrried cotitslE! does not elimirtat:e the debt against
the estat:~ bf the deceased recip_ieH-1t '·or t.he spouse.
TrahsferEt UrtdM: a tttar:tiage s~f:tletrleht: • agreen,:ent or
ot;her sudh t!gr~emEH1t · tnay be · voided if nlSt £ or
adequate coi-isiderat:iorL
·
(7-l-95)T

2s.

Re!1ease of Estate Claims.
The Oe!partment shall
reilease a dla.im when the bepartmertt' s claim has
been fully M~tisfi~d and . may release its ciaim .
under the following conditions:
·
(7-1-95)T

,. J
i. :. ,

a;

When an undue hardship waivet as defined in
Subsection 025. 26 of these ±'tiles has been
granted; or
(7-1-95)T

b.

When a written agreement with the authorized
representative to pay the Department t ;B claim
in thirty-six (36l monthly pctyntents or less
has been achieved1
.
(1-1-95)T

26.

Purpose of the Undue Hardship Exception. The undue
ha:rdship . exception is intended to avo:i.ci the
impoverishment of the deceased recipient•s family
due to the Department exercisihg its estate
recovery right. The faet that family lnembers
ant::icipate or expect art inheritance, or will be
inc:ionvenienced. ecortomicaily by the · lack of an
inheritancef is rtot cause for the Department to
dec,la.te an Undue hardship.
(7··1-95)T

27,

A.Qplication for Undue Hardship Waiver.
An
applicar1t for art Undue hardship waiver must have a
beneficial. interest irt the estate and muat apply

fo:t the waiver Withih hlhety (90) days bf thE:! death
of the recipient or Withit1 thirty (30) days of
receivihg rtotice of th~ Dep4rt~~rtt•~ claim,
whichever is later. The filihg of a elaim by the
Dep~rtment itt a probate proceeding shall constitute
notice to all heir~.
(7-1-95)T
2iL

Basis for Undue Hardship Waiver. . tJndue ha.rdship
waivers shall be cortsidered in the following
(7-l-95)T
circumstances!
a.

The estate subject to recovery :i.s th«~ sole
income-prodticihg asset of the survivors where
such income is limited/ or
(7-J~9S)T

b.

Payment of the Depar~mertt•s clai~ would· cause
heirs of the deceased recipient to be eligible
for public assist-ticeJ or
(7~1-95)T
000370
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The. bepart:ment. 1 s diaitif ls ie~s . than five
hundred doilar~ ($500} or·the total assets of
the entire estate are less thah five hundred
dollars {$~00); exo1tidirtg·ttust. accounts or
·other bartk accouhts1
·
(7-1-9S}T

d;

The recipient received MA as the reslilt of a
crime committed against the ±"ecipient.
.

29,

.

(7~,::J.-95)T

Litn:U:ations orl bnciue Hardsh:tp . Waiver.
Any
beheficiaty of the estate of a·deceased recipient
may appiy for waiver of the estat~·recoite±y claim
based on tindue hardship,. Arty claiin t11ay be waived by
the Department i partially or . fUlly, because of
undue hardship. An undue hardshiti does hot exist if
actiort taken by the recipient prior to his "death,
or by his legal representativer. divested or
1

diverted assets from the esb:ttE!, The Department
shall graht undue hardship waivers on a case by
case
bai::lis
tipon
review of all facts and
circumstances, includihg any action ta.ken to
dim.inish assets ava.ilable for estate recovery or to

circumvent estate recovery.

,.,

30.
..

(7-1--'95)T

Set Aside of Transfers.
Transfers of real or
personal property of the recipient without a.dequate

consideration are voidable and may be set a.side by
the district court.
(7-l-95)T
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chapt.er) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect-to Stat.es
2 which are not eligible to participate in such program) fs blln~ or disabled as defined
): ,in section 1382c oft!»,i title, or .:. :~,i:,: ,::;• · :· ,,. 1,;
y ..· ( C) a sibling of such individual (who has an equity interest in such home and who
X/ was residing in such individual's. home for a period of at least one year immedia~y
before. theda.te or ~e in~'1~ual's ~sion;~
i ., , .
lawfully residing fn such home.
·
· ::...., ,. . ,..:
~ (3) Any lien imposed .with respect to an individual pursuant to paragraph (l)(B) shall
,ldissolve upon that individual's dlscharge from the medical ins1itution and return home.

_;f;'.;;:; :<:;;;·,,·::.;; ·., .,~ ·' .. :. :

JiJ,,.

,~,~~~,ins,ti.~~~~~· .,-' .

)J~
J ~~;·

~. . . . . . ..,.....

2) No lien may be imposed under paragraph U)(B) .on such individual's .home if- .

•

i.,.., '. ,.: .... , ., . , .

<-_; . ;.:,.

,·J

"'I·~·:··.~,,~:·:·,

./.'

.

,.

k.,{b)
AdjU&tinent
or •recovery
of medical
assistance·
correctly
paid
under a State plan
•., .. ~· • ,.. •
•
•
•
,. •
J •• : .
-. :\ •••• :.-..:., L,.,
;
:
'l'I

~-J (1) No adjuatment or

recovery or any medlt:.a.l assistance correctly paid on

~an- individual ·under the State plan may

behalf of

be rnade,· except·tbat. the State shall seek
fac!justment· or recovery of any medical. assistance eo?Ted;]y. paid on behalf' of an
~'.; individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:
R

:'.:257

000373

•·

.··.:·_':<,'

,,,...,

?42'.,.§ 1396p
(A) In the ease of an individnardescribed in aubsel!tfon (a)(l)(B) of this section,/
•. ,,.the State shall seek adjustment or reroveryfrom the individual's estate orupon sale .
., :_::: c,f the property subject t.o a ·uen imposed on account 1>f medical assistance paid.Con}
· ::,::;.icbe~,ofthe
,i;:.i:'.
•• :, ...-:, ,1. (B) In the case .of an individual who was 65 years oC.._age_ -0r !)lder. when ~e :
,:·,:-:.•individual received such medical assistance, the State-shall seek adjustment;;,.or:;;
·': '· --~:recovefy from the individual's estat.e, but Ollly for medical ·aseistance consisting',qf-:\
''. : ·, .·
'(I) -n~g facility
home and co~unity-b~ servi~;and rela'iea'''
hospital and prescription drug services or
:.. · ": ··. -:o·.. ::. ,. :' " ,.• ,. • .• ··., a ? ;'

indivi~~; -:, ··:·· .•·; )<-.- ;·

::,.·:\\,;:\\,:,·:'.:,'.a~-,'. :·:::;f

~cea.

., ..._,,,_

ariy ~ or_s~~under)Jte·~-~te !>1§~~<

·
. (ii) ~-t ~e '>ption of'the State,
, ( C)(i) In the
of
Individual

case an

who has :received (or la entitledc to receive) ,
. benefits under a long-tenn care insurance policy in connection with which aaset.s· or
-resources are disregarded in the manner described in dause (il),·except as provided ·
in such clause, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the indivi~~ ..
.. estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual for D1J!'31:11g
• facility and other Jong-term care services. ·.: . ., , .; ... : ..,:: . "" !'. ,;
·· (ii) Clause (i) ahaJl not apply in the case of an individual who received medical :.
assistance Ullder a State plan of a State which had a State plan amendment .
approved WI of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or_

·':?,:.~.:".' .

reeouree.s-,.;
~
~
~
:rr:::-,ii:~ .. ,t ·,..i. ·.~ •• ..;:·-'~ :~..:_ } _/·::,1
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a long-term care insurance
·policy;or ,. . ·:~,,,-,, ·· . . • ,, .. <·-;,>:::~i,,: .,,-~_,··;·h.;,;;J,;.(
(II) because an indiridual ~ received· (or is ,mtitled !il' receive) benefits
under a long-term care insurance policy.. ..:. ·..;
: -~· ,:-: . • . :: if-/
'(2)-Any' adj~tcie~t'or reco\i~r:/und~ paragraph (1) may be'made only ~_-f.be."'
death of the individual's surviving spouse, iC any, and only at a time' ·s.X!:t•.;,
··· ,·''<A> ·when he~, n~,:~viiig cliild who is\mder. :ige 2i.'};r _(wit!i'respect ~:
St.ates eligible to participate in the. State program ·established under subchapte(.
XVI of this chapt.er) is blind cir permanently and t:Dtally disabled, or (with respect to}
States which are not eligible ·to partfcipat.e in euch program) is blind or disabled as
_ . detinedin-sectfon1382cofthistitle; and·_,,£,t ··,-:- . ,~:, > .. ::.·;-xi ,l,,r.,;r;·,
--~- '..'.\·1 (B) in the
lien an individual's honie imde:rsubsectiori (a)(l)(B) of this'
· .~i~--seetion,when- ,.-.1,•·H:.:.. d·.;:~u1;.;~ ·~ _.,;.i •.;(··-,-.:.:~·~ .• , :~:·~~:rl ~ _:·:·:._<:
--·+~i~
, .. , . . . " (i) no sibling of the ~dividual (who was residing in the individual's home foi: ..
I~

.,~.,

•

,.,.

case of'a

-

···::

·:::-,:.

-.

"':

:·.:'''::

"-~

. : ; •.

,;,)lf

on

-~~~~r!:-~,~-~

a period of at least one year immediately bef'ore the date- of ·the individual's
· admission t.o the medical institution), and · ,... - · " ,.:. :. --- ,._ ~,,
.•: , '!\
~
~
~J
(ii) no son or daught.er of the individual (who ·waa residing in the individual's i
home for a period of at least two years)nµnedi,at.ely before ~~·da~, of'.th.f
individual's admission. t.o the medical institution,· and who establishes to the,
-- ;. ·.· satisfact:ion ·of the State that he or she provided care to such individual ;yhich/·
permitted such individual to reside at. homEI rather than ,_in:,.~ instituti~} '. ,,,;· .is lawfully residing in such _home .w:ho has lawfully r,isiged in ,such: ~ome on,)
-.,:~ :. ~ontinu?us·, basis since: the .:da~ ;,C!,f .~~~.inc;im.dµal's ~~, ¥> . the :!Dedi~t
.:.,, ·mstitu.tiOn. ·... ,•;., ·:.:. .;L, ::.. ~:L ·-f~;::;.:,q ~)~w.-;r-:=l.."':-:·.1ur~.-, ... ·: ··:1 !:;rt!~t! ;.;_,_:_.,.__ ..,,,.:-.;:..:---:...: .. :... :f~1i
. , '·'ca) The State ~cy sh~ establish·
{in accordance with standard.a s~':
fted by the Secretary) wider which the agency shall-waive the applieation~of.~.
·aubsection (other than paragraph (l)(C)),ff such application would work.ali ..~~118..-;, hardship as determined on the basis of eriteria established by the Secretaey. ·, :,., :,, " itt~

·

· · ·."

,

• '• :!1-

"'

·:-

,

. · : ·. . . . .

•

;

l

-~··

\1••••'1

·.•. :

.,,

·······:

......

'· ·:-~~"

proceduriis

(4) For

,.,

purpooe1;-'i thls:·;~1,s~on','·ij;~- t.erm· ~te", -~th: respect tci··fdec~:
11

~\:f._

.. indfv:iduaJ-- .
_ .
. . ,.,~-re,.; i:.~.:-' 1 r.•.! :J:;.,:l!!:,i'l ,:iC.,THilJ_
.: ';'.:·'.!·,(A) shilllinclude all rea1·anc:t ·pei-sona1 property and other-assets included:witJiitl.
·.,:~·,r: the Individual's estat.e, as defined for-purposes of State probate law; and· ~--:')l!.ru~Jtk
. , . (B) may in"'ude, at. ~ (?p1;i~~ of ~ St.ate (and &ti~- jnclude, in ~e ~ ~Ill:'!•'.
' lndMdual · to whom ·paragraph '(1XCXO' ·applie.s), iIJ.y other· real' ·lind perao11111 ·,
· ; property and other assets in which the individual had-any legal .title- or interest .lit.;,
, ''the time of death (to.the extent of sueh.,intaest), including·such-aasets,conv~,,.
:, a survivor, heir, or assign or the deceased indMdual through joint t.eDaney.
,·
In common, survivorship, life est.ate,' living trust. or otller: arrangement.::!.!l:;;i:·.-,i ·.

;7258
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' · (e) Taking.Into account certain trans.fen.of asseta.,~i!,,.::j ,rr,., .;.,,::-

;ir<;

·,., ;', ..

' '<IXAnn''ordei to l?Jeet the requlrementa of t.bis"Biibilecl!on;toi"pu:rposes' of section

1396a(a)(18J of this titJe, the State plan must provide that lf an inatitutionaliud
/•individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, _at ~e .option of a State, a noniruldtut!onalized individual or the spouse of such an indMdual) disposes of asset.a for leM than
fair market value on or after the look-back date specified in aubparagraph (13)(i), the
, individual :Is ineligible for medical 8!18iatance for services deac:r:ibed in subparagraph
(C)(i) (or, in the caae of a noninstitutionalized individaal. for the services desaibed in
subparagraph {C}(ii)) during the period beginning on the date specified in subparagraph
(D) and equal to the number of months specified in subparagraph (E). , . ·
.
\ (B}(f) The look-back date specifled in ;this '.subparagraph fa a <hlte that ls" 86 months
.(or, In the case of payment.s from a trust or portions of a trust tliat are b'eated as assets
'disposed of by the individual pursuant to paragraph (3)(A)(ili)'or (8)(B)(fi) ofsubsection
(d) of this section, 60 months) before the date speclaed In 'clause (li). ;.. ;,. :. : .:,,
'cu)._Th_ edatespeclfi,.edlnthlacla~ ~th·..::.s·····.;.·;:ft·~:,:i_\•'\'_';,:_· .. ~, ,;:._,, .
.,..,_,pe~l,i, ~ ·:~ .'i°,.,,,;1•;<.~ ..
:1_-sr
:· (I) an institutionalized Individual isJbe i5rst date as of which-the individual both
Is an institutionalized individual and has applied far medical assietance under the
.State plan, or . .. ... _.". ,,·r:""'··,. -:
·;, ; . .,.... ,. ; .,.. .,, ,. ,, ., , ....
·
,

.

· ...•

,,

"&•. ,,

·I•

-

.. (II) a noninstitutionallzed individual is the date on:_which the individual applies
for medical sssistance IDlder the State .plan· or, ·if later, the date on which the
individual dlspol!l!ll of assets for lesa thatif*.market !al_uei,;; _1,, •• . " ,
(C)(l) The semcea described ln thfs !lllbparagraph with respect to an insdtutionaliz.ed
W &re the foJlowfng:
:, •.'. •;.•; . ; .. ";;;;:;;c",I:.! <, ,. '"
i '1 -'tD Nursing f'ac:illty services.
--·-· :.: !i ; , ..
-; (11) A level of care In any" Institution eqwvalen.t t.o that of ll11l'Sing facility

r

services.

:r.:..r.,~,:.:.

; ..•. ,:·~·-,:~:·,l:. --~·; ~:\ .,;;;<:J-:'

or commmiity-based &el"lices i'unmhed 1111dera waiver granted under
subsection (c) or (d) ofsection 1396n of this title• ._;:.,,,; A:,i ,.:, •j .• ; .·c
(U) The services descnl>ed in this subparagraph-with respect
noninstitutionall?.ed
individual are services (not including any services described in clause (i)) that are
'eaaibed ln paragraph (7), (22), or (Z4) of section 1396d(a) of this title, and, at the option
~ & St.ate, other long-term care services for which medical- assistance is otherwise
..11ailable UJ1der the State plan to individuals requiring long~lar!Jl- care. \,., . : ,, ;
. <D> The 'date speclfled ln tbla eubparagrapn ls the' fim day of.the f1rst month during
'aft.er which assets have been transferred for less,than fair market value and which
1ea not occur In any other periods of ineligibiµty under- tbill subsection. H::ii.. 1; :-·:i
(E)(I) Wlth•·respect to
institutionalized ind!vidual/thet·:numl:ier·:of rno11ths of
neligibillty under this subparagraph ror an Individual shall be:.equal ~ '· :. · ·. · ·
'
(J) the to~,' cumulative
valde o't all ll!lsets tranaferred by the
. individual (or individual's spoUlle) on <1r after the· look-back·. dat.e specified In
'·_'aubparagraph@({j)• divided by·: . ·. ·_· ...'.3.:._ ';' ·1?":··:"'.,.-:, .:·_"'•-:,: ;,··.·· •: . ·, ·
,. ''(llFthe iverage monthly'eoaflio a private patient of mirsfngfacJllty senlces in
·the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community in which t!ie indivi~ual Is
institutionalized) at the tbne of application.
· ·"'": ·· ·
1.,
'"
'
•
•
(11) With respect
a iloninstltutionalf fildhifdual,· the number of months of
iellglbllity under' this subparagrapb_t'or. a1i' indMdual aball not be
than':a
"-·: (Ill) Home

to·a

'an

uncompensated

1, •

to

grster

1~-~1~~ ~;~:~1~~~~~~--;~~-:-~·lii ~'.~~1~;~c/~·:~.

' individual (or Individual's 'spouse) on· or after the _lciok-baek date·~~peeified In
. l!'Jbparagraph (B)(l), divlded by
. '
' .
,L/:CB) tbe'avet'liie morithly:coit to a private patient of liuiiring facility'aemees in
: the St:at.e (or, the option olthe· St.at.e. In the community in'vmfch the indlvidual fa
!

at

1inst:ltutionalh:ed)attbetfmeofapplieatlon;

": . , .

• .• , .. : • . •• ;#

' ,; '

·: .

.

••

••••:--·::

•

· - t·•' ... ,. · ,.. ,;,,::,•,\ ·,· · · ·:·.···:. ···

'. ·~ ":

' •.

•. i

"I •• :

~·L 'l-·:

',i

i. I

.,',

•

~

• I

UH) """e number of months of Ineligibility otherwise determm~ under _cla1a. (1"') .or

r~to::,::!s:r:::::ti;~~::~:fi:·~~;-~e

number· of months of ineligibility applleable to the. :individual. oder elaue,('li) aa a
· result of such disposal, and
. ".
·

• 1
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~=£
iiO·:'rteabneii;~;~~::~:;;,t;::!\:'.:~:}c-'.,;,-'.'\J. : ,\'.~t::;}

["(5);-:fu this imbeecition.:tlie:.term:"resources". has the meaning .given such ,t.erm in
_o~~ ~-tJe,.'.witJioat ~ : w,the excl~~·
sub~on (a)(l}

d-:S~ in

1382b

!

i:.

.·:1'.·;:·

J:,i' ~- .

1

j _(1! For purpoae8:~f' d ~ ~ aii'.'in~~uiil's eligiliility'f'cir;'6r'.iii:iiowit of, benefita
under. a Stat.a plaiiwider this-~pterrsubjeet to'paragraph (4), the rules specified in
: pa1'3graph·cs> shall app1y·w·a_trust established by such Individual. - ,., . · · ·. . . · ...
;•,•ti'i..')•.\,JC.~··J(.I•'': . .
'-•".•! •',,.,.,.,:,.,,.;..,,!•"•
·, •·•:,
(~)(A) Fo.r purposes"of .this. siiliaectiori;. an Individual shall be' corisidered to have
I,stablished triist·if'aiiiet.a 'oftlie Individual were used t.o' form ·an or part of the COrpu8
. of the trust and ifanyof the following· individuals establlslied such trust-i1ther than by
1

__.l'Ar.•7'f'•1-:r;,4

':_;,",''-'

a

will:-<. · ·:

:··_1.

,,'!.::·~·,"'.~~;-_ ·.-~::•::,: · ::,·:·,·~~"

. (i):The'l.DclividU:a:L··;'.

····,

.

·.,;.'.'.:;·ri,:::
,';:j•:··-~,,(f! \·,.

.,:

:-: ,,

,_,.._ ...

·-'·:· .. ,, .

,--~11_;·:r--:··,.-··: ,·;.<"'"

•·. ·.:

:_,:~ (ii) Th~-bi'diridwil's spo···wie; >/'~n·. ;;;; . ' ---~- :,.·_.: .. : - . :.:: ;. ,' ..... : ·.
.
.
. . (iii) .A peri6~::%cl'liding'a;~urt:or ~ e ~y, d iepl authority to
act in place of or 011 behalf of the· individual or tb.e individual's spouse, '
:(Jv)·.-A person; mcluding any court or administrative body,.acting at the direction
i '· '-'or upon the request. of. the individual or the individnal'e,spowie•. _,.:, ; , ·.
(B) In the· _case cir_ 1riiiit the .corpus of which includes
of mi individual (as
-l et.ermiried under subpangraph (A))"iuid assets of any other pe1'!IOJl or persons, the
~onil of,this'_liubseetion ~ ·apply,to the portion of the trust attributable to the
IIIM!til ofthemdividuaL ·t·• .,:1.i,:,,_,·.·::,:::t ::·.::·, , · ... /· , .. ; :.,;.,- '._'·: :::.- '."'.· .. :::--~ ·.
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply without regard 00.:..:
I

•

I··' ·

a

assets

1

· \d> iii~'.~'r~r~~ at~(~ 8-stal?~ed; ;. :·~~:=;;,,/: t· ::-- , ·
,,i-,. Jil) w~ether_ t:fl~ ~ ~ve o~ ~~ ~ ~ti-~n im,der the trust,

on :when. or whether_ distribJ?,t;ions may !>e__~e from the
·..
.:~,·~.--•~i:";..•-..~~- . ~-.···:~·i~· -~JbrYU ,~;;:.iti_

' - ; ·-(ili}-any ~ctions

. trust, or

,. :_,.•.~-

;(~;(~~?'·corpus
~~~~~~~~:;;;~'
.~::~~~;:.~,;~·~;:-:,:r:·:·
_ :·_:· ,:, .
of tmat'ehall'
resources

I

(1) 1 the
t.h""ii
be considered
available t.o the individu·il;., :~:.,: ~-;,1._,~)_:,;{~' ;!c;·.· 1)-(.!.:lic:::1!·.\~:!tt .;a· :...:i.1),---,~~=-~.i ·; :1 :!:..; -~i-~.~;~~i\rl -~,. ;ri..:.: , . '.·:.. '. ·.~
I . (ii) payments from the trust t.o· or for the benefit' of' the individual shall be
[;· 'COosid~ income.~t.he~dual,. ~~: '.~1e: ·'.. _; l,,i;:;;i :,· ·,;,..;-C:' ii,. ·,:.: :~
•·'···~··: (Ui)"··aey ·otber payments from-the trust shall be considered·88Sets disposed of by

.. .'.t

:". '··i ~·

, · th~ mdividual for purposeii_of subsection (c) of this section.

·

.. -,.. r::,:', ,.

I (B) In.the Clise ofiul irrevocable t:nist(1) if there are any circumstances under which payment from the trust could be
· made t.o or fm: the benefit of' the fndividaali the portiQn of' the corpus from which, or
'··' the inco,m,e_p~ ~~ ~~.from whicll, pa~';D~ to ~e indfy.!dual co,uld. be made s~all
I .,be conB1d~ ,,.esourcea available to the mdiVJdual, and paymenta from ,that portion
! ;.,ofthe,~_qrJ.~c9rn~i; -~·: ;,/:hi;/;.:; ,:,;!;-~.
;;:::i:,;; ::'.:.,::;:.·.:,
. (~>. to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be _consi~ income. of the
mdividual,and · · .:~~:t':-'."-o:.!r. t!::.ii_;~f-·_.-t\.:.:·, ~:.£,: ~--- ~.-:>-~·ifi-./j}(r• -,.<: ..,,_.·· ( ·.
I . ,:, ,, ,• (II) for any other _purpose, shall be considered a transfer: of asset.a by the
l ..': ; ·.: individual iiiibject:tii stlbsection (c) of this section;' arid \ . ~ ·J." ' .· .
:~'.!l.~ .. ·.,.•·,.:,,,:_-,,J\·•(,;1;, '·,~Ai,"
,:,;_.;<•,:. ', ....
, !',)·oJ:~,.i . .,'""'1 ·\~"•;t7t' !\:,,!_. ·:
,
. . (u) any portion of the trust from which,. or any fricome on tiie ~orpus from which,
,nt1_ payment ,could under any circumstances be made to the individual shall be
i . considered,;'as: of dai2 of establishment of the trust (or, if later, the date on
:· whicli payment 'to~ the individual was foreclosed) ti, be. ·asset.a· disposed by the
'· ':individuaUor purposes of'~on.(c) ot: this section,,and the ~ue. of_the trust
shall be determined f'or purposes of such subsection by including the amount ~f any
,· payment.a made.from Sllch portio11 of the trust afte1: such date.
. .· . ,.:.,a;
1
1""
·
- "··. ,,·•!'' .... ,.~~--~·.· -· ..... _ ..... ,~.
·.• ,:,..,..·J·ad.,•.• , ,,~·.•,,.J_.Lu;,.., ..•.•.'.-::o.,
tn.·.r.:.! 1-:;·
!c4j: -This su~oi:J.,shaU not apply t;o;any otthe following trusts:,r,;.i: ~i -,f ;, : ·.. .
'·;:.,.;(A); A tfu.st'con~ the assets ·ot an individuahmder· age 66 who- is disabled
1
'1& defined iri 'section' l382c(a)(3): of this title} and 'which, is E!i!tablished · for the
Jiefit of such-indmdaal by a·parent;,grandparent., legalguardian_ of the individual,
iWa court if the Stat.a will receive all amounts remaming ~#)e trust.upon the_,death
•

1_

1 :

•

.

.

,;

'

•

•

',

•

.

•

•

•

-

.

:

•

•

.

.

•

'

•

•

•

•

•

:

,.,.

'.f .

,'

'•-.~~ .

'

•

,~i;;r_::.~·i::1:·l,-;i~'

1

,·,,1,;,'4

~.·.

, ••

1

the
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I

such individual up to an' amount eqaal to the total medical assisbmce. paid on'}
. · '· ; behalf af the:individualunder a State plan under this s11bchapter.'.1-:>·, -,,,,: ·- ,;_:.,:·.-1,iiii>.
(B) A t.nlBt established in a State for the benefit ofan Individual if- : ., .., ' r:it/
(0 the trust is composed only of pension. Social l¾eurity, ··and. other
.. ,,.. to the individual (and accumulated income in the trust), . . .·
. .. , .. ·;:.':'.
-,
, ···
·
· .
,·
·--···
· •. ·-·.'·:·: .· .. :. "i.:'.· :~.'·.,'-.. '..:~~,.· -:~,; -;,,-:.;;r: "".'•' '\.. )", ,·:, ,,}~-. - ;;,::.o '_'. (ii) the State will receive .all amounts l'\!mainlng iii the trust upon the death:.
· of such individW!1 up to an amount ~ . t.o the _total zriedf~ ~tan~-~~
, behalf of the Individual under a State plan under this subchapter, and · :_. "::_\.
• •
.
. ':
':
.,_ • ',
.. , · '. '. ·• '.; ., :-:; . · ,., , '--,,f,~' ." ;:
" : •
. , (iii) the State makes medical assistance· available to Individuals described iii
section.1396a(a)(l0)(A)(ll)(V) of this _title;· but does·not"niake such
available to individuals for ·nursing· facility · services under sectlon
· 1396a{a)(l0)(C) of this title. ·
·
. ·
..
· ·:::;
f\
' '
,.
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as defined in
section 1382c(a)(3) of this title) that meets the following ~om: . · . . •-· .

mco~{

.on

I~

,, : " ·

· ·: " (
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.j' ~

• "._
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• _'
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,
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~

I

~
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ti-ust is established and managed by a nonp,,fit'~tio;;:_' .'.., -,..,

account Is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust, but,
for purpose& of investment and management ol'. funds, the trust pools these
(il) A separate

accounts.

....

.;-_.,

_

"

_, . _ _

, ,·. ·, ,.,_,,-.,:·,·:

(HI) Accounts.In the trust are established solely for the benefit of individuals
who are disabled {as defined in section 1382c(a)(3) of this title) by the parent,
grandparent, or legal guardiBn of such lndlviduals, by such individuals, or by_ii
.·court.-=,,_
.. . .
. .. : '.
' - .. 'c,:,· ..
(iv) Tei the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account upon
the death.of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust paya t.o the
Stat,e from such remaining amounts in the account an amount equal to the total
·~ amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary under the State
plan under this subchapter. , ·
·
·
-- ·
-(5)

The State ~~ idlal1 ~b&h p~edures (hi· llCC<irdan~e ·with staridlU"ds ~~

fled by the Secretary) under which the agency W&Nes the application of thls .subsection
with respect t,o, an· Individual if the individual est.ablishes. that such, application would

_ work an undue hardship on the Individual as determined on the basis of criterla
estsblished_bytheSec:retary.,_-,,;-." ,-:; ·;tJ>··i·)..·_ .. ,,._·;- ,.;,;; ,
:,-.·-;-,:.-;i;:i-. ,::
(6) The term "trust" includes any legal instrument cir· device that ls ~ · t o a trust
but !Deludes an· annuity only, to such extent .and-, in such manner aa. the Secretary

Specifies.

;:·):S:'.:7T. ·

;

\, ... ,

:(e) ~ I U ~ , ; '"!'.t'-' ··:"/::. .,;~ ,:·, , , .,;,

:i ':~--~c~(~ it, ·)~ -;,••/

·

',

n

..,;,:~

,-;~;~;::z~~'.~;~~:'./?:,;:? , , , ,,. "· _

.

: In this section,.thetollowlngdeflnitiona·shall apply: ,,: 11,;.·-. ·, ·... -: ,,_ .,•. ,; ,,,~.-,
· ': ·':(Ij The·---..11&~11rtii", with respect to :an iric&7idual, includea·illl income and
resources of the individual and:oft-.he Individual's spouse; includlng-llllY income or
resources which the individual or auch individual's apouae is entitled to but ·does no;
receive.because of action-·- ::,/: ·,:t1:-'.\ "d:_ :,i: , -, : ·,:,, -~ ·. ·.·, ·- •. , , J

,c

. · . (A) by the individual or such individual's apowie. . ,:.::; · i,c,::,:·;•'.,ir: .
"·.' :_::,,~:--:,~
,· ···.s
·.,:<
"-q~:;,· ,• .· •-·
..
·, · · ·cB) by a peraon, inchidlng.· a court or administrative body, _with lega
... : ;' ~.,authorjty ~.act iii place of or o,n,~ehalfof th~_individ~ or a~ individual',
1

: . : : , ,. ..

,

~• • •

,, ,

,

l

.,..

••

;

.,,;..

~-

·•

; :: : !P0~.-~r:~·:··;.,.·-:;::;.. :;. ~~:t·.;:, ..· . '' ' .. : ':_; ';',, ..: '. .. ' .· ,.

. , ,,> ,.,!.:(C)

by·any person, including any court or administrative body, aeting at th
,,-: · : '1dlirectlon. or,.:.upon the ,request .. of the individual or such. individual's spouat
. ''(2fThe t:.erm'"income" has the meaning given 8!llch term.in secti~~-188ia of th;
::"(~ ~title:,·-.T~(• . ·.;_i-. ·>~J.~,i:/_-:~F: ·•,.: '.°!,}r,!':°'"~·,.:· :. •.. :.:~.": .....r'(."•.~: :-.""'.;jq_ 'f,~·• ;;.!;,r1-:r:-:J::.:; ..~·/ ;::l~.:i;~ •

. (3). The term "imititutiona&ed indlvidual" mew an !Ddividual 'who js':'an inp
tient in a nursing facility; who is an inpatient ·in a medical institution and wj,
.. respect- to :whoDl payment is ,made pased .on a level of care provided in a nursil
_.,,. facility, or.wh.o is described in,section 1396a(a)(l0)(A)(ii)(VI) of this title• .: ·. - .
' ,:; ;;:m 'term -~oruniltitutio~alized individual":~~eans an individual ~~ 3J
L. • '·of the servfces'speeified ID subsection (c)(l)(C)(ii) of'this section.;,:.. !i :1°;,;1,i .; :--,
0

The

.

0

262

000378

42-ii§ 1~96p _

PUBLIC,HEALTHr:'AND.WELFARE

i

! ·,,,r>_(o) 'The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1382b of
· :. ' 1 this 'tjtle;i without- .regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to the'
.'~ exclusioii-deairibed in subsection (a)(l) of such section. '
.. ,.
. ,. '. _'::
(Ang. 14,
1917,~'.;.id~ SepL 3,'i91iz
'.fitle I,,§ l~(b), 96
1 Stat. :no, and amended·Jan.12, 1983, Pub.L. &7~ Title III. §'309(b)(21), (22), 96 Stat. 2410; Dft.
1 22, 1987, Pab.L. - 1 ~ . ·Tltle IV, § 42ll(h)C12)(A), 101 Stat. 1330-20'1; Dec. 22;'1981, Pub.L.
, loo--203, Title JV;.§ 4211(h)(12)(B), as amended July 1, 1988, Pub.L. lro-360, TitlelV, § 411(0(3)(1),
'.. 102 Stat. 803; July 1, 1988, Pub.L. 100-360, Title III, § 30S(b), lO'Z Stat. 7.60•. Oct. 13, 1988, Pub.L.
100-,486, Title Yk § 608(dl(l6)(B), 102 Stat. 2417; Dec. J9, 1989, PubJ.; 101--239, Title VI,

I

I

Pu·bt 97~,

t~'.~58i:'n&~'·§

I § 64ll(e)(l), 103 Stat. 2271;

Aug. 10, 1998, Pub.L. 103--66, Title XIII, §§ 13611(•) to (c), 136l2(a)

to

·, Cc('.}rt~;:r ~ ;:~~;:·i~~ICAL ii STA~:~:':~~'.:i : :'.· :::t{;~;ii:;:::Y·:~t:.~
1

IRemlon Notes and LegfalaUve Reports · · · ,;
I 1993 Ac1a; Hu'. 'Reriort No. 103-111 and
House Conference Report No. 103--213, see 1998
' . U.S. C-ode Cong. and Adm. News, p. m

.. "(B) the·resourees were \ralUiferred (I) to or
from (or f.o another for the sole benefit of) tbe
individual's spouse, or (II)· to the individual's
ehild desm'lled in subparagraph (AXii)(II);",

-;'·f:ii'ff~df!'!~~~tedP.!'!;ts" .;~~

II

Amendments:···.;'. · · ,_'· ;'~'.-/ : . ·
1993 Amendme_nt&· ~ "(b)(l). Pub.L.
· 1~,§ 13612(a),lowereathrellholdageto56
1 from 66 for individuals from whom the State will
lseek.medicaid est.ate ~CJ!Sies, and expanded

. sou~" and addi!d'cl. (iii). ,. . . .,.. .

I l::i: °!::!,caii!iusez~~~wh!~r:;~:
1

. .

~t:?~,.~ -~e~~~\~~:/~~-~ r

· "CD) the State determines that denial of eligibilit:y would work an undue hardship," · ·
S11bsec.
(i:)(3),
Pub.L.
103-66.
§ Vl611(a)(2)(E), generally amended pal'.(3).
Prior to amendment par. (3) read ~ follOWB:

benefidarlea of long-term care Insurance. · ·
Subsec. (b)(3)"·. Pub.L .. 103-66, § 13612(b),
ladded par. (S). '; , · • , · .. · · · · · ·
,' Su~ (b)(4). Pub.I.. 103-66,. § ·j3612(ci

'added par. (4)•. · - .,. , , . , ... . .

-

·· .
. ..· -, ....... -,
.. ;,-. -,1:: . . ,, . ·· Subsec. ·· (c)C2)(D)•... ·. ·.Pub.L, • .103-66.
§ 1.S6ll(a)(2)(D), generally amended~.1111bpar.

·

Subsec._ (c)(l).:· Puii.i: IN, ·s 136ll(a)(l),
"(3) ID this. subsection, the term '!nstitution'lletely revtaed par. (1). Prior to the amendalir.l!d indMdllal' means 811 individual wbo ia an
par. (1) read as follon:
Inpatient in a nUJ'5ing facility, who ia an lllpa·,...r1) In order to meet the requirements of tient in a medical institution and with respeeuo
this subsection. (for purposes of lll!cilon ·-whom payment is made based on a level of eare
l396a{a)(61)(1l) otthis titJe), tbe State plan must p,ovided ID:&- nurslllg.facility, or who la deprovide for a period of Ineligibility for nUJ'Sing
scribed in section 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(il)(VD of this

=~

==oi:~~!f8;el~ ~ ; ·

facility serrieee and for services under section
I396n(c) of this title in the ·case of an institu1ion~ .individual (es defined ID ·paragraph (3))
rho. or whose _spowie, at any time during· or
lifter the SO-month period immedlat.ely before
the date the lndmdual beeomea an illlmtutionaJ.

§ -186ll(a)(2XFl,: added provisions- relating t:o ·
apportionment of period of lnellgibility amongst
spoWles..:,· .-!TT~.. • .
. ,,:, _ .. a::: ·.. ,:--,,.", ···'-'·
.. Sub~ (d); ;_l'ub.L. lM. §' 136ll(b}; added

aub~:<~b·~~--· ;._:.: . · ., .,. ~,. ;--.·::;,: ·_ .-.

ized fnd!vidual"(lf the ·indfridual is entitled to

;nedical ass!stanee under the State plan on such
fate) or, if tha individual la not ao entitled, the
late the indlvidual applies for such· aasilltance
ilrhile an institutfonalle.ed lndmdwil. disposed of
resources !'or leaa·t1wa· ralr market value. The
'leriod of ineligibility shall begin with the month

" whlch such. resources were trall.Bferred and
,he'number of'months in such period shall be
,!qua} to the lesser of·
: . , ·,; )
'"<Afsomonths/or "
... ,,·'
"(B) (i) tJie total WICOJnpelll!at.ed value.
the resources. so transferred, divided by (ii)

~t;:;ii-";,: icx~j_;; 1,·. _._.· ~b.i •. >i~.
Sllhaec. (e). ;· Pnb,L. 103-,M, §, 13611(,:), added

BUbsec. (e~

.,._,:: '.

·

.

E-ectiY.e ~

.~1"·;;

. ..•. _..

·

""'
· ,.,._, ' ·
···:'.;1993 Act.:' Sectuin 186ll(e) ..of Pub.L.· 10&-68
prov:ided that: v,'. ;
"; .- ·. _ ·· · ·
.
~ ."Cl) The. amendments made. by this section
[amending subsec. (c)and enacting eubsecs.. (d)

and (e) of this section and amending seet:iOlltl
1396a and-.l396r-5 of this title] sba1I apply,
except ,as ~vided in this .subsedion, t.o pay·
ments under title XIX of the Social Security Act
the average cost. to a private patient :at the... Jt.hia.c aubchapt.er] ror· calendar quarten begintime of the application, of nursing facility~
ning on·or after Oct.ober 1, 1993, without regard
vice& _in the State_ or, at_ State option, in the
to whether or not final regulatiom to cany out
i community in whlch ~e individual is institu- · such amendments have been ·proimilgat.ed by

of

i ~~.'~ : :,~:~r.-~·::•i.:~ ·.:-::·:.:.-. ;.
I Subsec. ··, _. (c)(2)(A). ,·. ,Pnb,L.

such date.
1 ~: :..
·· · ·• ·
. 1~,
"(2) The amendment.a· made bJ tbll section
§ J.a6ll(a)(2)(A), . substituted ~assets". for "re[ameJ1ding subsec. (c) and enacting subeecs. (d)
so~"·< ; .•,
, ,,
, ...·, _, ... _.. ,'·. ..
and (e) of this section and amending sections
Sub&ee.. ·,_; (tX2)(B)•. ,:, Pub.L. . 103-$, · 1396und 13961'-5 oftlp title} shall not apply. 136ll(a)(2)(B); generally amended par. (2)(B).
, ._' :'(Ai t:o medical
provided-for aer.-. Mor t.o amendment par. (2)(B) read as follows:
..vices fllrnished.bef!)re Qctoi?er l, 1993,.._., •
1 _,":;

...

I
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community spouse, as defined in section
1396r-S(h)(2) of this title.,".
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.L. 101-239,
§ 6411(e)(l)(B)(ii), struck out cl. (iii)
which contained material relating to
transfer of resources to person other
than a spouse for less than fair market
value.
1988 Ameudmenta. Suhsec. (c)(l).
Pub.L. 100-485, § 608(d)(l6)(B)(i), substituted "period of ineligibility for nursing facility services and for a level of
care in a medical institution equivalent
to that of nursing facility services and
for services under section 1396n(c) of
this title in the case of an institutionalize)d inhdividual (as defined in paragraph
(3 ) w o, at any time during or after the
30-month period immediately before the
date the individual becomes an institutionalized individual (if the individual is
entitled to medical assistance under the
State plan on such date) or, if the indi·
vidual is not so entitled, the date the
individual applies for such assistance
while an institutionalized individual" for
"period of ineligibility in the case of an
institutionalized individual (as defined
in paragraph (3)) who, at any time during the J~rnonth period immediately
before the individual's application for
medical assistance under the State plan".

:Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
J·, ~: 1!182 Act. Senate Report No. ·n-494
J/t, '.and House Conference Report No.
'.;'1t 97-760, see 1982 U.S.Code Co111;. and
tl;: Adm.News, P· 781.
1')83 Act. Senate Report No. 97-592
.:{r aod House Conference Report No.
.il).0(97-986, see 1982 U.S.Code Cong. and
1:ffl'Jtdm.News, P· 41 49.
}~: ';': 1987 A.ct. House Report No. lC0-391
·ti\R{ (Parts I and II) and House Conference
f~l{ ,Report No. 100-495, see 1987 U.S.Code
{if, Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2313-1.
1988
Acts. House
Report
No.
ff(/ 100-105(1), (II) and House Conference
- Report 100-(;61, see 1988 Us
~
J,;:.
. .co de ,;.;ong.
:1~?:. 'iind Adm.News, p. 803.
;0

i~N/ :···

)

tf,J\r

"':;i/t.'X'

}t(f. Senate Report No. 100-377, House

'\}J Conference Report No.
,d:Y 1988 U.S.Code Cong. and
/{ffe( f.] 7 6.

100-998, see
Adm.News, P·

i~'\<;'.' 1989 Act. House Report No. 101-247,
Jl\: House Conference Repon .No. 101--386,
c~i%· and Statement by President, see 1989
j:.;'i. U.S.Code

Cong. and Adm.News, p. 1906.

}ii
i:odlficatlons .
· ·.
[~J ;; Pub.I.. 100-203,

Title

· IV,

.li;';, § 4211(h)(12)(A), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat.

':1~i' 133~207,
provided
that
subsec.
;~l {c)(2){B)(i) is amended by striking out
:c~'( "skilled nursing facility, intermediate
j!!(;fcare facility" and inserting "nursing fa.
.J(~ cility, intermediate care facility for the
. ~("'
11
d d" · r
th
f
d
)1fmenta Y retar e m ieu . ereo ' an .
. ,;,;;, Pub.L.
100-203,
Title
IV,
4211(h)(I2)(B), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat.
·;}Jr; 133~207, as amended Pub.L. 100-360,
;tiTitle IV,§ 411(/)(3?(1), July 1, 1988, 102
cfii(.St.at. 803,
provided that subsec.
i:l:·(c)(2)(B)(ii), is amended l,y striking out
"skilled" each place it appears, which
amendments could not be executed in
.view of complete amendment of subsec.
(~l._?Y Pub.L. 100-360, § 303(b).

Pub.I.. 100-360, § 303(b), substituted
provisions establishing a period of ineligibility for institutionalized individuals
who, at any time during the 30-month
od
d
b f
peri
irnme iately e ore the individu·
al's application for medical assistance
:!:esu;~r ~~\C!~raf:s::rk~t°!a1i:;

~1lf§

i:.., ·

~endments
~i.1989 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(l).
.Pub.L. 101-239, § 641 l(e)(l)(A), inserted
:·whose spouse," followinf "an institu·
llzed individual (as defined in para•
h C3H who,".
sht:isec. (c)(2)(B)(i). Pub.L. 101-239,
. ll(e)(l)(B)(i), substituted "(i) to or
'in (or to another for the sc,le benefit
.the individual's spouse, or'' for "(f) ·to
: to another for the sole benefit of) the

.

42 § 1396p

for provisions for denial of medical assistance for any individual who would
not be eligible for such assistance except
for such disposition.
Subsec.
(c)(2). Pub.L. . 100-360,
§ 303(b), substituted provisions that an
individual shall not be ineligible for
medical assistance by reason of pill', (1)
to the extent that the resources transfer•
red were a home and title to the home
· was transferred to certain individuals,
the resources were transferred to (or to
another for the sole benefit of) the community spouse, or the individual's child
who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled, a satisfactory showing was
made to the State that the individual

7~
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intended to dispose of the resources either at fair market value or for other
valuable consideration, or the resources
were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical
assistance, or the State determines that
denial of eligibility would work an undue hardship for provisions which empowered States to establish periods of
ineligibility in excess of 24 months in
any case in which the uncompensated
value of disposed of resources exceeded
$12,000 or the property was disposed of
for less than fair market value.
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(ii). Pub.L. 100-485,
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(ii), designated existing
provisions in part as subcls. (I) and (II),
respectively.
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iii). Pub.L 100-485,
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(iii), substituted "the individual becomes an institutionalized individual" for "of the individual's admission to the medical institution or nursing facility".
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv). Pub.L. 100-485,
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(iv), substituted "the individual becomes an institutionalized individual" for "of such individual's admission to the medical institution or nursing facility".
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub.L. 100-485,
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(v). designated existing
provisions in part as cl. (i), added cl. (ii),
and struck out "or the individual's child
who is blind or permanently and totally
Nsection
disabled"
following
1396r-S(h)(2) of this title,".
Subsec.
(c)(3). Pub.I..
100-485,
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(vi), qualified definition
of "institutionalized individual" to provide that inpatients in medical institutions must be those with respect to
whom payment is made based on a level
of care provided in a nursing facility,
and included within the definition persons
described
in
section
1396a(a)(l0)(A)(il)(Vl) of this title.
Pub.I.. 1~360, § 303(b), substituted
definition of the term "institutionalized
individual'' for provision that in any case
where an individual was ineligible for
medical assistance undei- the State plan
solely because of the applicability to
such individual of the provisions of section 1382b(c) of this title, the State plan
could provide for the eligibility of such
individual for medical assistance under
the plan if such individual would have

Ch. 7 ·. ·.

been so eligible if the State plan requirements with respect to disposal of re- ·
sources applicable under paragraphs '(l)
and (2) of this subse<:tion had
applied in lieu of the provisions of section '
1382b(c) of this title.
Subsec.
(c)(4). Pub.L.
§ 303(b), added par. (4).
Subsec.
(c)(S). Pub.L.
100-485, ,.
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(vii), a1Jded par. (5) .., .. ,..
1987
Amendment.
Subsec: '
Pub.L.
100-203,.
(a)(l)(B)(i).
§ 4211 (h)(l2)(A), substituted ·nursing
facility, intermediate care facility for the.
mentally retarded" for "skilled nursing '
facility, intermediate care facility". : ·.,
1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b)(2)(B).
Pub.L. 97-448, § 309(b)(21), substituted
"who" for "and" preceding "has lawfully· ·· ·
resided".
· · y:
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub-L. 97-44"8; ;'
§ 309(b)(22), substituted in subcL (I) ..
"can" for "cannot" and deleted from '
subcl. (IV) the introclu:::tory word "if~ ·

been

100-360,.

,•-;

Effective Dates
1989 Act. Amendment by Pub.L
101-239 amending subsec. (c)(I) and
(2)(B)(i), (ii) and striking subseci
(c)(2)(B)(iii), applicable to transfers oc- .
curring after Dec. 19. 1989, see section
64l l(e)(4) of Pub.L. 101-239, set out as a·
note under section 139<ia of this title:;
1988 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. .
100--485 effective as if included in the~
enactment of Pub.L 1~360, see section ...
608(g)(1) of Pub,L 100-485. set out as'
note undei- section 704 of this title. · : ~
Amendment by secti,,n 303(b) -of·
Pub.L. 100-360 applicable to resources ·
disposed of on or after July 1, 1988,
except that such subsection, as · so
amended, shall not apply with respect to
inter-spousal transfers occurring befor~
October l, 1989, and to p.1yments under:
this subchapter for calendnr quarters be- .
ginning on or after July 1, 1988 (except
in certain situations requi.ring State legislative action), without regard to whether or not final regulatiom; to carry out ·
such amendment have been promulgated by such date (with an exception
for resources disposed of before July l,
1988), see section 303(g)(2), (5) of Pub.L.
100-360, set out as a note undei- section
1396r-S of this title.
1987 Act. Amendment by Pub.L.:
100--203 applicable to nw·sing facility

a
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 10~105(11)
(page 65]
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encompass a range of issues with respect to access, quality, financing, and other aspects of long-term care.
Protection of income and resources of couple for maintenance of
community spouse (section 214)
The leading cause of financial catastrophe among the elderly is
the need for long-term care, especially the need for nursing home
placement. The expense of nursing home care-which can rangefrom $2,000 to $3,000 per month or more-has the potential for
rapidly depleting the lifetime savings of all but the wealthiest.
Even under the Committee's bill, Medicare's expanded skilled nursing facility benefits will not protect the elderly against the costs of
long-term institutionalization. Private insurance coverage for nursing home costs is not ienerally available. For most of the elderly,
the Medicaid program 1S the only third party source of payment for
nursinJ home care.
.
Medicaid, a means-tested entitlement program, requires that the
elderly or disabled nurs~·ng oine resident be poor in order to qualify for coverage. It also li its the income that an institutionalized
spouse may make avail e for the spouse remaining in the com·
munity. If' the institu · nalized spouse receives the pension and
other income in his name, this limit may have the effect of impoverishing the spouse in the community. The purpose of the Committee bill is to end this pauperization by as.,uring that the community spouse has a sufficient-but not excessive-amount of income
and resources available to her while her spouse is in a nursing
home at Medicaid expense. This will be of particular benefit to
older women, who, in the current generation at risk of nursing
home care, have often worked at home all their lives raising families and have limited income other than their husbands' pension
checks.
·
Current law.-To determine how much is available for the com~
munity spouse to live on when her elderly spouse in the nursing
home applies for Medicaid, it is necessary first to determine whether the institutionalized s1>ouse is eligible for Medicaid based on
income and resources. If eligibility is established, it is then necessary to determine how much of the institutionalized spouse's
monthly income is to be applied to the cost of nursing home care,
and how much is to be available to the community spouse. ·
Eligibility standards.-In general, in order to qualify for Medicaid, an individual must be categorically related-that is, be aged,
blind, disabled, or a member of a family with dependent childrenand must meet certain income and resources standards.
In most States, elderly or disabled people receiving cash assistance under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program are
automatically eligible for Medicaid. Aged or disabled individuals
may receive SSI benefits if their countable income and countable
resources do not exceed specified standards. The basic SSI income
standard for an individual in 1987 is $340 per month, but many
States have elected to supplement this benefit with their own
funds. Thei basic SSI resource standard for an individual in 1987 is
$1,800. In determining countable resources, a number of items are
excluded, including the individual's home (of any value), household
goods and personal effects worth less than $2,000, an automobile
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with a market value of $4,500 or less, and up to $1,500 in life insurance or burial funds.
Not all States automatically extend Medicaid coverage to SSI
beneficiaries. In about 14 States, known as "209(b)" Stat.es, eligibility standards, farticularly resource rules, more restrictive than
those under SS are applied to the elderly or disabled. In about 35
States, elderly individuals who are not poor enough to qualify for
SSI, but who have large, recurring medical expenses, such as nursing home bills, qualify for Medicaid as "medically needy." Finally,
aboµt 30 States offer coverage, on · an "optional categorically
needy" basis, to nursing home residents whose incomes fall below a
State-establi:3hed special income level no higher than 300 percent
of the basic SSI benefit level ($1,020 per month in 1987).
There are roughly 1.5 million Medicaid beneficiaries in nursing
homes, whether skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) or intermediate
care facilities (ICFs). Less than one--fourth of those are poor enough
to qualify for SSI cash assistance. The remaining three-fourths are
eligible either as "medically needy" or "optional categorically
needy." Individuals who qualify for Medicaid in nursing homes on
either of these bases must apply a certain portion of their income
toward the cost of their nursing home care. It is these post-eligibility rules, in combination with the rules for attributing income and
resources, that give rise to the problem of "spousal impoverishment."
·
Attribution of income.-When one spouse enters a nursing home
(or other institution) and applies for Medicaid, the following rule
determines the amount of that spouse's income for eligibility purposes. Shortly after institutionalization, each spouse is treated as a
separate household. Income-generally Social Security checks, pensions, and interest or dividends from investments-is considered to
belong to the spouse whose name is on the instrument conveying
the funds (in the case of Social Security checks, the amount attributed to each spouse is the individual's share of the couple's benefit). Thus, in a case where a couple's pension check is made out to
the husband, if the husband enters a nursing home, all of the
income is considered his for purposes of determining eligibility. If
the wife in this case enters the nursing home, however, none of the
income is considered hers, and the husband is under no obligation
under Federal law t-0 contribute any of his income toward the cost
of her care. (However, some States do impose spousal contribution
requirements in these circumstances).
Attribution of resources._:The rule for attributing resources is
basically the same as that for attributing income. Of course, the
only resources that are~ttributed are countable resources, commonly liquid assets like\savings accounts, mutual fund investments, certificates of depos~t, etc. Generally, in the month following institutionalization, resources to which a spouse has unrestricted access, including joint savings accounts, are considered available
to that spouse for eligibility purposes. Thus, if resources are held
solely by the institu.tionalized spouse, they are attributed to him
for eligibility purposes. If the resources are jointly held, they are
also consid,ered to belong entirely to the institutionalized spouse, on
the theory that he or she has an unrestricted right to use them. If
the assets :are held solely by the community spouse, however, they
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are considnred, after the first month, to belong to her. There is no
obligatir • under Federal law on the part of the community spouse
to cont".-ibute any amounts of resources toward the costs of care of
the a1stitutionalized spouse. In the view of the Department, these
attribution rules apply in all States, including those with community property laws: this Departmental interpretation ·is currently the
subject of liti~ation.
Transfer o( resources. -States have the option of denying Medicaid eligibility to individuals who have transferred countable resources for less than fair market value within two years of applying for Medicaid. In the SSI program, the uncompensated value of
the resource is counted for 24 months from the month the resource
was disposed of, regardless of the amount at issue. States can be
less restrictive than SSI, but they can also be more restrictive as
well. \Vhere the value of the resorces for which no compensation
was received exceeds $12,000, the State may deny eligibility for
more than 24 months, beginning with the date of the transfer.
States may waive this penalty in cases where undue hardship
would result. In the case of transfers of an individual's home to
someone other than a spouse or minor or disabled child, the period
for which eligibility is denied, if any, must be based on the relationship between the value of the home for which no compensation
was received and the average Medicaid expenditure for ·nursing
home care. States cannot deny eligibility if the individual intended
to dispose of the home at fair market value or if denial would
cause undue hardship.
Post-eligibility application of income.-Once an institutionalized
spouse has established eligibility for Medicaid by meeting the applicable income and resource standards, some of his monthly income
is reserved for his use and that of his spouse, and the rest is applied to the cost of nursing home care. These post-eligibility income
rules apply whether the spouse qualifies for Medicaid as a "medically needy" or "optional categorically needy" individual. From the
gross monthly income of the institutionalized spouse are deducted
the following amounts, in the following order. First, there is reserved for the institutionalized spouse a personal needs allowance
for clothing and other expenses of at least $25. Second, there is set
aside an allowance for the maintenance needs of the communit,Y
spouse. This amount, combined with the community spouse s
income, if any, allows the community spouse a certain amount of
income, or maintenance needs level. Third, if the institutionalized
spouse has a family' at home, an amount is set aside for the maintenance of the family. Finally, an amount is allowed for expenses incurred for medical care that is not covered by the State's Medicaid
plan or by Medicare or other third party. Any income remaining
after these deductions is used to reduce the imount that the Medicaid program pays to the nursing home for~fthe care of the institutionalized spouse.
Under current regulations, the mainten ce needs level for the
community spouse, may not exceed the hig . est of the SSI, State
supplemEmtation, or "medically needy" income standard in the
State. As the folla,wing table, based on a March 1987, survey conducted by the American Association of Retired Persons, indicates,
these· community spouse maintenance needs levels vary greatly
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from S~te to State. The maintenance needs level is the total of the
amount of the community spouse's income and the amount set
aside from the income of the institutionalized spouse. Thus, in a
State with a maintenance needs level of $340, if the community
spouse receives a monthly Social Security check of $150, the contribution from the institutionalized spouse is $190, not $340.
/

~

0

.._,
j.

Community spouse maintenance needs leuels

"
e-

Alabama ........................................................................................................... .
$34.0
Alaska ................................................................................................................
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(1)
Ari.iona ..............................................................................................................
Arkansas ........................................................................................................... .
188
California ...................................................... ·.................................................. ..
534
Colorado .............................................................................................................
229
Connecticut ....................................................................................................... 375-450
Dela·ware.......................................................................................................... ..
164
District of Columbia ....................- ................................................................. .
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Florida ...............................................................................................................
840
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Idaho ................................................................................................................. . Up to 393
Illinois ................................................................................................................
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Indiana.............................................................................................................. .
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Iowa ....................................................................................................................
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Maine .................................................................................................................
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Maryland ...........................................................................................................
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Mi<'higan ............................................................................................................
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Montana ........................................................................................................... .
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Nevada .............................................................................................................. .
New Hampshire ...............................................................................................
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Ohio ....................................................................................................................
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373
475
340
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Tennessee ..........................................................................................................
Texas ................................................................................................................. .
Utah ...................................................................................................................

340
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Court-ordered support. -In some cases, courts have issued orders
against institutionalized spouses requiring them to make monthly
support payments in certain amounts to their spouses in the com·
munity. The policy of the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) is that, notwithstanding such an order, the income of the
institutionalized spouse is to be considered available to him for purposes of determining the amount of his contribution toward the
cost of nursing home care. The only part of his income which
HCFA policy acknowledges as available to the community spouse is
the specified maintenance needs allowance. This interpretation is
the subject of litigation.
Committee bill. -The improvement of individuals whose spouses
reside in nursing homes and receive Medicaid benefits is not justifiable. The current maintenance needs levels for community spouses,
which are limited by current Federal regulation, are inadequate. In
some cases, they have forced community spouses, in desperation, to
sue their husbands for support. The financial duress that these low
maintenance needs levels impose on the community spouse may, in
certain cases, even force the premature institutionalization of that
spouse.
The C.Ommittee bill would end spousal impoverishment. It revises
the current Federal requirements relating to attribution of income,
attribution of resources, transfer of resources, and post-eligibility
application of income. These revisions are limited to the context of
a couple with one spouse in an institution who applies for or receives Medicaid. The purpose of these revisions is to assure that
the community spouse in these circumstances has income and resources sufficient .to live with independence and dignity.
This bill establishes a uniform national spousal protection ~olicy
that applies in all States, whether they are "SSI," "209(b)," ' medically needy," or "special income level" States, and whether or not
they are community property jurisdictions. Should Arizona at some
point offer nursing home coverage through its Medicaid demonstration, these rules would apply to it as well.
The bill allows an institutionalized spouse to elect to be governed
by the rules that were in effect in his State as of March 1, 1987,
regarding the treatment of income, the protection of income for the
community spouse, the transfer of resources to the community
spouse. The purpose of this election is to assure that the bill does
not inadvertently make a community spouse worse off than under
current law with respect to protected income of with respect to the
minimum protected resource level of $12,000. This election could be
used by the institutionalized spouse either to increase the amount
of income or resources available to the community spouse or to
reduce it, thereby allowing the community spouse to qualify for
Medicaid or other public assistance benefits herself. However, the
bill does not permit either the institutionalized spouse or the community spouse to opt out of the rules regarding the treatment of
countable resources at the time of initial eligibility determination,
which impose, in effect, a maximum protected countable resource
limit of $48,000 on the 'community spouse.
Eligibility standards,-The bill does not alter income or resource
standards for Medicaid eligibility of the institutionalized spouse.
Thus, if the current resource standard is $1,800, it would remain
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$1,800 under this bill. Similarly, the bill generally does not alter
current law as to what income or resources are countable, and
which are not, or how income or resources are valued. The principal exception to this relates to the exemption for household goods
and personal effects for the limited purpose of attributing resources
at the time of institutionalization. The spousal protection rules in
this bill apply regardless of whether the institutionalized spouse
has qualified for Medicaid by meeting the eligibility standards as a
categorically needy, optional categorically needy, or medically
needy individual.
Attribution of income.-During any month that a spouse enters a
nursing home, hospital, or other institution, the following attribution rules apply for purposes of determining eligibility. Income paid
solely in the name of one spouse or the other is considered to
belong to that respective spouse. Thus, no income paid solely to the
community spouse is considered available to the institutionalized
spouse for eligibility purposes. If the income is paid in the names of
both spouses, half is considered available to the community spouse,
and half to the institutionalized spouse. If income is paid in the
name of either spouse and another person or persons, the income is
considered available to each individual names in equal proportional shares, unless the instrument controlling the income specifically
otherwise provides. The same principles apply in the case of
income from trust property. In the case of income from a trust
where there is no instrument establishing ownership, half of the
income is attributed to the institutionalized spouse and half to the
community spouse. These attribution rules are subject to rebuttal
by the institutionalized spouse upon a showing, by preponderance
of the evidence, that ownership interests are otherwise.
Attribution of resources.-The following rules would apply in determining the amount of countable resources at the time of application for Medicaid benefits by the institutionalized spouse. First, a
determination would be made of the total value of all the countable
resources held by either the institutionalized spouse, the community spouse, or both, on the day the institutionalized spouse began
the continuous period of institutionalization during which he applies for Medicaid benefits. Any countable resources belonging to
either or both spouses would be included in this determination, including resources from inheritance or previous marriages. For this
purpose only, the current limit of $2,000 on the equity value of the
exemption for household goods and personal effect.s would be inapplicable. Thus, all household goods and personal effects, regardless
of value, would not be counted among the resources attributed to
the couple or either spouse at the time of institutionalization for
purposes of determining eligibility.
One half of the value of all these resources, known as the spousal
sharE!, would be attributed to each spouse. If the spousal share of
the community spouse were less than $12,000, the institutionalized
spouse would be allowed to transfer a sufficient amount to the community spouse to enable her to hold countable resources in her
own name of a' total of $12,000. The institutionalized spouse would
not be required to make this transfer; however, any resources not
solely in the ownership of the community spouse would be attributed to the institutionalized spouse and, to the extent they exceed893
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ed the applicable resource standard (generally $1,800), would
render the institutionalized spouse ineligible for Medicaid.
If the spousal share of the community spouse were greater than
$48,000, the institutionalized spouse would have attributed to him,
for purposes of determining eligibility, both his own spousal share
and the resources attributed to the community spouse in excess of
$48,000. This $48,000 limit represents four times the $12,000 protected resource level. In 1989 and each year thereafter, these dollar
amounts would be increased by the percentage increase in the consumer price index for all urban consumers for each year since September 1987.
The attribution of resources into spousal shares, and the subsequent imposition of limits on the community spouse's shares, would
occur only once, at the time of initiaJ application. Afrer the month
in which an institutionalized spouse has met the resource eligibility standard and is determined to he eligible for benefits, no resources of the community spouse, regardless of value, would be considered available to the institutionalized spouse Thus, if while the
care of the institutionalized spouse is being paid for by Medicaid,
the community spouse's countable resources grow to exceed the
$48,000 initial limit, the State would not be authorized to require
the community spouse to apply any excess toward the cost of care
of the institutionalized spouse.
The Committee observes that, in many cases, the institutionalized spouse may not apply for Medicaid benefits until months after
his admission to a nursing home. Often these individuals and their
spouses have "spent down" a significant amount of their life savings to pay the nursing home charges. Repeated division of the couple's total resources into equal spousal shares at each application
or reapplication for benefits would result in the pauperization of
the community spouse, as the couple's total resources would effectively be reduced to twice the resource eligibility standard, generally $3600, before the institutionalized spouse qualified for Medicaid.
Precisely the opposite result is intended b,;y the Committee. For this
reason, the bill requires, .,n effect, that a 'snapshot" of the couple's
total resources be taken at the time of initial institutionalization,
and that attribution of resources into spousal shares proceed on the
basis of that "snapshot," regardless of the point at which the institutionalized spouse actually files application for benefits. The Committee expects that the States, in reconstructing the couple's resources at the time of institutionalization, will not apply unreason-
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Post-eligibility application of i~ome.-After an institutionalized
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spouse has met the resource and income criteria for eligibility, the
income attributed to that spouse would be applied as follows each
month. (The rules relating to attribution of income for purposes of
determination of eligibility, described above, would also apply for
purposes of post-eligibility treatment of income). From the institutionalized spouse's income, the following amounts would be deducted, in the following order. First, at least $25 would be reserved for
that spouse's personal needs. Second, a community spouse monthly
income allowance ·would be set aside. Third, a family allowance
would be deducted for each minor or dependent child, dependent
parent, or dependent sibling of either spouse living with the com-
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munity spouse. Finally, there would be deducted amounts for incurred expenses for medical care for the institutionalized spouse
not paid for by Medicaid, Medicare, or another liable third party.
The community spouse monthly income allowance is the amount
needed to bring the community spouse's monthly income, including
any income otherwise available to her, up to a minimum level.
This minimum level is defined as the sum of (1) an amount equal
to 150 percent of the Federal poverty guidelines for a family of two,
or $925 per month in 1987; (2) an excess shelter allowance (the
amount by which mortgage expenses or rent, plus utility costs,
exceed 30 percent of the amount in (1); and (3) one-half of the
amount by which the income of the institutionalized spouse exceeds the sum of amounts (1) and (2). The community spouse's minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance may not exceed $1500
per month. In 1989 and each year thereafter, this amount would be
increased by the percentage increase in the consumer price index
for all urban consumers for each year since September 1987. This
$1500 limit applies only to the amount that may be deducted from
the institutionalized spouse's income for the maintenance of the
community spouse; it does not in any way constrain the amount of
income that the community spouse may receive in her own name
from sources other than the institutionalized spouse.
The $1500 limit on the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance is not absolute. Under the bill, the institutionalized spouse
is entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate, at- a fair hearing, that
the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance is inadequate
to support the community spouse without financial duress. If the
spouse makes this showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the State would be required to establish an adequate monthly
maintenance needs allowance in that case.
Under the bill, States would be required, upon request by either
spouse or upon a determination of eligibility, to notify the institutionalized spouse of the amount of the community spouse monthly
income allowance, the family allowance, the way in which the community spouse resource allowance was computed, and the spouse's
right to a fair hearing. The bill makes clear that an institutionalized spouse who believes that the minimum monthly maintenance
needs allowance for the community spouse is inadequate, or who
believes that the State has not accurately determined the amount
of monthly income actually available to the community spouse
from other sources, is entitled to a fair hearing on either of these
issues, as well as any other State determinations that adversely
affect the incc,me or resources available to the community spouse.

Court ordered support.-The Committee recognizes that there
will be some instances in which the rules set forth in the bill do
not take adequate account of the special circumstances affecting a
particular community spouse. The bill therefore provides that; if a
. court has entered an order against an institutionalized spouse for
monthly income for the support of the community spouse, the community spouse monthly income allowance must be at least as great
as the amount of the !ncome ordered to be paid. Similarly, if a
court has en1;ered a l?Upport order against an institutionalized
spouse requiring that spouse to transfer countable resources to the
community spouse, the spouse ntay comply with the court's order
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without running afoul of the transfer of assets prohibitions, even
where the effect is to leave the community spouse with countable
resources in excess of $48,000.
Tran.-;fer of resources.-The Committee is informed that a
number of States have not made effective use of the authorities
under current law to prevent affluent individuals from disposing of
resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home coverage.
In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement program
for the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated
wealth from nursing home patients to their non-dependent children. The Committee is also concerned by the arbitrary nature of
current SSI policy relating to disposal of assets, under which the 2year penalty for transfers is unrelated to the amount of the assets
disposed of. Accordingly, the Committee bill replaces the current
law option with a uniform national policy, mandatory on all the
States, that is specific to Medicaid eligibility and that reasonably
relates the value of the resources improperly transferred to the
period of denial of eligibility.
Under the bill, States must determine whether each nursing
home or hospital patient who applies for Medicaid has, within 2
years of application, disposed of any countable resources for less
than fair market value. If such a transfer has occurred, the State
must determine the value (as of the time of transfer) of the countable resources transferred for which the applicant received less
than fair market value. The total uncompensated value of these
countable resources must then be divided by the average cost, to a
private patient at the time of application, of nursing home care in
the State. This yields the number of months for which the individual is ineligible for Medicaid, beginning with the month in which
the transfer took place. The Committee expects that, where practicable, the State should use the cost of nursing home care to private
patients in the community in which the applicant is institutionalized.
To avoid inequitable results, the bill provides for a number of exceptions from the denial of eligibility for transfers of countable resources for less than fair market value.
First, the prohibition on transfer does not apply at all in the case
of the transfer of an applicant's home to his or her spouse, child
under 21, or blind or disabled adult child. The Committee recognizes that, so long as an individual lives in a home or intends to
return to it, the home is not a countable resource. The purpose of
thi,s exception is to underscore that the transfer of an applicant's

or bem~ficiary's home to the community spouse or to any minor or
disabled children would be protected.
Second, the prohibition on transfers does not apply at all in the
case of a transfer of countable resources to the community spouse
of an institutionalu.ed individual, or to another for the sole benefit
of the community spouse. Since the Committee bill establishes
rules for the attribution of resources of married couples at the time
of institutionalization which reach both spouses, no purpose would
be served by pr9.hibiting transfers of countable resources from the
institutionalized SJX?US8 to the community spouse.
Third, if an individual can demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the
State, that he or she intended to dispose of the resources at fair
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market value, or for other valuable consideration, denial of eligibility for Medicaid should not occur. The purpose of the Committee
bill is to deter those who, through "gifting" or other disposal,
knowingly seek to shelter assets from dissipation due to nursing
home costs. The bill is not intended to penalize those who inadvertently, or through lack of sophistication, did not receive adequate
compensation. Nor is the bill intended to deny eligibility to those
who transfer resources to relatives or others by way of compensation for the informal care which these individuals have given to
the applicant or beneficiary; the imposition of a penalty in such
circumstances would have the unfortunate effect of discouraging
family members and friends from caring for the frail elderly or disabled and helping them remain independent for as long as possible.
Finally, the Committee recognizes that there will be circumstances where, although an individual may have transferred assets
in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits, the effect of denying Medicaid coverage for the specified period of time would be to seriously
threaten the continuing care or well-being of the applicant or otherwise work an undue hardship. The Committee also recognizes
that there will be circumstances where, with no expectation of
needing nursing home care and no intent of qualifying for Medicaid, an individual may give away money or property, perhaps for a
grandchild's education, and then later learn that, as a result of a
rapid change in medical condition, such as a stroke, nursing home
placement is suddenl_y required. The bill provides that where the
State determines such circumstances exist, eligibility for Medicaid
benefits must not be denied.
These prohibitions on transferring countable resources, and the
exceptions to them, are mandatory on all the States. The Committee bill expressly provides that States are not authorized to impose
more-or less-restrictive eligibility delays than those specified in
the Committee bill. Thus, the States could not impose any penalties
for transfers of resources on applicants or beneficiaries other than
those in nursing homes or hospitals. Similarly, the current SSI
policies relating to transfer of assets would no longer apply for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility of applicants or beneficiaries in institutions or those outside.
Conforming changes.-Currently, a number of States that offer
Medicaid coverage to the aged and disabled under the "medically
needy" option use less restrictive income or resource methodologies
in determining eligibility than apply to the aged and disabled
under the SSI program. HCFA interprets current law to require
that States use SSI income and resource methodologies under their
medically needy programs for the elderly and disabled.
The current treatment of income and resources of institutionalized spouses-substantially revised by the Committee bill-is essentially the result c,f applying SSI principles in a Medicaid context.
This is only one of many examples where principles that may be
valid in the context of a cash assistance program are not appropriate in the context of a medical assistance program. The State Medicaid Directors A..<1SOCiation has submitted a report to the Congress
concluding that directly linking Medicaid and SSI income and resource methodolo1pes results in impoverishment of the elderly and
disabled, increased State and Federal costs, and burdensome ad897
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ministrative practices. The Medicaid Directo1'3 offer a number of
examples of SSI policies which are inappropriate when applied to
Medic.aid, such as the rule that resource eligibility is determined
on the first day of the month. Following this SSI rule, if a nursing
home patient has resources in excess of the allowable. threshold
($1,800) on that day, he or she is ineligible for Medicaid throughout
the rest of the month, even if the amount of excess resources is too
small to enable the individual to pay for the entire month's nursing home costs.
In the view of the Committee, there is no justification for the
rigid application of SSI eligibility rules to Medicaid medically
needy programs. Prior to this HCFA interpretation, States had
flexibility to establish income or resource methodologies less r~
strictive-i.e., more generoUB from the applicant's standpointthan those under SSI. States should continue to have this flexibility. On the other hand, the Committee does not believe that the
States should have .the discretion to apply methodologies under
their medically needy programs that are more restrictive-i.e., less
generous from the applicant's standpoint-than those under SSI.
The bill therefore provides that the State's methodology for determinir1g eligibility for the medically needy aged and disabled shall
be no more restrictive than that under the SSI program (or, in the
case of families with children, under the corresponding Aid to Families with Dependent Children cash ruisistance program). To avoid
any possible ambiguity, the bill provides that a methodology is consider,~ to be "no more restrictive" if, using the methodology, individuals qualify for Medicaid even though they would not be eligible
were the SSI methodology used, and individuals who would be eligible for Medicaid under the SSI methodology would not be ineligible
under the State's medically needy methodology.
Effective dates.-The provisions relating to the treatment of
income and resources for institutionalized spouses are effective for
individuals residing in institutions on or after January 1, 1988.
This includes spouses who were residing in nursing homes before
that date, as well as spouses who are admitted on or after that
date. The provisions relating to transfers of resources apply to all
institutionalized individuals first applying for Medicaid on or after
January 1, 1988, with respect to any transfers for less than fair
market value occurring up to two years prior to the date of application. Both provisions are effective whether or not the Secretary of
HHS has promulgated final implementing regulations. If the Secretary determines that a State requires State legislation. other than

an appropriations bill, to implement these requirements, the provisions do not take effect until the first day of· the first calendar
quarter beginning after the close of the first regular State legislative session beginning after enactment. Finally, the provision allowing States to use less restrictive income and resource methodologies in their medically needy programs is October 1, 1982, the
effective date of the current statutory language on which HCFA erroneously bases its current interpretation. No disallowances or
other adverse .. actions may be taken against States based on the
currimt statufury language relating to "same" methodologies.
Examples.-The following examples illustrate the operation of
the Committee bill. Assume an elderly couple who together own a
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home assessed at $110,000 and have a joint savings account, to
which either spouse has unrestricted access, with a balance of
$20,000. The husband's monthly income, from his Social Security
benefit and his private pension, is $750. The wife, who worked at
home all her life raising a family, has income of $150 from Social
Security. The husband develops Alzheimer's disease and his wife,
no longer able to care for him at home, must place him in a nursing home. The husband a~plies for Medicaid. The State covers "optional categorically needy' nursing home residents under a special
income standard of $875 per month and a resource standard of
$1,800. The State's maintenance needs allowance for community
spouses is $340 per month.
Under current law, the husband is categorically related due to
his age, and, as of the beginning of the first full calendar month
after institutionalization, is eligible under the special income standard of $875. (Until the beginning of the first full calendar month,
the wife's income is attributed to him, and he does not meet the
special income standard). However, he must still meet the $1,800
resource standard. The entire amount in the couple's joint savings
account is attributed to the husband, since he has unrestricted
access to it, giving him excess resources of $18,200. Until he spends
these excess resources, he will remain ineligible for Medicaid. If he
gives the $18,200 to his wife, the State has the option of denying
him Medicaid eligibility for more than 2 yea,rs from the date of
transfer.
Assuming all the excess resources in the couple's joint account
are applied to the cost of nursing home care, and assuming a private patient rate of $2,000 per month, it will take about 9 months
for the husband to become resource-eligible for Medicaid. After eligibility has been established, the husband's income is applied as
f:,llows. First, an allowance of $25 is reserved for his personal
needs. Then an allowance of $190 for the maintenance needs of his
wife (the State standard of $340 minus the wife's own income of
$150) is set aside. If the husband had no uncovered medical costs in
the previous month, the remaining $535 of his income is applied to
the cost of nursing home care. The remainder is paid by the State
and Federal governments through Medicaid.
The wife in the community is left with the house, a monthly
income of $340, and access to the $1,800 remaining in the couple's
joint savings account. Before her husband entered the nursing
home, the couple's total income ($900 per month) was about 146
percent of the Federal poverty level for a couple; after her hus-band's institutionalization, she has only $1,800 in liquid assets and
her income places her at 75 percent of the Federal poverty level for
a single individual.
In sharp contrast to current law, the Committee bill would not
impoverish the wife in this case. At the time the husband enters
the nursing home, only $750 in income would be attributed to him,
and he would immediately be eligible under the State's special
income standard. With respect ,to resources, half of the couple's
total assets would be attributed to the wife and half to the husband. However, the bill allows-- the husband to transfer without
peni;tlty $12,000-the minimum community spouse resource allowance-to an account in his wife's name at any time. When the hus-
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band has spent all but $1,800 of the remaining $8,000, he becomes
resource-eligible for Medicaid. Assuming he applies all of these
excess resources to the cost of his nursing home care at $2,000 per
month, this will take about 4 months.
Once eligibility for Medicaid has been established, the husband's
monthly income is applied as follows. First, $25 is set aside each
month for a personal needs allowance. Second, $725 is reserved for
the maintenance needs of the community spouse. The community
spouse is allowed a minimum of $925, including her income; since
the wife's income is only $150, she can receive at least $775 from
the husband. However, since the husband's total income is less
than $775, she receives only the total income less the $25 personal
needs allowance, or $725. Nothing remains to reduce the cost of the
husband's nursing home care to the Medicaid program.
Under the Committee bill, the wife is left with a monthly income
of $875 (her Social Security check of $150 plus the maintenance
needs allowance of $725), or about 190 percent of the Federal poverty level for a single individual. She also has $12,000 in savings in
her name. The husband would qualify for Medicaid about 5 months
earlier than under current law. The total Federal and State Medicaid payment to the nursing home would go up by $535 per month
(the difference between the husband's $190 community spouse
monthly income allowance under current law and the $725 allowance under the bill).
Another example will illustrate the effect of the bill's provision
for an equal division of the couple's resources. Assume that the
couple's joint savings account at the time of institutionalization
contains not $20,000, but $50,000. Under the bill, the husband
would be . allowed, without penalty, to transfer $25,000 of this
amount to an account in the wife's name. Of the remaining half,
$23,000 would have to be spent before the husband would become·
resourc~ligible for Medicaid. Under current law, all but $48,200
in the joint account has to be spent before the husband becomes
eligible for Medicaid. (Although a couple with $50,000 in savings is
likely to have household goods and personal effects valued at more
than $2,000, the bill provides that all these items are not to be considered resources for purposes of determining the community
spouse resource allowance).
The effect of the bill's ceiling of $48,000 on the community
spouse resource allowance may be demonstrated by assuming that
the couple has not $20,000, but $100,000 in joint savings accounts
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and jointly held stocks and mutual funds at the time of the hus-

band's institutionalization. The bill allows the husband to transfer
half of the jointly held resources, or $50,000, to the wife in her own
name, subject to the limit of $48,000. Thus, the couple would have
to spend $50,200 (the husband's $50,000 share, plus $2,000 excess
resources from the wife's share, less the resource eligibility standard of $1,800) before the husband could qualify for Medicaid. Again,
any household goods or personal effects would not be taken into account in determining 'the amount of the community spouse's resource allowance.
The effect of the bill on financial planning {or the lack thereof)
can be illustrated with the following example. Assume that this
couple has a total of $50,000 in savings, and because it has done no
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financial planning, all of these resources are held by the husband
in his own name when he is admitted to the nursing home. Under
current law, the husband cannot qualify for Medicaid until all but
$1,800 of this amount is spent. Under the bill, however, the husband may transfer $25,000 to the wife in her own name without
penalty.
If one assumes that this couple, learning of the husband's disease, anticipated the need for institutionalization and transferred
all of the $50,000 joint savings to the wife more than two years
prior to application for Medicaid, the result under the bill is the
same as in the previous example. Regardless of ownership, the resources are attributed in equal shares to each spouse. Until the
wife's resources are reduced to $25,000, the husband is not resource-eligible for Medicaid. Under current law, the husband, with
no resources attributable to him, would immediately qualify for
Medicaid, and the wife would be under no Federal law obligation to
contribute toward the cost of his care.
Finally, the concept of the resource "snapshot" at institutionalization is illustrated by the following example. Assume, as above,
that couple has countable resources of $50,000, jointly held, at the
time of the husband's admission to the nursing home. The husband
does not apply for Medicaid upon admission; instead, the couple
begins to spend it resources to pay for the cost of his care. After a
year, the couple has spent $24,000 from its joint resources, and the
husband applies for Medicaid. The State would then look back to
the date of the husband's institutionalization for purposes of attributing resources. Since the wife's spousal share was $25,000 then, if
the husband transfers his interet in $25,000 of the remaining resources to his wife, he will immediately be resource-eligible for
Medicaid, since the remaining $1,000 would meet the $1,800 resource standard.
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Study of adult day care services (section 215)
The Committee bill would require the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to conduct a survey and report to the Congress on
adult day care services that are currently being provided throughout the United States. Such a report is to include information on
(1) the scope of adult day care services and the extent of their
availability around the country; (2) the characteristics of the various entities (such as community-based programs, hospitals, and
nursing facilities) that provide these services; (3) licensure, certification, and other quality standards that are applicable to those entities providing such services; (4) the cost and financing of adult
day care services; and (5) the characteristics of individuals who use
the services (including on the individuals' level of disability and on
the availability of similar in-home care services).
The purpose of this review is to evaluate programs and projects
that have already been established, so that Congress can properly
consider the advisability of Medicare coverage for adult day care
services. Thus, it is not the intention of the Committee that the
Secretary undertake a demonstration project or in any other
matter initiate or fund new adult day care programs. The Secretary is to report only on the current availability of services and on
901
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Further, the committee expects that the Secretary, in reviewing a
State's P.roposed cost-sharing charges to determine if they are nominal, will consider the monthly amounts paid by the 8tate as cash
assistants under the State's AFDC program. and the income standards use.d to determine eligibility for the medically needy, as well as
the costs of the specific medical services. Finally the amendment assures that recipients are not denied emergency care or other needed
services because they are not able to pay required copayment amounts
as a precondition to securing such services.
Ejfect,~ve date.-Enactment.

Eatima.tea aavinga.Fiscal years:

Mlltlons

1983.......·--·························-·····-·-·-···-················-···················-··········--····--·······
1984..........................................................................................................................
l 985..........................................................................................................................

$42

47
53

ELIMINATE MATCHING RATE FOR MEDICINE PART B "BuY·IN"

( Section 132 of the Bill)

J

Present law.-Most State Medicaid plans pay the monthly Medicare Part B premium payment for their dual eligible beneficiaries
under a "buy-m" agreement. While States may buy-in to Medicare for
both their cash assistance and medically needy populations who are
eligible for Medicare federal matching for premium payments is
r, ,·oilab]e only for the cash assistance group. If a State does not buy
in for Part B coverage, it cannot receive Federal matching payments
for services that would have been covered under Medicare if there had
been a buy-in arrangement. Four Statrs and two jurisdiction~ do not
currently have a buY-in arrangement. These are: Alaska, Louisiana,
Oregon, ·wyoming, tl:e Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico.
A}i,,c;ki,'s buv-in agreement becomes effectfre 0ctober 1. 1982.
Committee a.mendment.-The amendment eliminates Federal
matching for all Medicare Part B premium payments, effective with
respect to pN?miums due for months after September 1982. The com·
mittee notes that the current comhination of the 75 pere€nt FC'dernl
general revenue subsidy for part B (for all Medicare part B eligibles) coupled with the Federal match for Medicaid eligibles results
in a Federal subsidy of close to 90 percent for part B services for this
popnlation group.
Eftccti·re date . -Premiums due -for months after September 1982.

Eatlmated savings.·
Fiscal years:
MIiiions
1983.....·-···················· . ··-·································........... _...................... - ..·······-······· $203
1934.................................................................................................................................. 216
1985................................................................ -··--····--.. ·······-··.. ·····-·················-··· 230
MODIFY LIEN PROVISIONS

(Section 133 of the Bill)

>

Present law.-Under current law, States ore barred from imposing /
any lien against a~y recipient's property prior to his death because of
813
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Medicaid claims paid or to be paid on his behalf unless placed as a
result of a court judgment. In the case of individuals under age 65, no
n.djustments or recoveries can be made for Medicaid claims correctly
paid. In the case of individuals over 65, adjustments and recoveries for")
correctly paid claims can only be made from his/her estate after the
individ•iaPs death and only (1) after the death of his surviving)
spouse; and (2) where there are no surviving children who are under>
21, blind, or disabled.
'Further, under current law, States may deny medicaid eligibility to
applicants who, within the previous 24 months, transferred for less
than fair market value resources which, if retained, would ha,·e made
them ineligible for the program. However, in most instances the
applicant's ownership of a home would not make him or her ineligible
for medicaid.
It is therefore possible, under current law, for an elderly individual
who anticipates needing nursing home care to give his/her home to a
famil1 member or friend without fear of losing or being denied medicaid eligibility. By so doing, the individual assures that the home will
not be part of his/her estate and therefore will not be subject to any
recovery action initiated by the State after the individual's death.
O(}7Tlt'lnittee amendment.-The amendment intends to assure that all
of the resources available to an institutionalized individual, including
equity in a home, which are not needed for the support of a spouse or
dependent children will be used to defray the costs of supporting the
mdividual in the institution. In doing so) it seeks to balance government's legitimate desire to recover its medicaid costs against the individual's need to have the home available in the event rlisclrn,rge from
the institution becomes feasible.
The amendment has two parts. First, it allows States to deny :Medicaid eligibility temporarily to patients in medical institutionc; who
dispose of a home for Jess than £air market value, even though such
disposal would not make them ineligible for supplemental seeuritJ
income (SSI). States could either deny eligibility to all such in<l1yiduals for periods reasonably related to the uncompensated value, or
they could deny eligibility in all cases for a minimum of 24 months,
with the option to provide for longer periods of ineligibility in the
case of individuals who disposed of homes worth substantial amounts.
The provision would not apply in the case of individuals who reasonably expected to be discharged from the medical institution and return home; indivi<luals who demonstrated that they had intended to
obtain fair market value or other valuable consideration in exchange
£or their homes; or individuals who transferred title to their homes
to a spouse or a minor or handicapped child. The State coulrl also
make an exception in other cases where undue hardship would otherwise result.
,
Second, the amendment would allow States to attach the real property, including the home, of medicaid recipients who are permanently
institutionalized, in nursing homes or other long term care medical
institutions. The lien could not be foreclosed upon, and States could
recover the cost- of medical assistance provided to the recipient only
when the recipient volunt!J,rily chose to sell the property or, after the
recipfont's death, from his estate. As under current law, no recovery
would be permitted while the recipient's spouse was still living or
814
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while his/her children were still dependent (under 21, or blind, or
disabled). Further, if the recipient is discharged from the institution
and returns home, the lien would dissolve, and the property wou:d be
available for the recipient's use until his/her death.
The commjttee notes that, under current law, States are often unable to recover resources which recipients hold as homes or as inoJmeproducing real property. The amendment would facilitate States'
efforts to recover medical assistance costs from these types of resources
and to assure that all resources available to an indivi<luaJ,will be used
to defray the public costs of supporting that individual in a long-term
medical institution.
At the same time, the committee notes that the legitimate rights of
the recipient, the recipient's spouse and his/her dependent children are
protected under the amendment.
Effective date.-Enactment.
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1983........ ·-···························································-·················································· $183
1984.......................................................................................................................... 200
1985............. -........................................................................................................... 221
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REDUCTION IN :ERROR RATE TOLERANCE

( Section 134 of the Bill)

Present Zaw.-Under an amendment to the 1980 Appropriations Act,
States were reguired to reduce their payment error rMes for eligi.bility determinat1ons to 4 percent by September 30, 1982.. States whose
error rates exc-eed the target figure are subject to a penalty reductio~.
The nationwide Medicaid payment error rate for the October 1980l\farch 1981 period was estimated at 4.1 percent.
Oommittee amendment.-The amendment deletes the error rate pro·
visions and penalties incorporated in the 1980 Appropriations A~t. It
substitutes language establishing a 3 percent target error rat,~ fqr
quarters beginning after March 30, Hl82. Prospective fiscal sanction~
are to be applied beginning in the second half of fiscal year 1983 for
States which have error rates exceeding the 3-percent figure. The annual penalty, applied on a prospective basis, will be equal to th¢
product of (a) the portion of the projected error rate which eX·~eeds
;1 percent for the year in question and ( b) the total amount of Federal

from

1

~r-,Hcho
g~ch
;ccurity
nrliYidtl \ or
r.i 1ths,
· in the
r

noi,mts.

r ison-

a ~ re'lded to
:ch•mge
,mes
,1, ,also
:. other1 ~opu . at]y
nedical
'r.,-.,u]d
1t ,nly
l1,,. ,the
:eovery

.,ir~ or

Millions
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provided to recipients for whom the State determined eligibility. If thf
estimated prospective penalty proves to be inaccurate when actual data
from the period become available, appropriate adjustments wm be
made in subsequent grants. The Secretary is prov1ded discretion in
applying the fiscnl penalties, in whole or part, for a State which has
made a good faith effort to meet the 3-percent target.
The committee is a.ware that many questions remain to be res,)lved
relative to the matter of sanctions for e:s:cessive rates of error. For
example~.· under the existing provision no sanctions have in fact been
imposed. H°'ve\'er, the Administration's projections of program cost$
under present law appear to he based on an assumption that no waiv-.
ers would be grante<l. The committee believes that the question
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PUBLIC LAW 103-66-AUG. 10, 1993

PART fi...,.ELJGIBILITY
SEC. 13611. TRANSFERS OF ASSETS; TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRUSTS.
(a) PERIODS OF INELIGIBILITY FOR TRANSFERS OF AssETS.-

(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 1917(c)(l) (42 u.s.c. 1396p(cX1))
is amended to read as follows:
"(l)(A) In order to meet the requirements of this subsection
for purposes of section 1902(aX18), the State plan must provide
that if an institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an
individual (or, at the option of a State, a noninstitutionalized
individual or the spouse of such an individqa}) disposes of assets
for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date
specified in subparagraph (BXi), the individual is ineligible for
medical assistance for services described in subparagraph (CXi)
(or, in the case of a noninstitutionalized individual, for the services
described in subparagraph (C)(ii)) during the period beginning on
the date specified in subparagraph (D) and equal to the number
of months specified in subparagraph (E).
"(B)(i) The look-back date specified in this subparagraph is
a date that is 36 months (or, in the case of payments from a
trust or portions of a trust that are treated as assets dis~sed
of by. the individual pursuant t.o paragraph (3XA)(iii) or (3XB)(ii)
of subsection (d), 60 months) before the date specified in clause
.

(ii).

b
u

D

a

.
"(ii) The date specified in this clause, with respect to.
"(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of

which the individual both is an institutionalized individual
and has applied for medical assistance under the State plan,
or
"(II) a noninstitutionalized individual is the date on which
the individual applies for medical assistance under the State
plan or, if later, the date on which the individual disposes
of assets for less than fair market value.
"(C)(i) The services described in this subparagraph with respect
to an institutionalized individual are the following:
"(I) Nursing facility services.
.
"(II) A level of care in any institution equivalent to that
of nursing facility services.
"(Ill) Home or community-based services furnished under
a waiver granted under subsection (c) or (d) of section 1915.
"(ii) The services described in this subparagraph with respect
to a noninstitutionalized individual are services (not including any
services described in clause (i)) that are described in paragraph
(7), (22), or (24) of section 1905(a), and, at the option of a State,
other long-term care services for which medical assistance is otherwise available under the State plan to individuals requiring longterm care.
·
"(D) The date specified in this subparagraph is the first day
of the first month during or after which assets have been transferred
for less than fair market value and which does not occur in any
other periods of ineligibility under this subsection.
"(E)(i) With respect to an institutionalized individual, the number of months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall be equal to-"(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets
transferred by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or
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after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (BXi), divided
by
"(Il) the average monthly cost t.o a private patient of nursing facility services in the State (or, at the option of the State,
in the community in which the individual is institutionalized)
at the time of application.
"(ii) With respect to a noninstitutionalized individual, the munher of months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall not be greater than a number equal to"(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets
transferred by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or
after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (BXi), divided
by
"(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility services in the State (or, at the option of the State,
in the community in which the individual is institutionalized)
at the time of application.
"(iii) The number of months of ineligibility otherwise determined under clause (i) or (ii) with respect to the disposal of an
asset shall be reduced"(I) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under
clause (i), b,: the number of months of ineligibility applicable
to the individual under clause (ii) as a result of such disposal,
and
"(II) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under
clause (ii), by the number of months of ineligibility applicable
to the individual under claUBe (i) as a result of such disposal.
(2) EXCEPTIONS.-Section 1917(c) is amended(A) in parar.-aph (2XA), by striking "resources" and
inserting "assets ;
(B) by amending paragraph (2XB) to read as follows:
"(B) the assets"(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to
another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse,
"(ii) were transferred from the individual's spoUBe to
another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse,
"(ill) were transferred to, or to a trust (including a
trust described in subsection (dX4)) established solely for
the benefit of, the individual's child described in subparagraph (AXii)(II), or
"(iv) were transferred to a trust (including a trust
described in subsection (d)(4)) established solely for the
benefit of an individual under 65 years of age who is
disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3));";
(C) in paragraph (2)(C)(i) by striking "resources" each place it appears

42 USC 1396p.

and inserting "assets",

(ii) by striking "any",
(ill) by striking "or (ii)" and inserting "(ii)", and

(iv) by striking "; or" and inserting ", or (iii) all
assets transferred for less than fair market value have
been returned to the individual; or";
(D) by amending paragraph (2XD) to read as follows:
"(D) the State determines, under procedures established
by the State (in accordance with standards specified by the
Secretary), that the denial of eligibility would work an widue
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hardshiJ!c: determined on the basis of criteria established

by the

tary;";
by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the
following:
"(3) For p ~ of this subsection, in the case of an asset
held by an individual in common with another eerson or persons
in a joint tenancy.I.. tenancy in common, or similar arrangementJ
the asset (or the anected portion of such asset) shall be conaiderea
1;o be transferred !>Y such individual when any action .is taken,
either by such individual or by any other person. that reduces
or eliminates such individual's ownerBhip or control of such asaet.n;
and
(F) by adding at the end of paragraph (4) the following:
"In the case of a transfer !7 the ~use of an individual
which results in a period of ineligibility for medical assist..
ance under a State plan for such individual, a State shall,,
using a reasonable methodology (aa specified by the Sec··
retary), apportion such period of inellinf>ility (or any J)(!rtiori:
of such. period) among the individual and the individual's
spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical
assistance under the State plan.".
(b) TREATMENT OF TRUST AMOUNTS.-Section 1917 (42 U.S.C,.
l396p) is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(dXl) For purposes of determining an individual's eligibility
for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under this title.,
subject to paragraph (4), the rules specified m paragraph (3) shalll
appll. to a trust established by such individual.
(2XA) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall
be considered to have established a trust if assets of the individua:l
were used to form all or part of the corpus of the trust and
if any of the following individuals established such trust other
than by will:
·
"(i) The individual.
"(ii) The individual's
use.
·
"(iii) A person, inclu'!lrng a court or administrative body,
with le~ authority to act in place of or on behalf of thE:
individual or the individual's spoUBe.
"(iv) A person. including any court or administrative body,
acting at tlie · direction or upon the request of the individual
or the individual's spouse.
"(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which includes assets
of an individual (as determined under subparagraph (A)) and assets
of any other perBon or persons, the provisions of this subsection
shall apply to the portion of the trust attributable to the aasets
of the individual.
"(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply with·
out regard to"(i) the purposes for which a trust is established.
"(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion
(E)

Intergovernmental
relations.

·!

•= '

...

under the trust,

"(iii) any restrictions on when or whether distributions
may be made from the trust, or
"(iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the
trust.
"(3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust"(i) the co~ of the trust shall be considered resourcea
available to the individual,

.1

·'
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"(ii) payments from the .trust to or for the benefit of the
individual shall be considered income of the individual, and
"(iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered
assets disposed of by the individual for purposes of subsection (c).
"(B) In the case of an irrevocable trust"(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment
from the trust could be made to or for the benefit of the
individual, the portion of the corpus from which, or the income
on the corpus from which, payment to the individual could
be made shall be considered resources available to the individual, and g.ayments from that portion of the corpus or income(!) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be
considered income of the individual, and
"(ID for any other purpose, shall be considered a transfer of assets by the individual subject to subsection (c);
and
"(ii) any portion of the trust from which, or any income
on the corpus from which, no payment could under any circumstances be made to the individual shall be considered,
as of the date of establishment of the trust (or, if later, the
date on which payment to the individual was foreclosed) to
be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of subsection
(c), and the value of the trust shall be determined for purposes
of such subsection by including the amount of any payments
made from such portion of the trust after such date.
"(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following
trusts:
"(A) A trust containing the assets of an individual under
age 65 who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) and
which is established for the benefit of such individual by a
parent, grandparent, legal· guardian of the individual, or a
court if the State will receive all amounts remaining in the
trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount equal
to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual
under a State plan under this title.
.
"(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of an
individual if"(i) the trust is composed onlr of pension, Social Security, and other income to the individual (and accumulated
income in the trust),
"(ii} the State will receive all amounts remaining in
the trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount
equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of
the individual under a State plan under this title, and
"(iii) the State makes medical assistance available to
individuals described in section 1902(aXl0XA)(iiXV), but
does not niake such assistance available to individuals

,. :e

ll'CeS

for nursing facility services under section 1902(aX10XC).
"(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who
is disabled (as defined in section 1614(aX3)) that meets the
following conditions:
.
"(i) The trust is established and managed by a nonprofit association.
"(ii) A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust, but, for purposes of investment and
management of funds, the trust pools these accounts.
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"(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for
the benefit of individuals who are disabled (as defined
in section 1614(aX3)) by the parent, grandparent, or legal
guardian of such individuals, by such individuals, or by
a <".ourt.
"(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the
beneficiary's account upon the death of the beneficiary
are not retained by the trust, the tl'Ust pays to the State
from such remaining amounts in the account an amount
equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan under this
title.
·
"(5) The State a~ncy shall establish procedures (in accordance
with standards specified by the· Secretary) under which the agency
waives the application of this subsection with respect to an individual if the individual establishes that such application would work
an undue hardship on the individual as determined on the basis
of criteria established by the Secretary.".
"(6) The term 'trust' includes any legal instrument or device
that is similar to a trust but includes an annui~ only to such
extent and in such manner as the Secretary specifies..
(c) DEFINITIONS.--Section 1917 (42 U.S.C. 1396p), as amended
by subsection (b), is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
"(e) In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
"(1) The term 'assets', with respect to an individual,
includes all income and resources of the individual and of
the individual's spouse, including any income or resources
which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled
to but does not receive because of action·
"(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
"(B) by a person, including a court or administrative
body, with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf
oft;he individual or such individual's spouse, or
"(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the direction or upon the request of
the individual or such individual's spouse.
"(2) The term 'income' has the meaning given such term
in section 1612.
"(3) The term 'institutionalized individual' means an
individual who is an in_patient in a nursing facility, who is
an inpatient in a medical institution and with res_pect to whom
payment is made based on a level of care provided in a nursing
facility, or who is described in section 1902(aXl0)(A)(ii)(VI).
"(4) The term 'noninstitutionalized individual' means an
individual receiving any of the services specified in subsection
(cXlXCXii).
.
"(5) The term 'resources' has the meaning given such term
in ~tion 1613, without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to the exclusion described in subsection (aXl)
of such section.".

(

isam
(e) E
tion shall
under tit
beginninE
or not fir:
promulga·
(2) T;
(,

before
0
date C
((

date C
(3) Ir,
title XIX.
and Hum.
than legis
the additi
subsectior,
t.o comply
on the ba
before the
the close,
begins aft
of the prf
year legisl
to be a sep
SEC.18612.
(a) M
13f
follows an

u.s.c.

seek adjw
paid on b<
of the follo

"(,

(aXlX:
the in
to a l
behalf
"(]

age or
ance,
indivic
of-

(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.(1) Section 1902 (42 U.S.C. 1396a) is amended-

(A) in subsection (a)(18), by striking "and transfers
of assets" and inserting ". transfers of assets, and treatment
of certain trusts";
(B) in subsection (a)(51)-
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(i) by s t ~ •(A)"; and
(ii) by striking •, and (B)" and all that follows

and inserting a semicolon; and

(C) by striking subsection (k).
(2) Section 1924(b)(2)(B)(i) (42 U.S.C. 1896r-5(b)(2)(B)(i))

is amended by striking "1902(k)" and inserting "1917(d)".
(e) EFFECTIVE DATES.-{!) The amendments made b;yJhie_sec- 42 USC 1396p
ti~n shap apply, exceJ>.~as __l>~~-d:~ ~ _ tjjj_-~]luh•tt&n;].i)__p'!1-.Plenta note.
qnde1" ·t1tJe·--xix-ofthe 13oclfil. __Secimty . AcLfor. -.calendar--quar,t.ers

;!!;~~!l~~J~~~-lJt!~~~~~:ta
~a;:e:
promulgated by such date.
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(2) The amendments made by this section shaJ.J.__n_Qt-.Jlppl_y(N to medical assistance provided for servi~~-furnisped
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date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) In the case of a State plan for medical assistance under
title XIX of the Social Security Act which the Secretary of Health
and Human Services determines requires State legislation (other
than legislation appropriating funds) in order for the plan to meet
the additional re<{uirements imposed by the amendment made by
subsection (b), the State plan shall not be regarded as failing
to comply with the requirements imposed by such amendment solely
on the basis of its failure to meet these additional requirements
before the first day of the first calendar quarter beginning after
the close of the first regular session of the State legislature that
begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, in the case of a State that has a 2year legislative session, each year of such session shall be deemed
to be a separate regular session of the State legislature.
SEC. 13612. MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERIES.

(a) MANDATE To SEEK REcOVERY.-Section 1917(b)(l) (42
U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)) is amended by striking "except-" and all that
follows and inserting the following: "except that the _State shall
seek a<\justment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case
of the following individuals:
"(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection
(a)(l)(B), the State shall seek a(ijustment or recovery from
the individual's estate or upon sale of the property subject
to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the mdividual. .
"(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of
age or older when the individual received auch medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the
indiviclual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting
of-.
"(i) nursing facility services, home and communitybased services, and related hospital and prescription drug
services, or
"(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services
under the S!:8te plan.
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"(CXi) In the case of an individual who has received (or
is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance
policy in connection. with which assets or resources are disregarded in the manner described in clause (ii), except as
provided in such clause, the Stat.e shall seek acljustment or
recovery from the individual's estate on account of medical
assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility
and other long-term care services.
"(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an individual
who received medical assistance wider a State plan of a State
which had a State plan amendment approved as of May 14,
1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or
resources"(D to the extent that payments are made under a
long-term care insurance policy; or
"(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled
to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance
~licy.".
(b) HARDSHIP WAIVER.-Section 1917(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b))
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance
with standards s~ed by the Secretary) under which the agency
shall waive the application of this subsection (other than paragraph .
(lXC)) if such ap_plication would work an undue hardship as determined on the bains of criteria established by the Secretary.".
(c) DEFINITION OF ESTATE.-Section 1917(b) (42 u.s.c.
1396p(b))l as amended by subsection (b), is amended by adding
· · at the ena the following new paragraph:
"(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'estate', with
respect to a deceased individual"(A) shall include all real and personal property and other
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for
purposes of State probate law; and
"(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall
incl~de, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (lXCXi)
applies), any other real and personal pro~rty and other assets
in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such
assets conveyed to a ,urvivor, heir, or assign of the deceased
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.".
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES.-(lXA) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the ~endments ade bY.... this se~tion. s_ha!L_apJ>JY. .to
~~~ under title XIX..of..the..Socu~Lf½l;Jll'lty:_J\cLfQ.cciilendar
<@.~.ti-oo~r after October 1, 1993, without regard
t<f whether or not ffiiiuffigu1affonrtocany-out such amendments
have been promulgated by such date.
(B) In the case of a State plan for medical assistance under
title XIX of the Social Security Act which the Secretary of Health
and Human Services determines requires State legislation (other
than legislation appropriating funds) in order for the plan to meet
the additional requirements imposed by the amendments made
by this section, the St.ate plan shall not be regarded as failing
to comply with the requirements imposed by such amendments
solely on the basis of its failure to meet these additional requirements before the first day of the first calendar quarter be~ng
after the close of ,the first regular session of the State legislature
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that begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, in the case of a State that has a 2year legislative session, each year of such session shall be deemed
to be a separate regular session of the State legislature.
(2) The amendments made by this section shall not apply
to individuals who died before October 1, 1993.

PART ID-PAYMENTS
SEC. 13821. ASSURING PROPER PAYMENTS TO DISPROPORTIONATE

SHARE HOSPrrALS.
(a) DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITALS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE
MINIMUM LEvEL OF SERVICES TO MEDICAID PATIENTS.(!) IN GENERAL.-Section 1923 (42 U.S.C. 1396r-4) is

l
)

!''it'
1
l

amended(A) in subsection (aXl)(A), by striking "requirement"
and inserting "requirements";
(B) in subsection (b)(l), by striking "requirement" and
inserting "requirements";
(C) in the heading to subsection (d), by striking
"REQUIREMENT" and inserting "REQUIREMENTS";
(D) by adding at the end of subsection (d) the following
new paragraph:
"(3) No hospital may be defined or deemed as a disproportionate share hospital under a State plan under this title or
under subsection (b) or (e) of this section unless the hospital
has a medicaid inpatient utilization rate (as defined in subsection (b)(2)) of not less than 1 percent.";
(E) in subsection (e)(l)(i) by striking "and" before "(B)", and
(ii) by inserting before the period at the end the
following: ", ai;id--{C) the plan meets the requirement
of subsectiol)-{d)(3) and such payment adjustments are
made consf'stent with the last sentence of subsection
(c)"; and/
(F) in s~bsection (e)(2)(i) :'in subparagraph (A), by inserting "(other than
the last sentence of subsection (c))" after "(c)",
(ii) by striking "and" at -. the end of subparagraph
(A),

()
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l
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(iii) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (B) and inserting", and", and
(iv) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
"(C) subsection (dX3) shall apply.".
(2)

EFFECTIVE DATE.-The

amendments made by this sub-

42 USC 1396r-4

section shall apply to payments to States under section 1903(a) note.
of the Social Security Act for payments ·to hospitals made
under State plans after(A) the end of the State fiscal year that ends dwing
1994, or
(B) in the case of a State with a State legislature
which is not scheduled to have a regular legislative session
in 1994, the end of the State fiscal year that ends during
1995;
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I.
INTRODUCTION
By Order dated August 26, 1998, the Court has requested that the Appellant, the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department") file a limited
responsive brief addressing only the issue of "whether the definition of 'assets' contained
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(I)(B) as enacted in 1993 is applicable to the Marriage Settlement
Agreement between Lionel and Hildor dated March 8, 1993."
This brief concludes that:
( 1)

Whether the definition is "applicable" depends on whether the issue

examined is Medicaid eligibility or estate recovery;
(2)

The definition of "assets" is not applicable for the purpose of determining

Hildor Knudson's Medicaid eligibility;
(3)

The definition of "assets" is applicable and significant in understanding

Congressional intent for estate recovery purposes; but
(4)

The definition of assets is only persuasive authority and does not control the

outcome of this case.
While the Department profoundly disagrees with many other aspects of Jackman's
Rehearing Brief, in accordance with the Court's order, only the issue presented by the
Court has been briefed herein.

LINIITED RESPONSE TO
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........

II .
THE DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" lVIA Y BE
APPLICABLE FOR ESTATE RECOVERY PlJRPOSES
EVEN THOUGH IT IS INAPPLICABLE IN
DETERlVIINING MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY.

A.

The Distinction Between Eligibility and Estate Recoverv.
When scrutinizing asset transfers, including transfers between spouses through a

marriage settlement agreement, there is a significant distinction between questions of
eligibility and questions of estate recovery. Transfers which may be appropriate for
eligibility purposes, may be voidable in other contexts. See IDAPA citations, infra. This
unusual circumstance arises because, at least in part, federal Medicaid law ignores state
marital property laws.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p deals with both eligibility and estate recovery in different
sections. For example, subsection (c) imposes a period of ineligibility for prohibited
transfers, while specifically permitting transfers between spouses. Seemingly in conflict
with state community property principles, transfers to third parties by either spouse are
punished, without regard to which spouse is the legal owner of the property. At the same
time, what property is available for estate recovery is enlarged in subsection (b) by an
expansive definition of "estate."
The eligibility provision, punishing transfers to third parties, ignores the effect of
state community property laws. When estate recovery law is applied to the same
circumstance to recover property which has been transferred between the spouses, it
LIMITED RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING - 2
000415

appears that the laws conflict. This perceived conflict arises, however, only because of
the interplay between state community property laws and federal Medicaid law. There is
actually no conflict, and in Idaho, community property principles are preserved and are
modified only to the extent necessary to effectuate the federal scheme.
As an example, IDAPA_ 16.03.09.025.20 permits recovery only of estate property
which had previously been the couple's community property:
20.
Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's
claim against the assets of a deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections
56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a surviving
spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited to the value of the assets of the
estate that were community property 1 or the deceased recipient's share of
the separate property, and jointly owned property.
IDAP A 16.03.09.025.20 (underline added). 1 Similarly, transfers between spouses
• 11,•

.r

through a marriage settlement agreement, valid under state law, which have no effect on
eligibility. are, because of community property law, restricted for purposes of estate
recove:r:y:
24.
Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of
the deceased recipient or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement
agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate
consideration.

1It is because of this section that most of the "examples" posed by Jackman at pages 15 through 18 of
the Rehearing Brief are wrong. The Department does not seek recovery of property that has been received and
maintained as separate property. Only property that was, prior to establishing Medicaid eligibility, community
property, is subject to the Department's reimbursement claim. The Court's decision, contrary to Jackman's
claim at page 16 of her Rehearing Brief, does not ignore "treasured principles of community property law", it
protects them.
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IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24. This provision is found within the Medicaid estate recoverv
provisions, but a similar provision is found within the eligibility rules:
A marriage settlement agreement may be valid for Medicaid eligibility and
still be voidable for estate recovery purposes if value is transferred between
spouses without adequate consideration.
IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04.
These provisions of State and federal law merely show that a different ar;,alysis is
required when considering questions of eligibility and questions of estate recovery. The
reason this dichotomy arises is, at least in part, because federal law ignores community
property principles and State law preserves them.
B.
Hildor Knudson's Medicaid Eligibility Is Not in Issue and the Eligibilitv
Provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p Are Not in Issue.
Had the marriage settlement agreement improperly conveyed assets between
Hildor and Lionel Knudson, Hildor's Medicaid eligibility could have been affected. No
one, however, has contended that Hildor was not eligible for Medicaid. No one has
claimed the marriage settlement agreement improperly transferred assets from one spouse
to the other. Therefore, whether the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p applies to
the marriage settlement agreement, for eligibility purposes, is completely irrelevant to the
outcome of this case.
At page 28 (under subheading 1) of her brief, Jackman argues that the definition in
42 U.S.C. § 1396p does not apply because the marriage settlement agreement was entered
into before the effective date of the act. In support of this argument, Jack.man cites P .L.

,...,

LIMITED RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING - 4
000417

103-66, § 13612(e)(2)(B). Section 13612 contains the effective dates for those provisions
dealing with estate recovery. However, the cited provision does not exist in section
13612. Instead, the correct citation is§ 1361 l(e)(2)(B). Section 13611 is the section
dealing with eligibility not estate recovery. Therefore, it is true that Hildor Knudson's
eligibility was unaffected by transfers made prior to the effective date of the act. But
that was never the issue.

The effective date for the estate recovery changes is found in § 13612(d)(l )(A)
which states:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the amendments made by this
section shall apply to payments under title XIX of the Social Security Act
for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, without regard
to whether or not final regulations to carry out such amendments have been
promulgated by such date.
P.L. 103-66, § 13612(d)(l)(A). In other words, the estate recovery amendments are
effective based on payments made, not on the date of a transfer which could have affected
eligibility. There is no question that the definition of "assets" is applicable to estate
recovery issues in this case.

,_,
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III.
THE DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IS IMPORTANT
AND APPLICABLE IN DEMONSTRATING
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO RECOVER ASSETS
TR.\NSF'ERRED BETWEEN SPOUSES.
A.
The Definition of "Assets" Is Significant and Important to Proving Jackman's
Preemption Claim Is Incorrect.
The fact that Hildor Knudson's eligibility is not in issue does not mean the
definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p is unimportant. It is important, but mostly to
show congressional intent. Jackman's argument has been that federal law somehow
preempts Idaho's estate recovery law and prohibits recovery from the estate of a
surviving spouse. Since there is no specific federal prohibition to spousal estate recovery,
Jackman has been forced to argue that the structure and purpose of the federal law
somehow implies preemption. However, this is simply not so. The definition of "assets"
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, by including a broad range of property of both spouses merely
shows that Congress did not view State marital property laws as having an effect on the
overall scheme to permit one spouse to become eligible without impoverishing the other,
while at the same time preserving the State's ability to recover the couple's property after
both of them are deceased.
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B.

42 U.S.C. § 1396p Supports Idaho Code§ 56-218 Spousal Estate Recovery.
The Court correctly held that Idaho Code§ 56-218 permits estate recovery from

the estate of Hildor Knudson's spouse in this case. This section, alone, is sufficient to
reach all of the property in this case. The court also correctly perceived the federal
support for spousal estate recovery found in the definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)( 4):
(4)
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with
respect to a deceased individual (A)
shall include all real and personal property and other
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for
purposes of State probate law; and
(B)
may include, at the option of the State (and shall
include, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i)
applies), any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added). This section refers to "assets" and
therefore incorporates the definition of "assets" found in subsection ( e). 2 Unlike the
eligibility amendments made in§ 13611 of P.L. 103-66, this provision was adde:d by§
13612. As stated above, this section became effective based on payments made and is
clearly applicable in this case. There is no question but that the definition of "estate," as
2Jackman

argues that the definition of "assets" in subsection ( e) cannot be applied to the word "assets"
found in subsection (b). Rehearing Brief, p. 27. There is no support for this contention, however, which
contradicts the plain language of the definition which begins "(e) Definitions - In this section, the following
definitions shall apply:".
1
"'•· '
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broadened by reference to the definition for "assets" includes property transfen-ed by
Hildor in the marriage settlement agreement. \Vhile these provisions of federal law are,
by no means, essential to the court's holding in this case, they clearly defeat Jackman's
argument that federal law somehow prohibits spousal estate recovery.

IV.
CONCLUSION
The Order requesting this brief asked whether the definition of "assets" frmnd in
42 U.S.C. § l 396p( e) is "applicable" to the marriage settlement agreement. If the
question were whether the definition was applicable with regard to Hildor's elig;ibilitv,
the answer would have to be "no." However, the definition is clearly applicable to show
that Congress intended estate recovery to reach assets conveyed between spouses,
including assets conveyed through a marriage settlement agreement. While not essential
for the court's decision in this case, the property Hildor conveyed to Lionel through the
marriage settlement agreement is certainly part of the definition of "estate" and is subject
to recovery in this case.
DATED this 9 day of September, 1998,

omey General

_...,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 23928
. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE-OF · ·.. )
, LIONEL:MALCOLM· KNUDSON,.-·.·
,···) ·, ..

,.,\-.

J
)

Deceased.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,
Petitioner-Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)

v.

Lewiston, April 1998 Term
1998 Opinion No. 60.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)·

BARBARA JACKMAN, Personal

Representative for the Estate of LIONEL
MALCOLM KNUDSON,
Respondent.

Filed:June16,1998
Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, Latah County. Hon. John R. Stegner, District
Judge; Hon. W.C. Hamlett, Magistrate Judge.
Appeal from order denying claim against estate.
remanded.

Vacated and

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. W.
Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, argued,
William C. Kirsch, Moscow, for respondent.

JOHNSON, Justice

Thls is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that p!lrsuant to section 56-218(1) of the
Idaho Code (I.C.), the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the.Department) may recover
from the available estate of a surviving spouse the balance ·of Medicaid payments received by an

1
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individual who was fifty-five years old or older when receiving the payments- if the individual's
estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount.

I.
THE BACKGllOUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS ,..
'

•

'

~

•

'

I

•

,

.

.

Barbara Jack.man (Jackman) \_Vas the niece of IUl elderly couple, Hildor_an~ Lionel Knudson
(the Knudsons). - Jackman was also Hildor's guardian and held a durable power of attorney for
Lionel. On behalf of the Knudsons, Jackman signed a ''Marriage Settlement Agreement" (the
_agreement) on March 8, 1993. The agreement transmuted most of the Knudsons' community
_property into Lionel's separate property. By the agreement, Hildor received as her separ~te property
. her personal property and household effects in her possession, her irrevocable burial trust, arid
$1,900 in cash. The purpose of the agreement was to makeHildor eligible for Medic:aid assistance.
Hild.or received $41,600.55 in Medicaid payments (the Medicaid°payments) prior to her death on
October 27, 1994.
After Hildor's death, Jackman collected Hildor's estate-pursuant to the procedures for smaU
estates contained in LC. § 15-3-1201. After paying Hildor's funeral expenses _fmd legal fees,
Jaclan~ delivered the balance ofHildor's _estate, $1,638.03, to the :Oepartment ~n August 10, 1995.
.

-

-..

.

_The Department .accepted this as a partial settlement of.its claim fo,r.recoveiy of the_ ·Medicaid
.

.

.

'

payments,
Lionel died two weeks after Hildor on November 11, 1994. After Lionel's death, Jackman
initiated probate proceedings (or his estate and became Lionel's personal representa.tive. Lionel's
estate was vatu·ed at $40.,798.35. The Department sought allowance of a claim against Lionel's
estate to recover the remaining balance of !ho Medicaid payments (the balance of the Medicaid
, payments). Jackman objected to the Department's claim.
The magistrate judge denied the Department's claim against Lionel'~ estate because Hildor
had an estate, and the Department received the remainder of the estate after expenses. The
Department appealed to the district judge, ·who affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The
Department appealed.

II.

. I.C. § 56-218 PERMITS RECOVERY OF THE BALANCE
2
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OF THE MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM LIONEL'S ESTATE.

The Department asserts that LC. § 56-218 pennits recovery of the balance c.f the Medicaid
payments from Lionel's estate. We agree.
I. C. § 56-218 prbvides that rrtedic~f assistan~e "paid on behalf of an ~dividual who was fiftyi,

·fiv-e'.(55}'yeats 'of age or'oldhr wheri th~'.iridi~idual reteived such ~~istance may be reco~ered from
the estate, or if there be rio estate the estate of the surviving sp~use, if any, shall be charged for'such
aid paid to either or both .... " I.C. § 56-218(1) .

.In George W. Watkins Family v, Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990), the Court
- pointed out: 'The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent
is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." Id. at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388.
If we were to read I.C. § 56-218(1) not to allow recovery from LionePs estate of the balance
of the M~dic.aid payments because there was $1,638.03 in Hildor's estate, our reading would be
contrary to expressed legislative intent and would lead to absurd results. This reading would mean
that if the estate of a spouse who received Medicaid assistance had even one cent, or a toothbrush,
the Department could collect nothing from the estate of the surviving spouse. As acknowledged by

s

,. Jack:man; attorney ~t the oral ~~erit of

this c~e. this readirig ~fthe stafut~ ·would ~ean that there

... ii h<> ;circum'sta.nte' iii which ·tiii iegislativgiritent t~ rebo;et" fro~ "t&e: 6state rif is~r~ivi~g spo~se
1

would be fulfilled. 1bis result flies in the face of the expressed legislative intent that the Department
recover from the estate of the surviving spouse under some circumstances. It is absurd to read the
statute as preventing recovery from the surviving-spo\lse's estate even if the recipi.ent's estate is

inadequate for the full recovery of Medicaid payments.
From this analysis we conclude that the correct reading ofI.C. § 56-218(1) is that if the
estate of the individual who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of
the assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from tho estate of the surviving
spouse. Stated in terms of the circumstances of this case, when the Department receiv1:d the balance
of Hildor' s estate, there was "no estate,, of Hildor remaining from which tho Department could
recover the balance of the medicaid payments. Therefore, the Department is entitled to recover the
balance from Lionel's estate.

3
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Jaclonan contends that the Idaho statutes allowjng for estate recovery exceed the authority
granted by federal law. We disagree.
Jaclanan relies on a portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B) for the proposition that re~overy
may only be had from the recipient's estate, Reading the entir~ _section, however, it :is clear that the
statute is only a limitation on the types ofI1_1eclical assistance which can bo recovered. lbis includes
payments for nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and related Jiospital and
prescription drug services, or, at the State's option, any items or services under the State plan. The
tp.at,· are recoverable and does not purpprt to def111e from whom
statute defines the types of
. payments·
,.
_these payments may be recoyered.
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as well as from the
estate of the surviving spouse, The federal definition of asset is significant. Federal law includes
within the recipient's estate "all real and personal property and <?ther assets included within the
.individual's estate ... " and "any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or_interest at the time of death . .- .. ''. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); I.C. §
,

56-2,8(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and resources as well as
Lionel's income and resources, The agreement does not affect the status of the assets that federal
law considers to be part of the recipient's estate because the definition of assets includes "income
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive
because of action by a person . . . with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual
or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B). Jacbnan's signing of the agreement
constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor and Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the
Department from recovering the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate.

III.
CONCLUSION
We vacate the magistrate judge's denial of the Department's claim against Lionel• s estate
and remand the c~e to the ~agistrate judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not address Jackman's contention that pursuant to J.C.§ 15-3-720 she is entitled to
receive from Lionel's estate her necessary expenses and disbursements includmg reasonable attorney
fees. 1his is a question the m~~gistr~te judge· must consider on remand.

' 4
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/
We award the Department costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal.

Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER, and WALTERS, CONCUR.
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Sec. 26. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B. l 5, subdivision la, is amended to read:
s Subd. la. Estates subject to claims. (£!)_If a person receives any medical assistance
221. 9hereunder, on the person's death, if single, or on the death of the survivor of a married
221. 1ocouple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, or as otherwise provided
221. 11for in this section, the total amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person
221.12and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the person or the estate of the
221.13surviving spouse in the court having jurisdiction to probate the estate or to issue a decree
221. Hof descent according to sections 525.31 to 525.313.
221.1s(b) For the purposes of this section, the person's estate must consist of:
221.16(1) the person's probate estate;
221.11(2) all of the person's interests or proceeds of those interests in real property the
221.1sperson owned as a life tenant or as a joint tenant with a right of survivorship at the time of
221. 19the person's death:
221. 20(3) all of the person's interests or proceeds of those interests in securities the person
221.21owned in beneficiary form as provided under sections 524.6-301 to 524.6-311 at the time
221. 22of the person's death, to the extent the interests or proceeds of those interests become part
221. 23of the probate estate under section 524.6-307:
221.24(4) all of the person's interests in joint accounts, multiple-party accounts, and
221.2spay-on-death accounts, brokerage accounts, investment accounts, or the proceeds of
221.26those accounts, as provided under sections 524.6-201 to 524.6-214 at the time of the
221.2merson's death to the extent the interests become part of the probate estate under section
221. 2s524.6-207; and
221.29(5) assets conveyed to a survivor. heir, or assign of the person through survivorship,
221.Joliving trust, or other arrangements.
221.n(c) For the purpose of this section and recovery in a surviving spouse's estate for
221. J2medical assistance paid for a predeceased spouse, the estate must consist of all of the legal
221.JJtitle and interests the deceased individual's predeceased spouse had in jointly owned or
221.Jfmarital property at the time of the spouse's death. as defined in subdivision 2b. and the
221. Jsproceeds of those interests. that passed to the deceased individual or another individual, a
222.1survivor, an heir. or an assign of the predeceased spouse through a joint tenancy, tenanfY_
222.2in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. A deceased
222.Jrecipient who, at death, owned the property jointly with the surviving spouse shall hav,~
222.•an interest in the entire property.
222. s( d) For the purpose of recovery in a single person's estate or the estate of a survivor
222. 60f a married couple, "other arrangement" includes any other means by which title to all or
222. 1any part of the jointly owned or marital property or interest passed from the predeceased
222. sspouse to another including, but not limited to, transfers between spouses which are
222. 9permitted, prohibited, or penalized for purposes of medical assistance.
222.10.(tl_A claim shall be filed if medical assistance was rendered for either or both
222.11persons under one of the following circumstances:
222 . 1 ~ i l l the person was over 55 years of age, and received services under this chapter;
222.1Jte,...a.l the person resided in a medical institution for six months or longer, received
222 .14services under this chapter, and, at the time of institutionalization or application for
222.1srnedical assistance, whichever is later, the person could not have reasonably been expected
222. 16to be discharged and returned home, as certified in writing by the person's treating
222.17Physician. For purposes of this section only, a "medical institution" means a skilled
222.1snursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with
222. l9developmental disabilities, nursing facility, or inpatient hospital; or
222. 2~11} the person received general assistance medical care services under chapter
221. 1

221.

222. 21256D.

222.22.(fi_The claim shall be considered an expense of the last illness of the decedent for the

I
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222. 2Jpurpose

of section 524.3-805. Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, a state or
agency with a claim under this section must be a creditor under section 524.6--307.
222. 25Any statute of limitations that purports to limit any county agency or the state agency,
222.26or both, to recover for medical assistance granted hereunder shall not apply to any claim
222. 27ffiade hereunder for reimbursement for any medical assistance granted hereunder. Notice
222.2softbe claim shall be given to all heirs and devisees of the decedent whose identity carr be
222.29ascertained with reasonable diligence. The notice must include procedures and instrui;tions
222.Jofor making an application for a hardship waiver under subdivision 5; time frames for
222.J1submitting an application and determination; and information regarding appeal rights and
222. J2procedures. Counties are entitled to one-half of the non federal share of medical assistance
222. JJcollections from estates that are directly attributable to county effort. Counties are entitled
222. 34to ten percent of the collections for alternative care directly attributable to county effort.
222.24county

Sec. 27. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, subdivision lb, is amended to read:
Subd. lh. Estates ofspecific persons receiving medical assistance. (a) For
22J.2Purposes of this section, paragraphs (b) to Wiil apply if a person received medical
223. Jassistance for which a claim may be filed under this section and died single, or the
22J.4surviving spouse of the couple and was not survived by any of the persons described
22J. 5in subdivisions 3 and 4.
223. 6
(l:i) For p1:tFposes of this seotiot1, the persoa's estate ooasists of: (l) the f')ersoa's
22J. 7flFObme estme; (2) all of01e f')ersoR's iRterests or proeeeds of those iaterests ia real property
223. sthe persoR ov1Recl as a life teaaRt or as a joiRt teRant with a right of SllfYiYorship m the
22 J. gtime of the persoa's death; (3) all of the persoR's iaterests or proeeeds of those iaterests itl
22J.10see1:trities the persoa ov,rRed ia beRefieiary form as proYided 1:tHder seetioRs 524.6 301-to
22J. 11524.6 311 m the time of the persoa's death, to the eKteRt they beeome f')art of the proba-te
223 .12estate eader seetioa 524 .6 307; (4) all of the persoR's iRterests iR joiRt aeeol:Hlts, meltiple
22J.13f'larty aooo1:tRts, and pay OR demh aooo1:tRts, or the prooeecls of those aeom.lftts, as provided
22J .141:tRder seotioas 524 .6 2Q 1 to 524 .6 214 at the time of the persoa's death to the eKteat
22J.1sthey beeome pat1 of the probate estate uader seetioa 524.6 207; ilild (5) the f')ersoR's
223. 16legal title or iRterest at the time of the persoR's death iR real f'lFOperty traRsferrecl uRder
22J.11a traRsfer oR death deed Hnder seotion 507.071, or iR the proeeeds from the soosequeRt
223. 19sale of the persoa's interest in the real f')Foperty. NotwithstaRding l¼RY law or rule to thti
22 J. Hoontrary, a state or 001:tRty agene~' with a el aim. HRder this seetion shall ee a ereditor 1:HM:ier
22J.20seetion 524.6 307.
22J.21
W..Du Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, the person's life estate or joint
223. 22tenancy interest in real property not subject to a medical assistance lien under sections
223.235)4.980 to 514.985 on the date of the person's death shall not end upon the person's death
22J.24and shall continue as provided in this subdivision. The life estate in the person's estate
22J.25shall be that portion of the interest in the real property subject to the life estate that is equal
223. 26to the life estate percentage factor for the life estate as listed in the Life Estate Mortality
22J.21Table of the health care program's manual for a person who was the age of the medical
223. 2sassistance recipient on the date of the person's death. The joint tenancy interest in real
22J.29property in the estate shall be equal to the fractional interest the person would have owned
223. Join the jointly held interest in the property had they and the other owners held title to the
223. 31property as tenants in common on the date the person died.
223. J2
Will The court upon its own motion, or upon motion by the personal representative
223. JJor any interested party, may enter an order directing the remaindermen or surviving joint
22J. J4tenants and their spouses, if any, to sign all documents, take all actions, and otherwise
22J.J5fully cooperate with the personal representative and the court to liquidate the decedent's
223. J6life estate or joint tenancy interests in the estate and deliver the cash or the proceeds of
224. 1those interests to the personal representative and provide for any legal and equitable
222.35
22J.1
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as the court deems appropriate to enforce and carry out the order, including an
of reasonable attorney fees.
224. 4
Wifil The personal representative may make, execute, and deliver any conveyances
224. 50r other documents necessary to convey the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy interest
224. 6in the estate that are necessary to liquidate and reduce to cash the decedent's interest or
224. 1for any other purposes.
224. s
fffM Subject to administration, all costs, including reasonable attorney fees,
224. 9directly and immediately related to liquidating the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy
224. 1ointerest in the decedent's estate, shall be paid from the gross proceeds of the liquidation
224. 11allocable to the decedent's interest and the net proceeds shall be turned over to the personal
224 .12representative and applied to payment of the claim presented under this section.
224.13
Will The personal representative shall bring a motion in the district court in which
224. Hthe estate is being probated to compel the remaindermen or surviving joint tenants to
224. 15account for and deliver to the personal representative all or any part of the proceeds of any
224 .16sale, mortgage, transfer, conveyance, or any disposition of real property allocable to the
224 .11decedent's life estate or joint tenancy interest in the decedent's estate, and do everything
224.1snecessary to liquidate and reduce to cash the decedent's interest and turn the proceeds of
224. Hthe sale or other disposition over to the personal representative. The court may grant any
224. 2olegal or equitable relief including, but not limited to, ordering a partition of real estate,
224.21under chapter 558 necessary to make the value of the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy
224. 22interest available to the estate for payment of a claim under this section.
224.23
fhj_(g} Subject to administration, the personal representative shall use all of the cash
224.24or proceeds of interests to pay an allowable claim under this section. The remaindermen
224. 25or surviving joint tenants and their spouses, if any, may enter into a written agreemenit
224. 26With the personal representative or the claimant to settle and satisfy obligations imposed at
224.21any time before or after a claim is filed.
224.2s
fi:)Jhl. The personal representative may, at their discretion, provide any or all of the
224.29other owners, remaindermen, or surviving joint tenants with an affidavit terminating the
224. 3 odecedent's estate's interest in real property the decedent owned as a life tenant or as a joint
224. 31tenant with others, if the personal representative determines in good faith that neither the
224.J2decedent nor any of the decedent's predeceased spouses received any medical assistance
224. 33for which a claim could be filed under this section, or if the personal representative has
224. 34filed an affidavit with the court that the estate has other assets sufficient to pay a claim, as
224.3spresented, or if there is a written agreement under paragraph fhj__(g), or if the claim, as
224. 36allowed, has been paid in full or to the full extent of the assets the estate has available
225.1to pay it. The affidavit may be recorded in the office of the county recorder or filed in
225.2the Office of the Registrar of Titles for the county in which the real property is located.
225.3Except as provided in section 514.981, subdivision 6, when recorded or filed, the affidavit
225. 4Shall terminate the decedent's interest in real estate the decedent owned as a life tenant or a
22s. ajoint tenant with others. The affidavit shall:
225. 6(1) be signed by the personal representative;
225. 1(2) identify the decedent and the interest being terminated;
225. s(3) give recording information sufficient to identify the instrument that created the
225.9interest in real property being terminated;
225. 10(4) legally describe the affected real property;
225. 11(5) state that the personal representative has determined that neither the decedent
225.12nor any of the decedent's predeceased spouses received any medical assistance for which
22 s .13a claim could be filed under this section;
225 .14( 6) state that the decedent's estate has other assets sufficient to pay the claim, as
225. 1spresented, or that there is a written agreement between the personal representative and
225. 16the claimant and the other owners or remaindermen or other joint tenants to satisfy the
224.2sanctions

224. 3award

,__,.
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225.11obligations imposed under this subdivision; and
state that the affidavit is being given to terminate the estate's interest under this
225.19subdivision, and any other contents as may be appropriate.
225. 20The recorder or registrar of titles shall accept the affidavit for recording or filing. The
225. 21affidavit shall be effective as provided in this section and shall constitute notice even if it
22s.22does not include recording information sufficient to identify the instrument creating the
225. 23interest it terminates. The affidavit shall be conclusive evidence of the stated facts.
22s.24
f:BJU The holder of a lien arising under subdivision le shall release the lien at
225.25the holder's expense against an interest terminated under paragraph fhj_(g} to the extent
22 s. 26of the termination.
22s. 21 Wii.l If a lien arising under subdivision 1c is not released under paragraph f:BJU,
22s.2sprior to closing the estate, the personal representative shall deed the interest subject to the
22s.29lien to the remaindermen or surviving joint tenants as their interests may appear. Upon
225.3orecording or filing, the deed shall work a merger of the recipient's life estate or joint
225.Jltenancy interest, subject to the lien, into the remainder interest or interest the decedent and
225.32others owned jointly. The lien shall attach to and run with the property to the extent of
22s. 33the decedent's interest at the time of the decedent's death.
225 .1s(7)

Sec. 28. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, subdivision 2, is amended to read:
Subd. 2. Limitations on claims. The claim shall include only the total amount
226. 20f medical assistance rendered after age 55 or during a period of institutionalization
226.3described in subdivision la, elat1se (b) paragraph (e). and the total amount of general
226.4assistance medical care rendered, and shall not include interest. Claims that have been
226. sallowed but not paid shall bear interest according to section 524.3-806, paragraph ( d). A
226. 6claim against the estate of a surviving spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for
226. 7ffiedical assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, shall be payable from the full
226.svalue of all of the predeceased spouse's assets and interests which are part of the surviving
226. 9Spouse's estate under subdivisions 1a and 2b. Recovery of medical assistance expenses in
226. 1othe nonrecipient surviving spouse's estate is limited to the value of the assets of the estate
226. 11that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage._Jhe
226. 12claim is not payable from the value of assets or proceeds of assets in the estate attributable
226 .13to a predeceased spouse whom the individual married after the death of the predeceased
226. Hrecipient spouse for whom the claim is filed or from assets and the proceeds of assets Jin the
226. 1sestate which the nonrecipient decedent spouse acquired with assets which were not marital
226. 16property or jointly owned property after the death of the predeceased recipient spouse.
226.11Claims for alternative care shall be net of all premiums paid under section 256B.0913,
226. 1ssubdivision 12 , on or after July 1, 2003, and shall be limited to services provided on or
226. 19after July I, 2003. Claims against marital property shall be limited to claims against
226.2orecipients who died on or after July 1, 2009.
225.34
226 .1

226.21
Sec. 29. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, is amended by adding a
226.22subdivision to read:
226.23
Subd. 2b. Controlling provisions. (a) For purposes of this subdivision and
226.24Subdivisions la and 2, paragraphs (b) to (d) apply.
226.2s(b) At the time of death of a recipient spouse and solely for purpose of recovery of
226.26medical assistance benefits received, a predeceased recipient spouse shall have a legal.
226.27title or interest in the undivided whole ofall of the property which the recipient and the
226.2srecipient's surviving spouse owned jointly or which was marital property at any time
226.29during their marriage regardless of the form of ownership and regardless of whether
226. 3oit was owned or titled in the names of one or both the recipient and the recipient's
226. 31spouse. Title and interest in the property of a predeceased recipient spouse shall not end
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226. 32or extinguish upon the person's death and shall continue for the purpose of allowing
226.JJrecovery of medical assistance in the estate of the surviving spouse. Upon the death of
226.J4the predeceased recipient spouse, title and interest in the predeceased spouse's property
226.Jsshall vest in the surviving spouse by operation oflaw and without the necessity for any
221. 1probate or decree of descent proceedings and shall continue to exist after the death of i:he
221.2Dredeceased spouse and the surviving spouse to permit recovery of medical assistance.'"
221. JThe recipient spouse and the surviving spouse of a deceased recipient spouse shall not_
221. 4encumber, disclaim, transfer, alienate, hypothecate, or otherwise divest themselves of
221. sthese interests before or upon death.
221. 6(c) For put:poses of this section, "marital property" includes any and all real or
221. 10ersonal property of any kind or interests in such property the predeceased recipient
221. sspouse and their spouse, or either of them, owned at the time of their marriage to each
221. gother or acquired during their marriage regardless of whether it was owned or titled in
221. 1othe names of one or both of them. If either or both spouses of a married couple received
221. 11medical assistance, all property owned during the marriage or which either or both spouses
221. 12acquired during their marriage shall be presumed to be marital property for purposes of
221. 1Jrecovering medical assistance unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
221.14(d) The agency responsible for the claim for medical assistance for a recipient spouse
221. ismay, at its discretion, release specific real and personal property from the provisions of
221. l6this section. The release shall extinguish the interest created under paragraph (b) in the
221 .11land it describes upon filing or recording. The release need not be attested, certified, or
221. 1Backnowledged as a condition of filing or recording and shall be filed or recorded in the
221. aoffice of the county recorder or registrar of titles, as appropriate, in the county where 1:he
221. 20real property is located. The party to whom the release is given shall be responsible for
221. 21paying all fees and costs necessary to record and file the release. If the property described
221. 22in the release is registered property, the registrar of titles shall accept it for recording and
221. 2Jshall record it on the certificate of title for each parcel of property described in the release.
221. 24If the property described in the release is abstract property, the recorder shall accept it_
221.2sfor filing and file it in the county's grantor-grantee indexes and any tract index the county
221. 2rmaintains for each parcel of property described in the release.

Sec. 30. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B. l 5, is amended by adding a
221.2ssubdivision to read:
221.29
Subd. 9. Commissioner's intervention. The commissioner shall be permitted to
221.3ointervene as a party in any proceeding involving recovery of medical assistance upon
221. 31filing a notice of intervention and serving such notice on the other parties.
221. 21
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IDAHO GENERAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
THE POWERS YOU GRANT BELOW ARE EFFECTIVE
EVEN JF YOU BECOME DISABLED OR INCOMPETENT
NOTICE: THE POWERS GRANTED BY THIS DOCUMENT ARE BROAD AND
SWEEPING. THEY ARE EXPLAINED IN THE UNIFORM STATUTORY FORM POWER
OF ATTORNEY ACT. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT "rHESE POWERS,
OBTAIN COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE. THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE
ANYONE TO MAKE MEDICAi. AND OTHER HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU.
YOU MAY REVOKE THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IF YOU LATER WISH TO DO SO.
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND.WILL CONTINUE
TO BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF YOU BECOME DISABLED, INCAPACITATED, OR
INCOMPETENT.
I, Martha Jean Perry 2401 Tendoy Boise, Idaho 83705

Lrcu

".,

,j

Appoint

,,-\'

t\":JV 2 B WU!

George D. Perry 2401 Tendoy, Boise, Idaho 83705 or

,•,

:.,

·~
;.
;;•

RECEIVED

,,

as my Agent (attorney-In-fact) to aot for me In any lawful way with respect to the
followlng initialed subjects:

-~~

TO GRANT ALL OF THE FOLLOWING POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONr OF
(N) AND IGNORE THE LINES IN FRONT OF THE OTHER POWERS.

',

,)

:(

TO GRANT ONE OR MORE, BUT FEWER THAN ALL, OF THE FOLLOWING
POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF EACH POWER YOU ARE GRANTING.
TO WITHHOLD A POWER, DO NOT INITIAL THEUNE IN FRONT OF IT. YOU MAY,

BUT NEED NOT. CROSS OUT EACH POWER WITHHELD.
Note: If you initial Item A or Item B, which follow, a notarized signature will be
required on behalf of the Prlnclpal.
INITIAL

I

h1 d (A} Real property transactions. To lease, sell, mortgage, purchase,
, ~ e . and acquire, and to agree, bargain, and contract for the lease, sale, ·

/

,.

purchase,.exchange, and acquisition of, and to accept, take, receive, and possess any
lntereat in real property whatsoever, on such terms and conditions, and under suoh
~venants, as my Agent shall deem proper; and to maintain, repair, tear down, 1after,.
. rebuild, improve manage, insure, move, rent, lease, sell, convey, subject to liens,
mortgage$, and security deeds, and In any way or manner deaf with all or any part of
any Interest in real property whatsoever, Including specifically, but without llmltatfon, real

,,..

....

-~,,.
.,
'•
•',
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:,
•/

'.~
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property lying and being situated in the State of 1daho, under such tenns and conditions,
and under such covenants, as my Agent shaU deem proper an'd may for all deferred
payments accept purchase money notes payable to me and secured by mortgages or
deeds to secure debt, and may from time to time collect and cancel any of said notes,
mortgages, security Interests, or deeds to secure debt.
. -1
l-rclJ

-.f//J f

\e)

Tangfble personal property transactions. To lease, se~1/ko~g,e,

purchase, exchange, and acquire, and to agree, bargain, and contr~~.c.J~e )ei'Gel
sale, purchase, exchange, and acqulslti?n of, and to ~ccept,_ta,ke, re~ro,~ssess
any personal property whatsoever, tangible or intangible, or mterest thereto, oinuth
terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem proper; and .
to maintain, repair, improve, manage, insure, rent. lease, sell, convey, subject to llens or
mortgages, or to take any other security interests in said property which are recognized
under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted at that time under the laws of the State
of Idaho or any applicable state, or otherwise hypothecate (pledge), and in any way or
manner deal with all or any part of any real or personal property whatsoever, tangible or
intangible, or any interest therein, that I own at the time of execution or may thereafter
acquire, under such terms and conditions, and under such cov~nants, as my Agent
shall deem proper.

;,;
.',·'

',·

lll.Jt.(C) Stock and bond transaction&._To purchase, sell,exohange, surrender,
,,.
,;,

'~':

assign, redeem, vote at any meeting, or otherwise transfer any and arr shares ,of stock,
bonds, or other securities In any business, association, corporation, partnership, or
other legal entity, whether private or public, now or hereafter belonging to me.

•','

··'
"

,,
','

;.

·..,·~
!,

..
,•

· '111 /J )(D) Commodity and option transaction•. To organ!~ or continue and

~~ny business which term includes, without limitation, any farming,

manufacturing, service, mining, retailing or other type of business operation In any form,
whether as a proprietorship, joint venture, partnership, corporation, trust-or other legal
entity; operate, buy, sell, expand, contract, terminate or liquidate any buslness: direct,
control, supervise, manage or participate In the operation of any' business and engage,
compensate and discharge business managers, employees, agents, attorneys,
accountants and consultants; and, In general, exercise all power.& with respect to
business fntere$ts and operations which ·the principal could If present and unde'~ no
disability.

.,.
\\

::~

':;'

. ~·

Md /

(E) Banking and other flnanoial institution tranaacaona. To m~ke, recetve,
, ~orse, execute, acknowledge, deriver and possess chects, drafts, bills of
exchang$, letters of.credit, notes, stock certificates. wlthdrawal receipts_ and deposit
instruments. relating to accounts or deposits in, or certfflcates of 4eposit of banks,
saving$ and· loans, credit unions, or other Institutions or assoclatlbns. To pay all sums of
mon~y, at any time or times, that may ~ereaft&r be owing by me µpon any account, bfll
of exchange, check; draft, purchase, contract, note, or trade acce;ptance made,
executed, endorsed, eccepted, and delivered by ma or for me In my name, by m,y
Agent. To borrow from time to time such sums of money as my Agent may deem proper
and execute promissory notes, security deeds or agreements, financing statements, or
,,
,,·.

,t·
:{

~

-'.~
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other security instruments in such form as the lender may request and renew said notes
and security Instruments from time to time In whole or in part. To have free access at
any time or times to any safe deposit box or vault to which I might have access.
:•,,

ht

/J ~F) Buainess operating transactions. To conduct, engage in, and[dJf)e,wise
~ t h e affairs of any and all lawful business ventures of whatever nature··or'K~
that I may now or hereafter be Involved in.
Nl) 1/ '> u

ltl1f'e /
,.
.•:,
.,

,,',,

'•
~: ·

,,

•,,

·/.

·,·,,\

·.,.
:,

:~~
·:·,

,.
..•

·

~o

280?

(G) Insurance and annuity tranaactfons. To exercise or p e ~ ~ .
po r, duty, right, or obligation, in regard to any contract of life, accide-~t,h~.
disability, liability, or other type of Insurance or any combination of insurance; and to
procure new or ·additional contracts of insurance for me snd to ·designate the beneficla·ry
of same; provided, however, tllat my Agent cannot designate himself or herself as
beneficiary of any such Insurance contracts .

t:::.D

)/J d / (H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt for,
· ~ release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand. sue for, claim and
.recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or payment due or
payable to or for the principal; assert any Interest in and exercfse any power over any
trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary control; establish a revocable trust solely for
the benefit of the principal that terminates at the death of the principal and is then
distributable to the legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, in general,
exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts whict, the principal could exercise
If present and under no disability; provided, however, that the Agent may not make or
change a wiU and may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or amendable by tl'1e
principal or require the trustee of any trust for the benefit of the prfnclpel to pay income
or principal to the Agent unless specific authority to that end is given.

Mf J ;J (l)Clalms and litigation. To commence, prosecute, discontinue, or defend all
' ~ r other legal proceedings touching my property, real or personal, or any part
thereof, or touching any matter in which I or my property, real or personal, may be in
any way concerned. To defend, settle, adjust, make allows.nces, compound, submit to
arbttration, and compromise all accounts, reckonings, claims, and demands whatsoever
that now are, or hereafter shall be, pending between me and any person, flnn,
corporation, or other legal entity, in such manner and in all respects as my Agent shall
deem proper.

..

'lJltt._
(J) Pentonal and family maintenance. To hire accountants, attorneys at law,
consultants, clerics, physicians, nurses, agents, servants, workmen, and others and

.....

remove them, and to appoint others In their·place, and to pay and allow the persons so
employed such salartes, wages, or other remunerations, as my Agent shall deem
proper.

'•'

t

:;,:

-~·
..i•
"•

. ::·
,i.
'.<

.~.:~-·

to

.

0

'JJ/ 11.

.

/ ' (IC) Benefits from Soclaf Security, •dtcare, Medicaid. or other
-~ental programs, or military service. To prepare, sign and file any cla'lm or ·

·.application for Soclal Security, unemployment or mlfitary servfce benefits; sue for, settle ·

',•

:t.
'•'
{,

',

,_;,•

'~,',:.

,
l
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or abandon any claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local or
foreign statute or regulation; control, deposit to any account, collect, receipt for, and
take title to and hold all benefits under any Social Security, unemployment, military
service or other statej federal, local or foreign statute or regulation; and, in general,
exercise all powers with respect to Social Security, unemployment, military service, and
governmental benefits, Including but not lfmited to Medioare and Medicaid, which the
principal could exercise if present and under no disability.

,'

,,

\'

~. l

.,)

/.'·

l!l.t ~

(L) Rellrem•nt plan transactions. to contribute to, withdraw from and
de osit funds in any type of retirement plan (which term includes, without limrtation, any
tax Qualified or nonquallffed pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, employee savings and
other retirement plan, indlvldual retirement account, deferred compensation plan and
any other type of employee benefit plan); select and change payment options for the
principal under any retirement plan; make rollover contributions from any retirement
plan to other retirement plans or lndMdual retirement accounts; exercise all investment
powers available under any type of self-directed retirement plan; and, in general,
exercise all powers with respect to retirement plans and retirement plan account
balances which the principal could If' present and under no disability.

,,

~:'

}/.d /

(M) Tax matters. To prepare, to make elections, to execute and to file all tax,
~ u r i t y , unemployment insurance, and informational returns required by the laws

of the United States, or of any state or subdivision thereof, or of sny foreign
government; to prepare, to execute, and to file all other papers and instruments wtilch
the Agent shall think to be desirable or necessary for safeguarding of me against
excess or illegal taxation or against penalties imposed for claimed violation of any law or
other governmental regulation; and to pay, to compromise, or to contest or to apply for
refunds in connection wrth any taxes or assessments for which I am or may be liable.

',,

)n/) / (N) ALL OF THE POWERS LISTED ABOVE. YOU NEED NOT
~LINES IF YOU rNITIAL LINE (N).
·
.

.

,,.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

LttP(JL ANY

~v

.

.

.

L'if

<
.

. '.

.

A, u, ;_ 8 2001

ON THE FOLLOWING LINES YOU MAY GIVE SPECIAL INSTRUCT~~§:£-G
OR EXTENDING THE POWERS GRANTED TO YOUR AGENT.
.
.
:t:

-~.•.
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THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AN ~AWNIINUE
UNTIL IT IS REVOKED.
• vi::u
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS A GENERAL DURABLE
POWER OF ATTORNEY AND SHALL CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF I
BECOME DISABLED, INCAPACITATED, OR INCOMPETENT.
(YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY OTHER PERSONS AS
NECESSARY TO ENABLE ·THE AGENT TO PROPERLY EXERCISE THE POWERS
GRANTED IN THIS FORM, BUT YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE TO MAKE ALL
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS. IF YOU. WANT TO GIVE YOUR AGENT THE RIGHT
TO DELEGATE DISCRETIONARY DECISION-MAKING POWERS TO OTHERS, YOU
SHOULD KEEP THE NEXT SENTENCE, OTHERWISE IT SHOULD BE STRICKEN.)

,.
}

I

-~

I

to Deh~gate. My Agent shall have the right by written Instrument to delegate
any or all of the foregoing powers involving discretionary decision-making to any person
or persons whom my Ag~nt may select, but such delegation may be amended or
revoked by any agent 0ncludlng any successor) named by me who is acting under this
power of attorney at the time of reference.
Authority

(YOUR AGENT WILL BE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR ALL REASONABLE
EXPENSES INCURRED IN ACTING UNDER THIS POWEROF ATTORNEY. STRIKE
OUT THE NEXT SENTENCE IF YOU 00 NOT WANT YOUR AGENT TO ALSO BE
ENTITLED TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES AS AGENT.}

,,,
-,,
,.,.

>,:..

..::

:~

I:\
'.',

Right to Compensation. My Agent shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for
services renderec:I as a.gent under this power of attorney.

{If YOU WISH TO NAME SUCCESSOR AGENTS, INSERT THE NAME(S) AND
ADDRESS(ES) OF SUCH SUCCESSOR(S) IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.)

Successor Agent. If any Agent named by me shall die, become incompetent, resign or
refuse to accept the office of Agent, I name the following (each to act alone and
successively, In the order named) as successor(s) to such Agent:
Steven A. Perry 3215 Targee, Boise, Idaho 83705
Barbara McCormick 2525 Joretta Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704

~-
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BE VALID IN ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ALL
FOREIGN NATIONS.

I am fully informed as to at! the contents of this form and understand the
full import of this grant of powers to my Agent.
I agree that any third party who receives a copy of this document may act
under it. Revocation of the power of attorney is not effective as to a third
party unt\l the third party leams of "the revocation. I agree to Indemnify the

third party for any claims that arise against the third party because of
reliance on thts power of -attorney.
Signed this _j.___ day of

'7l? g ~

,20 a5

L,cu
fVDv' 2 8

A-'

?n'!J. ,
C,

l

r::: c2rv1:::LJ

CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NOTARY PUBLIC
:,

STATE OF I D A ~ .
COUNTY OF
'.
.1
.

efore me on
4'mlh

.3 / .3 / oS

'-n'l~~lf..~ fi

.

.

•

•

[Date] by

[name of prtncipa!].

~a- '

A.\!&4-:&1

.

..'.'

:;-::

m#. ~

'~

.

·.·.
:,

:·:,

(Signature of' Notartal Officer)

.,...

·Notary Publle for the State of Idaho

(
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EXHIBIT "A"

The East 70 feet of Lot 11 In WINES SUBDIVISION, according to the offictal plat thereof, filed in Book 10 of
Plats at Page(s) 489, official records of Ada County, Idaho.

Lrcu

000439

27/28

Westlavv

_,

Page I

970 P.2d 6
132 Idaho 2 l 3, 970 P.2d 6
(Cite as: 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6)

I>

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Lewiston, April 1998 Term.
In the Matter of the Estate of Lionel Malcolm
Knudson, Deceased.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE, Petitioner-Appellant,
V.

Barbara JACKMAN, Personal Representative for
the Estate of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, Respondent.
No. 23928.
Nov.2, 1998.
Following death of Medicaid recipient and subsequent death of her husband, Department of Health
and Welfare sought allowance of a claim against
husband's estate to recover the remaining balance
of the Medicaid payments. W.C. Hamlett, Magistrate Judge, denied claim, and the District Court,
Latah County, John R. Stegner, J., affirmed. Department appealed. The Supreme Court, Johnson,
J., held that: (I) if the estate of the individual who
received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay
the full amount of the assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from the estate of
the surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when recipient and her husband entered into

I 98Hlfl(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
l 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
l 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak24 l. 70)
Health 198H €=::>495
198H Health
l 98HIII Government Assistance
I 98HIIl(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
l 98Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak24 l .70)
If the estate of the individual who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full
amount of the assistance received, the Department
of Health and Welfare can recover the balance from
the estate of the surviving spouse. I.C. § 56-2 l 8.
(21 Statutes 361 ~188
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 Vl(A) General Rules of Construction

361 k 187 Meaning of Language
361 kl 88 k. In General. \1ost Cited

marital settlement agreement transmuting most of
recipient's and husband's community property into
separate property of husband, limited the Department to recovering any community property recipient and husband may have accumulated after the
agreement.

Cases
Plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or
unless plain meaning leads to absurd results.

Vacated and remanded.

131 Health 198H €=;:,494

West Headnotes

Ill Health 198H ~494
198H Health
I 98HIII Government Assistance

198H Health
l 98HIIT Government Assistance
I 98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
! 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Rt:coupment
of Payments

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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970 P.2d 6
132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6
(Cite as: 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6)
ii_,..

l 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241.70)
Health 198H €=495
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
1981-IlH(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
l 98Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241.70)
Federal statute regarding recovery of Medicaid assistance, as in effect when husband's guardian
signed marriage settlement agreement on March 8,
1993, transmuting most of husband's and wife's
community property and the income from that
property into separate property of husband, precluded Department of Health and Welfare from recovering from husband's estate the Medicaid assistance that wife had received and that Department
had not recovered from wife's estate, except Department could recover any community property
husband and wife may have accumulated after the
agreement. Social Security Act, § l 9 l 7(b )(l )(B),
(b)(4), (e)(l)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.C.(1994 Ed.)
§ 1396p(b)(l)(B), (b)(4), (e)(l)(B); I.C. §§
15-1-201(15), 32-906(1), 56-218(4).
**7 *214 Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General;
W. Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for Appellant. W. Corey Cartwright argued.
William C. Kirsch, Moscow, for Respondent.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED JUNE, 16, 1998, IS
HEREBY WITHDRAWN.
JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that
section 56-218(1) of the Idaho Code (LC.), as it ex-

isted at times applicable to this case, authorized the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) to recover from the available estate of a
surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments
received by an individual who was fifty-five years
old or older when receiving the payments if the individual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire
amount. We conclude, however, that federal law
applicable to this case prohibited this recovery, except from any community property the spouses may
have accumulated after a marriage settlement
agreement transmuting their community property
into separate property of each. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Barbara Jackman ( Jackman) was the niece of an
elderly couple, Hildor and Lionel Knudson (the
Knudsons). Jackman was also Hildor's guardian and
held a durable power of attorney for Lionel. On behalf of the Knudsons, Jackman signed a "Marriage
Settlement Agreement" (the agreement) on March
8, 1993. The agreement transmuted most of the
Knudsons' community property into Lionel's separate property. By the agreement, Hildor received as
her separate property her personal property and
household effects in her possession, her irrevocable
burial trust, and $1,900 in cash. The purpose of the
agreement was to make Hildor eligible for Medicaid assistance. Hildor received $41,600.55 in
Medicaid payments (the Medicaid payments) prior
to her death on October 27, 1994.
After Hildor's death, Jackman collected Hildor's estate pursuant to the procedures for small estates
contained in I.C. § 15-3-1201. After paying Hildor's
funeral expenses and legal fees, Jackman delivered
the balance of Hildor's estate, $1,638.03, to the Department on August I 0, 1995. The Department accepted this as a partial settlement of its claim for re-
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covery of the Medicaid payments.
Lionel died two weeks after Hildor on November
11, 1994. After Lionel's death, Jackman initiated
probate proceedings for his estate and became Lionel's personal representative. Lionel's estate was
valued at $40,798.35. The Department sought allowance of a claim against Lionel's estate to recover the remaining balance of the Medicaid payments
(the balance of the Medicaid **8 *215 payments).
Jackman objected to the Department's claim.
The magistrate judge denied the Department's claim
against Lionel's estate because Hildor had an estate,
and the Department received the remainder of the
estate after expenses. The Department appealed to
the district judge, who affirmed the magistrate
judge's decision. The Department appealed.

II.

l.C. § 56-218 AUTHORIZED RECOVERY OF
THE BALANCE OF THE MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM LIONEL'S ESTATE.

[I] The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it
existed at times applicable to this case, authorized
recovery of the balance of the Medicaid payments
from Lionel's estate. We agree.

If we were to read I.C. § 56-218( I) not to allow recovery from Lionel's estate of the balance of the
Medicaid payments because there was $1,638.03 in
Hildor's estate, our reading would be contrary to
expressed legislative intent and would lead to
"absurd results." Id. This reading would mean that
if the estate of a spouse who received Medicaid assistance had even one cent, or a toothbrush, the Department could collect nothing from the estate of
the surviving spouse. As acknowledged by Jackman's attorney at the oral argument of this case, this
reading of the statute would mean that there is no
circumstance in which the legislative intent to recover from the estate of a surviving spouse would
be fulfilled. This result is contrary to the expressed
legislative intent that the Department recover from
the estate of the surviving spouse under some circumstances. The statute should not be read as preventing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate
even if the recipient's estate is inadequate for the
full recovery of Medicaid payments.

From this analysis we conclude that the correct
reading of I.C. § 56-218( l) is that if the estate of
the individual who received Medicaid assistance is
inadequate to repay the full amount of the assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from the estate of the surviving spouse. Stated
in terms of the circumstances of this cas~:, when the
Department received the balance of Hildor's estate,
there was "no estate" of Hildor remaining from

l.C. § 56-218 provides that medical assistance "paid
on behalf of an individual who was fiftyfive (55)
years of age or older when the individual received
such assistance may be recovered from the estate,
or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving
spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to
eitherorboth .... "I.C. § 56-218(1).
[2] In George W Watkins Family v. Messenger,
118 Idaho 537. 797 P.2d 1385 (1990), the Court
pointed out: "The plain meaning of a statute will
prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is
contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd
results." Id. at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388.

which the Department could recover the balance of
the Medicaid payments.

III.
FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS THE AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY
I.C. § 56-218 TO RECOVER FROM LIONEL'S
EST ATE, EXCEPT FROM ANY COMMUNITY
PROPERTY OF LIONEL AND HILDOR.

[3] Jackman asserts that federal law applicable to
this case does not permit recovery from Lionel's es-
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tate. We agree, except to the extent of any community property Lionel and Hildor accumulated
after the agreement.

transmuting the community property Lionel received into his separate property, contained the following provision:

The pertinent portions of 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4), as enacted in 1993,
provide, as follows:

3. We further specifically agree that the income,
rents, issues, profits, capital gains, and other earnings or increases on our separate property as described above and the proceeds from any disposition thereof constitute the separate property of the
person owning such property and are: not community property. The forgoing [sic] also shall apply
to all property that may be separately acquired
hereafter by either ofus in any manner whatsoever.

(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance
correctly paid under a State plan
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual
under the State plan may be made, except that the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual**9 *216 under the State plan in the case of
the following individuals:

(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years
of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment
or recovery from the individual's estate, but only
for medical assistance consisting of(1) nursing facility services, ....
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term
"estate", with respect to a deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and

other assets included within the individual's estate,
as defined for purposes of State probate law; ....
This amended statute applied to Medicaid payments
for calendar quarters beginning on or after October
I, 1993. Pub.L. 103-66, § 13612(d).
J.C. § 15- I -20 I (I 5) defines "estate," as follows: "
'Estate' means all property of the decedent, including community property of the surviving spouse
subject to administration, property of trusts, and
property of any other person whose affairs are subject to this code as it exists from time to time during administration." The agreement, in addition to

As authorized by LC. § 32-906(1 ), this provision
maintained the separate character of the assets
transmuted into Lionel's separate property by the
agreement, as well as "the income, rents, issues,
profits, capital gains, and other earnings or increase" on this separate property. The agreement
did not prevent the accumulation of other community property by Lionel and Hildor after the date
of the agreement and before Hildor's death. The record before us does not disclose whether Lionel and
Hildor had any community property at lthe time of
Hildor's death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that
community property may be part of Lionel's estate,
and may therefore be part of Hildor's "estate" that
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4) authorizes the
Department to recover and apply against the balance of the Medicaid payments.
The Department contends that 42 U.S.C. ~
l 396p( e )(1 )(B), enacted in 1993, broadens the
"assets" from which it may recover the balance of
the Medicaid payments. This portion of the federal
law provides, as follows:

(e) Definitions
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(I) The term "assets", with respect to an individual
includes all income and resources of the individual
and of the individual's spouse, including any in-
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come or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive
because of action-

ant to I.C. § 15-3-720 she is entitled to receive from
Lionel's estate her necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorney fee:s. This is a
question the magistrate judge must consider on remand.

(B) by a person, including a court or administrative
body, with legal authority to act in place of or on
behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse,

We award no costs or attorney fees on appeal.

We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed
on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 1993.
The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993
amendments to the federal statute does not apply
"with respect to assets disposed of on or before the
date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, I 993]."
Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore, it does not
apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover the balance of the Medicaid
payments from Lionel's separate property. This is
true even though 42 U.S.C. § l396p(b)(4), which
applies to Medicaid payments for calendar quarters
beginning on or after October I, 1993, authorizes
the Department to recover the Medicaid payments
from "other assets." Without the definition of
"assets" contained **10 *217 in 42 lJ.S.C. §
l 396p( e )(I), "other assets" are only those included
within Hildor's estate, as defined by J.C. §
15-1-20 I (15). Lionel's separate property, including

TROUT, C.J., and SILAK, SCHROEDER and
WALTERS, JJ., concur.
Idaho, 1998.
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman
132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6
END OF DOCUMENT

the community property transmuted by the agree-

ment, is not part of Hildor's estate.

IV.

CONCLUSION
We vacate the magistrate judge's denial of the Department's claim against Lionel's estate and remand
the case to the magistrate judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not address Jackman's contention that pursu-
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Supreme Court of North Dakota.
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Verna M.
WIRTZ, Deceased.
North Dakota Department of Human Services,
Claimant and Appellant,
V.

Vernon Caroline, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Verna Wirtz, deceased, Respondent and
Appellee.
No. 990275.
March 21, 2000.
Department of Human Services petitioned for allowance of claim against widow's estate for Medicaid benefits paid for benefit of husband prior to his
death. The District Court, Mountrail County, Northwest Judicial District, Robert W. Holte, J., denied
department's claim, and department appealed. The
Supreme Court, Neumann, J., held that any assets
conveyed by husband to his widow before his death
and traceable to widow's estate were subject to department's recovery claim.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[I] Appeal and Error 30 €=-842(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVl(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law,
which is fully reviewable by the Supreme Court.
[2] Statutes 361 €:=181(1)

361 Statutes
361 VJ Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 I k 180 Intention of Legislature
36 lk 18 l In General
36lkl8l(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
The primary objective of statutory construction is
to ascertain the legislature's intent.
[3] Statutes 361 €:=188
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k 187 Meaning of Language
36 lkl88 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In ascertaining legislative intent, thf: Supreme
Court looks first at the words used in ithe statute,
giving them their ordinary, plain-language meaning.
[4) Statutes 361 €=>205

361 Statutes
361 VJ Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction

36lk205 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statutes 361 €:=206
361 Statutes
361 VJ Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361 k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire
Statute. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court construes statutes as a whole to
give effect to each of their provisions, whenever
fairly possible.
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[51 Statutes 361 €:=212.7

[81 Health 198H €;=495

361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VT(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction
361k212.i' k. Other Matters. Most
Cited Cases
If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent is presumed clear from
the face of the statute.

198H Health
I 98HIII Government Assistance
I 98HIIl(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
I 98Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak24 I. 70)
Recovery from a surviving spouse's separatelyowned assets because of a past obligation to pay a
now-deceased Medicaid recipient's medical expenses as necessaries, or recovery from the surviving spouse's entire estate, including asse1s not traceable from the recipient, is not allowed. Social Security Act, §1917(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396p(b); NDCC 50-24.1-07.

[61 Statutes 361 €=>214
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VT(A) General Rules of Construction
36 t k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361k2!4 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
If statutory language is ambiguous, the Supreme
Court may resort to extrinsic aids to construe the
statute.

171 Health 198H €=>495
198H Health
l 98HI II Government Assistance
198HITI(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241.70)
Any assets conveyed by husband to his widow before his death and traceable to widow's estate were
subject to recovery claim by state Department of
Human Services for Medicaid benefits paid for benefit of husband prior to his death; however, separately-owned assets in widow's estate, or assets in
which husband never held interest, were not subject
to department's claim for recovery. Social Security
Act,§ 1917(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)
; NDCC 50-24.1-07.

[91 Health 198H €;=503(2)
198H Health
I 98Hlll Government Assistance
I 98Hlll(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
I 98Hk499 Administrative Proc,~edings
198Hk503 Evidence
I 98Hk503(2) k. Presumptions and
Burden of Proof. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241.l 15)
As the claimant seeking recovery from widow's estate for Medicaid benefits paid for bene:fit of husband prior to his death, the Department of Human
Services bore the initial burden of showing traceability of those assets it sought recovery against. Social Security Act, § I 9 I 7(b ), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b); NDCC 50-24.1-07.
*883 Blaine L. Nordwall, Special Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, for claimant and appellant.
Shane C. Goettle of McGee, Hankla, Backes &
Dobrovolny, Minot, for respondent and appellee.

NEUMANN, Justice.
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['II

I] The North Dakota Department of Human Services appeals from the trial court's order denying
the department's claim against Verna M. Wirtz's estate for Medicaid benefits paid by the department
for the benefit of Clarence Wirtz. We reverse and
remand.

['II 2] Clarence Wirtz and Verna Wirtz married in
1943. In July 1996, Clarence Wirtz began receiving
Medicaid benefits to pay for nursing home care.
Clarence Wirtz continued to receive benefits until
his death on August 24, 1997. Clarence Wirtz was
over age fifty-five and married to Verna Wirtz at all
times he received benefits. The parties stipulated
Clarence Wirtz received $53,635.83 in benefits.
Clarence Wirtz's estate was not probated at his
death.

['II 3] Verna Wirtz died on September 21, 1998.
Vernon Caroline was appointed Personal Representative of the estate. On November 18, 1998, the
department filed a claim against Verna Wirtz's estate for $55,977.93, seeking reimbursement for benefits paid to Clarence Wirtz, plus interest. On
January 11, 1999, Caroline denied the claim. On
January 22, 1999, the department petitioned the trial court for allowance of the claim. A hearing was
held on April 12, 1999. The department argued
Verna Wirtz's entire estate was subject to recovery
because Clarence Wirtz had a marital or equitable
interest in all of her property at his time of death.
Caroline moved to dismiss. The trial court denied
the department's claim, rendering the motion for
dismissal moot. The trial court determined "[n]one
of the property in the Verna Wirtz Estate is property Clarence had any legal title or interest in at the
time of his death." The department appeals.

homestead interest, and a legal interest in the surviving spouse's obligation to pay for the Medicaid
recipient's medical care as a necessary. Caroline argues the trial court did not err because any asset not
transferred by the Medicaid recipient at death to the
surviving spouse through joint tenancy, tenancyin-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust
is not subject to recovery, even if the asset was
transferred only hours before the recipient's death.
We disagree with both parties' arguments.

['II 5] 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) limits a stat~:'s power to
recover Medicaid benefits, providing:
*884 (b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a State plan
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical as-

sistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid
on behalf of an individual under the State plan
in the case of the following individuals:

(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years
of age or older when the individual received
such medical assistance, the State shall seek

adjustment or recovery from the individual's
estate, ...

(2) Any adjustment or recovery under parngraph ( 1)
may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any, ...

['II 4]

The department argues the trial court erred, as
a matter of law, by interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b) and N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 as not allowing recovery for past Medicaid benefits paid to
Clarence Wirtz from Verna Wirtz's entire estate.
The department contends 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) allows recovery of equitable interests, a marital estate
interest in the surviving spouse's entire estate, a

(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'estate
', with respect to a deceased individual (A) shall include all real and personal property and
other assets included within the individual's
estate, as defined for purposes of State pro-
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explained our statutory analysis process.

bate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any
other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
Id. ( emphasis added); see Estate o/Thompson, 1998
ND 226, 586 N.W.2d 847.
[1 6] Section 50-24.1-07, N.D.C.C., using broader
language, fully implements 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)
and provides:
1. On the death of any recipient of medical assistance who was fifty-five years of age or older
when the recipient received the assistance, and on
the death of the spouse of the deceased recipient,
the total amount of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the recipient following the recipient's
fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred
claim against the decedent's estate ....
2. No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the
decedent's surviving spouse, if any, nor while
there is a surviving child who is under the age of
twenty-one years or is blind or permanently and
totally disabled, but no timely filed claim may be
disallowed because of the provisions of this section.

[1 7] We rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) to provide
the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 because the
federal statute limits the situations in which the
states can recover Medicaid benefits from the surviving spouse's estate. Estate of Thompson, at 11
8-11; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(b)(I) and 1396a(a)(18).
We must, therefore, interpret 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)
to determine which assets in Verna Wirtz's estate
are subject to recovery.

Interpretation of a statute is a question of law,
which is fully reviewable by the Court. Jensen v.
North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau. 1997 ND
107,' 9, 563 N.W.2d 112.
The primary objective of statutory construction is
to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Eff'ertz v.
North Dakota Workers' Comp. Biweau, 481
N.W.2d 218, 220 (N.D.1992). Jn ascertaining legislative intent, we look first at the words used in
the statute, giving them their ordinary, plainlanguage meaning. Shiek v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 139, 1 16, 582
N.W.2d 639. We construe statutes as a whole to
give effect to each of its provisions, whenever
fairly possible. *885County of Stutsman v. State
Historical Society, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325
(N.D.1985). "Jf the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the legislative int,~nt is presumed clear from the face of the statute." 1Wedcenter One, Inc. v. North Dakota S1ate Bd. of
Pharmacy, 1997 ND 54, ii 13, 561 N.W.2d 634.
Jf statutory language is ambiguous, we may resort
to extrinsic aids to construe the statute . Hassan v.
Brooks. 1997 ND 150, 15,566 N.W.2d 822.
Estate of Thompson, at 116-7.
[19] Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B), the operative language provides Medicaid benefits can be recovered from:
[R]eal and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
[110] The parties stipulated Verna Wirtz is a survivor, heir, or assign of Clarence Wirtz, and Clarence Wirtz had not transferred or conveyed any

[1](2][3][4][5][6] [18] Jn Estate of Thompson, we
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property or other assets he had any legal title or interest in at the time of his death to Verna Wirtz
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust. Our inquiry,
therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz
had "real and personal property and other assets in
which [he] had any legal title or interest at the time
of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna
Wirtz through "other arrangement."

[i! 11] Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), asset 1s
defined as:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual,

includes all income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any
income or resources which the individual or such
individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action-

mained liable for the decedent's debts); Estarl:' of
Rhodes, 148 Misc.2d 744, 561 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346
(N.Y.1990) (including homestead interests). Recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{b) is not limited to assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the Medicaid recipient had legal title to and conveyed
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust. Such an interpretation would ignore the words "interest" and "other
arrangement." However, on this point, the statute's
language and meaning are not clear. See Estate of
Thompson, at ,r,r 11-14. The words "interest" and
"other arrangement" are ambiguous. We, therefore,
resort to extrinsic aids to ascertain the legislative
intent. Id. at ,r 7.
FNI. North Dakota is not a community
property state. American Standard Life and
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Speros, 494 N .W.2d 599,
606 (N.D.1993).

(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative

body, with legal authority to act in place of or on
behalf of the individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the direction or upon the
request of the individual or such individual's
spouse.

See Idaho Department of Health and Weljare v.
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6, 9 (Jd.1998)
(concluding the definition does not apply to assets
disposed of on or before August 10, 1993).

[i! 12] Thus, the department can assert a claim
against real or personal property, and other assets in
which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other
interest at his death, including income and assets
conveyed through "other arrangement." This has
been interpreted to include community property
1
FN and homestead interests. Bucholt: v. Be/she,
114 F.3d 923, 927-28 (9th Cir. I 997) (including
community property interests because they are included in the state's definition of "estate" and re-

[,r

13] In Estate of Thompson, we determined the
Congressional committee reports*886 on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(b) revealed an intent to allow states a wide
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries. Id.
at ,r 14.
"Allowing states to recover from the estates of persons who previously received assistance furthers
the broad purpose of providing for the medical
care of the needy; the greater amount recovered
by the state allows the state to have more funds to
provide future services." Belshe v. Hope, 33
Cal.App.4th 161, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 925
(Cal.Ct.App.1995). That broad purpose is
furthered more fully by allowing states to trace a
recipient's assets and recover them from the estate of a recipient's surviving spouse. ...
We conclude consideration of all the relevant
statutory provisions, in light of the Congressional
purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to
trace the assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies.
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Id. at ,r,r I 4-1 S (emphasis added).

[7][8] [,r 14) We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's
death and traceable to her estate are subject to the
department's recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever held by
either party during the marriage. Cf Estate ,~f Johe,
S90 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in
which the deceased recipient once held an interest
will be traced. It does not provide that separatelyowned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in
which the deceased recipient never held an interest,
are subject to the department's claim for recovery.
Thus, recovery from a surviving spouse's separately-owned assets because of a past obligation to
pay a now deceased Medicaid recipient's medical
expenses as necessaries, or recovery from the surviving spouse's entire estate, including assets not
traceable from the recipient, is not allowed.

N.D.,2000.
In re Estate of Wirtz
607 N.W.2d 882, 2000 ND S9
END OF DOCUMENT

[9] [11 1S] On the limited record before us, traceable
assets could minimally include Clarence Wirtz's
transferred interest in the Granada House and his
interest in a land contract for deed dated March 22,
1977. However, unless the department can show
traceability, assets subject to recovery would not include Verna Wirtz's solely-owned home interior
business, automobile, bank account, and miscellaneous personal property. As the claimant, the department bears the initial burden of showing traceability. See Sorum v. Schwartz. 411 N.W.2d 6S2,
6S4 (N.D.1987) (providing "one who asserts the existence of a fact material to an issue in a case assumes the burden of proof'). We remand to allow
the department the opportunity to present evidence
concerning asset traceability.

[,r 16] We reverse the trial court's order and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[11 17] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J.,
MARY MUEHLEN MARING, DALE V. SANDSTROM, CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., concur.
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121 Judgment 228 €==181(8)
Intermediate Court of Appeals ofHawai'i.
Blossom Joshua KUNEWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
Gladys K. Brash, Lorraine K. Daniel and Doris K.
Farm, Plaintiffs,
V.

Isaac K. JOSHUA, Jr., aka Isaac Kahele Joshua, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16229.
Aug. 28, 1996.
In suit challenging conveyances of virtually all
principal's property by agent to himself under
power of attorney, the First Circuit Court ruled that
agent exceeded authority, imposed constructive
trust on conveyed assets, and awarded punitive
damages. Agent appealed. The Intermediate Court
of Appeals, Watanabe, J., held that: (I) general
power of attorney did not authorize agent to make
gifts to himself; (2) plaintiffs attorney fees could
be considered when computing amount of punitive
damages; but (3) admitting evidence of agent's refusal to comply with court order for return of property was error.

228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 18 I Grounds for Summary Judgment
228k 181(5) Matters Affecting Right to
Judgment
228kl81(8) k. Ambiguity in Written
Instrument. Most Cited Cases
Where construction of written instrument is at issue
in lawsuit, preliminary question of whether instrument is ambiguous is question of law tlhat may be
resolved on summary judgment.

[31 Judgment 228 €;=181(18)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 18 I Grounds for Summary Judgment
228kl81(15) Particular Cases
228k 181 (18) k. Brokers or Agents,
Cases Involving. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 228k181(15.l))
If language of power of attorney is clear and meaning of instrument can be readily ascertained from
words used, legal effect and construction of instrument are questions of law properly resolved on
summary judgment disposition.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

141 Principal and Agent 308 C:=97
West Headnotes

11 I Appeal and Error 30 ~863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Order granting summary judgment is reviewed on
appeal under same standard applied by trial court.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c).

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Fundamental rule in construing power of attorney
document is that intent of parties governs, as
gleaned from entire context of instrument.

151 Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
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308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k I OJ Purchases, Sales, and Conveyances
308k I 03( I 0) k. Purpose and Terms
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most
Cited Cases
Agent lacks authority to make gift of principal's
property, unless authority is expressly given in
power of attorney.
[61 Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1)

308 Principal and Agent
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
3081I(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308ITl(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k103 Purchases, Sales, and Conveyances
308k I 03(10) k. Purpose and Terms
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most
Cited Cases
Agent may

not gratuitously convey principal's

property to himself absent express written authorization in power of attorney.

f71 Evidence 157 €==385
157 Evidence
I 57XI Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k385 k. Writings Excluding Extrinsic
Evidence in General. Most Cited Cases
Extrinsic evidence of principal's intent to allow
agent to make gifts to himself or herself is not ad-

missib\e when power of attorney does not expressly
authorize gift to agent.

[8] Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308II(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69( I) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

Principal and Agent 308 €;=103(10)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308IIl(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k I 03 Purchases, Sales, and Conveyances
308k I 03(10) k. Purpose and Terms
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most
Cited Cases
Oral authorization from principal is insufficient to
prevent agent to make gift to himself or herself;
written documentation of principal's clear intent in
power of attorney is required.

[9] Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308II(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

Principal and Agent 308 €;;;;>103(10)
308 Principal and Agent
308TII Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k I 03 Purchases, Sales., and Conveyances
308k I 03(10) k. Purpose and Terms
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most
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Cited Cases
General grant of authority in power of attorney, to
perform every act that principal could, did not authorize agent to make gift of principal's property to
himself, to exclusion ofprincipal's other children.
110) Principal and Agent 3081£;:::>79(9)

308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308II(A) Execution of Agency
308k79 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful Acts of Agent
308k79(9) k. Judgment and Measure of
Damages. Most Cited Cases
Attorney fees incurred by plaintiff could be considered when determining amount of punitive damages to award against agent who used power of attorney to make unauthorized gifts to himself of virtually all of principal's property to exclusion of
principal's other children; attorney fees provide
meaningful standard for guiding jury when awarding punitive damages. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 908 comment.
[11) Damages 115 ~87(1)
I I 5 Damages
I I 5V Exemplary Damages

115k87 Nature and Theory of Damages Additional to Compensation
115k87( !) k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
Purpose of punitive damages award is to punish defendant for aggravated or outrageous misconduct
and to deter defendant and others from similar conduct in future, rather than to compensate plaintiff.

f 12) Principal and Agent 3081£;:::>79(5)
308 Principal and Agent
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308Il(A) Execution of Agency
308k79 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful Acts of Agent
308k79(5) k. Evidence. Most Cited

Cases
Agent's refusal to comply with order directing return of principal's assets which agent conveyed to
himself, in excess of authority granted under power
of attorney, was irrelevant to agent's state of mind
when conveyances were made and, thus, admitting
evidence on issue of punitive damages was error.
**560 *66 Syllabus by the Court

The circuit court correctly ruled that a defendant
exceeded his authority when the defendant used a
general power of attorney from his moither to gift
substantially all of her property to himself, to the
exclusion of his four sisters. The clear and unambiguous language of the power of attorney did not
expressly authorize the defendant to make a gift to
himself, and we will not construe any broad, allencompassing grants of power to the defendant under the power of attorney to confer the power to
make a gift.
The circuit court properly instructed the jury that it
could consider the plaintiffs reasonable attorney
fees in computing the amount of punitive damages.
The instruction provided objective guidance to the
jury in calculating the amount of punitive damages,
thus allowing punitive damages to be more accurately measured and decreasing the potential for an
arbitrary and abusive punitive damages award. Additionally, the instruction helped to enmre that a
plaintiff entitled to punitive damages can be made
truly whole as a result of a defendant's wrongful
and malicious act.
The circuit court erred, however, in admitting evidence at trial of the defendant's refusal to comply
with a partial summary judgment order directing
the defendant to return to the administrator of his
mother's estate the assets he had wrongfully conveyed to himself. Such evidence was inelevant to
the defendant's state of mind at the time he allegedly committed fraud in conveying his mother's
property to himself. Since the jury's award of punitive damages may have been based on the foregoing
evidence, we remand this case for a new trial on
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punitive damages.
Edward Y. N. Kim, Kim & Kim, on the briefs,
Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.
Carroll S. Taylor (Taylor, Leong & Chee, of counsel), on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BURNS* C.J., WATANABE and REEN, JJ.,
RECUSED.FN

FN"' On October 6, 1993, Circuit Judge
Marie N. Milks was assigned to sit with
the judges of the Hawai'i Intermediate
Court of Appeals, temporarily, in place of
then Associate Judge Walter M. Reen, who
was recused from this case. Judge Hccn
subsequently retired on October 30, 1994.
WAT ANA BE, Judge.
This lawsuit arises out of a dispute over whether
Defendant-Appellant Isaac K. Joshua, Jr., also
known as Isaac Kahele Joshua, Jr. (Defendant), exceeded his authority when he used a general power
of attorney from his mother, Rose K. Joshua
(Mother), to gift substantially all of Mother's property to himself, to the exclusion of his four sisters,
Gladys K. Brash (Gladys), Lorraine K. Daniel
(Lorraine), Doris K. Farm (Doris), and PlaintiffAppellee Blossom Joshua Kunewa (Plaintiff) FNI
(collectively, Sisters).
FNI. This lawsuit was filed by PlaintiffAppellee
Blossom
Joshua
Kunewa
(Plaintiff) against Defendant-Appellant
Isaac K. Joshua, Jr., also known as Isaac
Kahele Joshua, Jr., (Defendant) on March
16, I 988. On December 20, 1988, Gladys
K. Brash (Gladys), Lorraine K. Daniel
(Lorraine), and Doris K. Farm (Doris)
moved to intervene in the lawsuit as
plaintiffs, and their motion was granted on
April 17, 1989. In the meantime, however,
on December 29, 1988, Plaintiff filed a

motion for partial summary judgment
which was granted on July 14, 1989. Because the intervention was granted after
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment had been filed, a question arose
as to whether the partial summary judgment could be entered in favor of Gladys,
Lorraine, and Doris, in addition to
Plaintiff. To obviate this question, Gladys,
Lorraine, and Doris stipulated with Defendant that they would dismiss with prejudice the prosecution of their cla:ims against
Defendant, but that Plaintiffs claims for
"payment of rents and proceeds.," "fraud,"
and "willful, wanton and callous disregard
of ... trust" would be tried. Gladys, Lorraine, and Doris also agreed to be bound
by the judgment entered by the circuit
court on the issues that were tried.
**561 *67 Defendant appeals from the First Circuit
Court's: {I) July 14, I 989 order granting partial
summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor, which concluded that Mother's power of attorney did not authorize Defendant to convey Mother's property to
himself without consideration and which directed
Defendant to hold all property so transferred as
constructive trustee for the beneficiaries of Mother's estate (Partial Summary Judgment Order); (2)
June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment based upon a special jury verdict, awarding Plaintiff $34,670.10 in
special damages and $95,000 in punitive damages
(Amended Judgment); and (3) April 26, 1991 Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of
[the February 4, 1991 Order Denying] Defendant's
Motions for (A) Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, (8) Reconsideration of Order Denying
Motion for Directed Verdict and (C) New Trial
(April 26, 1991 Order).

We (I) affirm the Partial Summary Judgment Order, (2) affirm that part of the Amended Judgment
which awarded Plaintiff special damages, vacate
that part of the Amended Judgment which awarded
Plaintiff punitive damages, and remand for a new
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trial on the punitive damages issue, and (3) vacate
the April 26, 1991 Order.
BACKGROUND
Mother was the widow of Isaac Joshua, Sr.
(Father), who died on January 9, 1963. On September 15, 194 7, both Mother and Father executed
wills, bequeathing their individual estates to the
other, and in the event of the death of the survivor,
then in equal shares to their five children-Plaintiff,
Defendant, Gladys, Lorraine, and Doris.
In 1980, Mother was hospitalized for medical problems. After she was released from the hospital,
Mother asked Defendant to take her to an attorney
so that she could settle her property and business
affairs. On June 26, 1980, Defendant took Mother
to see attorney Matthew Pyun (Pyun), a friend of
Defendant. At Mother's request, Pyun prepared a
document, which Mother subsequently signed, giving Defendant a general power of attorney to manage Mother's affairs (June 26, 1980 power of attorney).
The June 26, 1980 power of attorney, which was recorded at the Hawai'i Bureau of Conveyances on
June 27, 1980, read in relevant part, as follows:
ROSE KAPU JO SHU A of 2105 St. Louis Drive,
City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii
[Hawai'i),
have made, constituted and appointed and by these
presents do make, constitute and appoint ISAAC
KAHELE JOSHUA, JR., of86-124 Hoaha Street,
Waianae [Wai'anae], City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii [Hawai'i),
my true and lawful attorney, for me in my name,
place and stead, and for my use and benefit with
full power and authority to do and perform every
act, deed or thing that I might or could do if personally present, including without limitation, the
following:

******
2. To bargain, contract, purchase, receive and
take real property and/or any interests therein and
to accept the seizin and possession thereof and
the delivery of all deeds, leases, assignments,
agreements, options and other conveyance documents thereto, and to rent, lease, sublease, bargain, sell, release, convey, mortgage, hypothecate, and in every manner deal with the real property I now own, and any real property I may hereafter acquire, upon such terms and conditions,
and under such covenants as he shall think fit;
3. To bargain and agree for, buy, sell, mortgage,
hypothecate and in any and every way and manner deal in and with goods and m•!rchandise,
choses in action and other property in possession
or in action;

******
6. To sign, seal, execute, acknowledge and deliver for me and in my name, and as my act and
deed, such deeds, options, grants, leases, assignments, covenants, indentures, agreements, mortgages, hypothecations, bills, checks, bonds,
notes, receipts, evidences of debts, and such other
**562 *68 instruments in writing of whatever
kind and nature as may be necessary or proper in
the premises.
The foregoing power of attorney did not contain
any language expressly permitting Defendant to
make gifts of Mother's property.
Defendant did not use the June 26, 1980 power of
attorney to transfer title to any of Mother's property
until the summer of 1987. On June 20, 1987, Mother suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Her treating physician, Dr. Bernard Fong (Dr. Fong), discussed with Defendant and Sisters the possibility of
Mother not being able to live beyond the, next four
days. Dr. Fong also informed Defendant and Sisters
that Mother, on the other hand, might have a prolonged recovery, in which case the cost of her care
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''"-'
and treatment could consume all of her assets.
After the meeting with Dr. Fong, Defendant decided to use the June 26, 1980 power of attorney to
transfer all of Mother's assets to himself. Because
Defendant initially could not locate the June 26,
1980 power of attorney, he requested that attorney
Blake Okimoto (Okimoto) prepare another power
of attorney and have Mother execute it at the hospital.
Upon arrival at Mother's hospital room on June 22,
1987, Okimoto found that Mother "was bedridden
and unable to communicate verbally[.]" To determine whether Mother were mentally competent to execute this second power of attorney, Okimoto explained the contents of the power of attorney document to Mother and informed her that if she signed
the document, she would be giving Defendant the
ability to act on her behalf as to all property that
she owned. Okimoto asked Mother to squeeze his
hand if she understood what he was explaining to
her, and Mother responded by squeezing his hand.
Okimoto also asked Mother if it was her desire to
convey her property to Defendant, and Mother
again squeezed Okimoto's hand.
Because of her physical condition, Mother was unable on her own to sign her name on the power of
attorney document. Defendant, therefore, assisted
Mother by guiding her hand to the signature line of

document, to sign his record book as witnesses to
the transaction: Doris, who would later be named as
the personal representative of Mother's estate; Lorraine; and Faith Brash, Lorraine's daughter and
Mother's granddaughter.
FN2. Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) §
456-15 (1993) requires, in part, that
"[e]very notary public shall record at
length in a book of records all acts,
protests, depositions, and other things, by
the notary noted or done in the notary's official capacity."
Following Mother's execution of the second power
of attorney, Defendant located the original June 26,
1980 power of attorney at the Bureau of Conveyances. Before Mother died on September 9, 1987,
Defendant used the original power of attorney to
transfer to himself Mother's interest in a lien-free
home on St. Louis Drive, some real property on the
Big Island, and some real property in California. In
addition, Defendant put his name on the titles to
Mother's bank accounts and car. Defendant attempted, but was not allowed, to use the power of attorney to transfer Mother's common stock into his own
name; however, he continued to use the power of
attorney after Mother's death to negotia1e Mother's
stock dividend checks and to deposit the: same into
his bank account. Defendant never paid Mother for
any of the property so transferred.

the document and holding her hand steady as she

made an "X" mark. Okimoto, who was also a notary public, then signed and sealed the notarial acknowledgment certificate on the document, thus
certifying that Mother had appeared before him and
had signed the document as her free act and deed.
Okimoto also required Mother to sign her "X" in
2
his notarial record book.fN which contained documentation of all notarial acts performed by
Okimoto. Okimoto then had both Defendant and
Defendant's wife, Maile Joshua (Maile), sign the
power of attorney document as witnesses. He also
required Maile and the following individuals, who
were present in the hospital room and had witnessed Mother's signing of the power of attorney

After Defendant made the foregoing transfers of
title to Mother's property to himself, he informed
Sisters of the transfers. He also assured them that
they should not worry because "[i]t will all be
equal.... When *69 **563 [M]other gets well, I will
give everything back to [Mother]."
After Mother's death, however, Defenda111t changed
his mind. At a family gathering in October 1987,
Defendant showed Sisters a copy of Mother's will,
the original of which was never found, and the original power of attorney which Mother had given
him. Defendant then informed Sisters that Mother
had expressed to him many times over the years of

··~
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her intent to give him all of her property and that
Mother had given him the power of attorney for
that purpose. Defendant indicated that, in view of
Mother's wishes, he considered all of the property
he had transferred to himself pursuant to the power
of attorney to be his alone. He also refused to commence a probate of Mother's will or to share Mother's property with Sisters in accordance with Moth.
FN3
er's w1·11 or the statutes on mtestacy.
FN3. Under the will of Rose K. Joshua
(Mother), all of Mother's property was to
be divided equally among her five children. The same division of property would
result if Mother had died intestate. HRS §
560:2-103( I) (1993).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 16, 1988, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging fraud and breach of trust by Defendant and
seeking to ( 1) impose a constructive trust on the
property transferred by Defendant to himself, (2)
return the transferred property to Mother's estate,
(3) submit Mother's will to probate, (4) collect fair
market rent from Defendant for his occupancy of
Mother's house after the transfer, and (5) award
Plaintiff punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs
for Defendant's conversion of Mother's property.
On December 29, 1988, Plaintiff filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on two issues: ( 1)
whether Mother's will should be submitted to probate; and (2) whether Defendant should be required
to "convey to the personal representative of
[Mother's estate] all property, real and personal,
formerly owned by [Mother], title to which was
conveyed into Defendant's name by Defendant acting under a power of attorney given him by
[Mother], together with any dividends, interest,
rents, issues and profits received by Defendant
from or on account of said property." In opposing
the motion, Defendant provided three affidavits
4
FN in support of his assertion that Mother had
made several oral representations that she intended

for Defendant to have all of her property.
FN4. The affiants who signed the affidavits were as follows: Defendant; Defendant's wife, Maile Joshua; and Rose
Kajioka Brash, Mother's niece.
On July 14, 1989, the circuit court enter,ed an order
granting Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment. In relevant part, the order r,ead as follows:
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS: that the power
of attorney given by [Mother] to Defendant dated
June 26, 1980 is clear and unambiguous; and that
said power of attorney does not contain any authority for Defendant to transfer [Mother's] property to himself, thereby effecting a gift to himself
of her assets;
AND THE COURT THEREFORE CONCLUDES: that the June 26, 1980 power of attorney given by [Mother] must be strictly construed;
that a strict reading of said power of attorney
shows that Defendant was not empowered to
deed over [Mother's] property to himself and
thereby effect a gift to himself of [Mother's] assets; that the affidavits submitted by Defendant
which tend to show [Mother] wanted Defendant
to obtain the property through the power of attorney are insignificant in the light of the unambiguous power of attorney strictly construe:d; that the

affidavits submitted by Defendant are inadmissible as parol evidence and are deem1!d not admissible for the Court; that Defendant holds all
property formerly belonging to [Mother] which
he acquired by the use of the June 26, 1980
power of attorney and said property shall be held
as a constructive trust for the benefit of those
people who will take through the probate of
[Mother's] estate[.]
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions,
the circuit court ordered Defendant to deliver Mother's will to Plaintiff, to hold all of Mother's property
in constructive trust, and to not transfer or encum-
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her the real and personal property he had transferred to himself.

DISCUSSION

On December 19, 1990, the case proceeded to trial
on the issue of damages. On January **564 *70 3,
1991, the jury returned a special verdict, awarding
Plaintiff special damages in the amount of
"$45,671.00 less documented funeral expenses"
and punitive damages in the amount of $95,000.
The circuit court entered judgment for the foregoing amounts on February 4, 1991, and Defendant
appealed from this judgment. However, on May 2,
1991, Defendant's appeal was dismissed by the
Hawai'i Supreme Court because "the judgment did
not fully determine the amount of special damages,
is therefore incomplete and not final, and we do not
have jurisdiction." Thereafter, on June 9, 1992, the
circuit court entered an amended judgment which
determined that the amount of special damages
awardable to Plaintiff, after deducting documented
funeral expenses of $11,000.90, was $34,670.10.
This appeal followed.

I. The Partial Summary Judgment: Whether Defendant Exceeded His Authority Under .rhe Power
of Attorney

Defendant argues that the circuit court committed
reversible error in several respects. First, Defendant
argues that the court was wrong when it granted
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment because a genuine triable issue of material fact existed
as to Mother's intent in giving Defendant the power
of attorney. Second, the court improperly instructed
the jury that Plaintiffs attorney fees in bringing this
lawsuit could be considered in computing the
amount of a punitive damages award. Third, the circuit court erroneously admitted evidence of Defendant's refusal to comply with a prior court order
to return Mother's assets to the administrator of
Mother's estate. Fourth, the circuit court improperly
allowed several of Plaintiffs witnesses to testify,
since insufficient notice was provided to Defendant
that the witnesses would be testifying. Finally, Defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it
refused to allow Defendant to read into evidence a
part of Plaintiffs deposition which was relevant to
attack Plaintiffs credibility.

A. Standard of Review

[1] On appeal, an order granting summary judgment
is reviewed under the same standard applied by the
trial courts. State v. Tradewinds Elec. Serv. & Contracting Inc., 80 Hawai'i 218, 222, 908 P.2d 1204,
1208 ( 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate "if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hawai'i
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c).

[2][3] Where the construction of a written instrument is at issue in a lawsuit, the preliminary question of whether the instrument is ambiguous is a
question of law that may be resolved on summary
judgment. Pelosi v. Wai/ea Ranch Estates, 10
Haw.App. 424, 436, 876 P.2d 1320, 1327, cert.
denied, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994).
Moreover, if the language of the instrument is clear
and the meaning of the instrument can be readily
ascertained from the words used therein, the legal
effect and construction of the instrument are questions of law properly resolved on summary judgment disposition. Id.
Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in
concluding, as a matter of law, that the power of attorney did not authorize him to convey Mother's
property to himself without consideration. Defendant claims that because he submitted three affidavits which explained that Mother had intended
that he use the power of attorney to make gifts to
himself, a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to the scope of his authority under the power of attorney, thus precluding summary judgment. We dis-
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agree.
B. Rules Governing Construction of Powers of Attorney

"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordance with the rules for interpretation of written instruments generally; in accordance with the principles governing the law of agency; and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, in accordance with
the prevailing laws relating to the act authorized." 3
Am.Jur.2d Agency§ 30, at 533-34 ( 1986).
**565 *71 [4] The fundamental rule in construing
written instruments is that the intent of the parties,
as gleaned from the entire context of the instrument, governs. Pelosi, IO Haw.App. at 436, 876
P.2d at 1327. "As long as the terms of [the instrument] are not ambiguous, i.e., not 'capable of being
reasonably understood in more ways than one,' we
are required to interpret the terms 'according to
their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common
speech.' " Id. (quoting Cho Mark Oriental Food,
Ltd. v. K & K Int'/, 73 Haw. 509, 520, 836 P.2d
1057, 1064 (1992)).
It is also well-established that powers of attorney
"are subjected to a strict construction and are never
interpreted to authorize acts not obviously within
the scope of the particular matter to which they
refer." Lopez v. Soy Young, 9 Haw. 113, 115 (I 892)
. As explained in F.Af. Stigler, Inc. v. H.N.C. Real~v. 595 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Civ.App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 609 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.1980),
when authority is conferred upon an agent by a
formal, written instrument, such as a power of attorney, the authority given the agent will be
strictly construed so as to exclude any authority
not specifically set forth, except authority necessary to effectuate the purpose of the authority
granted.
(Emphasis added.)
[5] Accordingly, it is well-settled that an agent

lacks authority to make a gift of the principal's
property unless that authority is expressly given by
the language of the power of attorney. Kaname
Fujino v. Clark, 71 F.Supp. l, 4 (D.Haw.1947) (to
authorize gift of asset by agent, the agent must have
such a power expressly and clearly conforred; even
if principal intended to make a gift to agent, if
power of attorney lacked express language authorizing gift, no gift could be made), affa; 172 F.2d
384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 937, 69 S.Ct.
1512, 93 L.Ed. 1743, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839,
70 S.Ct. 34, 94 L.Ed. 513 ( 1949); Aiello v. Clark,
680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) (in absence of
express authority to make a gift, none may be
made); Johnson v. Fraccacreta, 348 So.2d 570, 572
(Fla.App.1977) (agent has no power to make a gift
of his principal's property unless that power is expressly conferred upon the agent by the instrument
or unless such power arises as a necessary implication from the powers which are expressly conferred).
[6] Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the
absence of express written authorization, an agent
may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366
So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use fonds in decedent principal's checking account in the absence
of clear language to that effect in the power of attorney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re
Estate of DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352
N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held
to encompass an authorization to attorney-in-fact to
make gift to himself of principal's property; such a
gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and
self-dealing, a presumption which can be overcome
only with the clearest showing of principal's intent
to make the gift), affd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363
N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975).
[7][8] Where a power of attorney docs not expressly authorize the attorney-in-fact to make gifts
to himself or herself, extrinsic evidence of the prin-
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cipal's intent to allow such gifts is not admissible.
An attorney-in-fact may not make a gift to himself
or herself unless there is clear intent in writing from
the principal allowing the gift. Oral authorization is
not acceptable. McCarter v. Willis. 299 S.C. 198,
383 S.E.2d 252, 253 (App.1989).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained
the policy reasons underlying the rule prohibiting
extrinsic evidence as follows:
When one considers the manifold opportunities
and temptations for self-dealing that are opened
up for persons holding general powers of attorney-of which outright transfers for less than value
to the attorney-in-fact [himself or] herself are the
most obvious-the justification for such a flat rule
is apparent. And its justification is made even
more apparent when one considers the ease with
which such a rule can be accommodated by principals and their draftsmen.
Estate of Casey v. Comm 'r of Internal Revenue, 948
F .2d 895, 898 ( 4th Cir. 1991 ).
**566 *72 We now examine the power of attorney
at issue in this lawsuit according to the foregoing
rules.
C. The Power of Attorney in this Case
[9] In the instant case, the power of attorney which
Mother gave to Defendant did not expressly authorize Defendant to make gifts of Mother's property.
However, it did broadly authorize Defendant to
"perform every act, deed or thing that [Mother]
might or could do if personally present" and to
"bargain, contract, purchase, receive and take real
property and/or any interests therein and to accept
the seizin and possession thereof and the delivery
of all deeds, leases, assignments, agreements, options and other conveyance documents ... and to
rent, lease, sublease, bargain, sell, release, convey,
mortgage, hypothecate, and in every manner deal
with the real property I now own, and any real
property I may hereafter acquire, upon such terms

and conditions ... as he shall think fit." (Emphasis
added.)
Defendant contends that since the power of attorney
which Mother conferred on him was so broad, its
language is ambiguous as to whether it authorized
him to make gifts of Mother's property to himself.
Therefore, the circuit court should have considered
extrinsic evidence of Mother's intent in giving him
the power of attorney and denied Plaintiffs motion
for partial summary judgment. We disagree.
"Well established rules of interpretation of powers
of attorney dictate that broad, all-encompassing
grants of power to the agent must be discounted."
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Harper, 622 S.W.2d 345,
349 (Mo.App.1981) ( citing Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 34, comment h (1958)). See al5o Estate of
Casey v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 948 F.2d at
900-0 I (where power of attorney expressly authorized agent to transfer principal's asse1s by sale,
lease, or mortgage, but omitted any reference to the
power of transfer by gift, the expansive language of
the power of attorney would be interpreted to confer only those incidental, interstitial powers necessary to accomplish objects as to which authority has
been conferred and not to confer power to make a
gift).
Three reasons are mentioned for the application of
the foregoing doctrine:
First, the power to make a gift of the principal's
property is a power that is potentially hazardous
to the principal's interests. Consequently, this
power will not be lightly inferred from broad, allencompassing grants of power to the agent. Accordingly, the agent must be circumspe,ct with regard to the powers created-or the lack of them.
Second, the main duty of an agent is loyalty to
the interest of his principal.... Thus, in exercising
granted powers under a power of attorney, the attorney in fact is bound to act for the be,11efit of his
principal and must avoid where possible that
which is detrimental unless expressly author-
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ized ....
Third, it would be most unusual for an owner of
property to grant a power of attorney authorizing
the attorney in fact to give his property away. If a
person has decided to make a gift of property, he
or she usually decides as to who is going to be
the donee.

King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 492 A.2d 608, 613
( 1985) ( citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
In Kaaukai v. Anahu, 30 Haw. 226 ( 1927), the
Hawai'i Supreme Court held that a power of attorney broadly authorizing an agent to "grant, bargain
and sell" on behalf of the principal "any land in the
Territory of Hawaii [Hawai'i] belonging to [him or]
her or in which [he or] she might have an interest"
did not confer authority on the agent to give the
land away. Id.
In the present case, we similarly conclude that the
clear and unambiguous language of the general
power of attorney given by Mother to Defendant
did not authorize Defendant to make a gift to himself of Mother's property. Therefore, the circuit
court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Defendant lacked authority to make a gift of Mother's
property to himself and properly granted Plaintiffs
motion for partial summary judgment.
**S67 *73 II. The Punitive Damages Award
In its charge to the jury, the circuit court gave the
following instruction regarding how punitive damages should be calculated:
If you allow punitive damages in this case then in
assessing such damage you may take into consideration the following items: (I) such amount as
will deter defendant from such future conduct;
(2) an amount as shall be an example to others
and deter them from such conduct; (3) [t]he
probable and reasonable expense of the litigation
including attorney's fees, expert witness fees and

the inconvenience and time involved in preparing
for trial [.] The amount should not be so small as
to be trifling nor so large as to be unjust, but such
as candid and dispassionate minds can approve as
a punitive example and as a warning to others
against a similar lapse of duty.
(Emphasis added.)
[ 10] Defendant contends that the circuit court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury
that attorney fees are an element of punitive damages. Defendant points out that the "longstanding
rule of Hawai'i law" is that "no attorney fees may
be awarded as damages or costs unless so provided
by statute, stipulation or agreement" and no statute,
stipulation, or agreement authorized the imposition
of attorney fees in this case. Therefore, Defendant
contends, the court's instruction provided an indirect means for Plaintiff to obtain compensation for
attorney fees where none was allowed by law.
We find no error in the circuit court's instruction.

A. The Law of Punitive Damages in Hawai 'i
[11] The purpose of a punitive damages award in
Hawai'i is not to compensate the plaintiff, but
rather, to punish the defendant "for aggravated or
outrageous misconduct and to deter the defendant
and others from similar conduct in the future." Masaki v. General 1\.-fotors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 6, 780
P.2d 566, 570, reconsideration denied, 71 Haw.
664, 833 P.2d 899 (1989). In order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff "must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has acted
wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as
implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference
to civil obligations, or where there has been some
wilful misconduct or that entire want of ,;are which
would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences." / d. at 16- I 7, 780 P .2d at
575.

The Hawai'i Supreme Court has instructed that "the
proper measurement of punitive damages should be
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'[t]he degree of malice, oppression, or gross negligence which forms the basis for the award and the
amount of money required to punish the defendant....' " Kang v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 663,
587 P.2d 285, 291 (1978) (quoting Howell v. Associated Hotels, 40 Haw. 492, 501 (1954)). However,
no Hawai'i case has specifically addressed the
question of whether a plaintiffs attorney fees may
be considered (n determining the amount of punit. d amages. FN5
1ve
FN5. In Masaki v. General Motors Corp.,
71 Haw. I, 780 P.2d 566, reconsideration
denied, 71 Haw. 664, 833 P .2d 899 ( 1989),
the Hawai'i Supreme Court observed in
dicta that "[o]ther purposes for imposing
punitive damages which have been recognized by courts and commentators include
preserving the peace; inducing private law
enforcement; compensating victims for
otherwise uncompensable losses; and paying the plaintiffs attorneys' fees." 71 Haw.
at 8 n. 2, 780 P.2d at 571 n. 2 (emphasis
added; citation omitted).

B. Attorney Fees as an Element of Punitive Dam-

ages in Other Jurisdictions
Courts in other jurisdictions disagree on whether a
jury, or a judge sitting as fact finder, may consider

Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal.2d 261, 158 P.2d 3 (1945)
; Kinane v. Fay, 111 N.J.L. 553, 168 A. 724 ( 1933);
international Elecs. Co. v. NS T. Metal Prods. Co.,
370 Pa. 213, 88 A.2d 40 ( 1952); Earl v. Tupper. 45
Vt. 275 ( 1873); Fairbanks v. Witter, 18 Wis. 287
(I 864).

The majority of jurisdictions, however, regularly allow a jury to consider attorney fees in computing
the amount of punitive damages. See e.g., AfroAmerican Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649
(D.C.Cir.1966); Marshall v. Beh1er, 17 Ala. 832
(I 850); Markey v. Santangelo. 195 Conn. 76, 485
A.2d 1305 ( 1985); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho
700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partnership v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85
Ill.App.3d 1108, 41 Ill.Dec. 147, 407 N.E.2d 645
(1980); Dorris v. Miller, 105 Iowa 564, 75 N.W.
482 ( 1898); Newton v. Hornblower, 224 Kan. 506,
582 P.2d 1136 (]978); St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church. Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337,568 A.2d 35
( 1990); Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich.App.
288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1966); Central Bank of Mississippi v. Butler, 517 So.2d 507 (Miss.1987); Senn
v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119
(Mo.1979); .Jeffries Av/on, Inc. "· Gallagher. 149
Misc.2d 552, 567 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y.1991); Fremont Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 26 O.O.2d 109,
192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Com.Pl.1963); Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.1984); Debry & Hilton

a plaintiffs attorney fees or other litigation costs in

Travel Servs., Inc. v. Capitol Int'/ Airways. Inc.,

determining an award of punitive damages. See Annotation, Attorneys' Fees or Other Expenses of Lit-

583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978); Kemp v. Miller. 166
Va. 661, 186 S.E. 99 (1936); Olds v. Ho.~ford, 354
P.2d 947 (Wyo.1960), reh'g denied, 359 P.2d 406
(Wyo.1961 ).

igation as Element in Measuring Exemplary or
Punitive Damages, 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970),
Several jurisdictions refuse to allow a jury to consider reasonable attorney fees in measuring an
award of punitive damages, reasoning that (I) such
fees are compensatory in **568 *74 nature and
therefore not a proper consideration in measuring a
punitive damages award, or (2) the jury ought to
have unfettered discretion in deciding the amount
of punitive damages subject only to a trial court's
remittitur if it deems the award excessive. See, e.g.,

Under the majority approach, " 'attorney fees are
not allowed as compensation [to the plaintiff] but
rather as punishment for defendant's wrongful and
malicious act. They are not allowed in addition to
the sum assessed as [punitive] damages., and their
recovery is never permitted in a separate action .... '
"Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 434 P.2d
at 830 (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages§ 50 (1966)).
Courts that have adopted the majority VIew gener-
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ally reason that allowing a jury to consider the
amount of a plaintiffs attorney fees in calculating
punitive damages diminishes the potential for arbitrary and abusive punitive damages awards. In St.
Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith.
568 A.2d 35, for example, the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that allowing a jury to consider reasonable attorney fees in determining punitive damages satisfies two seemingly disparate goals:
First, because the jury will be offered objective
guidance in calculating the amount of its punitive
award, punitive damages will be more accurately
measured and the potential for abuse decreased.
Second, the plaintiff can be made truly whole in
precisely those kinds of cases in which the defendant's wrongful conduct is found to be at its
most flagrant, for only in such cases are punitive
damages warranted.
568 A.2d at 43 (citations omitted).

....,

The majority view is consistent with the approach
advocated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(I 958). The Restatement recognizes that "damages
in a tort action do not ordinarily include compensation for attorney fees or other expenses of the litigation." Id. § 914(1), at 492. However, the Restatement also states that "[i]n awarding punitive damages when they are otherwise allowable, the trier of
fact may consider the actual or probable expense
incurred by the plaintiff in bringing the action." Id.,
comment a, at 493. See also Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 908, comment e, at 467 (in determining
the amount of punitive damages, the trier of fact
can consider the extent of harm to the injured person, including "the fact that the plaintiff has been
put to trouble and expense in the protection of his
interests, as by legal proceedings in this or in other
suits").
C. Attorney Fees as an Element ofPunitive Damages in Hawai 'i
In Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont. Inc. v. Ke/co
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Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278, 109 S.Ct. 2909,
2922, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court **569 *75 held that "the propriety
of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in
question, and the factors the jury may consider in
determining their amount, are questions of state
law." (Emphasis added.) The Court thus left the responsibility for framing guidelines for punitive
damages awards to the states. In a cogent concurring opinion, however, Justice Brennan lamented
the general lack of guidance given to juries faced
with the responsibility of calculating a punitive
damages award:

Without statutory (or at least common-law)
standards for the determination of how large an
award of punitive damages is appropriate in a
given case, juries are left largely to themselves in
making this important, and potentially devastating, decision. Indeed, the jury [in Browning-Ferris ] was sent to the jury room with nothing more
than the following terse instruction: 'In determining the amount of punitive damages, ... you may
take into account the character of the defendants,
their financial standing, and the nature of their
acts.' [Citation omitted.] Guidance like this is
scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not
suggest that the instruction itself was i111 error; indeed, it appears to have been a correct statement
of [state] law. The point is, rather, that the instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive damages are imposed by juries guided by
little more than the admonition to do what they
think is best.
492 U.S. at 281, l 09 S.Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Subsequently, in Pacijic Mut. Lije Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d I
(1991 ), the Court was called upon to determine
whether a due process violation had occurred when
an Alabama jury awarded over $800,000 in punitive
damages against an insurer whose agent had defrauded an insured. The award was more than four
times the amount of the compensatory damages
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award, more than two hundred times the outof-pocket expenses incurred by the insured, and
greatly in excess of the fine that could be imposed
for insurance fraud under Alabama law.
The Court's majority initially conceded "that unlimited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion
for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages
may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." Id. at 18, 111 S.Ct. at 1043.
However, the Court ultimately upheld the award,
concluding that the award had been made pursuant
to objective criteria and had also been subjected to
a full panoply of procedural protections. First, the
trial court's instructions had placed reasonable constraints on the exercise of the jury's discretion by
expressly describing the retribution and deterrence
purposes of punitive damages, requiring the jury to
consider the character and degree of the particular
wrong, and explaining that the imposition of punitive damages was not compulsory. Second, the trial
court had conducted a post-trial hearing to scrutinize the punitive damages award. Finally, the award
had been subject to meaningful judicial review because the Alabama Supreme Court had approved
the verdict, on appeal, after reviewing the propriety
of the award according to the following factors:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the
harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct
as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c)
the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful
conduct and the desirability of removing that
profit and of having the defendant also sustain a
loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant;
( e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of
criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the
existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be

taken in mitigation.
Id. at 21-2, 111 S.Ct. at I 045 ( emphasis added).

The Court held that the application of thf: foregoing
standards "impose[d] a sufficiently dt:finite and
meaningful constraint on the **570 *76 discretion
of Alabama fact finders in awarding punitive damages [,]" and "ensure[ d] that punitive damages
awards are not grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the offense and have some understandable relationship to compensatory damages." Id. at
22, 111 S.Ct. at I 045. The award of punitive damages, therefore, "did not lack objective criteria" and
did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional
impropriety." Id. at 23-4, 111 S.Ct. at 1046. Compare BMW of North America. Inc. v. Gore. 5 l 7U.S.
559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996),
where the Court struck down a $2 million punitive
damages award against BMW of North America,
Inc. (BMW) for having knowingly failed to tell a
BMW automobile buyer that, at a cost of $600, it
had repainted portions of his new $40,000 car,
thereby lowering its potential resale value by approximately ten percent. The Court held the award
grossly excessive in light of the following: (I) the
low level of BMW's reprehensible conduct, (2) the
500 to I ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages awards, and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal sanctions that could be imposed for comparable
conduct.
If a reviewing court may consider a plaintiffs litigation expenses in evaluating the propriety of a punitive damages award, we see no reason to preclude
a jury from considering such expenses in calculating the award. Indeed, Justice O'Connor suggested
as much in her dissent in Haslip, in which she
strongly criticized the vagueness of the i111structions
concerning punitive damages provided to the jury
and strongly urged that the same factors which the
Court held that appellate courts could consider in
reviewing punitive damages awards "could assist
juries to make fair, rational decisions." 499 U.S. at
52, 111 S.Ct. at I 061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
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(emphasis added). As Justice O'Connor pointed out:
Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with restraint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a
devastating potential for harm. Regrettably, common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages fall into the latter category. States routinely
authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages
without providing them any meaningful instructions on how to do so. Rarely is a jury told anything more specific than "do what you think
best."
In my view, such instructions are so fraught with
uncertainty that they defy rational implementation. Instead, they encourage inconsistent and unpredictable results by inviting juries to rely on
private beliefs and personal predelictions. Juries
are permitted to target unpopular defendants,
penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and
redistribute wealth. Multimillion dollar losses are
inflicted on a whim. While I do not question the
general legitimacy of punitive damages, I see a
strong need to provide juries with standards to
constrain their discretion so that they may exercise their power wisely, not capriciously or maliciously. The Constitution requires as much.
Id. at 42-3, 111 S.ct. at I 056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
More recently, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg. 512
U.S. 415, 114 S.ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994),
the Court struck down a $5 million punitive damages award by an Oregon jury which was over five
times the amount of the plaintiffs compensatory
damages award. The Court held that because the
Oregon Constitution prohibited judicial review of
the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury,
"unless the court can affirmatively say there is no
evidence to support the verdict," the Oregon procedure for awarding punitive damages violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. id. at ---, I 14

S.Ct. at 2332. Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg noted
that although Oregon did not provide for a postverdict review and remittitur of the amount of a
punitive damages award, it provided several preverdict mechanisms which channeled the jury's discretion more tightly than in Haslip. Significantly,
the jury was instructed that the defendant could not
be found liable for punitive damages unless the defendant's liability were established by "clear and
6
convincing evidence." FN **571 *77 More importantly, jurors were given precise instructions detailing seven substantive criteria which they could
consider in making their award, far more guidance
than their counterparts in Haslip received. These
criteria resembled the seven factors against which
the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the punitive
damages award in Haslip. Justice Ginsburg argued
that
FN6. United States Supreme Court Justice
Ginsburg noted that in Pac/fie Mut. Life
fns. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. l, 6 n. I, 111
S.ct. 1032, 1037 n. I. 113 L.Ed.2d 1
( 1991 ), the "jury was told it could award
punitive damages if 'reasonably satisfied
from the evidence' that the defendant committed fraud." Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
512 U.S. 415, ---- n .4, 114 S.Ct. 2331,
2334 n .4, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994).
requir[ing] the factfinder to apply ... objective criteria [when calculating punitive damages is] more
likely to prompt rational and fair punitive damage
decisions than are the post hoc checks [by appellate courts] employed in jurisdictions following
Alabama's pattern.
Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also remarked that "
'application of objective criteria ensures that sufficiently definite and meaningful constraints are
imposed on the finder of fact.' " Id. (quoting
Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 316 Or. 263, 283,
851 P.2d 1084, 1096 (1993)).
We agree with Justices Brennan, O'Connor, and
Ginsburg that meaningful standards are needed to
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guide a jury in its award of punitive damages. Accordingly, we adopt the majority view that a jury
should be allowed to consider a plaintiffs attorney
fees in determining the amount of a punitive damages award. We also conclude that, in the instant
case, the circuit court's instruction to the jury to this
effect was proper.
III. The Circuit Court's Evidentiary Rulings

A. Evidence of Defendant's Refusal to Comply with
Circuit Court's Order

[ 12] At trial, the jury was repeatedly allowed to
hear evidence about Defendant's refusal to comply
with the circuit court's Partial Summary Judgment
order directing Defendant to return to the administrator of Mother's estate the assets he had wrongfully conveyed to himself. In explaining the relevance of such evidence, Plaintiffs counsel stated it
was necessary for the jury to understand that its
task was not to determine whether Defendant
should return property to Mother's estate, but to assess the damages caused by Defendant's breach of
duty. Plaintiffs counsel also explained that this
evidence was relevant to establishing that Defendant's behavior was willful:
The gist of my question, Your Honor, is the mental
intent which I have to establish for punitive damages. My analysis of the case is that the question
of intent breaks down into two parts post Judge
Klein's order which is a separate element of punitive damages. This disobedience of the court's
order and pre Judge Klein's order when he-what
is his intent in breaching his fiduciary duties as
an attorney in fact. So what I am getting at right
now is his disregard, callous, wanton, and wilful
disregard of Judge Klein's order and it goes into
the punitive damages on the post Judge Klein issue.
Defendant contends that evidence of his refusal to
comply with the Partial Summary Judgment Order

should have been excluded at trial. Based on Kang
v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 587 P.2d 285, we
agree.
In Kang, supra, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled
that a non-jury award of $20,000 in punitive damages was excessive because it appeared that the trial
court, in making its determination, improperly considered a defendant's subsequent actions in attempting to perpetrate a fraud on the court, as well as on
the plaintiff. 59 Haw. at 660,587 P.2d at 291. In reducing the punitive damages award, the supreme
court held as follows:
"The proper measurement of punitive damages
should be '[t]he degree of malice, oppression, or
gross negligence which forms the basis for the
award and the amount of the money required to
punish the defendant.. . .' Howell v. Associated
Hotels, [40 Haw. 492, 50 I (l 954) ]. Further, in
determining that degree, the analysisH572 *78 is
limited to an examination of defendant's state of
mind at the time of the act. O'Harra v. Pundt,
210 Or. 533, 310 P.2d 1110 (1957). Consequently, defendant's subsequent actions and
state of mind during trial are irrelevant."
Id. at 663, 587 P.2d at 293. The suprem1! court also
explained that
[t]he distinction between appellant's fraud on the
court and his fraud on appellee is cm~ial since a
finding of fraud on the court is unrelated to the
fraud on appellee and will not provide a basis for
an award of punitive damages. In assessing punitive damages the trial court should haLVe ignored
appellant's fraud upon the court and looked only
to his fraud on appellee.
Id. at 660, 587 P.2d at 291.

In this case, Defendant's conduct in violating the
circuit court's Partial Summary Judgment Order is
similarly distinguishable from Defendant's fraud
upon Sisters and cannot form a basis for an award
of punitive damages. While Defendant's conduct
may appropriately subject Defendant to contempt of
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court sanctions, such evidence is irrelevant to Defendant's state of mind at the time he allegedly
committed fraud in conveying Mother's property to
himself.
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in allowing
such evidence to be admitted at trial. Because the
jury's award of punitive damages may have been
based on the foregoing evidence, we must remand
this case for a new trial on the punitive damages issue.
B. The Circuit Court's Other Evidentiary Rulings

In view of our remand of this case for a new trial,
we find it unnecessary to address Defendant's remaining arguments on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the
First Circuit Court's July 14, I 989 order granting
partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor. We
vacate that part of the June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment which awarded Plaintiff S95,000 in punitive
damages and remand this case for a new trial on the
punitive damages issue. In all other respects, we affirm the June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment. In view
of our vacatur of part of the June 9, 1992 Amended
Judgment, we also vacate the April 26, 1991 Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of

(the February 4, 1991 Order Denying] Defendant's
Motions for (A) Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, (B) Reconsideration of Order Denying
Motion for Directed Verdict and (C) New Trial.
Hawai'i App.,1996.
Kunewa v. Joshua
83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court oflowa.
In the Matter of the ESTA TE OF Archard A.
CRABTREE, Deceased,
Mary Ann Crabtree, Appellant.
No. 95-399.
June 19, 1996.

!62VI(D) Disputed Claims
162k256 Review
l 62k256(6) k. Scope and Extent of Review. Most Cited Cases
Resolution of claims in probate are reviewed on appeal for correction of errors at law. Rules
App.Proc., Ruic 4.
131 Appeal and Error 30 ~1010.1(6)

Decedent's child, who was named payee upon death
of certificate of deposit owned by decedent,
brought damages suit against attorney-in-fact who
cashed certificate upon maturity. The District
Court, Chickasaw County, James L. Beeghly, J.,
dismissed suit and appeal was taken. The Supreme
Court, Tcrnus, J., held that: (I) attorney-in-fact did
not engage in self-dealing or make prohibited gift
by cashing certificate to provide support for principal; (2) attorney-in-fact acted in principal's best
interests by cashing disputed mature certificate,
rather than using other certificates of deposit which
were subject to early withdrawal penalty; and (3)
claim that attorney-in-fact owed fiduciary duty to
payee as third-party beneficiary was waived.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, V1!rdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30k l Ol O Sufficiency of Evidence in
Support
30k l Ol 0.1 In General
30k IO IO. I ( 6) k. Substantial
Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Appellate court is bound by trial court's findings of
fact, provided findings are supported by substantial
evidence.

Affirmed.

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent

West Headnotes
( l I Executors and Administrators 162 ~249
162 Executors and Administrators
162VI Claims Against Estate
162VJ(D) Disputed Claims
I 62k248 Trial by Probate Court
162k249 k. Nature and Form of Proceeding. Most Cited Cases
Claims in probate are triable at law.
121 Executors and Administrators 162
256(6)
162 Executors and Administrators
162VI Claims Against Estate

C=

141 Principal and Agent 308 ~97

308k95 Express Authority

308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney is strictly construed and instrument will be held to grant only those powers which
are specified.
151 Principal and Agent 308 ~103(6)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Thitrd Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308kl 03 Purchases, Sales, and Conveyances
308k I 03( 6) k. Sales and Convey-

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

000468

Page 2
550N.W.2d 168

(Cite as: 550 N.W.2d 168)

ances in General. Most Cited Cases
Absent express grant in power of attorney, of power
to make gift, attorney-in-fact did not have that
power.
16] Gifts 191 ~ 4
191 Gifts
191 I Inter Vivos
191 k4 k. Requisites in General. Most Cited
Cases
Gift is made when donor has present intention to
make gift and owner is divested of all control and
dominion over subject of gift.

17] Gifts 191 €=18(2)
191 Gifts
l 91 I Inter Vivos
19lkl7Delivery
191kl8 Necessity
191 k 18(2) k. Necessity of Surrendering Control. Most Cited Cases
Transfer of dominion and control, required for gift,
must be actual transfer, rather than future interest.
18] Gifts 191 €=30(1)
191 Gifts
I 9 I I Inter V ivos
191 k30 Gifts of Deposits in Bank
191 k30(]) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

Principal and Agent 308 €=69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308II(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69( l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Attorney-in-fact did not make gift to herself by
cashing principal's mature certificate of deposit
which was payable on death to another, even
though effect of transaction was to increase principal's estate and residual bequest to attorney-in-fact,

given that principal retained dominion and control
over certificate proceeds, attorney-in-fact's ability
to use funds remained restricted, attorney-in-fact
did not benefit from transaction at time it occurred,
and certificate was cashed to provide support for
principal.
19) Principal and Agent 308 €=69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308IJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308IJ(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69( I) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Attorney-in-fact did not breach fiduciary duty by
cashing mature certificate of deposit that was payable on death to attorney's sibling, rather than using
another certificate of deposit given that it was in
principal's best interests to use mature certificate of
deposit to provide needed support.
(101 Appeal and Error 30 €=170(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30kl 70 Nature or Subject-Matter of Issues or Questions
30kl 70( I) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

Person named as payee on death of ce,rtificate of
deposit, which attorney-in-fact cashed upon maturity to support principal, waived claim that attorneyin-fact owed payee a fiduciary duty as third-party
beneficiary by failing to raise issue in trial court.
*169 Christopher F. O'Donohoe, New Hampton, for
appellant.
Richard T. Tekippe, New Hampton, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LA VORA TO, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.
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TERNUS, Justice.
Appellant, Mary Ann Crabtree, seeks damages resulting from the cashing of a certificate of deposit in
the name of her father, Archard A. Crabtree, and
payable on his death to Mary Ann. This transaction
was consummated before Crabtree's death by
Sherry Wurzer, Mary Ann's sister and Crabtree's
daughter, who was acting under a power of attorney. Because we find no merit in Mary Ann's challenge to Sherry's action, we affirm the district court
judgment dismissing Mary Ann's claim.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On March 4, 199 I, Crabtree deposited $20,000 in a
one-year certificate of deposit, payable on his death
to Mary Ann. In October 199 I, Crabtree had a
stroke. After his stroke, he had problems with balance and vision, and moved to a nursing home.
In November 1991, Crabtree executed a plenary
power of attorney, appointing Sherry his attorneyin-fact. Pursuant to the power of attorney, Sherry
had "full power and authority to manage and conduct all of [Crabtree's] affairs, with full power and
authority to exercise or perform any act, power,
duty, right or obligation" that Crabtree had the legal
right, power or capacity to exercise or perform. The
appointment included the power and authority "[t]o
open, maintain or close bank accounts, .. . savings
and checking accounts; to purchase, renew or cash
certificates of deposit.. .. "
The cost of Crabtree's care varied depending upon
his medical condition; expenses ran between $1600
and $2000 per month. By March 1992, the cash on
hand was insufficient to continue into the next
month. At the same time, Crabtree expressed a desire to purchase a $4000 burial contract and a
$1700 monument. Crabtree's assets then consisted
of a one-half interest in a 200-acre farm and several
certificates of deposit. All of the certificates matured after March 4, 1992, except the one payable at
death to Mary Ann.

The district court found that in consultation with
Crabtree and with his agreement, Sherry cashed the
$20,000 certificate dated March 4, 1991, and placed
the money in Crabtree's checking account. Sherry
chose this certificate to cash because it was mature
and the only one that could be cashed without a
penalty for early withdrawal. She then purchased
the burial contract and monument Crabtree wanted.
Crabtree died in December 1992. In his will, executed in 1989, he appointed his daughters, Mary
Ann and Sherry, as co-executors; any assets remaining after the payment of his legal obligations
were to be distributed equally to Mary Ann and
Sherry. At the time of his death, Crabtree still
owned certificates of deposit in excess of $20,000.
Mary Ann filed a claim in probate seeking $20,000.
As noted by the district court in its rnling, had
Sherry liquidated other certificates*l 70 or personal
property of Crabtree instead of the $20,000 certificate, Mary Ann would have received the $20,000
certificate when Crabtree died. Thus, the liquidation of the certificate prior to Crabtree's death increased the probate estate by $20,000. As a result,
Sherry benefits by $10,000 while Mary Ann loses
the same amount.
The district court dismissed Ma1y Ann's daim, concluding Sherry did not breach her fiduciary duty to
Crabtree. On appeal, Mary Ann argues Sherry made
a gift to herself by cashing the $20,000 certificate
of deposit, a power not granted to Sherry under the
power of attorney. Alternatively, Mary Ann contends Sherry breached a duty to Mary Ann under
the power of attorney not to defeat Crabtree's
"contractual disposition" of his property unless it
was necessary for his support or maintenance. We
find no merit in the first argument and conclude the
second issue was not raised in the district court.
Therefore, we affirm.
II. Scope of Review.

[ l ][2] [3] Claims in probate are triable at law. In re
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Estate ol Voelker, 252 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Iowa
l 977). Consequently, we review for correction of
errors of law. Iowa R.App. P. 4. We are bound by
the trial court's findings of fact provided they are
supported by substantial evidence. Voelker, 252
N.W.2d at 402.
III. Did Sherry Breach her Duty to Crabtree Under

the Power of Attorney?
A. Sherry did not have the power to make a gift.
Mary Ann first asserts Sherry did not have the right
to make gifts pursuant to the power of attorney. We
agree.

[4 ][5] "The established rule is that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and the instrument
will be held to grant only those powers which are
specified." Bloom v. Weiser, 348 So.2d 65 I, 653
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977); accord Whitf'ord v. Gaskill,
119 N.C.App. 790, 460 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1995),
cert. granted, 342 N.C. 197,463 S.E.2d 250 (1995)
; see Abodeely v. Cavras, 221 N.W.2d 494, 501-02
(Iowa 1974) (construing power of attorney as granting only powers specified therein). Because the
power of attorney form used by Crabtree did not
expressly grant Sherry the power to make a gift, she
did not have that power. See Aiello v. Clark, 680
P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska I 984); Johnson v. Fraccacreta, 348 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977)
; In re Estate of Rolater,

542 P .2d 219, 223

(Okla.App.1975).
B. Sherry did not breach her duty to Crabtree under the power of attorney. Mary Ann argues that by
cashing the $20,000 certificate and thereby increasing the probate estate, Sherry made a gift to herself.
We disagree.

[6][7] We have held in other contexts a gift is made
when the donor has a present intention to make a
gift and divests himself "of all control and dominion over the subject of the gift." Taylor v. Grimes,
223 Iowa 821, 826, 273 N.W. 898, 901 (1937); see
Kirchner v. Lenz, 114 Iowa 527, 530, 87 N.W. 497,

498 (190 I) (a gift is anything "which is voluntarily
transferred by one person to another without compensation") (emphasis added); Fender v. Fender,
285 S.C. 260, 329 S.E.2d 430, 431 ( 1985) (attorney
in fact may not use his position for his "personal
benefit in a substantially gratuitous transaction").
The transfer of dominion and control must be actual-a present, not a future, transfer. Reeves v. Lyon,
224 Iowa 659, 662, 277 N.W. 749, 751 (1938);
Jones v. Luing, 152 Iowa 276,277, 132 N.W. 371.
371 ( 1911 ). Here Crabtree's "dominion and control"
over these funds was just as great after the transaction as before, and Sherry's ability to use the funds
for herself personally was just as restricted. Sherry
benefited in no way from this transaction at the
time it occurred.
[8] The trial court found the $20,000 certificate was
the only mature certificate and it was cashed to
provide needed support to Crabtree. There is substantial evidence to support these findings. Thus,
any benefit to Sherry was unintentional and merely
fortuitous. There was no reason to believe at the
time of the transaction that Sherry would profit
from it in the future. Had Crabtree lived longer,
eventually all his certificates would have been used
to pay his expenses. Moreover, Crabtree was competent to make *171 changes to his will, so there
was no certainty that Sherry would eventually benefit from this transaction as a beneficiary of the estate. Thus, we conclude Sherry did not make a gift
to herself by cashing the $20,000 certificate of deposit.
[9] Mary Ann's real complaint is that Sherry did not
cash other certificates of deposit before she cashed
the one payable on death to Mary Ann. As the trial
court found, however, cashing other certificates of
deposit would have reduced the monies available
for payment of Crabtree's expenses because he
would have had to pay an early withdrawal penalty.
Thus, it would not have been in Crabtree's financial
interest to cash a different ce11ificate. Sherry, as
Crabtree's fiduciary, was required to act in his best
interests. See Rolater, 542 P.2d at 223 ("in exer-
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cising granted powers, the attorney is bound to act
for the benefit of his principal avoiding where possible that which is detrimental"); Fender, 285 S.C.
260, 329 S.E.2d at 43 I ("an agent must further the
principal's interests"). Although not determinative,
we also note Crabtree approved of Sherry's cashing
of the certificate.
In summary, we conclude Sherry's cashing of the
certificate of deposit did not result in a gift to her.
Although her interest in the estate was ultimately
increased, there is no evidence this result was anything other than fortuitous. Additionally, Sherry acted in Crabtree's best interest, and with his approval, in cashing a mature certificate of deposit rather
than one which would have required payment of a
penalty. For these reasons, Sherry did not breach
her fiduciary duty to Crabtree.

party beneficiary, nor did either party advance this
theory in its trial brief'). Because Mary Ann did not
present this issue at trial, it is waived. See Hagartv
v. Dysart-Geneseo Community Sch. Dist., 282
N.W.2d 92, 96 (Iowa 1979) ("we cannot permit her
claim to be tried here on a theory not urged in the
trial court"); General Expressways, lr,c. v. Iowa
Reciprocity Bd., 163 N .W.2d 413, 417 (Iowa 1968)
(we only consider issues argued to and considered
by the trial court).
AFFIRMED.

Iowa,1996.
Matter of Estate of Crabtree
550 N.W.2d I 68
END OF DOCUMENT

IV. Did Sherry Violate a Duty to Mary Ann Under
Crabtree's Power of Attorney?
[ 1OJ On appeal Mary Ann argues that Sherry owed
her a duty under the power of attorney "much like
the rights of a donee beneficiary under the doctrine
of third party beneficiaries." This argument was not
made to the district court.
Although the district court ruled Sherry's "fiduciary
duty was to Mr. Crabtree, not Mary Ann Crabtree,"
this statement was made in the context of discussing whether Sherry breached her fiduciary duty by
making a gift to herself. There is nothing in the record to indicate the district court had a thirdparty-beneficiary theory in mind when this statement was made. At trial, Mary Ann simply claimed
Sherry "engaged in self-dealing as [a] fiduciary and
effectively made a gift to herself." No mention was
made to the district court of the theory of third
party beneficiary.
We conclude the issue of third party beneficiary
was not raised in the trial court. See Kanzmeier v.
McCoppin, 398 N.W.2d 826. 829-30 (Iowa 1987)
("trial court ... did not mention the concept of third
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this, burden is on contestant to show that a different
type of association or purpose existed.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Donna Louise AIELLO, Appellant,

[2) Principal and Agent 308 €;=97

V.

Ray CLARK and Joyce Clark, Appellees.
No. 7468.
April 6, 1984.
As Modified May 8, 1984.
Daughter, individually and as coconservator of her
mother's estate and who was also named as cotrustee of her mother's inter vivos trust, sought to set
aside an assignment to her brother by mother of beneficial interest in a note contained in the trust and
purportedly assigned by mother as attorney in fact
for daughter or, in the alternative, an award of damages. The Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District,
Jay Hodges, J., refused to set aside the assignment
or award damages, and daughter appealed. The Supreme Court, Moore, J ., held that: ( 1) power of attorney granted by daughter to mother did not include power to make gifts; (2) son could not claim
estoppel on part of daughter; (3) note in which
daughter held a one-half interest was part of trust
property even though trustor mother retained possession of it; and (4) purported assignment was in
violation of trust agreement.

308 Principal and Agent
308ITT Rights and Liabilities as to Th1ird Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Intention of daughter in granting mother a power of
attorney was required to be gleaned from the written grant of power as a reasonable person reading
the instrument would interpret it, where daughter
failed to meet her burden to show that a different
type of association or purpose other than an attorney in fact existed.
[31 Principal and Agent 308 €;=103(7)

308 Principal and Agent
3081Il Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
3081II(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308kl 03 Purchases, Sales, and Conveyances
308kl 03(7) k. Existence of Authority to Sell or Convey. Most Cited Cases
"Otherwise dispose of," as used in power of attor-

Reversed.
West Headnotcs

11 J Principal and Agent 308 ~97
308 Principal and Agent
308Ul Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308lll(A) Powers of Agent
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Powers of attorney creating relationship of attorney
in fact must be taken as prima facie evidence of
nature of relationship between the parties; beyond

ney granting power to bargain, agree for, buy, sell,
mortgage, hypothecate, and in any and every way
and manner deal with and otherwise dispose of
property, is a catchall phrase and adds nothing
since it refers to such undescribed methods of disposition as may have been omitted and are in nature
like those specifically enumerated.
[41 Principal and Agent 308 €;=100(2)

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k I 00 Principal's Property and Busi-
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I6] Principal and Agent 308 €;=48

ness
308k I 00(2) k. Lease of Property.
Most Cited Cases

Principal and Agent 308 ~100(3)
308 Principal and Agent
3081Il Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308IIl(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k 100 Principal's Property and Business
308k 100(3) k. Mortgage of Property. Most Cited Cases

Principal and Agent 308 €:=100(7)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308Ill(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k I 00 Principal's Property and Business
308k!00(7) k. Forming Partnership.
Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney, which granted power to lease,
bargain, and sell land upon such terms as grantee
saw fit and to bargain, agree for, buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, and in any and every way and
manner deal in and with other property and to
make, do and transact all and every kind of business of whatsoever nature and kind, did not include

power of making gifts of property in which grantor
had a beneficial interest; therefore, grantor/daughter
was not bound by grantee/mother's attempted assignment of daughter's beneficial interest a promissory note and the assignment was void.

I5] Gifts 191 €;=6
191 Gifts
1911 Inter Vivos
191 k6 k. Power to Make Gift. Most Cited
Cases
In absence of express authority to make a gift, none
may be made.

308 Principal and Agent
308]1 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308IJ(A) Execution of Agency
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation.
Most Cited Cases
An agent must avoid acting to the detriment of his
principal in absence of an explicit direction.
(7] Principal and Agent 308 ~137(1)

308 Principal and Agent
308IJI Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k 13 7 Estoppel to Deny Authority
308k 137( I) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Son, who received an assignment of daughter's beneficial interest in certain property from his mother,
who had been granted a power of attorney by
daughter, could not claim estoppel on part of
daughter, where he knew that mother held a power
of attorney from daughter, he did not inquire into
its limits, he did not pay for the assignment, and
daughter did not benefit from it.

[8] Trusts 390 €;=37.5
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
390I(A) Express Trusts
390k37.5 k. Necessity and Sufficiency of
Delivery of Property. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 390k37 l/2)
A note may be assigned to a trust merely by execution of the trust document; no endorsement is necessary where there are no challenges from a holder
in due course and, if creator of a trust by appropriate words or acts fully and completely constitutes
himself trustee, no change of possession of the note
is necessary.
[9] Trusts 390 ~37.5

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
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390l(A) Express Trusts
390k37.5 k. Necessity and Sufficiency of
Delivery of Property. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 390k371/2)
Trust was validly created and contained trustor/
mother's one-half interest in a note, even if mother
retained possession of the note as trustor, where
language of the trust showed necessary present intent to create the trust, mother's capacity at that
time was not contested, and trust agreement
provided that property set forth in exhibit, which
listed the note, would constitute the trust estate.

ment provided for her revocation upon written notice to trustee/daughter and prohibited her from disposing of trust property for less than adequate consideration in money or money's worth, daughter
was not notified in writing of the assignment, the
written assignment was not directed to daughter and
did not mention the trust, assignee did not pay for
the assignment, and mother did not replace the note
with any other property.
*1164 Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Fairbanks, for appellant.
Daniel T. Saluri, Fairbanks, for appellees.

[1 OJ Trusts 390 €;::::)58

390 Trusts
390! Creation, Existence, and Validity
390I(A) Express Trusts
390k58 k. Modification. Most Cited Cases
Strict compliance with terms of trust providing that
written notice of revocation be given by trustor/
mother to trustee/daughter was mandated in regard
to mother's attempt to remove certain property from
the trust, where mother suffered a gradual deterioration of her physical and mental health, was described as tired, forgetful, confused, and in need of
full custodial care, was diagnosed as suffering from
Alzheimer's disease, and was declared incompetent
after establishment of the trust and after her attempt
to remove the property from the trust.
(11 l Trusts 390 €=147(1)

390 Trusts
390II Construction and Operation
390II(B) Estate or Interest of Trustee and of
Cestui Que Trust
390k 146 Transfer of Estate or Interest of
Cestui Que Trust
390k 147 Express Trusts in General
390kl47(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Trustor/mother's attempted assignment of her beneficial interest in a note contained in the trust was in
violation of the trust, where her right to receive
payments on the note was a trust asset, trust instru-

Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION
MOORE, Justice.
Donna Aiello, individually and as co-conservator of
the estate of Fern Palfy, appeals the judgment of the
superior court refusing to set aside an Assignment
of Beneficial Interest or, in the alternative, award
damages. Palfy purported to act for herself and as
attorney in fact for Aiello in assigning a note which
they held as joint tenants. Aiello alleges that the assignment was beyond Palfy's general power of attorney and in violation of the Palfy Family Trust.
We agree and reverse the judgment of the superior
court.

I. Factual Background
Raymond Clark and Donna Aiello are the son and
daughter of Fem Palfy. Donna Aiello (Aiello)
signed a "General Power of Attorney" on September 9, 1968 and another one on April 16, 1974 making Fem Palfy her attorney in fact at all material
times. During the mid- l 970s Palfy conveyed a great
deal of property to Aiello; however, through her
power of attorney, she retained use of the property
and proceeds from sales of property. On March 24,
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1976 Palfy sold a piece of real estate known as the
brewery property to Daniel and Josephine Gaudiane. The subject promissory note (Gaudiane note)
and deed of trust were executed giving Palfy and
Aiello undivided half interests with the right of survivorship in the lien on the brewery property. Aiello had no direct input concerning the terms, conditions or decisions to sell in the property transactions of which she was a beneficiary. However, she
was one of the payees on the Gaudiane note and a
named beneficiary under the deed of trust. She was
also very active in the efforts to collect the outstanding debt.
On October 20, 1976 Palfy created a trust to hold
the Gaudiane note and other property. Palfy was
Trustor of "The Palfy Family Trust." Palfy and Aiello were named as Co-Trustees. Fern Palfy was to
be the trust beneficiary during her life. Upon her
death, Donna Aiello, as trustee, was to distribute
Palfy's residence to Ray Clark and his daughter
Joyce and the remainder of the Trust property to
herself. The property placed in the Trust, to the extent it still exists, is administered pursuant to the
Trust Agreement.
On April 21, 1979, Palfy, purporting to act individually and as attorney in fact for Aiello, signed an
Assignment of Beneficial Interest. The assignment
attempted to transfer the Gaudiane note from Palfy
and Aiello to Ray and Joyce Clark. Daniel Gaudiane and Attorney Eugene Belland jointly prepared
the documents. Palfy signed the instrument in the
presence of Gaudiane and his notary friend, John
Rowlett.
Under the assignment, Palfy retained a life estate
and the Clarks took the remainder interest. Aiello
was completely divested of her interest. According
to the instrument, the assignment was "in consideration of love and affection, and other good and
valuable considerations, in hand paid ... "
Clark testified that Palfy told him she was "going to
do it for what she owed me, *1165 money she
owed .... " However, Clark regarded the promissory

notes representing the money owed as outstanding,
and therefore, he did not release Palfy from the obligations in consideration of the interest in the
Gaudiane note. Furthermore, Clark testiified he did
not learn of the assignment until April 30, 1979 and
testified he did not pay anything for it at that or any
other time.
Aiello revoked the powers of attorney in August
1979 when she learned Palfy had granted Gaudiane
a two-year extension on t~e note, which was at that
.
$12 ,000 m
. arrears. FN l
time
FNI. Unaware of the assignment which
purported to divest her of any interest, Aiello traveled to Fairbanks in the summer of
1979 to begin foreclosure proceedings
against the Gaudiane note. She learned at
this time that in April, Palfy, individually
and as Aiello's attorney in fa,;t, had executed a modification of Deed of Trust and
Promissory Note moving the due date for
the $12,000 installment from March 1978
(over a year past due) to March 1981 ( two
years hence).
Aiello testified she did not learn of the assignment
to the Clarks until October 1981. On May 8, 1979,
just a week after he first learned of the assignment,
Clark testified that he told Aiello about the assignment. She testified that he did not explain the transaction to her. Neither Clark nor Palfy (nor anyone
else) ever sent Aiello a copy of the assignment or
aw,, written notice of the termination of her interest.
F - On April 13, 1982, six months after learning
of the assignment, Aiello filed suit individually and
as co-conservator of the estate of Fem Palfy
FN3
'
against the Clarks.
FN2. In fact, Aiello received a document
prepared by the Clarks' attorney dated July
16, 198 I titled Declaration of Default
which she was requested to sign as beneficiary and as co-conservator for Fem Palfy,
beneficiary under the Gaudiane note.
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FN3. Mrs. Palfy was declared incompetent
and Ray Clark and Donna Aiello were
named as co-conservators based upon a
hearing and a petition filed with the superior court dated June 24, 1980. According to
trial testimony, Palfy, age 75, suffered a
gradual deterioration of her physical and
mental health between the mid- l 970s and
1980. She was described as tired, forgetful,
confused, and in need of full custodial
care. She was diagnosed as suffering from
Alzheimer's disease.
II. Powers of Attorney

Aiello argues that Palfy, under the provisions of the
powers of attorney acted outside the scope of her
authority when she made a gift of Aiello's half interest in the Gaudiane note to the Clarks without
her knowledge or consent. The Clarks argue that
the powers of attorney were held by Palfy to protect
her equitable interest in the property and, as such, a
gift was authorized. They further argue that Aiello
had no more than bare legal title, and thus no
agency relationship was ever created.
[1][2] The powers of attorney granted by Aiello in
1968 and 197 4 were general. These were not granted in consideration of being named as payee on the
Gaudiane note in 1976. The instruments creating

for, buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, and in any
and every way and manner deal in and with ...
other property ... and to make, do and transact all
and every kind of business of what nature and
kind soever.
[3][4] Expressions such as "and otherwise dispose
of' are catchall phrases and add nothing for they
refer "to such undescribed methods of disposition
as may have been omitted (but were not) and are in
nature like those specifically enumerated." *1166
Fujino v. Clark, 71 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D. Hawaii 1947).
The powers of attorney held by Palfy contained
phrases of the same nature (see above); however,
these phrases do not transform the power granted to
include making gifts.
The general rule of construction is stated in Brown
v. Laird, 291 P. at 354 deferring to Gouldy v. Metcalf: 75 Tex. 455, 12 S.W. 830, 831 ( 1889):
The language used in the grant of general power is
certainly very comprehensive, but the established
rule of construction limits the authority derived
by the general grant of power to the acts authorized by the language employed in granting the
special powers.
In Gouldy, the Texas Court further stated that:
When an authority is conferred upon an agent by a
formal instrument, as by a power of attorney,

the relationship must be taken as prima facie evid-

there are two rules of construction to be carefully

ence of its nature. "The intention of the donor or
grantor is to be gathered from the instrument of creation." Brown v. Laird, 291 P. 352, 353 ( Or.1930)
citing 49 C.J. §§ 34, 40. See also 72 C.J.S. Powers
§ 22 ( 1951 ). Beyond this, the burden is on the contestant to show that a different type of association
or purpose exists. This burden was not met. Thus,
Aiello's intention must be gleaned from the written
grant of power as a reasonable person reading the
instrument would interpret it. In 1968, Aiello granted Palfy power to:

attended to: ( 1) The meaning of general words in
the instrument will be restricted by the context,
and construed accordingly. (2) The authority will
be construed strictly, so as to exclude the exercise of any power which is not warranted either
by the actual terms used, or as a necessary means
of executing the authority with effect.

lease, ... bargain, sell ... lands ... upon such terms ...
as she shall think fit. Also to bargain and agree

12 S.W. at 831
Thus, the authority to deal "upon such terms as she
shall think fit" does not alter the type of acts which
are authorized.
A general power of attorney authorizing an agent to
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sell and convey property, even though it authorizes him to sell for such price and on such terms
as to him shall seem proper, implies a sale for the
benefit of the principal, and does not authorize
the agent to make a gift of the property, or to
convey or transfer it without a present consideration inuring to the principal.
Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768, 773-74
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) quoting Johnson v. Fraccacrera, 348 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977)

The terms of the powers of attorney granted to
Palfy were general though limited to business transactions. Consistent with that, Palfy had on all prior
occasions received valuable consideration in Aiello's behalf for transfers she made as Aiello's attorney in fact. As the court said in Fujino, 71 F.Supp.
at 4, "[a] gift is not a business transaction." Furthermore, 72 C.J.S. Powers § 25 (1951) states: "Gifts.
Power to sell does not include authority to make a
gift of the subject matter, or convey it without consideration, and such a transfer is void." See also
Brown 1•. Laird, 29 I P. 352, 354 (Or.1930).
[5][6] In the absence of express authority to make a
gift, none may be made. The agent must avoid acting to the detriment of his principal "in the absence
of an explicit direction." Estate of Rolater, 542
P.2d 219. 223 (Okla.App.1975).

beneficial interest in the promissory nolte and deed
of trust and was informed of most of her interests
although she was not active in the transactions.
Palfy's apparent purpose in placing title in Aiello's
name was not to evade creditors but rather to give
her daughter a beneficial interest in the property
which would become hers at Palfy's death, or when
Palfy could no longer exercise the power of attorney.
The power of attorney granted to Pailfy merely
made her an agent for Aiello. Palfy acted beyond
the scope of her authority in making the gratuitous
assignment to *1167 Clark, and Aiello is not bound
by Palfy's acts and representations.
[7] The general rule was stated in State v. Neal &
Sons. 489 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Alaska 1971):
[A] person who deals with another, knowing that
the other is acting as an agent, and who fails to
inquire into the extent of the delegated authority,
may be held to deal at his peril.
Clark knew that his mother held a power of attorney for his sister. He did not inquire into its limits. Clark did not pay for the assignmf:nt, and Aiello did not benefit from it. Clark did not justifiably rely to his detriment upon another's acts, and
thus, he cannot claim estoppel on the part of Aiello. We hold that Palfy's assignment of Aiello's
4
beneficial interest to the Clarks is void. FN

Clark relies upon the case of Clay v. Saute, 295
P.2d 914 (Cal.App.1956) for the proposition that
the agent may make a gift where the principal holds
bare legal title and the agent holds equitable title.
Clay is distinguishable from this case. In Clay, the
agent conveyed property to his daughter in order to
deprive his business associates and creditors of access to his assets. His daughter never knew about
these transfers and there is no evidence that she
held any beneficial interest. The agent was declared
incompetent, although he was not, and was later determined to be competent.

III. The Trust

To the contrary, in this case, Aiello was holder of a

The Clarks argue that Palfy's own beneficial in-

FN4. It is also possible that Aiello's own
interest was transferred to the Palfy Family
Trust, and that a gift of this interest would
also be invalid for reasons discussed in
Section III, infra, of this opinion. Because
we have already held that the powers of attorney did not authorize a gift, we need not
reach and do not decide this issue.

'W'
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terest in the Gaudiane note was validly assigned for
the reason that no conveyance of the property into
the Trust was ever made, or in the alternative, that
the Trust was revocable, and in fact had been revoked by Palfy. Aiello argues that the Trust Agreement was valid and enforceable, but that Palfy's gift
of her own interest was invalid for two reasons: (I)
that she was mentally disabled and (2) that Gaudiane, and perhaps Clark, exercised undue influence.
FN:,
FN5. Palfy's mental disability or the exercise of undue influence over her affairs by
others need not be addressed. Our decision
here makes these issues moot.
The Trust Agreement provided in Article I:
Trustor has contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement, transferred and delivered
to Trustee, or stated that she would transfer and
deliver to Trustee, without consideration paid or
to be paid therefor, the property set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. Such
property, together with any additions of property
made to this Trust, whether by Trustor or by an
other person, shall constitute and be known as the
"Trust Estate" and shall be held, administered,
and distributed as hereinafter provided.

( 1955).
[9] Even if Palfy retained possession as Trustor, a
trust was completed as to her one-half interest.
"Where the instrument creating the tru~.t expressly
provides that it shall be for the benefit of the grantor during his life, a retention of possession by him
is not inconsistent with the trust." 89 C.J.S. Trusts §
64 (1955). Palfy created a valid trust. The language
of the trust shows the necessary present intent to
create a trust. Her capacity at that time is not contested.
For Palfy to transfer the interest held in trust would
have required revocation of the Trust. The terms of
the Trust are unambiguous. The Declaration of the
Trust provided:
*1168 This Declaration and Agreement of Trust,
made and entered into this 21 day of October,
1976, by and between FERN PALFY of Fairbanks, Alaska, (hereinafter referred to as
"Trustor") and FERN P ALFY and DONNA
LOUISE AIELLO of Redwood City, California,
as Co-Trustees, (hereinafter referred to as
"Trustee").

The Trust was revocable as specified in Article IV:
During the lifetime of Trustor, this Trnst may be
revoked in whole or in part by the Trustor. The

Schedule A was attached to the Trust Agreement. It

power of revocation shall be exercised by written

listed the Gaudiane $874,000 promissory note. The
terms of the Trust were not contested. The testimony at trial established that the property listed for
the Trust was being administered as part of the
Trust.

notice delivered to the Trustee. In the event of
such revocation, the revoked portion thereof shall
revert to Trustor and shall constitute her separate
property as if this Trust had not been created.

[8) A note may be assigned merely by execution of
the trust document. No endorsement is necessary
where there are no challenges from a holder in due
course. 11 Am.Jur.2d Bills and ~otes § 313 (l 963).
As to delivery of the note, " ... if the creator of the
trust by appropriate words or acts fully and completely constitutes himself trustee, no change of
possession is necessary .... " 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 64

The document provides for revocation by the Trustor (Palfy) upon written notice to the Trustee (both
Palfy and Aiello). (emphasis added) The only writing prepared by Palfy regarding the Tmst property
was the Assignment of Beneficial Intf:rest to the
Clarks. This was never given to Aiello. She discovered it only through the Fairbanks Title Company while doing a title search. Her investigation
was triggered by a form she was requested to sign
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only as Palfy's co-conservator to permit Gaudiane
to transfer the brewery property. The parties were
listed as Clark and Aiello as co-conservators for the
estate of Palfy and the proposed transferee. The
writing was not directed to the Trustee nor did it
mention the Trust.
[ I OJ No other method of revocation is permissible
6
under the terms of the Trust.FN As stated in Restatement 2d Trusts § 330 ( 1959):
FN6. Under the facts of this case, see fn. 3,
strict compliance with the terms of the
Trust is mandated absent any exceptional
reasons that might justify non-adherence to
the requirement that written notice of revocation be given the Trustee.
(I) The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and
to the extent that by the terms of the trust he reserved such a power.

"Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the
contrary, no powers enumerated herein or accorded to the Trustee generally pursuant to law shall
be construed to enable the Trustor, or any other
person, to purchase, exchange, or oth,~rwise deal
with or dispose of all or any part of the corpus or
income of the Trust for less than adequate consideration in money or money's worth ... "
Clark did not pay for the assignment and Palfy did
not replace the Gaudiane note with any other property. Therefore, neither Palfy's nor Aiello's interest
was properly transferred to the Clarks.
REVERSED.
Alaska, 1984.
Aiello v. Clark
680 P.2d 1162
END OF DOCUMENT

Comment (a) to the same section explains: "The intention of the settlor which determines the terms of
the trust is his intention at the time of the creation
of the trust and not his subsequent intention."
Moreover, Comment j of§ 330 states:

Where method of revocation specified. If the settlor
reserves a power to revoke the trust only in a particular manner ... he can revoke the trust only in
that manner .... If the settlor reserves power to re-

voke the trust only by a notice in writing delivered to the trustee, he can revoke it only by delivering such a notice to the trustee.
[ I I] Palfy could not avoid this provision by assigning her interest in the Trust because her interest was
only a life estate. The interest which she purported
to assign to Clark was everything but an estate for
her life.
The assignment was in violation of the Trust.
Palfy's right to receive the payments on the Gaudiane note was a Trust asset. Article VII, M. of the
Trust instrument provides:
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12] Appeal and Error 30 €=>893(2)

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
Sophia CHELOHA, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Alphons Cheloha, deceased, Appellee and
Cross-Appellant,

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVl(F) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate
Court
30k893(2) k. Equitable Proceedings. Most Cited Cases

V.

Robert C. CHELOHA, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
No. S-96-360.
July 17, 1998.
Personal representative for uncle's estate sought accounting from nephew regarding transactions he
entered into on behalf of uncle by virtue of durable
power of attorney. The District Court, Platte
County, Robert R. Steinke, J., found that nephew
had converted money from uncle's certificates of
deposit to his own use and awarded personal representative that amount plus postjudgment interest
and costs. Nephew appealed and personal representative cross-appealed. The Supreme Court, Gerrard, J., held that: (I) nephew failed to establish express oral contract for payment of compensation for
services rendered; (2) nephew converted uncle's
certificates of deposit; (3) nephew converted money
from uncle's checking account; and (4) personal
representative was entitled to prejudgment interest

Appeal and Error 30 €=;>895(2)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(F) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k895 Scope of Inquiry
30k895(2) k. Effect ofFindings Below. Most Cited Cases
In an appeal of an equity action, an appellate court
tries factual questions de novo on the record and
reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of
the trial court, provided, however, that where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of
fact, the appellate court considers and may give
weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of
the facts rather than another.

on amount converted from certificates of deposit,

but not amount converted from checking account.

131 Principal and Agent 308 €=;)10(1)

Affirmed, as modified.

308 Principal and Agent
3081 The Relation
3081(A) Creation and Existence
308k7 Appointment of Agent
308k IO Letters or Powers of Attorney
Under Seal
308k 10( I) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
A power of attorney authorizes anoth{:r to act as
one's agent.

West Headnotes
11 I Executors and Administrators 162 €=>468
162 Executors and Administrators
I 62XI Accounting and Settlement
! 62Xl(B) Proceedings for Accounting
!62k468 k. Nature and Form of Remedy.
Most Cited Cases
An action for an accounting of estate property is in
equity.

141 Principal and Agent 308 €=>64(.5)1
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308 Principal and Agent
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308ll(A) Execution of Agency
308k64 Collection of Debts Due Principal
308k64( .5) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
An agent has a duty to account to his principal for
all property or funds which he has received or paid
out on behalf of the principal.

[51 Principal and Agent 308 o:£;=78(4)
308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30811(A) Execution of Agency
308k78 Actions for Accounting
308k78(4) k. Presumptions and Burden
of Proof. Most Cited Cases
The burden is upon the agent to prove a proper disposition of all property and funds which have been
entrusted to him pursuant to a power of attorney,
since the agent was the one who managed the property and funds and had control of the accounts.

[61 Principal and Agent 308 ~48
308 Principal and Agent
3081J Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30811(A) Execution of Agency
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation.
Most Cited Cases
An agent is generally required

10

act solely for the

benefit of his principal in all matters connected
with the agency and adhere faithfully to the instructions of the principal.

f71 Principal and Agent 308 ~ 1
308 Principal and Agent
3081 The Relation
308l(A) Creation and Existence
308kl k. Nature of the Relation in General. Most Cited Cases
An agent and principal are in a fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an obligation to refrain
from doing any harmful act to the principal.

[81 Principal and Agent 308 €=69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308JJ(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69( 1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
An agent is prohibited from profiting from the
agency relationship to the detriment of the principal.

[91 Principal and Agent 308 €;=103(.S)
308 Principal and Agent
308111 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308Jil(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308kl 03 Purchases, Sales, and Conveyances
308k 103( .5) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
No gift may be made by an attorney in fact to himself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the instrument itself and there is
shown a clear intent on the part of the principal to
make such a gift.

[101 Principal and Agent 308 €=>69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308H Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308TI(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Absent express intention, an agent may not utilize
his position for his or a third party's benefit in a
substantially gratuitous transfer.

1111 Contracts 95 €;=9(1)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95l(A) Nature and Essentials in General
95k9 Certainty as to Subject-Matter
95k9( l) k. In General. Most Cited
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Cases
A court of equity will not enforce a contract unless
it is complete and certain in all its essential elements.
112] Specific Performance 358 €;;;;.>28(1)

358 Specific Performance
35811 Contracts Enforceable
358k27 Certainty
358k28 In General
358k28(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The parties to a contract must agree upon the material and necessary details of the bargain, and if any
of these be omitted or left obscure or indefinite so
as to leave the intention of the parties uncertain respecting the substantial terms, the case is not one
for specific performance.
113) Contracts 95 €:=>143(3)

95 Contracts
95Jl Construction and Operation
95JI(A) General Rules of Construction
95k 143 Application to Contracts in General
95kl43(3) k. Rewriting, Remaking, or
Revising Contract. Most Cited Cases
It is not a function of a court of equity to make a
contract for the parties or to supply any of the material stipulations thereof.

[141 Contracts 95 €:=>9(2)

95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95I(A) Nature and Essentials in General
95k9 Certainty as to Subject-Matter
95k9(2) k. Services and Compensation
Therefor. Most Cited Cases
Elderly uncle's statement to nephew, that he would
pay for nephew's services, was insufficient to create
express oral contract for payment of compensation
for services rendered, absent additional evidence as
to material terms of purported contract.

115) Contracts 95 €:=>28(.5)

95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95T(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
95k28 Evidence of Agreement
95k28(.5) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Fact that nephew did not report income he received
from uncle's certificates of deposit on his tax returns supported inference that certificates of deposit
did not represent compensation for services
rendered.
(16) Contracts 95 €:=>14

95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95l(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
95kl4 k. Intent of Parties. Most Cited
Cases
Mutual assent to an agreement is determined by the
objective manifestations of intent by the parties, not
by their subjective statements of intent.
117] Trover and Conversion 389 €:=>22

389 Trover and Conversion
38911 Actions
389JI(A) Right of Action and Defonses
389k2 l Defenses
389k22 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Since uncle and nephew had not enter,~d into express contract for payment of compensation for services rendered, and power of attorney did not expressly grant nephew the power to mak,~ gifts with
uncle's property, nephew's use of uncle's certificates of deposit for his own purposes constituted
conversion.

I18] Principal and Agent 308 €;;;;.>62(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308TI Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308II(A) Execution of Agency
308k62 Custody and Care of Principal's
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Property
308k62( l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Disbursements nephew made from uncle's checking
account pursuant to power of attorney were proper,
to the extent they represented expense reimbursements and items that benefited uncle during his lifetime.

[191 Trover and Conversion 389 ~22
389 Trover and Conversion
38911 Actions
389Il(A) Right of Action and Defenses
389k2 l Defenses
389k22 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Compensation payments nephew made to himself
from uncle's checking account while acting as
uncle's attorney in fact were not proper disbursements, since uncle and nephew had not entered into
express contract for payment of compensation for
services rendered, and power of attorney did not authorize nephew to compensate himself from uncle's
property.

[20] Trover and Conversion 389 ~22
389 Trover and Conversion
3891I Actions
389II(A) Right of Action and Defenses
389k2 l Defenses

389k22 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Since power of attorney did not grant nephew the
power to make gifts with uncle's property, nephew's
use of uncle's money to purchase gifts for his wife
and children was not a proper disposition of uncle's
property.

121] Trover and Conversion 389 €'=>22
389 Trover and Conversion
38911 Actions
389TI(A) Right of Action and Defenses
389k2 l Defenses

389k22 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Nephew's purchase of radar detector with money
from uncle's checking account while acting as
uncle's attorney in fact was not proper disposition
of uncle's property; although nephew testified that
uncle authorized him to purchase radar detector so
that he would not get speeding tickets while transporting uncle to doctor's appointments, this testimony was not credible.

f221 Statutes 361 €'=>278.17
36 J Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 Vl(D) Retroactivity
36 lk278. l 7 k. Amendatory Acts. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 361 k270)
Where an amendment to a statute makes a procedural change, it is binding upon a tribunal on the effective date of the amendment and is applicable to
pending cases that have not been tried.
f23] Interest 219 €:=29

219 Interest
21911 Rate
2 l 9k29 k. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. Most Cited Cases
Amended prejudgment interest statute applied in
personal

representative's

action

for

accounting;

amendment became effective before action was
tried, and prejudgment interest statute was procedural in nature. Neb.Rev.St. § 45--103.02 ( 1993).
[241 Statutes 361 €'=>174
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
36 I VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 lk 174 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 361 k265)

Statutes 361 €'=>278.10
361 Statutes
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361 VI Construction and Operation
361 Vl(D) Retroactivity
36 lk278. IO k. Statutes Imposing Liabilities, Penalties, Duties, Obligations, or Disabilities.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 361 k266)

Since nephew, in his capacity as uncle's agent or attorney in fact, wrongfully converted to his own use
and retained money belonging to uncle without
uncle's consent, interest was allowable pursuant to
statute authorizing interest on money retained
without the owner's consent. Neb.Rev.St § 45-104.

Statutes 361 €=:>278.13

[27] Interest 219 €:=39(2.15)

361 Statutes
361 VT Construction and Operation
361 Vl(D) Retroactivity
361 k278. I 2 Statutes Relating to Remedies
and Procedures
36 l k278. l 3 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 36lk267(1))
A substantive law creates duties, rights, and obligations, whereas a procedural law prescribes the
means and methods through and by which substantive laws are enforced and applied.

219 Interest
2 l 9ITI Time and Computation
2 I 9k39 Time from Which Inter,est Runs in
General
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in General
2 l 9k39(2. l 5) k. Liquidated or Unliquidated Claims in General. Most Cited Cases
A claim is "liquidated," for purposes of prejudgment interest statute, when there is no reasonable
controversy either as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to the amount of such recovery.
Neb.Rev.St.§ 45-103.02 (1993).

f251 Interest 219 ~12
128] Interest 219 €;;=39(2.20)
219 Interest
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General
2 l 9k8 Compensation for Use of Money
219kl2 k. Money Wrongfu1ly Obtained,
Held, or Used. Most Cited Cases

Interest 219 ~31
219 Interest
21911 Rate
2 I 9k3 I k. Computation of Rate in General.
Most Cited Cases
An agent is chargeable with interest at the legal rate
from the time that the money is wrongfully withheld from the principal. Neb.Rev .St. § 45-104.

1261 Interest 219 ~12
2 l 9 Interest
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General
219k8 Compensation for Use of Money
2 I 9k I 2 k. Money Wrongfully Obtained,
Held, or Used. Most Cited Cases

219 Interest
2 I 91TI Time and Computation
2 l 9k39 Time from Which Inten!st Runs in
General
2 I 9k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in General
2 l 9k39(2.20) k. Particular Cases and

Issues. Most Cited Cases
Since damages were liquidated and no reasonable
controversy existed as to nephew's conversion of
money from uncle's certificates of deposit to his
own use, uncle's personal representative was entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law on
that amount from the time that nephew received the
certificates of deposit. Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02
( 1993).

129] Interest 219 ~39(2.20)
219 Interest
2 l 9TIT Time and Computation
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2 I 9k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in
General

ney, since the agent was the one who managed the
property and funds and had control of the accounts.

2 l 9k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in General
2 I 9k39(2.20) k. Particular Cases and
Issues. Most Cited Cases
Since, in personal representative's action for accounting regarding transactions nephew entered into on behalf of uncle by virtue of durable power of
attorney, reasonable controversy existed regarding
nephew's disbursements from uncle's checking account, personal representative's claim against nephew was not liquidated, and personal representative
was not entitled to prejudgment interest on improper disbursements from the checking account.
Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02 (1993).

**294 Syllabus by the Court

*32 1. Equity: Decedents' Estates: Accounting.
An action for an accounting of estate property is in
equity.
2. Equity: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of an
equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court,
provided, however, that where credible evidence is
in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate
court considers and may give weight to the fact that
the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and
accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
3. Principal and Agent. A power of attorney authorizes another to act as one's agent.
4. Principal and Agent: Property. An agent has a
duty to account to his or her principal for all property or funds which he or she has received or paid
out on behalf of the principal.
5. Principal and Agent: Property: Proof. The
burden is upon the agent to prove a proper disposition of all property and funds which have been entrusted to him or her pursuant to a power of attar-

6. Principal and Agent. Generally, an agent is required to act solely for the benefit of his or her
principal in all matters connected with the agency
and adhere faithfully to the instructions of the principal.
7. Principal and Agent. An agent and principal are
in a fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an
obligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to
the principal.
8. Principal and Agent. An agent is prohibited
from profiting from the agency relationship to the
detriment of the principal.
9. Principal and Agent: Gifts: Intent. No gift may
be made by an attorney in fact to himself or herself
unless the power to make such a gift is expressly
granted in the instrument itself and there is shown a
clear intent on the part of the principal to make
such a gift.
10. Principal and Agent: Intent. Absent express
intention, an agent may not utilize his or her position for his or her or a third party's benefit in a substantially gratuitous transfer.
11. Equity: Contracts. A court of equity will not
enforce a contract unless it is complete and certain
in all its essential elements.
12. Contracts: Parties: Intent. The parties themselves must agree upon the material and necessary
details of the bargain, and if any of these be omitted
or left obscure or indefinite so as to leave the intention of the parties uncertain respecting the substantial terms, the case is not one for specific performance.
13. Equity: Contracts: Parties. It is not a function
of a court of equity to make a contract for the
parties or to supply any of the material stipulations
thereof.
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**295 *33 14. Statutes: Time. Where an amendment to a statute makes a procedural change, it is
binding upon a tribunal on the effective date of the
amendment and is applicable to pending cases that
have not been tried.
15. Statutes. A substantive law creates duties,
rights, and obligations, whereas a procedural law
prescribes the means and methods through and by
which substantive laws are enforced and applied.
16. Principal and Agent: Prejudgment Interest:
Time. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue
1993), an agent is chargeable with interest at the
legal rate from the time that money is wrongfully
withheld from the principal.
17. Prejudgment Interest: Claims. A claim is liquidated when there is no reasonable controversy
either as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to
the amount of such recovery. There must be no dispute either as to the amount or as to the plaintiffs
right to recover.
Richard K. Watts, of Mills, Watts & Nicolas,
Osceola, for appellant.
Clark J. Grant, of Grant, Rogers, Maul & Grant,
Columbus, for appellee.
CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD
, STEPHAN, and McCORMACK, JJ.
GERRARD, Justice.

In this equity action, Sophia Cheloha, as personal
representative of the estate of Alphons Cheloha, deceased, filed a third amended petition in the district
court, seeking an accounting from Alphons' brother,
Carl C. Cheloha, and Carl's son, Robert C. Cheloha,
as to all transactions they entered into on behalf of
Alphons by virtue of a durable power of attorney.
Sophia alleged that sums of money expended by
Carl and Robert, in their capacities as Alphons' attorneys in fact, were not solely for the benefit of
Alphons. Following a bench trial, the district court

entered judgment, finding that Robert converted
$33,495.05 in either principal or interest from certificates of deposit owned by Alphons to his own use
and awarded Sophia that amount plus postjudgment
interest and costs. Robert appeals, and Sophia
cross-appeals.

*34 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Alphons was a bachelor and retired farmer who
lived in rural Platte County, Nebraska. In 1986, Alphons was admitted to a nursing home, but sometime later was able to return to his own home.
However, in late July or August 1988, Alphons was
again admitted to a nursing home, where he remained until his death on October I 0, 1993.
Robert was Alphons' nephew and lived less than a
mile from Alphons' home. During Alphons' lifetime, few people other than Robert paid any attention to Alphons or his needs. Robert cleared snow
from Alphons' roads, trimmed his trees, provided
transportation for him for doctor's appointments,
and made arrangements for his medical and nursing
home care. In addition, Robert paid Alphons' bills,
managed his finances, and provided transportation
for him to purchase his groceries.
Robert testified that in April 1986, he had a discussion with Alphons regarding Robert's desire to be
compensated for the services that he had been
providing to Alphons. Robert testified that he had
this discussion with Alphons at the nursing home in
the presence of Robert's wife and parents. According to Robert, as corroborated by his mother,
Robert told Alphons that his care was more responsibility than Robert could handle, to which Alphons allegedly responded, "I am so glad that you
have been helping me, that you are helping me, and
I want you to be paid."
Robert testified that After this conversation, he discussed the matter with the family attomey, Cleo
Robak. Robert told Robak what Alphons had said,
and Robak told Robert that he was entitkd to com-
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pensation. Robak testified by deposition that he was
never informed or heard of any agreement between
Alphons and Robert for the payment of compensation. Robak, however, did testify that sometime
after problems began to surface with Alphons,
Robak told Robert that he could charge a reasonable fee for **296 whatever work he had done for
Alphons, although no further details were discussed
and no legal work was embarked upon by Robak to
specifically deal with this issue.
On August 11, 1988, Alphons executed a durable
power of attorney, naming Carl and Robert as his
attorneys in fact. Robak testified that in preparing
Alphons' power of attorney, Robak had no knowledge of any discussion between Alphons and *35
Robert regarding an agreement for the payment of
compensation for services rendered by Robert pursuant to the power of attorney. The power of attorney instrument did not contain a provision authorizing Robert to compensate himself or a provision authorizing Robert to make gifts from Alphons' property.
On September 20, 1995, Sophia, as personal representative of the estate of Alphons, filed a third
amended petition in equity in the district court,
seeking an accounting from Carl and Robert as to
all transactions they entered into on behalf of Alphons by virtue of the power of attorney. Sophia alleged that sums of money expended by Carl and
Robert, in their capacities as Alphons' attorneys in
fact, were not solely for the benefit of Alphons and
were, in fact, paid to the detriment of Alphons. At
the bench trial on the matter, Robert admitted that
he used the power of attorney in order to convert
$33,495.05 in certificates of deposit owned by Alphons to his own use. Robert, however, testified
that he received these monies as compensation for
services rendered by him pursuant to an oral contract with Alphons. Robert also admitted to using
the power of attorney to make various purchases
and disbursements with money from Alphons'
checking account. Robert, however, testified that
these various purchases or disbursements consti-

tuted either gifts, reimbursement of expenses, or
compensation for services rendered.
Following the bench trial, the district court entered
judgment, finding that Robert converted $33,495.05
in either principal or interest from certificates of
deposit owned by Alphons to his own use and
awarded Sophia that amount plus postjudgment interest and costs. The district court dismissed the petition as it related to Carl, since no evidence was
submitted that he had ever come into possession,
control, or management of Alphons' property.
Robert appeals, and Sophia cross-appeals. We removed the case to our docket pursuant to our power
to regulate the caseloads of the Nebraska Court of
Appeals and this court. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §
24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995).

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
[1][2] An action for an accounting of estate property is in equity. Mischke v. Mischke, 247 Neb. 752,
530 N.W.2d 235 (1995). In *36 an appeal of an
equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court,
provided, however, that where credible evidence is
in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate
court considers and may give weight to the fact that
the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and
accepted one version of the facts rather than anoth-

er. Schram Enters. v. L & H Properties. 254 Neb.
717, 578 N.W.2d 865 (1998); Mischke v. Mischke,
supra.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Robert's four assignments of error can be consolidated and restated into the following one: The trial
court erred in finding that the conversion of Alphons' certificates of deposit represented a gift to
Robert as Alphons' attorney in fact rather than compensation for services rendered pursuan1 to an express or implied contract.
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In her cross-appeal, Sophia assigns the following
two errors: The trial court erred in (1) determining
that she was not entitled to a money judgment for
funds wrongfully converted from Alphons' checking account to Robert's personal use pursuant to the
power of attorney and (2) not awarding prejudgment interest.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. POWER OF ATTORNEY

[3][4][5] A power of attorney authorizes another to
act as one's agent. Mischke v. Mischke, supra;
**291Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 448
N.W.2d 576 (1989). An agent has a duty to account
to his or her principal for all property or funds
which he or she has received or paid out on behalf
of the principal. Walker land & Cattle Co. v. Daub,
223 Neb. 343,389 N.W.2d 560 (1986). The burden
is upon the agent to prove a proper disposition of
all property and funds which have been entrusted to
him or her pursuant to a power of attorney, since
the agent was the one who managed the property
and funds and had control of the accounts. See id.
[6][7][8] Generally, an agent is required to act
solely for the benefit of his or her principal in all
matters connected with the agency and adhere faithfully to the instructions of the principal. Fletcher v.
Mathew, supra. *37 An agent and principal are in a
fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an obligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to the
principal. Id. An agent is prohibited from profiting
from the agency relationship to the detriment of the
principal. Mischke v. Mischke, supra; In re Estate
cf Lienemann, 222 Neb. 169, 382 N.W.2d 595
(1986).
[9][ IO] It is well settled that no gift may be made
by an attorney in fact to himself or herself unless
the power to make such a gift is expressly granted
in the instrument itself and there is shown a clear
intent on the part of the principal to make such a
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gift. Mischke v. Mischke, supra. We adopted the
foregoing rule in Fletcher v. Mathew, supra, in order to discourage fraud and abuse by attorneys in
fact. Thus, absent express intention, an agent may
not utilize his or her position for his or her or a
third party's benefit in a substantially gratuitous
transfer. Mischke v. Mischke, supra.
Robert asserts that his conversion of $33,495.05 in
principal or interest from Alphons' certificates of
deposit to his own use represented compensation
for services rendered by him pursuant to an express
oral contract or an implied contract and that, thus,
the district court erred in awarding Sophia
$33,495.05. At trial, however, Robert did not raise
the theory that he properly converted Alphons' certificates of deposit pursuant to an implied contract.
Therefore, on appeal, our sole inquiry is whether an
express oral contract existed whereby Alphons
agreed to pay Robert $33,495.05 in certificates of
deposit as compensation for services rendered. See
Sunrise Country Manor v. Neb. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 246 Neb. 726, 523 K.W.2d 499 (1994)
( cases are heard in state appellate courts on theory
upon which they were tried). Robert claims that an
express oral contract existed because Alphons had
specifically told Robert in the presence of his immediate family that Alphons wanted Robert to be
paid for his services.
[I 1][12][13] A court of equity will not enforce a
contract unless it is complete and certain in all its
essential elements. Sayer v. Bowley, 243 Neb. 80 I,
503 N.W.2d 166 (1993). The parties themselves
must agree upon the material and necessary details
of the bargain, and if any of these be omitted or left
obscure or indefinite so as to leave the intention of
the parties uncertain respecting *38 the substantial
terms, the case is not one for specific performance.
Id. It is not a function of a court of equity to make a
contract for the parties or to supply any of the material stipulations thereof. Id.

[ 14] In the instant case, the only evidenc,! in the record that would support a mutual understanding
between Alphons and Robert that Robert's services
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were not rendered gratuitously was the self-serving
testimony of Robert and the testimony of his mother that Alphons told Robert that Alphons would pay
Robert for his services. Even assuming that this
conversation did, in fact, take place and that a contract was formed between the parties, the record
contains no evidence of a mutual understanding as
to the specific terms of the compensation to be paid
to Robert. While Robert testified that 4 years after
the alleged conversation with Alphons, Alphons
told Robert that he was entitled to a certificate of
deposit as compensation for services rendered,
there is no evidence in the record as to which certificate of deposit or as to the amount of the particular certificate of deposit to which Robert was entitled. In short, the record is devoid of any evidence
as to the material terms of the purported contract,
and thus, as an appellate court, it is not our function
to supply the terms for the parties and enforce
**298 the parties' alleged contract for the payment
of compensation for services rendered.
[ 15] [ 16] Moreover, contrary to Robert's claim of a
contract for compensation of services, the record
reveals that Robert never reported the income he received from the certificates of deposit on his tax returns, thereby supporting an inference that the certificates of deposit did not represent compensation
for services rendered. Mutual assent to an agreement is determined by the objective manifestations
of intent by the parties, not by their subjective
statements of intent. See Viking Broadcasting Corp.
v. Snell Publishing Co .. 243 Neb. 92, 497 N.W.2d
383 (1993).
[ I 7] Therefore, we determine from our de novo review of the record that Robert's conversion of Alphons' certificates of deposit to Robert's own use
was not pursuant to any enforceable oral contract,
but, rather, was a substantially gratuitous transaction. Moreover, since the power of attorney did not
expressly grant Robert the power to make gifts with
Alphons' property, Robert has failed to meet his
burden of proof with respect to the *39 proper disposition of Alphons' certificates of deposit and in-

terest totaling $33,495.05. Accordingly, the district
court was correct in awarding Sophia the sum of
$33,495.05 with respect to the certificates of deposit. Robert's assignment of error is without merit.
2. SOPHIA'S CROSS-APPEAL
(a) Checking Account
In her cross-appeal, Sophia asserts that the trial
court erred in not awarding a judgment against
Robert for money he wrong-fully converted from
Alphons' checking account to his own use. Robert
admits to using the power of attorney to make various purchases and disbursements with money from
Alphons' checking account; however, Robert contends that these various purchases or disbursements
were proper because they represented either reimbursement of expenses, compensation for services
rendered, or gifts.
[ 18] As we address Sophia's claims in our de novo
review, we recognize that the nature of many of the
checking account expenditures was in d:ispute, and
we have considered and given weight to the fact
that the trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of facts over another with respect to several of the transactions. S,!e Schram
Enters. v. L & H Properties, 254 Neb. 717, 578
N.W.2d 865 (1998). In that regard, there were numerous checks that were written by Robert on behalf of Alphons either for alleged expense reimbursements or for items that allegedly benefited Alphons during his lifetime. Without detailing each
and every check, Sophia claims that se:veral purchases were not solely for the benefit of Alphons
and that certain checks were not reimbursement for
legitimate expenses. The checks at issue: were for
the purchase of two filing cabinets to keep track of
Alphons' business, the payment of real estate taxes
on Alphons' farmstead and personal property tax on
Alphons' pickup truck, several checks. to Walgreen's to purchase personal hygiene items and
medications for Alphons, the purchase of a televi-
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sion set for Alphons' room in the nursing home, the
purchase of a vacuum for Alphons' home, the payment for repairs to Alphons' truck, the purchase of a
camcorder that was eventually sold to Robert, and
the payment of utilities *40 and homeowner's insurance on Alphons' farmstead. The evidence was in
dispute in many of these transactions, and the trial
court heard several witnesses, including the administrator of the Genoa Haven Home, testify regarding the issue whether Alphons was benefiting from
the purchases and disbursements outlined above.
Based on our de nova review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not err in concluding
that Sophia was not entitled to judgment regarding
the aforestated disbursements.
[ 19] However, based on the principles set forth in
Fletcher v. A1athew, 233 Neb. 853, 448 N.W.2d 576
( 1989), our de nova review of the record leads us to
a different conclusion regarding Sophia's claims
with respect to the alleged compensation for services and gifts to Robert. With regard to those purchases constituting alleged compensation for services rendered, Robert testified that he purchased
**299 a pair of shoes for himself in the amount of
$241.50. Robert also testified that he paid himself
$500 for handling Alphons' funeral arrangements.
Lastly, Robert testified that he paid himself $80.15
for moving Alphons' belongings to and from the
various nursing homes. As previously detennined,
because the record is devoid of satisfactory proof
that Alphons entered into a binding contract to
compensate Robert for services rendered and because the power of attorney does not contain a provision authorizing Robert to compensate himself
from Alphons' property, we determine that Robert
has failed to meet his burden of proof with regard
to the proper disposition of Alphons' money in the
sum of$821.65.
[20] As to those purchases made with Alphons'
money allegedly constituting gifts, Robert wrote
checks to Wal-Mart totaling $7,055.74. While
Robert testified that these purchases were primarily
for personal items for Alphons, Robert also testified

that a portion of those purchases was for gifts for
his wife and children pursuant to Alphons' oral authorization. Despite Alphons' alleged oral authorization, because the power of attorney did not grant
Robert the power to make gifts with Alphons' property and the purchases were not solely for Alphons'
benefit, we determine that Robert has failed to meet
his burden of proof with respect to the disposition
of Alphons' money in the amount of$7,055.74.
[21] *41 Robert also purchased a radar detector for
$240.14. Robert testified that Alphons authorized
Robert to purchase a radar detector so that he would
not get speeding tickets while transporting Alphons
to doctor's appointments. Because we do not find
Robert's testimony credible in that regard, we determine that Robert has failed to meet his burden of
proof with respect to the proper disposition of Alphons' money in the further sum of$240.14.
Based on the foregoing, we determine that the trial
court erred in not awarding Sophia a judgment in
the amount of $8,117.53 for funds wrongfully converted from Alphons' checking account to the benefit of Robert.
(b) Prejudgment Interest
Sophia asserts that the trial court wrongly applied
an old version of Nebraska's prejudgment interest
statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-103.02 (Reissue 1993),
in denying her request for an award of prejudgment
interest. Sophia claims that under the amended version,§ 45-103.02 (Cum.Supp.1996), she is entitled
to prejudgment interest.
The version of§ 45-103.02 that the trial court applied in the instant case provided the following:
Except as provided in section 45-103.04, judgment interest shall also accrue on decrees and
judgments for the payment of money from the
date of the plaintiffs first offer of settlement
which is exceeded by the judgment until the
rendition of judgment if all of the following conditions are met:
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( 1) The offer is made in writing upon the defendant ... ;
(2) The offer is made not less than ten days prior
to the commencement of the trial;
(3) A copy of the offer and proof of delivery to
the defendant ... is filed with the clerk of the
court in which the action is pending; and
(4) The offer is not accepted prior to trial or within thirty days of the date of the offer, whichever
occurs first.
§ 45-103.02 (Reissue 1993 ). Under this version of§
45-103.02, in order to receive prejudgment interest
in a cause of action accruing after January 1, 1987,
a litigant must comply with the *42 four requirements of§ 45-103.02. See, Pantano v. McGowan,
247 Neb. 894,530 N.W.2d 912 (1995); Label Concepts v. Westendorf Plastics. 247 Neb. 560, 528
N.W.2d 335 ( 1995).

However, in 1994, the Legislature amended §
45-103.02, which now provides the following:
(1) Except as provided in section 45-103.04, interest as provided in section 45-103 shall accrue
on the unpaid balance of unliquidated claims
from the date of the plaintiff's first offer of settlement which is exceeded by the judgment until the
rendition of judgment if all of the following conditions are met:

**300 (a) The offer is made in writing upon the
defendant ... ;
(b) The offer is made not less than ten days prior
to the commencement of the trial;
( c) A copy of the offer and proof of de livery to
the defendant .. . is filed with the clerk of the
court in which the action is pending; and
( d) The offer is not accepted prior to trial or within thirty days of the date of the offer, whichever
occurs first.

(2) Except as provided in section 45-103.04, interest as provided in section 45-104 shall accrue
on the unpaid balance of liquidated claims from
the date the cause of action arose until the rendition of judgment.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
§
45-103.02
(Cum.Supp.1996). Thus, under the amended version of§ 45-103.02, compliance with the four conditions is no longer a prerequisite for an award of
prejudgment interest if interest is prov1ided for in
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue I 993) and the
claim is liquidated. Before analyzing whether interest is available pursuant to § 45-104 and the
claim is liquidated, it is necessary for us to resolve
the question of whether the amended prejudgment
interest statute is applicable in the instant case.
[22][23] Where an amendment to a statute makes a
procedural change, it is binding upon a tribunal on
the effective date of the amendment and is applicable to pending cases that have not been tried.
Stansbury v. HEP. Inc., 248 Neb. 706, 5.39 N.W.2d
28 ( I 995); Behrens v. American Stores Packing
Co., 236 Neb. 279, 460 N.W.2d 671 (1990). See,
also, Jackson v. Branick Indus., 254 Neb. 950, 581
N.W.2d 53 (1998). In the instant *43 case, the
amendment became effective July 16, 1994, and the
case was tried on November 28 and 29, 1995.
Therefore, the amended § 45-103 .02 was in effect
at the time of the trial, and thus, the new statute will
apply if the amendments to the statute we:re procedural in nature.
[24] A substantive law creates duties, rights, and
obligations, whereas a procedural law prescribes
the means and methods through and by which substantive laws are enforced and applied. Stansbury v.
HEP, Inc., supra. See, also, Jackson v. Branick Indus., supra . In the instant case, the amendments to
§ 45-103.02 did not create a new substantive right
to prejudgment interest on liquidated and unliquidated claims, since that right was already provided
for in the statute. Rather, the amendme:nts to the
statute merely altered the method for exercising the
right to prejudgment interest in a cause of action
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where the claim is liquidated. Therefore, because
we determine that the amendments to the statute
were procedural in nature, the district court erred in
not applying the amended version of§ 45-103.02 to
determine whether prejudgment interest should be
awarded in the instant case. Nevertheless, it still
must be resolved whether interest is provided for
pursuant to § 45- l 04 and whether Sophia's claim is
liquidated.
[25][26] First, with regard to whether interest is
available pursuant to § 45-104, this section states in
relevant part that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, interest shall be allowed at the rate of twelve percent
per annum ... on money received to the use of another and retained without the owner's consent, express or implied, from the receipt thereof .... " Under this section, an agent is chargeable with interest
at the legal rate from the time that the money is
wrongfully withheld from the principal. See Pearlman v. Snitzer, 112 Neb. 135, 198 N.W. 879 (1924)
. In the case at bar, because Robert, in his capacity
as Alphons' agent or attorney in fact, wrongfully
converted to his own use and retained money belonging to Alphons without Alphons' consent, interest is allowable pursuant to § 45-104.

( 1989). The record reveals that the amount of prejudgment interest on the certificates of deposit, as
set forth in exhibit 32, shall be callculated as
$17,873.74. However, a reasonable controversy did
exist regarding Robert's disbursements from Alphons' checking account. Therefore, Sophia's claim
on her cross-appeal is not liquidated, and Sophia is
not entitled to prejudgment interes.t on the
$8,117.53 in disbursements from the checking account.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is modified to provide a total r,ecovery of
$59,486.32, and as modified, it is affirmed in all
other respects.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
WHITE, C.J., participating on briefs .
Neb.,1998.
Cheloha v. Cheloha
255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291
END OF DOCUMENT

[27] Second, with regard to whether Sophia's claim
is liquidated, it is well settled that a claim is liquidated when there is no reasonable controversy either
as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to the
amount of such recovery. See, Blue Tee Corp. v.
CDI Contractors, Inc., 247 Neb. 397, 529 N.W.2d
16 (1995); Lange Indus. v. Hallam Grain Co., 244
Neb. 465, 507 N.W.2d 465 ( 1993). *44 There must
be no dispute either as to the amount or as to the
plaintiffs right to recover. Id.
[28][29] Since the damages were liquidated and no
reasonable controversy existed **301 as to Robert's
conversion of $33,495.05 in principal and interest
from Alphons' certificates of deposit to his own
use, Sophia was entitled to prejudgment interest as
a matter of law on that amount from the time that
Robert received the certificates of deposit. See
Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 448 N.W.2d 576
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quired to establish validity of power of attorney under which property was conveyed (C.S. § 6652).
Supreme Court of Idaho.
ARTHUR

Principal and Agent 308 €=>97

V.

KILPATRICK BROS. CO.
No. 5203.
Feb. 14, 1929.
Appeal from District Court, Blaine County; Hugh
A. Baker, Judge.
Action by Edward J. Arthur against the Kilpatrick
Bros. Company. Judgment for defendant was
entered, and, after plaintiffs subsequent death, notice of appeal was filed and served in name of deceased plaintiff. On defendant's motion to dismiss
appeal. Granted.
West Headnotes
Abatement and Revival 2 ~71

2 Abatement and Revival
2\/ Death of Party and Revival of Action
2\/(B) Continuance or Revival of Action
2k7 I k. Nature and Necessity. Most Cited
Cases
Action cannot be continued in deceased's name in
behalf of his

heirs without substitution of de-

ceased's representative or successor in interest (C.S.
§ 6652).

308 Principal and Agent
308lll Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308IIl(A) Powers of Agent
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Powers of attorney are strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified.
Principal and Agent 308 €=>103(7)

308 Principal and Agent
3081H Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308IIl(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308kl 03 Purchases, Sales, and Conveyances
308k I 03(7) k. Existence of Authority to Sell or Convey. Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney containing no speciffo authority
to convey realty did not authorize such conveyance.
*800 J. G. Hedrick, of Hailey, and C. T. Ward, of
Boise, for appellant.
Sullivan & Sullivan, of Boise, and Roy Van
Winkle, of Hailey, for respondent.
PERCURIAM.

Abatement and Revival 2 ~75(2)

2 Abatement and Revival
2\/ Death of Party and Revival of Action
2\/(B) Continuance or Revival of Action
2k75 Application and Proceedings Thereon
2k75(2) k. Issues Raised or Determined, and Pleading and Proof. Most Cited Cases
Grantee's right to continue action of deceased
grantor to quiet title being disputed, she was re-

This was an action to quiet title to real property, in
which judgment was entered in favor of defendant,
on November 15, 1927. Some time in th«! month of
December, 1927, plaintiff died intestate, and no administrator has been appointed to represent his estate. On January 30, 1928, notice of appeal was
filed and served in the name of the deceased
plaintiff. Thereafter motion to dismiss the appeal
was filed in this court, mainly on the ground that an
appeal may not be taken in the name of a deceased
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person, without a substitution of, or voluntary appearance*801 by, a representative of such deceased
party.
Edward B. Arthur, a son of the deceased plaintiff,
filed an affidavit, to which was attached as an exhibit a power of attorney executed by Edward J. Arthur, deceased, on November 16, 1926, under
which it is claimed Edward B. Arthur was given the
authority and power, among other things, to convey
all property of Edward J. Arthur, and that, pursuant
thereto, the property in controversy had been
deeded to Catherine J. Arthur after the entry of
judgment in the cause and prior to the death of Edward J. Arthur, and that she elected to continue the
action and appeal the same in the name of the original party, under the provisions of C. S. § 6652.
On the same date of the filing of the affidavit above
referred to, a motion was filed to have Catherine J.
Arthur substituted as appellant, for the reason that
she is the real party in interest. A subsequent affidavit of Edward B. Arthur set forth the names of
certain heirs of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, referred to the conveyance to Catherine J. Arthur, and
stated: "As no administrator has been appointed in
this state or elsewhere for the said deceased, Edward J. Arthur, this affiant respectfully requests
that the said action be continued in the name of Edward J. Arthur in case it should be determined by
this court that the said premises constitute part of
his estate."
Affidavits were also filed by others of the Arthur
family, deposing that respective affiants knew that
the purpose, object, and intention of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in executing the power of attorney
to Edward B. Arthur, was to give and grant unto the
latter power and authority, among other things, to
convey property of the said Edward J. Arthur.

C. S. § 6652, provides: "An action or proceeding
does not abate by the death or any disability of a
party, or by the transfer of any interest therein, if
the cause of action or proceeding survive or continue. In case of the death or any disability of a party,

the court, on motion, may allow the action or proceeding to be continued by or against his representative or successor in interest. In case of any other
transfer of interest the action or proceeding may be
continued in the name of the original party, or the
court may allow the person to whom the: transfer is
made to be substituted in the action or proceeding."
Having in mind the provisions of the foregoing statute, the situation to be addressed on the: motion to
dismiss is (I) the request of Catherine J. Arthur, as
grantee of the property under deed of Edward J. Arthur, by Edward B. Arthur, attorney in fact, before
the death of Edward J. Arthur, to be substituted as
appellant; and (2) if the efficacy of the deed to
Catherine J. Arthur be inquired into, and it is held
to be of no force or effect by reason of failure of
the power of attorney to extend to the right of conveying real estate belonging to Edward J. Arthur,
the application to have the action continued in the
name of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in behalf of
his heirs.
If there were no question as to the sufficiency of the
power of attorney, claimed to authorize the deeding
of the property to Catherine J. Arthur, undoubtedly
she would have the right to be substituted as appellant, coming within the provisions of the last sentence or clause of C. S. § 6652, supra, covering a
transfer during the lifetime of the original party,
such as is purported to have occurred herein. In
such circumstances it is unnecessary to decide
whether, upon the death of the transferor and original party, the action could be continued in his
name, since the request is made by the transferee or
assignee to be substituted. Her right, however, to
continue the action or to be substituted as appellant
being disputed, it appears to us that she must
present satisfactory evidence of the grounds upon
which she relies to be made a party to the action in
her own right entirely. This involves, therefore, a
consideration of the power of attorney, under which
it is contended the property formerly belonging to
Edward J. Arthur, deceased, was conveyed to her
and is now her property, subject of course to de-
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termination of the litigation involving the title.
The instrument is denominated "special power of
attorney," and admittedly does not expressly give
Edward B. Arthur the power to convey real estate
of Edward J. Arthur, but grants him "full power and
authority to do and perform all and every act and
thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done
in and about the premises (concerning all property
belonging to Edward J. Arthur within the State of
Idaho) as fully to all intents and purposes as he
might or could do if personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming all that his said attorney, Edward B. Arthur shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue of these presents." It is seen that this
power of attorney contains no authority to convey
real estate, eo nomine, and as such instruments are
subject to strict interpretation, without regard to parol evidence, and are not to be construed as authorizing acts beyond those specified (see I Cal. Jur. p.
748 et seq.), our conclusion is that the deed to Catherine J. Arthur was ineffective by reason of insufficiency of the power of attorney to authorize conveyance of real estate. It follows, therefore, that the
request of Catherine J. Arthur to be substituted as
appellant in the cause and to continue the same in
her name and right must be denied.

Idaho 1929.
Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co.
47 Idaho 306, 274 P. 800
END OF DOCUMENT

The request that the action be continued in the
name of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in behalf of
his heirs, if granted, would not be a substitution,
and, by the provisions of C. S. § 6652, "In case of
the death *802 or any disability of a party, the
court, on motion, may allow the action or proceeding to be continued by or against his representative
or successor in interest," it is clearly expressed that
a substitution of a representative or successor in interest of the deceased is necessary in order to have
the action continued. 20 Cal. Jur. 544; Lowe v. Superior Court, l 65 Cal. 708, 134 P. 190.
There is no proper party appellant before the court,
and the appeal must be dismissed. It is so ordered.
All concur.
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Supreme Court of Idaho.
EATON
V.

McWILLIAMS et al.
No. 5798.

308Hl(A) Powers of Agent
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney to sell land must be strictly construed.

Principal and Agent 308 C:=103(6)
May 26, 1932.
Appeal from District Court, Canyon County; John
C. Rice, Judge.
Action in equity by A. L. Eaton against W. H.
McWilliams and others for the cancellation of an
assignment of a contract of sale of real property and
for the return of money paid thereunder. From a
judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
3081II(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k 103 Purchases, Sales, and Conveyances
308kl03(6) k. Sales and Conveyances in General. Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney to sell land and convey complete
title did not include power to assign contract and
receive payment therefor.

West Headnotes

Principal and Agent 308 C:=122(1)
Appeal and Error 30 C:=1008.1(8.1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(l)3 Findings of Court
30k I 008 Conclusiveness in General

30k I 008. I In General
30k 1008.1 (8) Particular Cases
and Questions
30k l 008. l (8. l) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 30kl008(1))
Court's finding under evidence that principal did
not ratify agent's unauthorized act in assigning land
contract held conclusive on appellate court.

Principal and Agent 308 (;;;:;,97
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308IIl(A) Powers of Agent
308k 118 Evidence as to Authority
308k 122 Declarations and Acts of
Agent
308kl22(1) k. Declarations and

Acts in General. Most Cited Cases
Statement in assignment of land contract that agent
was lawfully authorized to execute assignment held
not binding upon principal.

Principal and Agent 308 C:=147(3)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(C) Unauthorized and Wrongful Acts
308k147 Duty to Disclose or Ascertain
Authority
308kl47(3) k. Special Agency. Most
Cited Cases
Where power of attorney authorized ag,~nt only to
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308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(D) Ratification
308k 175 Operation and Effect
308k 175(2) k. Agent's Contracts. Most
Cited Cases
Principal's ratification of agent's sale of land upon
credit did not impart validity to agent's unauthorized assignment of contract from which principal
received no benefit.
*259 Herman Welker, of Weiser, John H. Norris, of
Payette, and Walter Griffiths, of Caldwell, for ap-

of the premises to one Earl F. McClure for the sum
of $1,000, $100 of which was paid down, and the
balance being payable at the rate of $ 100 per year.
Pursuant to this contract, McWilliams as attorney in
fact for Eaton executed and acknowledged a deed to
the premises, and thereafter kept the contract, deed,
and abstract in his possession for a considerable
length of time, instead of depositing them in escrow
in the First National Bank of Caldwell as provided
by the contract. The down payment of $100 was received by Mc Williams and was never accounted for
to Eaton. McWilliams was entitled to $:50 as compensation for making the sale, and expended $17
for conveyancing and abstracting costs. On March
4, 1929, and prior thereto, McWilliams had endeavored to sell this contract to the defendant
Pence, who had offered him $646 for it. This
Mc Williams refused to accept, but made a deal with
Pence that the latter should advance $500, taking
the contract in pledge as security, together with a
written assignment thereof, and that he
(McWilliams) would endeavor to sell the contract
elsewhere and out of the proceeds pay Pence. This
McWilliams was unable to do, and later he agreed
to take the balance of $146 from Pence, which was
paid to him. All of this $646 was converted by
McWilliams and he never paid over any portion of
it to Eaton, nor did he account therefor. After the
assignment was made the defendant Pence received
from the purchaser on the contract the total sum of

pellants.

$164, covering payments of principal and interest

sell land, one taking assignment of contract from
agent, and paying him therefor, did so at his peril.

Principal and Agent 308 €=>169(3)
308 Principal and Agent
308Ill Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308Ill(D) Ratification
308k 168 Implied Ratification
308k 169 In General
308k 169(3) k. Acts Not Amounting
to Ratification. Most Cited Cases
That principal attempted to secure settlement from
agent assigning land contract without authority held
immaterial, as regards rights of assignee, where efforts were unsuccessful.

Principal and Agent 308 ~175(2)

LEEPER, J.

from the year 1929, and on October 26. 1930, the
purchaser paid the further sum of $121 to the First
Security Bank of Payette, in which institution the
papers had been placed by Pence.

The plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land in
Canyon county, Idaho. On the 13th day of March,
1928, the plaintiff executed a written power of attorney in favor of the defendant W. H. Mc Williams,
which authorized him only to sell and convey the
aforesaid premises, to execute a deed therefor, and
to do all acts necessary to convey a complete title.
The defendant McWilliams, acting under the power
of attorney, thereafter made a contract for the sale

During the time occupied by these transactions
Eaton was living in Montana and was never present
in Idaho. McWilliams advised him by letter that he
had made the sale some time in the fall of 1928, but
nothing was remitted to him, and he did not know
of the details of the deal with McClure until he returned to Idaho in February of 1930. At that time
McWilliams concealed the fact that he had so sold
the contract to Pence, but admitted having drawn

Cleve Groome, of Caldwell, for respondent.
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some money on it. On August 12, 1930, Eaton
again returned to Idaho, and saw McClure and
Pence. He had an argument with Pence about the
division of a $38 check given for damages to the
land by a drainage ditch constructed across it, and
*260 finally compromised by dividing it equally,
Mr. Pence acting as intermediary and dividing the
money. At that time McClure advised him that
McWilliams had assigned the contract to Pence,
and they had some further discussion about that
matter. This was the first time that Eaton knew of
the assignment, and he later went to the Payette
bank and inspected the papers. Shortly after this,
Eaton employed an attorney, who thereafter served
notice upon the bank and in November, 1930, filed
this action on behalf of Mr. Eaton, seeking cancellation of the purported assignment, for the return of
moneys theretofore paid by McClure, and for the
delivery of the deed, contract, and abstract to him.
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff
granting him full relief, from which this appeal is
taken by defendants Mc Williams and Pence.
We have carefully inspected the record and find no
error. The power of attorney given to McWilliams
clothed him only with the power to sell, and must
be strictly construed. "In accordance with the rule
requiring powers of attorney to be strictly construed, a power of attorney to sell lands must be
strictly construed and cannot be extended by construction. Hence an authority to sell must be strictly
pursued and acts beyond those which are legitimately necessary to carry the particular power into
effect will not bind the principal, although, in the
absence of restrictions, the agent has the undoubted
power to do those things which are usually done in
making such sales." 2 C. J. 611, § 245. Obviously,
the power to assign the contract and receive payment therefor is not included within the purview of
the written power of attorney, by the limitations of
authority therein expressed. Pence being the assignee of the contract, and having full knowledge of the
terms of the power of attorney, certainly knew or
should have known that McWilliams was acting
beyond the scope of his agency. Indeed, as a matter

of law, that agency was entirely terminated and no
longer existed after the sale was completed. This
case does not involve any question as to the apparent scope of an agent's authority, because the specific written limitation was known to the purchaser,
and the record does not disclose that this was ever,
subsequent to its execution, changed or enlarged in
any manner by the principal. A person who makes a
payment to an agent acting without the scope of his
employment does so at his peril. Whalen v. Vallier,
46 Idaho, 181,266 P. 1089; Nielson v. Westrom, 46
Idaho, 686, 270 P. I 054.
Appellant contends that Eaton ratified the assignment and isis therefore bound. We have searched
the record for evidence of ratification and found
none. Eaton moved with reasonable rapidity to recover his property as soon as he learned of the
transaction on August 12, 1930, and prior to this
time he had no knowledge of it. Apparently he did
not know of many facts connected with the assignment, particularly the purchase price, and he never
received any of the consideration. That he attempted to secure settlement from McWilliams is immaterial, in view of the fact that his efforts were unsuccessful. Pence did not rely upon anything said or
done by Eaton at any time, and it appears to us that
almost every element essential to ratification is
missing in this case. Black-well v. Kercheval. 29
Idaho, 473, 160 P. 741. The finding of the court,
upon this record, that there was no ratification is
conclusive upon us. The statement contained in the
assignment to the effect that McWilliams was lawfully authorized to execute it amounts to no more
than a declaration of the agent and is not binding
upon Eaton. Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho, 466,
207 P. 326; Cox v. Crane Creek Sheep Co., 34
Idaho, 327, 200 P. 678. As to whether or not
McWilliams was empowered to sell upon credit under the terms of the power of attorney we are not
called upon to decide, since Eaton ratified the deal.
This ratification, however, does not impart validity
to the transaction between McWilliams and Pence,
of which Eaton knew nothing and from which he
received no benefit.
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The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
LEE, C. J., and BUDGE, GIVENS, and VARIAN,
JJ., concur.
Idaho 1932.
Eaton v. McWilliams
52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259
END OF DOCUMENT
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for himself or others.
Supreme Court ofldaho.
JENSEN
V.

SIDNEY STEVENS IMPLEMENT CO.
No. 3621.
Dec. 4, 1922.
Appeal from District Court, Bear Lake County;
Robt. M. Terrell, Judge.
Action by Thomas C. Jensen against the Sidney
Stevens Implement Company. From a judgment for
plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes

Principal and Agent 308 €=:>48
308 Principal and Agent
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308Jl(A) Execution of Agency
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation.
Most Cited Cases
It is an agent's first duty to communicate to his
principal any facts relating to the business of his
agency which he should in good faith under their
trust relations have made known to his principal.

Principal and Agent 308 €;=69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308JI(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69( 1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The law guards the fiduciary relation between principal and agent with jealous care, and seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between the agent's
duty and his personal interest, and forbids him acting adversely to the interests of his principal either

Principal and Agent 308 €=:>69(2)
308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308II(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69(2) k. Duty of Agent to Account for Profits of Agency. Most Cited Cases
If an agent makes a profit in the course of his
agency because of his failure to inform his principal
of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of
due diligence he should have ascertained for his
principal, the profits of such transaction as a matter
of law will belong exclusively to the principal.
*1003 Jones, Pomeroy & Jones, of Pocatello, and
D. C. Kunz, of Montpelier, for appellant.
Budge & Merrill, of Pocatello, and A. B. Gough, of
Montpelier, for respondent.

LEE,J.
Respondent brought this action to recover from appellant a balance on account of wages ea.med while
in its employment. Appellant, by way of answer
and *1004 cross-complaint, alleged that it was a
Utah corporation, qualified to transact business in
the state of Idaho, and had for many years maintained a branch establishment at Montpelier in said
state, where it was engaged in selling farming implements and other merchandise, in the course of
which it acquired the ownership of real property
hereafter referred to; that until August, 1919, respondent was in its employment, and his duties
were to collect accounts, look after its real estate,
and find purchasers for the same, collect rents, and
attend to all of its business matters arising in that
locality, subject to the direction of appellant; that in
May of that year it was the owner of certain real estate, specifically described, comprising about I 20
acres of farm land in Bear Lake county, which it
listed for sale with respondent, together with other

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

000501

Page 2

210 P. 1003
36 Idaho 348,210 P. 1003
(Cite as: 36 Idaho 348, 210 P. 1003)

of its real estate; and that it was at the time winding
up its affairs and closing its business at said branch
house. It further alleges that respondent was under
instructions, and that it was his duty, to obtain the
best possible price for said property, and to keep
appellant fully informed with respect to all matters
affecting the sale of such property, but that respondent failed to do so, but that respondent while
so employed, and when occupying such fiduciary
relationship, failed to disclose to appellant the true
conditions regarding offers made for the farm land
in question, and thereby induced appellant to sell
said premises to respondent for a much less sum
than respondent had been offered for the property
by a prospective purchaser, to whom he afterward
resold the same for an advance of $1,000. Appellant asked to have the balance claimed for wages
set off against the excess obtained by respondent
upon the resale of this property, and judgment for
the remainder.
Respondent answered said cross-complaint, in effect admitting the relationship of principal and
agent as alleged, that the real estate in question had
been listed with him for sale, that he had purchased
the same from his principal without having disclosed the facts to appellant as to a previous offer
from a third party, and that, after obtaining a conveyance of the same, he had soon thereafter contracted to resell said premises to the party who had

informed it that he had an offer of $2,600 cash for
this farm. The letter does not disclose who was
making this offer, but respondent testified at the trial that it was in fact his own offer. Two days later
appellant replied, rejecting the offer, but stating that
it would accept $3,000 as its lowest price, with the
condition that such price was subject to change at
any time prior to acceptance. On the 12th day of
May following, respondent again wrote to appellant, stating that he had decided to purchase the
land for himself and his boys at the price of $3,000.
This offer appellant accepted, and respondent paid
$2,000 and gave a mortgage for the remainder.
The witness Berry, who had been negotiating with
respondent for the purchase of this land, testifies
that about the 7th of May respondent, with other
members of his family, came to his place, which
adjoined the land in question, and that he made respondent an offer of $3,600 for the land. Respondent never informed appellant as to this offer, and
gave as a reason for not doing so that the condition
which Berry attached with regard to the lease
caused him to believe that the offer would not be
acceptable. Upon respondent securing title to the
premises, negotiations were renewed between Berry
and himself, which resulted in Berry agreeing to
purchase the land from respondent for the sum of
$4,000. Before the deal was consummated, Berry
ascertained that respondent had just previously pur-

the offer before he had purchased the

chased the land from appellant for $3,000, and de-

premises, for $1,000 in excess of the price for
which he had purchased the land from his principal,
and had subsequently closed such sale for $850 in
excess of what he had paid his principal for the
land.

murred to paying this much of an advancement. Respondent and Berry adjusted their differences by
agreeing upon a consideration of $3,850, which sale
was finally consummated on June 9th.

made

The cause was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of respondent for his wages, and failed
to make any direct finding upon the affirmative issues tendered by the cross-complaint.
There is practically no conflict in the testimony regarding the material issues presented by the pleadings. On May 7, 1919, respondent, by letter addressed to appellant's home office at Ogden, Utah,

There is a conflict between the testimony of Berry
and that of respondent as to when Berry made the
offer of $3,600 which respondent reject,ed without
submitting the same to his principal, he giving as a
reason that Berry's offer imposed some condition
with reference to the lease that made such offer of
less value than that of $3,000 which he had made.
But it is not controverted that Berry made this offer
prior to respondent receiving the letter from his
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principal quoting him a price of $3,000, so it is
clear that respondent, after having submitted his offer of $2,600, which was rejected, and prior to the
counter proposal from his principal to sell for
$3,000, had received from Berry an offer of $3,600,
which he failed to disclose to his principal. Respondent admits in his testimony that the statement
contained in his letter of May 12th to his principal,
wherein he says that a Mr. Groo was the party who
had made the offer of $2,600, was not true, and that
Groo had not made such an *1005 offer, but that,
on the contrary, the offer was intended to be for
himself.
From these conceded facts it is clear that respondent did not exercise toward his principal in the matter of the sale and purchase of this real estate such
good faith as the law requires an agent to exercise
toward a principal. The entire transaction was carried on by correspondence, and it was his duty before purchasing this land for himself to fully disclose all of the facts and circumstances regarding
the negotiations then pending with any other prospective purchaser, so that appellant would be fully
advised of the situation. The court correctly instructed the jury that:
"Loyalty to his trust is the first duty which an agent
owes to his principal. It follows as a necessary conclusion that the agent must not put himself in such a
relationship that his interests become antagonistic
to those of his principal. Fidelity in the agent is
what is aimed at, and as a means of securing it the
law will not permit the agent to place himself in a
situation in which he may be tempted by his own
private interest to disregard that of his principal. So
it is the duty of the agent to make his principal a
full and complete disclosure of all facts relative to
the subject of his agency which it may be material
to the principal to know. And, if an agent makes
any profit in the course of his agency because of his
failure to inform his principal of facts known to
him, or which in the exercise of due diligence he
should have ascertained for his principal, the profits
of such transaction, as a matter of law, will belong

exclusively to the agent's principal. The law guards
the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is, with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall
work with an eye single to the interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his
principal, either for himself or for others. * * *"
The jury in rendering a verdict for respondent,
failed to apply to the admitted facts in this case the
rule of law thus given to it by the court. It was not
until some 60 days after this transaction that appellant became aware of respondent's breach of trust,
and demanded an accounting for the $850 he had
received for this land in excess of what he had paid
his principal. The demand was refused, and respondent subsequently brought this action to recover from appellant the balance of his wages in part
earned while the transaction relative to the land sale
was pending. We think that appellant was entitled
to set off its demand against respondent's claim for
these wages, and to recover judgment for the excess
received by respondent for the sale of said land.
Appellant complains of that part of the court's instructions which is as follows:
"In this connection, you are advised that, if you
find that the defendant and cross-complainant has
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the
transaction whereby the plaintiff purchased the land
in question was not made in good faith, and likewise that the defendant and cross-complainant has
proved each and every material allegation of its
cross-complaint, then your verdict should be in favor of the defendant and cross-complainant."
We think that this instruction does not correctly
state the law applicable to the admitted facts in this
case, because it is equivalent to an instruction that
it was incumbent upon appellant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction
whereby the respondent purchased the land in question was not made in good faith. All of the material
facts and circumstances relating to the agency set
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forth in the cross-complaint were in effect admitted
by respondent, either by his pleading or his testimony. The fact of his having purchased the real
property which had been listed for sale with him,
under both express and implied conditions that he
should sell it for the best interests of his principal,
prevented him from purchasing the same on his
own account without first making a full and complete disclosure to his principal of all offers of purchase by others, and of all the facts and circumstances connected with the sale of this property. His
admission that he did not do so would relieve the
appellant from the requirement that it assume the
entire burden of proof of establishing the agent's
want of good faith. That is, the question of good
faith on the part of respondent must be determined
from all the facts and circumstances of the case,
and we do not think that the burden of establishing
this by a preponderance of the evidence shifted to
appellant, in view of the admissions of respondent
in his answer to the cross-complaint and also in his
testimony.
The cause is reversed and remanded, with instructions to grant a new trial. Costs awarded to appellant.
RICE, C. J., and McCARTHY and DUNN, JJ., concur.
BUDGE, J., took no part.
Idaho 1922.
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co.
36 Idaho 348,210 P. 1003
END OF DOCUMENT
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Deceased.
On February 26, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on the claim of the State of
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (Department) against George Perry's estate.
The Department seeks to recover Medicaid benefits paid to Mr. Perry's wife, Martha
Perry. The personal representative of Mr. Perry's estate, Barbara McCormick, is
represented by Peter Sisson and the Department by Corey Cartwright. The parties have
agreed to the relevant facts and have presented written memoranda and made oral
argument.
I. Background.
During George and Martha Perry's marriage, Martha owned a home at 2104
Tendoy Drive in Boise. On November 18, 2002, by quitclaim deed, Martha transferred
this property to herself and George. On July 31, 2006, again by quitclaim deed, the
property was transferred to George alone. 1
Over the years, Martha's health has failed and, since October 1, 2006, she has
received assistance from the Medicaid program to pay for her nursing home care. At the
time of George's death, February 25, 2009, Medicaid had provided over $100,000.00 in
benefits to Martha. In March 2009, Ms McCormick, in her capacity as personal
1 The

court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from Martha and that he had
the authority to transfer the property to himself.
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representative of George's estate, sold the Tendoy home and has preserved the net
proceeds of the sale in an estate account. This money is the only significant asset of
George's estate.
On April 15, 2009, the Department filed its claim against George's estate and on
June 4, 2009, Ms. McCormick filed a notice of disallowance of the claim. Pursuant to
Idaho Code 15-3-806, on June 15, 2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance
of Claim which is now before the court.
II. Issues Presented.
The ultimate issue is: May the Department recover Medicaid benefits that it has
paid to Martha (who is still living) from George's estate--the proceeds of the sale of the
Tendoy home? Under the Department's reasoning, since Martha had an interest in the
Tendoy home during the marriage (and after federal statutory changes in 1993), it may
recover benefits paid in an amount equal to Martha's ownership interest from the
proceeds of the sale of the home. The personal representative (PR) argues that the
Department may only recover, from George's estate, an amount equal to Martha's
interest in the Tendoy home at the time of her death. Since Martha is still living and

neither this home nor its proceeds will ever pass to her, the PR denies that the
Department may recover any amount.
The foundation of the Department's claim is Idaho Code 15-56-218(1) which
provides:

Recovery of certain medical assistance.-(1) Except where exempted or waived
in accordance with federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year so age or older when
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the individual's
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both:
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(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be authorized
pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this section
may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse.
(emphasis added)
The only Idaho case dealing with recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of
the recipient's spouse is Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman 132 Idaho
213 (1998). 2 Jackman's essential holding is that the Department is not limited to the
estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may recover appropriate
amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The case was remanded to the probate
court for a determination of whether the Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an
interest in community property, at the time of her death, the value of which, the court
suggested, could be recovered from her husband's estate.
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what

time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid recipient's interest
in property-any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the time of the
recipient's death. 3
The Department's claim depends upon an interpretation of the definitions of

"estate" and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)
provides:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance co1Tectly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:
2

In re Estate of Kaminsky 141 Idaho 436 (2005) involved a claim to recover Medicaid benefits from the
recipient's estate and was decided on the grounds that the Department's claim was untimely.
3 Jacknum certainly suggests that the time of the recipient's death is the determinative time: "The record
before us does not disclose whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property at the time ofHildor's
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property property may therefore be part of Hildor's
"estate" that 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover and apply against the
balance of the Medicaid payments." Id. at 216. (emphasis added)
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate,

This statute goes on to define "estate" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4):
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased
individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within

the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time
of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
(emphasis added)
Finally, 42 U.S.C.1396p(h) contains general definition provisions:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but
does not receive because of action-(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's
spouse.

To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate because
Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse; 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of "estate" and 42 U.S.C.
1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person transferred to her spouse. The
court cannot accept this interpretation.
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The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in Estate of

Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N. Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received Medicaid
benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the estate of Verna Witz,
Clarence's wife. The Wirt.:: court analyzed the federal statutory definitions of "estate" and
"asset" as quoted above and held that " ... any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to
Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death are subject to the department's recovery
claim." Id at 886. This ruling depends, however, on an awkward interpretation of the
term "other arrangement" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz
interpreted the "other arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section.
The bulk of the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fa5hion
on the death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates.

It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of property of
this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context of the surrounding
language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include transfers of a similar, automatic
nature not any possible transfer.
The case of Estate o,f Barf?, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) provides a more
reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not
have an interest in at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale
for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates
from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from the "estate" of the
Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the
extent the 1993 amendments allow states to expand the definition of "estate" for
Medicaid recovery purposes. the language of the federal law clearly limits that
expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death.
Id at 71._(emphasis added)
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_,
III. Conclusion.
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of property
made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of
a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint
tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any
interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition for Allowance of claim is
denied.
DATED This JO" day of March, 2010> .

_

/

l~~~
1

Hon. Christo'])~ M. Bieter
Magistrate Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

________________
TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214
NOTICE OF APPEAL
EXEMPT: I.C. § 31-3212

BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND HER
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PETER SISSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, AND TO THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND WELFARE (hereinafter "the Department"), appeals pursuant Idaho Code § 17201 and Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
1.

The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of

the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for the County of
Ada, Magistrate Judge Christopher M. Bieter, presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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2.

The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the

Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada.
3.

The Department appeals from the ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM filed

March 10, 2010.
4.

This appeal is taken upon matters oflaw.

5.

This matter was heard by oral argument on February 26, 2010, at Boise, Idaho;

however, no evidentiary hearing was had and no testimony or evidence was taken. The hearing
was tape recorded and the recordings are in the possession of the clerk of the court.
6.

The issues on appeal are:
1.

Did the Magistrate err in determining that the general power of attorney

held by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha
Perry's real property?
2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code

§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George
Perry?
3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396p as pre-empting application ofldaho Code § 56-218?
4.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding

in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to
the facts of this case?
5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Y:\MRCaseslEstate\PerryMID Court\Notice of Appeal.wpd

000513

DATED this 18th day of March, 2010,

-Y

W. Cf)
CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
DATED this

_j!L_ day of March, 2010.

fv~Qdiiliq_ ru.iauL

Marchele Premo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services
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10

This case is before the Court on Appellant Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's

11

(Depaitment's) motion for stay pending appeal. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be

12

granted in part and denied in part.

13

14

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

15

The Department made a claim against the Estate of George D. Perry (George) for
16

reimbursement of amounts expended by the Medicaid program on behalf of George's wife Martha,
17
18

who survives George and is confined to a nursing home. The personal representative of the estate,

19

Barbara McCormick (Personal Representative), is the daughter of George and Martha . It appears

20

that she may be a beneficiary of the estate. The Personal Representative denied the claim. The

21

magistrate, Hon. Christopher M. Bieter, upheld the Personal Representative's denial of the claim,

22

and the Department now appeals. The present motion before the Court is to stay distribution of the

23

assets of George's estate pending the outcome of this appeal. The Personal Representative has no

24

objection to the stay, except to the extent necessary to pay her costs and attorney fees.
25

~
~

26
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ANALYSIS
1
2

The Department asserts that the Personal Representative is not entitled to pay costs and

3

attorney fees from estate funds because she has a fiduciary responsibility to the estate and creditors

4

and therefore cannot use estate funds to advocate for her personal interests.

5

6

7

B

9

10

Idaho Code§ 15-3-720 provides:

If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursement~.
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred.
At least two Idaho cases have discussed whether a personal representative is entitled to
reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in pursuing his or her own interests. In Eliasen v.

11

Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234,668 P.2d 110 (1983), the court allowed attorney fees to the personal
12

representative on a finding that the litigation was pursued in good faith, including the representative's
13

14

resistance to efforts to remove him. In Matter of Estate of Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 700 P.2d 96

15

(1985) the personal representative was also a beneficiary under the will and incurred attorney fees in

16

asserting his claim to certain assets of the estate. There, the court held that he was not entitled to

17

attorney fees under the foregoing statute because he was litigating solely his own personal interests.

12,

19

The present case is clearly distinguishable. Here, the claimant is the Department; the personal
representative is simply defending the appeal. There is no allegation that she is doing so in bad faith.

20

The fact that denial of the Department's claim may increase the amount available to the beneficiaries
21

does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty absent some showing of bad faith. Indeed a personal
22
23
24

representative who is also a beneficiary would breach a fiduciary duty by failing to dispute
unmeritorious claims, and should not be required to front the attorney fees to do so on the basis of a

25
26
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personal interest (a greater share) if successful. The Department's interpretation wouid render the
1

2

statue essentially meaningless, in any case in which the personal representative is also a beneficiary.

3

CONCLUSION

4

5

Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

6

The Personal Representative shall distribute no funds or assets of the estate to any beneficiary,

7

except for payment of expenses and attorney fees incurred in this appeal, until further order of the
8

Court.
9

10
11

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

I'\*

day of May, 2010.

12
13

14

District Judge

15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order disallowing a creditor's claim in a probate proceeding. It
involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate recovery, as provided by
Idaho Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program required by federal and state law that seeks
to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, to reimburse the taxpayers
for expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. This matter involves the
Department's claim filed in the estate of the deceased spouse of a Medicaid recipient.
Course of Proceedings
The personal representative was appointed in this estate on March 19, 2009. The
Department filed a contingent 1 claim, in the amount of$106,251.08, on April 15, 2009. On June
2, 2009, a Notice ofDisallowance of Claim was filed by the personal representative. On June 15,
2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. Hearing was held on the
Department' Petition on February 26, 2010. On March 10, 2010, Judge Bieter issued his Order
Disallowing Claim. This appeal followed.
Statement of the Facts
George D. Perry ("George") was born
age of 79. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was born

and died February 25, 2009, at the
and at the time this brief is

written is believed to be still living. Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no
later than September 18, 1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real
property in Ada County. At some point in time later, Martha and George were married. On

1Idaho

Code§ 15-3-810.
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November 18, 2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as "Martha Jean
Boyle" and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." At some point, with
Martha's health declining, George and Martha needed assistance in paying for Martha's medical
care. About July 31, 2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real property to
himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Martha as her Power of Attorney. About
September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the Department for medical assistance to help
pay for Martha's medical care. Since October l, 2006, the Department has provided payment for
Martha's medical care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least$ l 08,364.23. (This
was the amount on April 27, 2009. Medicaid expenditures are ongoing.)
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the Magistrate err in determining that the general power of attorney held by

George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real property?
2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofldaho Code§ 56-

218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George Perry?
3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C.. § 1396p as

preempting application of Idaho Code § 56-218?
4.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in

Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P .2cl 6 (1998) to the

facts of this case?
5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
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ARGUMENT
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)( 1) sets forth the standard of review for appeals to the
district court from the magistrate's division, as follows:
Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a
trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine
the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards
of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the
statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court.
Rule 83( u)( 1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v.

Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785,589 P.2d 532 (1978), explained the import of Rule 83(u)(l):
We read [I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l)] as saying that a district court, in making an
appellate review of a magistrate's decision, should perform that task in the same
manner as this Court performs its appellate review of the trial decision of a district
court. In reviewing a magistrate's findings, therefore, the district courts should
adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Prescott
v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 542 P.2d 1176 (1975); Jsaguirre v. Eschevarria, 96
Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975); I.R.C.P. 52(a).
Furthermore, upon the appellate review conducted in a district court, the
district court is, as is this Court on an appeal where the district court has been the
factfinder, empowered to affirm, reverse, remand (including remand for a new
trial with instructions), or modify the judgment. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2). Where the trial
court's findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a
particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what
findings are correct, the district court ordinarily will not modify the judgment.
Frederickson v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 15 Idaho 41, 96 P. 117 (1908); 58 C.J.S.
Appeal and Error§ 1874 (1958). The district court will either remand for new
findings, or, alternatively, act under LC.§ 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) and
conduct a partial or whole trial de novo.

Hawkins, 99 Idaho at 788-789, 589 P.2d at 535-536.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that a trial court, sitting without a jury, enter
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'

specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho
316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained this requirement:
Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P., requires a trial court in all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." The rule also
provides that "[i]f an opinion or memorandum decision is filed, it will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein."
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the district court on appeal from a
magistrate, we must determine from the trial court (magistrate) record whether
substantial evidence supports the magistrate's findings of fact and whether those
findings support the magistrate's conclusions oflaw. Nicholls v. Blaser, I 02 Idaho
559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Ustickv. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215,657 P.2d 1083
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principles have been applied, then the
district court's decision affirming a magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id. Only
where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings.
See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P .2d 988 ( 1982); In re
Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162,525 P.2d 357 (1974).

Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho at 320,678 P.2d at 112.
In the case of In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974), the Idaho
Supreme Court was presented with a district court's affirmance of a magistrate's refusal to admit
a will to probate. The magistrate's decision was rendered by memorandum opinion, without the
entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Jd. at 163. Reversing the district court,
the Supreme Court stated:
Even though IRCP 52( a) recognizes that findings of fact and conclusions
of law may be embodied in a memorandum opinion, still both the findings and
conclusions must be specially stated if they are to fulfill their designed purpose.
This court has held that the absence of findings of fact may be disregarded by the
appellate court if the record is so clear that the court does not need their aid for a
complete understanding of the issues. However, in this case the record is not that
clear. The assignments of error are directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the magistrate's decision. It cannot be determined upon what facts the
magistrate based his decision.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5
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***

When the district judge was considering the appeal in this case, explicit
findings of fact and separate conclusions of law by the magistrate would have
clearly reflected the basis of the magistrate's decision, and then the district court
more readily could have determined whether facts sustained the magistrate's
decision and whether he had correctly applied the appropriate principles oflaw.
Moreover, with such findings of fact, the district court could have properly
determined whether this was such a case as should have been tried de nova before
the district court. I.C. § 1-2213.

Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho at 164,525 P.2d at 359. (citations omitted).
II.

MEDICAID IS NOT A FEDERAL PROGRAM
ADMINISTERED BY THE STATE, IT IS A JOINT STATEFEDERAL PROGRAM.
To the uninitiated, Medicaid law can be obscure and unintuitive. 2 While outsiders may
view Medicaid as a federal program administered by the state, it is in fact a joint state-federal
program. Federal enactment provides a framework and the states then enact their own laws to
provide medical assistance to their own citizens and receive federal financial participation.
Medicaid is intended to provide care for the needy. Unlike social security disability or
Medicare, there are no premiums or payroll taxes for Medicaid. Instead, it is a welfare program
funded by state and federal general fund revenues. It is intended to be the payer of last resort.
Medicaid is a strictly means-tested program, available only to those of the most limited
resources. For example, an elderly single person must have no more than $2,000 in available
resources to qualify for assistance.

2Indeed, one federal court has noted that Medicaid law is of"labyrinthine complexity" and called it "almost
unintelligible to the uninitiated." Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 (2nd Cir. 1976).
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Where a married couple is involved, and only one of them needs nursing home care, the
law takes care not to impoverish the at-home spouse. Resources such as the couple's home and
automobile are not counted in establishing eligibility. In this way, the nursing home spouse can
qualify for Medicaid while the at-home spouse3 can retain the resources needed for his support.
However, there is a trade-off for the public's largesse. Restrictions are imposi;:d on both
spouses' ability to transfer assets to third parties. Penalties are imposed for transfers of assets
within federal "look back" dates, which are either three or five years prior to Medicaid
application, depending on the circumstances and date of transfer. See generally 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c). Likewise, Idaho law criminalizes transfers of assets to qualify for Medicaid, and
transfers of assets by either spouse, without adequate consideration, can be set aside by the
courts. Idaho Code§§ 56-227 and 56-218(2).
Medicaid has always been intended to provide only for the needy. In 1993, Congress
strengthened federal law relating to estate recovery and asset transfers in response to widespread
reports of abuse. Among the changes made were longer look back periods, an expanded
definition of assets subject to estate recovery, and penalties for asset transfers. The legislative
history accompanying these actions shows Congress' intent that a couple's assets be traced to
facilitate recovery:
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The proi=ram must identilfy
and track resources (whether or not excluded for eli&ibility purposes) of
individuals who receive nursing facility. home and community-based services.,
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain

3In

Medicaid parlance, this person is known as the "community spouse." This has nothing to do with
community property law, since federal Medicaid law ignores state community property principles, but rather refers to the
spouse that lives "in the community" rather than in an institution.
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when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide for
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the
individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the
survivine spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living
trust, or other arrangement.
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added).
The federal Medicaid framework anticipates transfers between spouses for the: sole
purpose of providing a necessary living for the at-home spouse. See generally 42 U.S.C. §
l 396p(c). The federal law uses terms such as "for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse." 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii). When eligibility is determined, all of the assets of both spouses
are taken into consideration, without regard to whether the property is separate or community
property or whether it has been transferred from one spouse to the other. See IDAP A
16.03.05.735 to .752. The eligibility process involves complicated provisions meant to ensure
that the at-home spouse has enough resources to provide for himself. See id. It is obvious that
these provisions are not intended to provide an inheritance for the couple's heirs. To the
contrary, they are intended to make necessary medical care available to one spouse, provide for
the necessary living expenses of the other, and that is all. 4

III.
ESTATE RECOVERY IS PART OF THE WHOLE
PROCESS OF MEDICAID FOR THE ELDERLY.
The 1993 amendments to the Medicaid law (often referred to as OBRA '93) made estate
recovery mandatory to the states. OBRA '93 also created the anti-spousal impoverishment

4 There

are also provisions to provide for minor or disabled children, but those provisions are not relevant here.
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provisions that permitted the spousal transfers referred to above. Prior to OBRA '93, the athome spouse would be left destitute and unable to provide for himself. With OBRA '93, the
Medicaid spouse was allowed to transfer property needed for the at-home spouse's living, and
the at-home spouse was allowed to retain sufficient resources to maintain his household. OBRA
'93 also enacted the expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) and Idaho
Code § 56-218(4)(b ). Of course, these enactments are all related and support the legislative
intent quoted in the house report, above. The intent was to prevent the impoverishment of the athome spouse, but at the same time, provide for recovery of the couple's assets after both had
passed away and no longer needed them.
The process for this is estate recovery. Estate recovery involves the recovery of the assets
of the couple from the probate estate. Probate law is uniquely state law; there is no federal
probate law. Accordingly, there is no part of the federal-state Medicaid partnership that is more
completely governed by state, rather than federal, law. It is state probate and marital property
law that defines what property is available for payment of creditors from the probate f:state.
Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) specifically anticipates that the states will define what other
property, not included in the probate estate, will be included in Medicaid recovery:
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a.
deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets includ,ed
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyf:d to
a survivor. heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement:.
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,_
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added).
Estate recovery is an anticipated and expected part of providing Medicaid for the elderly.
The restrictions on the amount of assets and resources the couple can retain are relaxed, but the
trade-off is that once the need of the couple for those assets has ended, they must be n:~paid into
the treasury to offset the expense to the taxpayers and provide for the needs of others similarly
situated. Federal and state law is not intended to provide an inheritance to the able bodied heirs
of Medicaid recipients and their spouses, at taxpayer expense, but only to provide for the elderly
couple and return the retained assets to the treasury when they are no longer needed.
IV.
IDAHO LAW HAS ALWAYS PLACED THE
RESPONSIBILITY ON SPOUSES TO PROVIDE
NECESSARY CARE AND SUPPORT FOR EACH OTHER.
Idaho recognizes the responsibility of spouses to provide for one another. Idaho Code §
32-901 states that "Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect,
fidelity and support." In the case of Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92 P. 842 (1907), a wife
entered into a contract for lodging and her landlord brought an action to recover from the
husband. The question before the court was whether the husband could be liable for a contract
for lodging entered into only by the wife. The Idaho Supreme Court held in the affim1ative:
On the part of the husband, it is contended that he is not liable, for the reason that
the complaint shows that the credit was extended to the wife on her promise, and
not upon any implied liability of his.

***

The liability of the wife, if any, rests on her contract and promise to pay, while the
husband's liability for a necessary, such as board and room, grows out of and is
incident to his marital duties, and arises therefrom by operation oflaw. The wife
is entitled to these necessaries at the husband's expense, but, ifhe neglects to
furnish them and she cannot secure them on his credit, and can do so on the faith
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10
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of her own promise to pay the bill, she is certainly entitled to procure them in that
manner. If the creditor parts with his goods on the faith of the wife's promise to
pay, he is entitled to recover against her if the debt is not paid. The fact that she is
obliged to obligate herself can in no way relieve the husband of his duty and
responsibility in the matter. The wife has a right, on the other hand, to have the
husband holden for the debt, so that, if it can be collected from him, she may be
relieved of that obligation. The creditor is entitled to hold the husband, although
he is not willing to part with his goods without the additional assurance of the
wife's personal obligation to pay the debt.

***

We conclude that the husband is unquestionably liable for the debt, and that a
good cause of action is stated against him.

Edminston, 13 Idaho at_, 92 P. at 843-44. Clearly, the Idaho legislature's choice in Idaho
Code§ 56-2 I 8, of making one spouse's estate liable for medical expenses paid on behalf of the
other is not unusual or unprecedented. Indeed, it only makes sense that the couple's money
should be used first for their own care, and only after Medicaid is reimbursed, can the remainder
be distributed to the heirs. 5
V.
IDAHO LAW CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR RECOVERY IN
THIS CASE.

Idaho Code § 56-218(1) permits the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse
of a Medicaid recipient:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both;

5While the heirs sometimes complain that Medicaid recovery takes their inheritance, this program benefits them
as well as the needy couple. Without the Medicaid program, the couple would have to liquidate their assets to pay for
their own care. Medicaid rates are substantially lower than private pay medical rates, and therefore, the heirs are more
likely to have something left for their inheritance because their decedent was a Medicaid recipient.
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Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) (underline added). This law, on its face, is not limited to the community
or other property the Medicaid recipient owned at death. Indeed, there is no limitation of any
kind on what property of the spouse's estate is subject to recovery. Where a statute is.
unambiguous, there is no need for construction. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State

Dept. ofAgriculture, 143 Idaho 366,368, 146 P.3d 632,634 (2006).
Even though federal Medicaid law, as discussed above, ignores state community property
principles, by rule the Department recovers only property which had been community property or
jointly held property after October 1, 1993 (the effective date of OBRA '93). ID APA
16.03.09.900.20 states:

20. Limitations on Estate Claims.

***

A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the
assets of the estate that had been. at any time after October 1. 1993. community
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly
owned property. * * *
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). However, the rules also make it clear that transfer of
property between spouses will not eliminate the Department's right ofrecovery. IDAPA
16.03.09.900.24 states:

24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement.
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of the deceased
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or
other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07)
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The Department's rules have the same force and
effect as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,619, 84 P.3d 551,555 (2004).
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Clearly, Idaho law permits the Department's claim in this estate and the claim was
required to be allowed against the estate.
VI.
IDAHO'S SPOUSAL RECOVERY LAW IS NOT
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
A.
State Law Will Only Be Preempted Where Congress Intends to Occupy an Entire Field of
Law or Where a State Law Directly Conflicts with Federal Law.

The Magistrate did not use the terms "preempted" or "preemption." However, since, as
discussed above, Idaho law unambiguously permits the Department's claim and recovery in this
case, he could only have concluded that Idaho law is preempted by federal law. The court stated:
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of
property made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim
against the estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only
recover against property in which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time
of her death. Martha Perry conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during
her lifetime. There was no joint tenancy, right of survivorship or "other
arrangement" that would have conveyed any interest in this property to Martha at
George Perry's death. The Department may not recover Medicaid benefits paid to
Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 6. Likewise, the case of Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn.
2008), relied upon by the Magistrate, was based on federal preemption of a portion of
Minnesota's spousal recovery law. Therefore, the Magistrate must have concluded that Idaho
Code § 56-218(1) is preempted by federal law.
When it comes to preemption, however, the question is not what "[t]he federal statutory
definition of' estate"' includes, but whether federal law directly conflicts with state law. It does
not.
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Federal law only preempts state law where Congress has evidenced an intent to occupy a
given field or where state law is in direct conflict with federal law:
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. If
Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling
within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent
it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comp1'l
with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 377, 913 P.2d 1141, 1147
(1996), quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621, 78
L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). Therefore, to show that Idaho Code§ 56-218 is invalid, the personal
representative must show that either Congress intended to occupy the entire field, or that the
Idaho statute directly conflicts with the application of federal law.
That Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field is abundantly clear. Congress
intended that the states enact their own legislation governing estate recovery. The Medicaid law
specifically requires the states to establish estate recovery programs:
[T]he State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the
following individuals:

***
In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or
older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State
shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate,, but only
for medical assistance consisting of(i)
nursing facility services, home and
community-based services, and related hospital and prescription
drug services, or
(ii)
at the option of the State, any items or services.
under the State plan.
(B)
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,._..,
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (underline added). Moreover, as shown, above, certain parts of the
Medicaid program are optional and may be adopted, or not, as the State desires. Such provisions
require enabling legislation or rule making by the State.
Idaho Code § 56-218 appropriately implements the estate recovery mandate of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396p. For the personal representative to show that section 56-218 is preempted, she must
show that the Idaho statute directly conflicts with federal law. This she cannot do.
B.

The Federal Statute Anticipates Recovery of Assets Transferred to a Surviving Spouse.
The federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), defines what payments are recoverable and

does not restrict from whom recovery is made. Medicaid does much more than pay for nursing
care for the elderly poor. It also pays for medical care for families receiving temporary support,
and for the blind and disabled under the AABD (Aid for the Aged, Blind and Disabled) program.
Funds expended for such care, however, are not recoverable in an estate recovery case. Rather,
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) mandates estate recovery only for payments made to certain elderly
persons.
Note the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) which restricts what payments may be
recovered (discussion regarding from whom recovery may be made follows):

(b)
Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under
State plan
(1)
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correcth~:
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that
the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:
In the case of an individual described in subsection
(A)
(a}( l}(B} of this section . . ..
(B)
In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or
older when the individual received such medical assistance . . . .
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (underline added). It is important to realize that the primary purpose of
this section is to define what payments may be recovered, rather than from whom those payments
are recovered.
The Magistrate focused on the language in section 1396p(b)(l)(B) which requires
recovery "from the individual's estate" and rules that the State cannot reach beyond property
owned by the recipient at death. Order Disallowing Claim, pp. 4, 6. This, however, ignores both
the plain language and the context of the statute.
Subsection (b)(4) defines the term "estate" as used in this subsection:
(4)
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect
to a deceased individual(A)
shall include all real and personal property and other
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of
State probate law; and
(B)
may include, at the option of the State (and shall include,
in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), an·y:
other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor. heir. or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Importantly, the individual's estate, for purposes of
section l 396p, goes far beyond traditional concepts of a probate estate6 and includes ''·other
assets" of the individual, as well as "assets ... conveyed to a survivor." This is important
because "assets" has a special meaning in Medicaid law. "Assets" is defined in subsection (h) of
section l 396p to include the property of the spouse of the recipient:

6See also Be/she v. Hope, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (Cal. App. 1995) ("Estate" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p,
must be interpreted broadly, and included the assets of a non-testamentary trust which contained property placed there by
the decedent recipient and which attempted to convey property to decedent's heirs avoiding estate recovery).
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(h)
Definitions
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
( 1)
The term "assets". with respect to an individual. includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse,
including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's
spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action(A)
by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B)
by a person, including a court or administrative body,
with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or
such individual's spouse, or
(C)
by any person, including any court or administrative
body, acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or
such individual's spouse.
42 U.S.C. § l396p(h) (emphasis added). Thus, for estate recovery purposes, "assets" includes
income and resources of the individual's spouse, including property transferred to the spouse
from the Medicaid recipient.
Therefore, by definition, the estate of the individual, for purposes of section l 396p,
includes the property of the spouse. Contrary to the Magistrate's ruling that 42 U.S.C. § l396p
forbids recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse, this section specifically permits recovery
from the property of the surviving spouse.
While it is true that federal Medicaid law (like all public assistance law) is difficult to
construe unless the entire statute is read in context, a review of section 1396p, alone, reveals the

intent of Congress to view the property of the recipient and the recipient's spouse as the same
and subject to the same limitations. 42 U.S.C. § l396p(b)(2), the very next subsection after the
section that defines what payments may be recovered, provides, in part, as follows:
(2)
Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made
only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any ....
42 U.S.C. § l396p(b)(2) (underline added). Recovery is permitted only after the death of the
surviving spouse because the spouse is permitted to possess and use the couple's property during
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17
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his lifetime. If the State were limited to property in the possession of the recipient at the time of
her death, then why would the State be prohibited from recovering until after the death of the
spouse?
Likewise, subsection (c) of this section imposes a penalty on the recipient for asset
transfers by the recipient's spouse:

(c)

Taking into account certain transfers of assets

(l)(A) In order to meet the requirements of this subsection for purposes
of section 1396a(a)(18) of this title, the State plan must provide that if an
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the option
of a State, a noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual)
disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date
specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual is ineligible for medical
assistance for services described in subparagraph (C)(i) (or, in the case of a
noninstitutionalized individual, for the services described in subparagraph
(C)(ii)) ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (underline added). Again, if the recipient spouse could simply transfer her
assets to her spouse and, thereby, cut off the State's claim to those assets, then it would be
pointless to penalize the recipient for further transfers by the spouse. Instead, however, the
spouse is only permitted to use the couple's property and cannot give it away. This is because
the State has the right to recover from those assets after the death of the recipient and the spouse.
If the spouse is prohibited from giving the couple's property away to avoid the State's claim

during life, why should he be permitted to avoid the State's claim by giving the property away at
death? 7
Clearly, the very nature of section 1396p is to treat the property of the recipient and the
property of the recipient's spouse as the same for the purposes of estate recovery.

7See

also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2) (Assets may only be transferred to the spouse or certain other parties having
an interest in the property.
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C.
The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision in the Jackman Case Necessarily Upholds the
Validity ofldaho Code § 56-218( ]).
In the case of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970
P.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaid
spouse. In the Jackman case, just as alleged here, the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred all
her property to her spouse, Lionel. Hildor passed away first and Lionel passed away two weeks
later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of Lionel's estate and the Department filed
an estate recovery claim. The personal representative challenged the Department's claim on
numerous grounds including federal preemption. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld Idaho's
spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of estate permitted by federal law 8 and
adopted by Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b), together with the definition of assets found at 42 U .S.C. §
1396p(h)( 1), validated recovery of property that had, at any time after October 1. 1993. been
community property.
The Jackman decision must be read carefully because of the way it was decided. The
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the
Department. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modified its decision because the
effective date of the federal law on which they had relied in their original opinion was after the
date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that recovery
would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date of the

842

U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
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federal law, "OBRA 93."9 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery against the federal
preemption argument, but in the Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided by a
marriage settlement agreement in March, 1993. prior to the effective date of the law:
We conclude that this definition of"assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8..
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l}. "other assets" are
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by LC. § 15-1-201(15).
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7, 970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added). The definition of "assets" the
Supreme Court is referring to is that found in 42 U.S.C. § l 396p(h), discussed above, which at
that time was found in section 1396p(e). Therefore, what the Court was referring to, was a
definition where "assets," for purposes of estate recovery, included the assets of the spouse and
assets a spouse divests herself of, such as by signing a marriage settlement abTfeement or a deed.
As noted, above, in Jackman, the court altered its decision because it determined the
transfer of assets from Hildor to Lionel occurred prior to the enactment of OBRA '93 which
included both 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h). The court remanded the
matter for a determination of what community property the parties had acquired since their
marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the Department was not permitted to recover the

9This

limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20, limiting spousal recovery to property that had been
community property at any time after October 1, 1993.
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property transferred through the marriage settlement agreement was because of the timing: the
marriage settlement agreement divided the property before the effective date of OBRJ\ '93.
Note that because Hildor died first, whatever property she possessed on death necessarily
became the sole and separate property of Lionel before his death. Therefore, even in the

Jackman case the court approved recovery of property that had become the sole and s,eparate
property of Lionel.
The Magistrate found Jackman inapplicable and believed it required property to be
community property at the time of death of the Medicaid recipient for recovery to be made. The
Magistrate said:
The case was remanded to the probate court for a determination of whether th1~
Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an interest in community property, at
the time of her death, the value of which, the court suggested, could be recovered
from her husband's estate.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 3. However, this goes too far. In Jackman there was a marriage
settlement agreement that divided the couple's assets before the effective date of OBRA '93.
This same marriage settlement agreement maintained the separate nature of proceeds from the
separate property:
As authorized by I.C. § 32-906( I), this provision maintained the separate
character of the assets transmuted into Lionel's separate property by the
agreement, as well as "the income, rents, issues, profits, capital gains, and othi~r
earnings or increase" on this separate property. The agreement did not prevent the
accumulation of other community property by Lionel and Hildor after the date of
the agreement and before Hildor's death. The record before us does not disclose
whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property at the time of Hildor's
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property may be part of
Lionel's estate, and may therefore be part ofHildor's "estate" that 42 U.S.C. §
13 96p(b )( 1)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover and apply against the
balance of the Medicaid payments.
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Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216,970 P.2d at 9 (underline added). The entire issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the Department could recover from Lionel's estate. The only context for
property transfers was the marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the marriage
settlement agreement made a difference was because it was executed prior to October 1, 1993.
The whole upshot of the Supreme Court's decision was that if the marriage settlement agreement
had been executed after October 1, 1993, it would have been irrelevant and the Department's
recovery would have been permitted. Accordingly, there was no issue as to property transfers
after October 1, 1993. The question on remand was not what Hildor owned at death, but what
community property had accumulated after the marriage settlement agreement. The ri~asoning of
the Magistrate swallows up the entire decision of the Court by reference to chance phraseology
that has nothing to do with the issue before the court.
The view of the Magistrate is that property transferred by a Medicaid recipient before
death cannot be recovered. But in Jackman the marriage settlement agreement did exactly that.
Therefore, if the Magistrate is correct, then the Supreme Court's entire discussion of OBRA '93
and its effective date, the definition of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (now 1396p(h)), and the
expanded definition of estate are all superfluous. The Court could just as well have said, "since
there was marriage settlement agreement and the property was transferred before her death, there
can be no recovery."
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VII.

THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF MINNESOTA LAW IN IN RE
ESTATE OF BARG DOES NOT INV ALIDATE IDAHO LAW.
The personal representative found her challenge to Idaho law on a Minnesota case, In re

Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In Barg the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially preempted by federal law. As discussed
above, the Jackman case relied on the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore,
the Barg holding and the Jackman holding, in which each state's highest court was interpreting
its own law, is not necessarily inconsistent.

A.

The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in Jackman.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1) 10 significant in

their analysis. The original decision stated the following:
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as
well as from the estate of the surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "all real and
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ... " and
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had
any legal title or interest at the time of death ..... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); LC. §
56-218(4 ). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not
affect the status of the assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the:
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because
of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B). Jackman's
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor an,l
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Dq,artment from recovering the balance
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate.

°Now 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l).

1
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Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit C to Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Allowance) (underline added). On rehearing, the Supreme Court did not retreat from their
original holding except to recognize the marriage settlement agreement was executed before the
"assets" definition of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l)(B) came into effect:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e) . Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15).
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7, 970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court didn't
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l). In fact, by necessary implication, it
stated that with the definition of assets contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{h)(l) the transferred
assets would have been part of Hildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery.
This is the same reasoning used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of

Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000):
Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and
personal property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at
the time of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna Wirtz through "other
arrangement."
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), asset is defined as:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all incom~
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
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any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse
is entitled to but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
See Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970
P .2d 6, 9 (ld.1998) (concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of
on or before August 10, 1993).
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal propert¼
and other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his
death, including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement."
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the federal statute and
concluded:
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a
legislative intention to allow states to trace the assets of recipients of medical
assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse
dies.
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subject to the department's
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever
held by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate ofJobe, 590 N. W .2d 162, l 66
(Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which
the deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It does not provide that
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery.
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added).
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg, did not even consider the effect of this important
definition of "assets" found critical in both Jackman and Wirtz. It cannot be said that if the
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Minnesota Supreme Court had been informed of this definition it might not have reached the
same conclusion as the Idaho and North Dakota Supreme Courts.
8.

The State of Minnesota Has Already Amended its Law to Overcome the Barg Holding.
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to

other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and Wirtz. It is understandable, then, that
Minnesota has already amended its state law to overcome the holding of its supreme court in
Barg. Without objection, the Department provided a copy of changes made to Minnesota law in

2009 (Exhibit F to its Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim), for the
express purpose of remedying the Barg decision. This legislation makes it clear that a Medicaid
recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets jointly owned at any time during marriage, even
when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the non-Medicaid spouse. This is exactly the effect
of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Jackman.
Obviously, if Minnesota can overrule Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not
federal law,per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision. Like the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held that Idaho's law permits recovery
under the circumstances of this case. These holdings are not necessarily inconsistent with Barg.
The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and has already been made in-elevant by
a change in Minnesota law.
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VIII.

EVEN IF THE BARG CASE WERE APPLIED IN IDAHO,
THE DEPARTMENT MUST STILL RECOVER BECAUSE
THE GIFT OF THE DECEDENT TO HIMSELF WAS
INVALID.
If Barg is to be the law in Idaho, it is critical to determine what property was transferred

by the Medicaid recipient to her spouse. In the court below, the Department challeng1~d the
validity of the Quitclaim Deed by which the decedent purported to convey the Medicaid
recipient's real property to himself, through a power of attorney. The Magistrate made no
findings of fact in this regard, but concluded, apparently as a matter of law, that the transfer was
valid. In a footnote, the court said:
The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from
Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 1, fn I.
A.
As a Matter of Law, the Power of Attorney Did Not Authorize the Decedent to Make a
Gift to Himself.
The Medicaid recipient, Martha Perry, brought the real property of this estate into the
marriage as her sole and separate property. Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Allowance of Claim. She later transferred the property to herself and to George, granting George
an interest in the property. Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of
Claim. George later transferred Martha's interest to himself. Exhibit A to Affidavit of Barbara
K. McCormick. However, the transfer of Martha's interest to George, was not performed by
Martha, but by George using his power of attorney for Martha. See id. The power of attorney,
however, contains no provision permitting gifting, much less, self-gifting. Exhibit G to
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Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. Indeed, the power of attorney
includes some language clearly prohibiting self dealing. See Exhibit G, to Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim,

11 G and H. George's gift to himself was, therefore,

invalid, and failed to eliminate Martha's interest in the real property. While this failure is
irrelevant under Jackman, it is important if the court follows Barg.

It is black-letter law that a power of attorney does not grant authority to make gifts absent
an express provision in the power of attorney granting that power. As stated in 3 Am . Jur. 2d
Agency§ 87, "The authority of an agent to make a gift on behalf of the principal musit be
express." Courts have uniformly supported this view. In Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65,924
P.2d 559, 565 (Haw.Ct.App.1996), the court explained:
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent
principal' s checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the
power of attorney), cert. denied, 3 76 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re Estate of
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself ofprincipal's property;
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing ofprincipal's
intent to make the gift), aff'd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975).

Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71, 924 P.2d at 565; see also Matter ofEstate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d
168 (Iowa, 1996) (absent express grant in power of attorney, of power to make gift,
attorney-in-fact did not have that power); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) (in
the absence of express authority to make a gift, none may be made); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255
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Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an attorney in fact to himself unless
the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the instrument itself).
Idaho law is consistent with these pronouncements. In Idaho, powers of attorney are
strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified. Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47
Idaho 306,274 P. 800 (1929); accord Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259 (1932).
In the case of Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,210 P. 1003 (1922), the
Idaho Supreme Court said:
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course of his agency because of his faillure
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such
transaction, as a matter oflaw, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal.
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is,
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to the
interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal,
either for himself or for others.
Jensen, 36 Idaho at_, 210 P. at 1005 (underline added).
Likewise, Idaho Code§ 32-912 requires an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to
convey or encumber community property:
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and
either may bind the community property by contract, excwt that neither the
husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell,
convey or encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds,
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity
herewith are hereby validated.
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Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added). 11 The title company may have recognized this defect
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal
representative sold the real property. 12 See Exhibit D to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick.
The term "express power of attorney" means more than a general power of attorney.
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines "express" as follows:
Clear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous.
Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated. Made known
distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Manifested by direct and
appropriate language as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
The word is usually contrasted with "implied."
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (citation omitted). There is no express language in the power
of attorney at issue. At best, the authority to make gifts at all, much less to oneself, is implied,
not express.
Therefore, even if the court were to find that Barg were controlling law in Idaho, the
estate is still subject to the Department's claim: The deed George executed conveying Martha's
interest in the property to himself, using his power of attorney for Martha, is ineffective to
extinguish Martha's interest in the real property.

11 The

Uniform Power of Attorney Act, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the transfer of Martha's
interest to George, but it also includes the requirement for an express grant of authority to make a gift of the principle's
property. Idaho Code§ l5-12-201{l){b), {c).
12 Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in
fact for Martha.
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B.
The Magistrate Failed to Make Any Findings of Fact That Could Support the Personal
Representative's Argument oflnterspousal Agency.
The personal representative argued before the magistrate that there was an exception to
the clear law requiring an express authorization in a power of attorney to make gifts to oneself.
See Reply Memorandum in Support of the Personal Representative's Objection to Department of

Health and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of Claim, section D. However, if this argument was
accepted by the court, it would have required findings of fact that the circumstances under which
such "interspousal agency" could be found are present. No evidence was presented, and
therefore, the court could, at best, make inferences from the documents and facts in the record.
Still, such findings would be required to support such a ruling.
As set forth in the Matter ofEstate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho 316, 320, 678 P .2d 108, 112
(Idaho App., 1984)
Only where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings.
Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho at 320,678 P.2d at 112 (citations omitted). In this case, the

Magistrate failed to make any findings of fact upon which to base its ruling that gifting was
authorized by the power of attorney. Therefore, even if Barg is to apply to this case, and even if
the gift isn't invalid as a matter oflaw, the matter must still be remanded for findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
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IX.
ATTORNEY FEES
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Idaho Code § 56-218(1) clearly and unambiguously
permits the Department's claim in this estate. The personal representative has advanced an
erroneous interpretation of an unambiguous statute. The Barg case relied upon by the personal
representative is clearly not the law in Idaho. The court in Barg failed to even consider the
critical federal definition of assets the Idaho Supreme Court found important in Jackman. The
personal representative, in disallowing the Department's claim, has acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law and the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

1.

Did the Magistrate err in determining that the general power of attorney held by

George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real prop1erty?
Yes. As a matter of law, the power of attorney, lacking any express authority to make
gifts, or gifts to oneself, is insufficient to have given the decedent authority to convey Martha
Perry's real property to himself. The Magistrate made no findings of facts that could in any way
support the personal representative's theory of"interspousal agency."
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·2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code § 56-

218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George Peny?
Yes. Idaho Code § 56-218 unambiguously permits the Department's claim against this
estate.
3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as

preempting application of Idaho Code§ 56-218?
Yes. The Idaho Supreme Court has already overruled similar preemption claims in
Jackman, and permitted the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse in cases such as
this. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Wirtz reached the same conclusion. The Minnesota
Supreme Court in Barg, relied upon by the Magistrate, did not consider the definition of "assets"
found important in Jackman and Wirtz.
4.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in

Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to the facts of this
case?
Yes. The Magistrate's holding that assets transferred from the Medicaid recipilent to her
spouse cannot be recovered ignores the entire underlying reasoning and holding in Jackman.
5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

Yes. There is no reasonable basis in fact or law for the disallowance of the Department's
claim in this estate.
DATED this 8 day of July, 2010,

h
/~2=~
co~

w.

CAiTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry, Barbara McConnick
("PR"), agrees with the Department's statement of the Nature of the Case as far as it goes. This
case requires interpretation of a federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)) and consideration of
whether the Department's application ofldaho law (LC. § 56-218) violates federal law and is
therefore preempted by federal law. Federal law requires the states to make claims against the
probate estates of Medicaid recipients to recovery correctly paid benefits. Federal law also
allows the states to expand the definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a
recipient at the time of the recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of
"estate." LC.§ 56-218(4). Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct
medical assistance estate claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of
benefits.
Under federal law, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estate any
property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of the
recipient's death (to the extent of the interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, LC. § 56-218,
requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased recipient, but
also requires that a claim be asserted against the estate of a surviving spouse who neve:r received
medical assistance benefits. The Department's interpretation and application of LC.§ 56-218 in
this estate recovery claim conflicts with federal law because the Department asserts a claim
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against George's estate which does not contain any assets in which Martha held an interest at the
time of her death.

Course of Proceedings
The PR restates the course of proceedings comprehensively as follows.

Date
2/25/2009
3/18/2009
3/19/2009
3/19/2009
4/7/2009
4/13/2009
5/28/2009
6/4/2009
6/11/2009
6/25/2009

rf~t/2009
2010

1/29/2010
2/19/2010
2/26/2010

Event
George Perry died testate
Application for Informal Probate of Will filed
Personal Representative appointed
Letters Testamentary signed appointing Barbara McCormick as PR
Information to Heirs and Devisees (giving Department notice)
Department filed estate recovery claim against Estate
90 day inventory served identifying all property as George's separate property
PR filed Notice of Disallowance of Claim
Department Petitioned for Allowance of Claim
PR filed Objection to Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim
PR filed Affidavit and Memo in Support of PR's Objection to Dept's Claim
Telephonic Status Conference with Judge Bieter. Court and parties agree that
the Department be given three (3) weeks to file Memorandum in Support of
Petition for Allowance and Personal Representative be given two (2) weeks
after that to file Reply Brief prior to hearing set for 2/26/2010
Department filed Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance
PR filed Reply Brief in Opposition to Petition for Allowance
Hearing On Petition for Allowance of Claim before The Honorable J. Bieter

3/10/2010

Magistrate issued Order Disallowing Claim

3/18/2010
5/3/2010

Department filed Notice of Appeal to District Court
Martha Perry died

I

Statement of Facts
The PR agrees with the Department's Statement of Facts, aside from the use of the word
"purported" in reference to the 2006 quit claim deed. The PR respectfully refers the Court to the
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick and the exhibits attached thereto, for a more complete and
detailed rendition of the facts. Since this appeal was filed, Martha died on May 3, 2010. The
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only property that Martha owned at the time of her death was one financial account located at
Wells Fargo. The balance of this Wells Fargo checking account was paid to the Department on
August 13, 2010.

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
1. Whether the PR is entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b )( 5) and LC. § 12-117, the PR claims attorney fees on appeal. The
Department's decision to appeal the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim lacks any reasonable
basis in fact or in law. The law does not support the Department's manner of applying LC. § 56218 and making a claim against property in which the Medicaid recipient has no title or interest
at the time of her death. If this was not apparent prior to this case, the proceedings below made
the law in this area quite clear.
The authorities cited in the briefing before the Magistrate, including but not limited to the
U.S. Solicitor General's amicus brief before the United States Supreme Court in In Re Estate of

Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008), the oral argument and The Honorable Christopher M.
Bieter' s Order Disallowing Claim all support the conclusion that the Department did not have a
reasonable basis in law or fact to bring this appeal. The Department's appeal asserts an
erroneous interpretation of clear, unambiguous federal statutes.
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III. ARGUMENT
A. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID
i. Statutory Framework.
The Medicaid program is jointly funded with the states as a "cooperative endeavor in
which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671,
65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into
state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). After this,
the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its
own program within the federal requirements, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS"), one of several federal agencies under HHS, administers the program and
approves state plans. Arkansas Dept. ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268
(2006).
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. §
1396r-5(c) (2000). There are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid. The value of the couple's home is not
included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-.S(c)(5); 42
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U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(l) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also c~ntitled to
an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not consider,ed available
to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the
recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or
her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of
community spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need for his or her own support.
ii. Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions.
It is important to understand pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, to give context
to the post-1993 changes, and because pre-1993 law is the basis for the sole case in Idaho upon
which the Department relies exclusively for its position - i.e. Idaho Department ofHealth and

Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998). Prior to amendments adopted in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute stated a
general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to
several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:

No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of
an individual under the State plan may be made, except --

****

(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he
received such assistance, from his estate.
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required,
to recover Medicaid benefits paid to recipients 65 or older. and the statute specified the recovery
would be from the recipient's estate 1•
Section l 396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993 2.

As

amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover
Medicaid payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual. with limited exceptions. 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993 amendments changed section I 396p(b) in several ways.
First, the 1993 amendments lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. Second, the
1993 amendments made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive.
Third, the amendments added a definition of "estate." which itself had both mandatory and
permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule and the relevant exception read
as follows:
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made. except that the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:

****
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate * * *. (emphasis added)

The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the
recipient's surviving spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovel)' before the
death of a surviving spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The
pre-I 993 federal law contained no definition of the term "estate."
1

2

OBRA of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § \3612(a), {c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(l), (4) (2000)).
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·Id. The amended version of section 1396p(b)(l)(B) retained the express reference to recovery

from the recipient's estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the
recipient's estate is only permitted after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse. 3

As with

the pre-1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or
reference to, recovery from a surviving spouse's estate.
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery,
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law:
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual (A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State* * * any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent o(such interest), including such assets conveyed to
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added).
Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid
recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on
the recipient's death. For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right
of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the
surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the optional expanded
3 "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving
spouse, if any* * *." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to
the surviving joint tenant. Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the
scope of recovery of medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 1396p. Arkansas Dept. ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268
(2006).
iii. Idaho's Medicaid Recovery Provisions.

Idaho Code LC.§ 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part,
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fiftyfive (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistimce may
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both: ...
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which thf:
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added).

Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand
the definition of"estate" beyond the scope of probate law. LC.§ 56-218(4). Therefore, it
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follows that Idaho is required to abide by the interpretation of the language in the federal statute
that CMS and HHS promulgate. Idaho's Supreme Court
has long followed the rule that the construction given to a statute by the executive
and administrative officers of the State is entitled to great \Veight and will be
followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise.
Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P .2d 309 (1979). This same principle holds true with regard
to HHS' s reading of the Medicaid statutes. In Wisconsin Dept of Health & Family Servs. v.
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473,497, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002), the Court stated,
The Secretary's position warrants respectful consideration. Cf. United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shala/a, 512 U.S.
504, 512 (1994) (reliance on Secretary's "significant expertise" particularly
appropriate in the context of "a complex and highly technical regulatory program"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
43-44 (1981) (Secretary granted "exceptionally broad authority" by Congress
under the Medicaid statute).
B. THE DEPARTMENT MUST ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH FEDERAL LAiN.

In In the Matter ofAppeal of Stafford, 181 P .3d 456, 461 (2008), our Supreme Court
stated,
Following passage of the MCCA [Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act], the

director of the Department requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether
legislation was required to implement its provisions. The Attorney General
responded:
While participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, a state that
chooses to participate must comply with all requirements imposed by the
federal statutory provisions and by regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services .... (emphasis added).

One of the requirements imposed on state plans in order to participate in the Medicaid
program and receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [42
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U.S.C. § l 396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly
paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l8) (2000). To
the extent a state statute "seeks to reach further than § 1396p(b)(1 ), it cannot stand." Bucholtz v.

Belshe, 114 F.3d 923, 925 (9 th Cir. 1997). The same holds true for state regulations, such as
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and 16.03.09.900.24, which cannot reach further than 42 U.S.C. §
l 396p(b )(I).
The Department does not have a choice in this matter. It must follow federal law
governing Medicaid estate recovery claims4. The Department argues that Idaho law is "clear"
and supports its claim against George's estate. Appellant's Brief, p. 11-13. This contention does
not withstand scrutiny. Once mandatory federal restrictions on the scope of estate recovery are
considered, it becomes very clear that the Department's claim asserted in George's estate
violates federal law as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p.
Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for medical assistance paid "from
the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both."
LC. § 56-218( l ). The PR has challenged the manner in which the Department applies I.C. § 56-

218( 1), not the language of that statute itself. This is because there may exist some
circumstances in which an asset in which the Medicaid recipient holds an interest at death passes
to the surviving spouse's estate upon the Medicaid spouse's death. In that circumstance, the
asset would be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate. For example, assets held jointly
with rights of survivorship would fall into this category. So the actual language used in LC. §
4 The Department does recognize that it "is bound by federal law." Department's Memorandum in Support, p. 15,
f.n. 11.
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56-218(1) is not offensive to the federal mandate, only the manner in which the Depaitment has
chosen to exercise estate recovery claims against community spouse estates in Idaho.
In order to be consistent with federal law, the Department's claims against a Medicaid
spouse's estate must be against "assets in which the individual [Medicaid recipient] had any legal
title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest." The Department's claim in
this probate, however, is against assets in which the Medicaid recipient (Martha) has no legal
title or interest at the time of her death. The Magistrate recognized this core issue in his Order
Disallowing Claim, p. 3, stating,
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid recipient's
interest in property - any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the
time of the recipient's death. (f.n. omitted).
The Magistrate sought an answer from the Department's counsel at the hearing on this
very issue. He asked counsel,
And where does the authority come from that says that the interest in that prop,erty
may be determined at any time in the marriage of these people after '93? What
says that it's not the time that the recipient dies, but it includes a period of timE:
when she had an interest other than- other than at the time of her death?
Tr., p. 25, LL. 21 through p. 26, LL. 3.
The Department's counsel was unable to answer that question. His first response was "I
think I can help that by analogy, Your Honor. And that's if you look at a different section that's
not part of our case here ... " Tr., p. 26, LL. 4-7. The Court continued to press for an answer to
this question and counsel for the Department remained unable to present one. See Tr., p. 28, LL.
2 through p. 33, LL. 18. Finally, the basis for the Department's position came out. The

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11

000575

Magistrate stated, "your argument depends on a definition of assets and that's different, you're
arguing, then, than the definition of the estate of the person." Tr. LL. 19-22. Department's
counsel answered "Yes." Tr., p. 33, LL. 23.
The Magistrate stated in his Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4,
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's
spouse; 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of
"estate" and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation.
(emphasis added).
As discussed below, the Magistrate properly ruled in rejecting the Department's argument.

C. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272,280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). Even when Congress has not chosen
to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless preempt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when th<::: state law
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective:s of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
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D. THE DEPARTMENT'S APPLICATION OF I.C. § 56-218 AND ITS REGULATIONS
CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW AND ARE PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
i. The Department's Claim, Based On An Erroneous Application Of I.C. § 56-218,
Conflicts With Federal Law.
The Department argues that because LC. § 56-218 appropriately implements the estate
recovery mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the PR cannot show that this statute conflicts with
federal law. Appellant's Brief, p. 15. This argument entirely misses the mark. It is the
Department's practice of using LC.§ 56-218 to improperly expand the scope of estate recovery
claims that violates federal law. If the Department applied the language of LC . § 56-218
consistently with federal law and only made claims against assets in which the Medicaid
recipient had an interest in at death, there would be no conflict. But conflict preemption occurs
when the state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purlPoses and
objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581
(1941 ). Compliance with both state and federal law is impossible when the Department makes
overly broad estate recovery claims based on LC. § 56-218 that violate federal law.
In 1998, our Supreme Court in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132

Idaho 213,215,970 P.2d 6, 8-10 (1998), held that the version of LC.§ 56-218 then in effect
(pre-OBRA 1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but
expressly recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the
Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized
that federal law does preempt the authority granted to the Department by LC. § 56-218, and held
that the only asset that might be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate was community
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property accumulated by the couple after the execution of their marriage settlement agreement.
Id. at 215-216. Our Supreme Court has already recognized, therefore, that federal law does

preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery claims - i.e. with respect to LC. § 56-218. The
Department argues that estate recovery is really controlled by state law. Appellant's Brief, p. 1112. Our Supreme Court in Jackman and Stafford, as well as the plethora of federal authority
cited supra, completely rebuts this contention.
ii. The Department's Regulations Conflict With Federal Law.

As discussed infra, the Department has misread and misapplied Jackman for over a
decade. Unfortunately, what ensued after the Jackman decision in 1998 was that the Department
enacted rules, adopted policies and made claims in married couple Medicaid cases as if the Court
had ruled on the very issue it explicitly did not rule upon. Simply because the Department enacts
regulations on its misreading of the Jackman decision and no one objects does not mean those
regulations are consistent with federal law.
In Jackman, the Court held that the community spouse's separate property, including the
community property transmuted by agreement, was not part of the Medicaid recipient's estate

and not subject to the Department's recovery claim. Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-217. The
Department cites IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24, its regulation allowing it to void a marriage
settlement agreement, as support that Idaho law controls, not federal law. Appellant's Brief, p.
12. This regulation proves nothing except that the Department enacted an overly broad
regulation that violates federal law based on an erroneous reading of Jackman and that this
regulation has gone unchallenged.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 14

000578

The Department also cites IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 as support for its position stating, "By
rule, the Department makes its recovery from property in which the Medicaid spouse had an

interest at some point in the past. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20." (emphasis added). Id. This
regulation is just as offensive as the statute in Minnesota that was struck down by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) because it was
inconsistent with federal law 5 Barg is discussed in detail in the next section of this brief.
E. A RECENT lVIINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION AND THE
PROCEDURAL AFTERMATH OF THAT DECISION ARE DIRECTLY ON POINT
AND SUPPORT AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDER.

In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on
point and is on all fours with the instant case. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth
and exhaustive review of other state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety
is very instructive because Minnesota's department of health and welfare made the vety same
argument in support of its recovery action as the Department makes in this action. Th 1: facts of

Barg, when pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts present in this probate.
For the Court's convenience, the PR has appended a complete copy of Barg to this Memorandum

as Appendix 1.
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving

5 The offending Minnesota statute allowed recovery against assets of the estate "that were marital property or jointly
owned property at any time during the marriage." Both IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 and 16.03.09.900.20 are in conflict
with federal law and are therefore preempted by it. These regulations must be repealed or amended to comport with
clear federal mandate that the Department may only recover against resources in which the Medicaid recipient had
an interest in at death.
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spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage. In that
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Barg Court determined that the county
could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in at the: time of
her death. Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died because she had
transferred her interests to her husband while she was alive. Therefore, the Court ruled that the
county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate6 • Id.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) in depth. This
discussion is directly applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal
language in that statute verbatim in J.C. § 56-218. In discussing the statutes at issm: the Court
addressed and rejected the state's argument that the "other arrangement" phrase opened the door
for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's statute. The Court stated in pertinent part,
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a
surviving spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent with
federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15 a11ows the state to recover
from a surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were
marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage."
(Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority
does not conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section
1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to
expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for
6 These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her interest in the couple's home to her
husband in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She retained no legal interest in that real property, nor in
the proceeds from the sale of that real property, which are the only assets that make up her husband's estate.
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broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with
the dual goals of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance
available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses from
pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section
1396p(b)(l) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section
1396p(b )(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include assets in which the
recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage"
recovery allowed by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favori111g
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language.
Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the
recipient spouse prior to her death . ...
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust,
or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The clause
describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any
legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to
whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes
several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust,
or other arrangement." Id.
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient
having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a federal statute we
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_

must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would be to read the words
"at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other arrangement"
cannot include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context.
"[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the:
time of death. The list ofrecipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign
of the deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid
recipient, must have died for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have
heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the
deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language
and its context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that "other arrangement" is
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.

We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the,
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to deatb
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to
expand the def"mition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold
that Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent th;nt it
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis
added)
Id. at 68-71.

The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. In May of 2009, the U.S. Solicitor
General submitted an amicus curiae brief authored by not only that office but joined by the
attorneys from the Department of HHS in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's order inviting
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the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. This is the most recent legal

briefing by HHS on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every
argument posited by the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond
that allowed by federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor
General's amicus curiae brief is appended hereto as Appendix 2.
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The
legal positions taken in that briefrepresent HHS's interpretations of federal law. CMS, as noted
above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid program, Idaho is
legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law. Congress has
extended HHS extremely broad authority in the Medicaid area. Blumer, supra.
In its 2009 briefing, HHS expressly rejects the interpretation and application that the
Department relies upon in using I.C. § 56-218 to support the claim made against the Estate of
George Perry. The United States/HHS in Barg, supra at p. 8-9, stated in pertinent part,
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid
benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but limits that
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest alt
the time of her death ...
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct

The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the
Medicaid Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid
benefits from assets in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal interest at
the time of her death.
1.
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·--·
... the Medicaid Act, which permits recovery only after the death of
the recipient's surviving spouse7, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a State to
file a reimbursement claim against the surviving spouse's estate, up to the
value of any assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the
time of her death.
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's
estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or
jointly owned property at any time during the marriage," Minn. Stat. Ann. §
256B.15, subd. 2 (2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the
recipient retained an interest in the assets at the time of her death. Becau:Se a
State may not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent
authorized by federal law, see 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l), Minnesota's statute
conflicts with federal law and is therefore preempted. . . . (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court decided not to grant cert and did not review the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Barg.
F. IDAHO'S APPELLATE COURTS HAVE NOT DECIDED THE ISSUE AT BAR
In 2005, our Supreme Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a
Medicaid recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate ofKaminsky, 141 Idaho
43 6, 111 P. 3d 121 (2005). Al though the issue in Kaminsky was the timeliness of the
Department's claim, the Court did recognize that the Department's recovery claim was properly

made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated,
Only persons with few financial resources qualify for assistance and assistance
comes with strings attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of
the State, pursuant to I.C. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid
7 The

Department argues that because federal estate recovery does not occur until after both spouses die, this
somehow is in conflict with the clear statutory language which mandates that only assets in which the Medicaid
recipient had an interest in at death are subject to recovery. Appellant's Brief, p. 17-18. The Department's
argument finds no support in the statutes. Nor does the argument find support in logic. Permitting recovery after
both spouses have died makes sense because it is only at that time that a final determination can be made as to what,
if any, interest the Medicaid spouse has in any property at her death.
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assistance from the estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition,
this right of recovery constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate.
(emphasis added).
Id. at 439.
i. The Jackman Decision Is Neither Dispositive Nor Controlling.

As it argued below, the Department's primary argument on appeal is that Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) is dispositive.

Appellant's Brief, p. l 9-22. A thorough reading of the Department's briefing and the case law
reveals the following: 1) The Department cites and relies heavily upon a Jackman opinion that
Idaho's Supreme Court withdrew. The withdrawn opinion is not Idaho law, has absolutely no
precedential value and is not binding upon this Court or any com1; and 2) The Department relies
on dicta in the substituted and published Jackman decision to bootstrap itself into a position of
arguing that somehow the law is settled in this area by the withdrawn Jackman opinion 8.

The Department also confuses pre-eligibility transfers and look-back rules with post-eligibility rights. From that
confusion it then makes an incorrect assertion regarding the community spouse's right to property post-eligibility.
Appellant's Brief, p. 18. The look back period referred to in 42 U.S.C. g 1396p(c) applies when one spouse applies
for Medicaid. Contrary to the Department's argument, once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid, any resources
belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse and the community spouse can do
whatever he wants with them. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4).

8

The import of this statute was discussed in a June 29, 1999 letter to Idaho attorney Rod Gere from Robert Reed,
Chief of the Medicaid Branch of the HHS Division of Medicaid and State Operations for Region X. This letter was
copied to Karl Kurtz, then acting Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and stated in part,
Thus, after the eligibility determination any resources belonging to the community spouse are
solely the property of that spouse. That spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them,
including leaving them, via a will, to particular heirs that do not include the institutionalized
spouse.

See also, April 5, 2000 letter from Ronald Preston, HHS Associate Regional Administrator for Region I stating in
part,
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In its November 2, 1998 Jackman decision, the opinion clearly notes "Substitute Opinion
The Court's Prior Opinion Dated June 16, 1998, Is Hereby Withdrawn.'' See Department Exhibit
E, p. 2. The Internal Rules Of The Idaho Supreme Court (amended January 3, 2008) found on
the Idaho State Judiciary website under Idaho Court Rules (www.isc.idaho.~ov), Rule l 5(f)
states in full:
(f) Unpublished Opinions of the Court. At or after the oral conference following
the presentation of oral argument or the submission of the case to the Court on the
briefs, the Court, by unanimous consent of all justices. may determine not to
publish the final opinion of the Court. If an opinion is not published, it may not
be cited as authority or precedent in any court. (emphasis added).
The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion was never published. The Court withdrew it and
issued a substitute opinion. The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion may not be cited as authority or
precedent in this Court, or any other for that matter. Yet the Department cited the withdrawn
opinion repeatedly before the Magistrate. Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Allowance, p. 13-14. Even more surprisingly. the Department again cites that withdrawn and
unpublished opinion before this Court, even though the PR raised Idaho Supreme Court Rule
l S(t) in the briefing below. See PR ·s Reply Memo, p. 19; Appellant"s Brief. p. 23. The
Department's continued reliance on and citation to this unpublished opinion is improper. The
withdrawn Jackman opinion carries absolutely no weight on the issue before this Court and the

Thus, after the month in which an institutionalized spouse is determined eligible for Medicaid, any
resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse. That is, the
community spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them.
The above-cited HHS letters are attached hereto for the Court's convenience as Appendix 3. The
Department errs when it asserts that federal law treats the property of the recipient and that of the spouse as
the same for purposes of estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, p. 18. Clearly it does not.
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Department is prohibited by rule from citing it as authority or precedent in any Idaho court. It
certainly in no way establishes law in Idaho. Yet the Department would have this Court
speculate as to what our highest Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar,
because of reasoning or rationale in an opinion that the Court never published and withdrew 9 •
That leaves the Department with the November 2, 1998 Jackman decision that was
published to support its position. The fundamental problem with the Department's reliance on
the published Jackman decision is that the Court was dealing with a situation that pre--dated the
OBRA-1993 amendments. The Supreme Court in Jackman stated repeatedly and was very
careful to make sure that its opinion was restricted to the version of federal law applicable to the
controversy before it - in other words the decision was applicable only to cases arising preOBRA 1993. Jackman was explicitly restricted to the facts in that case. The Court made this
very clear when it stated its holding that, "We conclude that section 56-218( 1) of the Idaho Code
(LC.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, ... " (emphasis added). Jackman, supra at
214.
The Court also stated,

We conclude that this [the post-OBRA 1993] definition of "assets" Js not
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and
Hildor on March 8, 1993. The defmition of "assets" contained in the 1993
amendments to the federal statute does not apply "with respect to assets
disposed of on or before the date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993] ."
Pub. L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore, it [the post-OBRA 1993 definition of
"assets"] does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department
to recover the balance of Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property.
Either the Department has misstated the holding of the published Jackman decision in its brief on appeal (see last
four lines of first full paragraph, Appellant's Brief, p. 19) or it is once again improperly citing the unpublished
opinion. In either event, the Department is ascribing a holding to Jackman that the Court simply did not make.
9
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........

Jackman, supra at 216.

The Department argues that because the Court discussed the OBRA 1993 amendments
that this somehow settles the issue. Appellant's Brief, p. 22. Justice Johnson's statements in
Jackman, upon which the Department so heavily relies, are simply dicta or dictum. "Dicta" is

defined as,
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the
specific case before the court. Expressions in the court's opinion which go
beyond the facts before court and therefore are individual views of author of
opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent. (emphasis
added)
Dictum is defined as follows:
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, ...
Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case
in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. . . . ( emphasis
added).
Black's Law Dictionary (6 th ed. 1991).
Justice Johnson's comments on how to interpret the post-OBRA amendments in federal
law were not involved in or necessary to the holding in the published Jackman decision which
was a pre-OBRA 1993 case. The Court says as much - repeatedly. The Department itself
admits as much when it states that, "there was no issue as to property transfers after October 1,
1993" at issue in Jackman and the question before the Jackman Court "was not what Hildor [the
Medicaid recipient] owned at death.

10"

(emphasis added). Appellant's Brief, p. 22.

While briefing the matter before the Supreme Court in 1998, the Department also admitted that any
comments the Court might make on the issue of whether the definition of "assets" in the post-OBRA
10
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The Magistrate also appropriately recognized that Jackman does not control this postOB RA 1993 case and does not support the Department's misapplication of I.C. § 56-218. The
following exchange occurred between counsel and the Court.
THE COURT ... I really have been struggling to deal with the definitions
of estate and assets in both the state and federal's schemes .... I perceive the
State as saying that Jackman [sic) allows the Court to look at any time, any
period of time, in which the recipient of benefits had an interest in property . .
. . I don't see that Jackman [sic) says that. ... Because I think we've got to
look at the published opinion, not the first one. What does that leave us.
And I don't think it leaves us much.
At least that's how it feels to me, that it doesn't necessarily say to me that
the State may look to any period of time after 1993 that a Medicaid beneficiary,
Medicaid recipient had an interest in property. I don't think it [Jackman] makes
that determination .... I don't think it [Jackman) makes a determination of
where in that period of time the estate may look at the recipient's interest in
property. (emphasis added).
Tr., p. 12, LL. 18 through p. 13, LL. 25.
No matter how much the Department would like to draw implications or speculate about
the Jackman decision based on the unpublished opinion, the fact remains -Jackman does not
control the outcome of this case. This Court should affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing

amendments was applicable in defining the breadth of an estate recovery action was dicta. The Department
stated in its Limited Response to Petition for Rehearing, p. 8 (provided below in the Department's
Exhibits), "While not essential for the court's decision in this case, the property Hildor conveyed to Lionel
through the marriage settlement agreement is certainly part of the definition of "estate" and is subject to
recovery in this case." (emphasis added). The Department admitted in its briefing before the Magistrate
and this Court that it is relying upon an "implication" that it draws from that opinion. Department's Memo
in Support, p. 14; Appellant's Brief, p. 24. The Department's perceived "implication" in the Jackman
decision - what is really dicta - is entirely insufficient to establish law in Idaho on the post-OBRA issue
before this Court.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 25

000589

Claim, and do so unencumbered by the Department's efforts to shackle the Court's analysis with
dicta from the Jackman opinion. 11

G. FEDERAL LAW CONTAINED IN 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(B)(4)(B) IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS. THE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION, BASED ON THE GENERAL
DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IN 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l), IS WITHOUT MERIT.
Federal law says nothing about allowing recovery from assets in which the Medicaid
recipient does not have an interest at death 12 • The U.S. Solicitor General's brief before the U.S.
Supreme Court plainly rejects the Department's argument relying on the definition of "assets" in
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) stating,

2.
Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery from the estate of the
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the term
"assets" to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the
individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). According to petitioner, "[b]y
including resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in
the meaning of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources
fall within the scope of§ 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27.
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the
Medicaid recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision
11 Even if the Court concluded that the Jackman opinion's dicta upon which the Department relies was actually a
holding in the case, the Court should still rule in the PR's favor for all the reasons urged by the PR. It is well past
time for Idaho law to be brought into line with mandatory federal statutes which require that estate recovery in Idaho
be limited to recovery against assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest in at death.
12

See e.g., 42 CFR § 433.36(h) entitled "Adjustment and recoveries" states as follows:
( 1) The agency may make an adjustment or recovery from funds for Medicaid claims co1rectly paid

for an individual as follows:
From the estate ofany individual who was 65 years of age or older when he or she
(i)
received Medicaid; and
(ii)
From the estate or upon sale of the property subject to a lien when the individual is
institutionalized as described in paragraph (g)(2) of this section. (emphasis added).
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of the Medicaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary to
rewrite that clause to read "'any* * * assets in which [either or both the
individual and the individual's spouse] had any legal title or interest."' Pet. 26
(brackets and asterisk in original) (emphasis added). But this editing doe,~
nothing less than make the statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain
language of the operative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's readings. 13
4.
Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting spousal
estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a
legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption do1es
not come into play, Pet. 28 ... (emphasis added).
U.S. Solicitoramicusbriet:p. 10-12.
The Department fails to even mention the U.S. Solicitor General's briefing in its
Appellant's Brief The PR anticipates it will argue, as it did below, that it is not governed by
HHS's position as expressed in the amicus brief1 4 ·

The U.S. Solicitor General's position is in

fact HHS's (and therefore CMS 's) opinion on the issue. As noted above, a federal agency
interpreting federal statutes is entitled to great weight by the court and HHS has extremely broad
authority in the Medicaid area. Blumer, supra. The Secretary of HHS in essence spoke through
its counsel in presenting its position before the U.S. Supreme Court in Barg. The U.S. Supreme

Court agreed with the U.S. Solicitor General and refused to grant cert in Barg.

13

(footnote 2 in the original) In describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the legislative
history of the 1993 amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits,
rather than the resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 835 (1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [which]••• recovery is sought may include any
real or personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death,
including the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original)
14 See

Department's Memo in Support, p. 15, f.n. 11.
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i. Basic Rules Of Statutory Construction Support The Magistrate's Decision.

Applying well-established rules of statutory construction also supports the conclusion
that the Department's position is without merit. Subsection 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)'s definition
of"estate" is specific to "this subsection." That definition is specific to subsection (b) of 42 U.S.
C. § 1396p. In contrast, subsection 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l)'s definition of "assets" applies
generally to "this section (i.e. all of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p) and is included in the "definitions"
section at the end of the statute. When interpreting statutory definitions and provisions, specific
definitions take precedence over general definitions. See e.g., In re Drainage District No. 3, 40
Idaho 549,553,235 P.2d 895 (1925), citing Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 387. The
more specific definition of"estate" under (b)(4) supplants or takes precedence over the broader,
more general definition of assets in (h)(l ), thereby imposing limits on what is recoverable in
Medicaid recovery actions. The Department's interpretation attempts to superimpose the
general definition of "assets" improperly upon the specific definition of "estate" that applies in
42 U.S. C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The U.S. Solicitor General explicitly rejected this flawed statutory
analysis. See U.S. Solicitor General amicus brief, supra at 10-12.

ii. The Department Has Misread Or Failed To Read The Barg Opinion.

The Department argues that the Barg court did not consider the definition of the word
"assets" in its opinion. The Department also argues that had the Barg Court simply considered
the definition of"assets", it would have ruled as the court did in In re Estate of Wirtz, 607
N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). Appellant's Brief, p. 25-26. In its request for attorney fees on appeal,
the Department reiterates this contention stating, "the court in Barg failed to even consider the
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-

critical federal definition of assets the Idaho Supreme Court found important in Jackman."
Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Even a cursory reading of Barg rebuts these arguments completely.
The Barg Court discussed and rejected Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.2000), and
explicitly addressed and rejected the Department's definition of "assets" argument stating,
... Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed
that authority to extend to assets that were transferred before the death of
the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d
882, 885-86 (N.D.2000).

Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional stat!!
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probat1:!
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 {holding that
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recovc~ry
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d
at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of' estate' in [section]
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death"'); see also In re
Estate ofSmith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. I, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had int1:!rest in
assets at time of death) ....
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting
principle requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. . .. Concluding
that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied
on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking
Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. . ..
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We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b )(4), is
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the
time of the Medicaid recipient's death . ...
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret: the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient didl
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by even~
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, lhe
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent th~Lt it
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subiect to
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis
added)
Barg, supra at 68-71. Either the Department failed to read Barg or it has misread it.
iii. Wirtz Is An Anomoly That Should Not Be Followed In Idaho.
The Department argues that Barg is an anomaly with limited application that "runs
contrary to other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and In re Estate of Wirtz ... "
Appellant's Brief, p. 26. As the Barg Court's comprehensive state survey mak1~s clear, Wirtz is
in fact the anomaly. Jackman cannot be cited for the proposition the Department would like to
cite it for (i.e. the unpublished opinion), so that leaves Wirtz standing alone. The Department's
argument inherently recognizes the weakness in the Wirtz court's reasoning because the
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Department does not even assert the same position that the Wirtz court relied upon to justify its
decision - i.e. a tortured reading of the words "other arrangement." See Barg, supra at 70.
Recognizing the clear weight of cogent, well-reasoned authority, the Magistrate rejected
the untenable "asset" definition argument and the Wirtz reasoning. The Magistrate stated,
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's
spouse; 42 U .S.C. 1396p(b)( 4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of
"estate" and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation.
The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in
Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received
Medicaid benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the
estate of Verna Witz [sic], Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal
statutory definitions of "estate" and "asset" as quoted above and held that'' ... any
assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wi1iz's death
are subject to the department's recovery claim." Id. at 886. This ruling depends,
however, on an awkward interpretation of the term "other arrangement" in 42
U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz interpreted the "other
arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section. The bulk of
the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion on the
death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates.
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of
property of this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context
of the surrounding language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include
transfers of a similar, automatic nature not any possible transfer. (emphasis
original).
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4-5. The Magistrate went on to note that the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Barg, supra at 71, provided a "more reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory
language." Id.
The Magistrate concluded,
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The federal statutory definition of"estate" does not include transfers made by a
Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of a
Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was
no joint tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have
conveyed any interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The
Department may not recovery Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the
proceeds from the sale of this property.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 6. The Magistrate was correct and this Court should affirm
that decision.

H. MINNESOTA'S POST-BARG LEGISLATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
DEPARTMENT'S POSITION IN THIS CASE.
The Department argues that because the State of Minnesota has amended its statutes in an
attempt to overcome the Barg holding, this proves that federal law governing estate recovery
claims are actually dictated by state law. Appellant's Brief, p. 26. This argument simply ignores
federal law and ignores the state of the law in Idaho 15 • Federal law limits the scope of estate
recovery to assets in which the Medicaid recipient has an interest in at death. State law then
15 The

Department asserts that it is "obvious" that federal provisions are intended to allow recovery "of the

couple's assets." Appellant's Brief, p. 8-9. It is interesting to note, however, that when the Department

cites and relies on the House Committee Report 42 U.S.C. § I 396p(b)(4) in its brief, p. 7-9, it underscores a
lot of language but consistently fails to highlight the very language that is key to the resolution of the issue
at bar. The Department ignores the fact that right after the words "estate of the individual or the surviving
spouse" the House Report contains the following language,
The tenn "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of a deceased individual and all
other assets in which the individual had any legally cognizable title or interest at the time of
death, including assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship,
life estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added)
Appellant's Brief, p. 8. This is the exact same language the Department ignores when it cites 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(4) and argues that federal law does not control the breadth of estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, p, 8-10.
The Department consistently ignores the language that limits the overly broad approach it has practiced for years
and which violates federal law. This same limiting language appears in J.C.§ 56-218(4). The Department cannot
prevail by simply ignoring clear, controlling, mandatory federal language.
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enters into the analysis to determine whether the Medicaid recipient retained an interest in any
assets at death. As the Magistrate found, pursuant to state law Martha retains no interest in the
house sale proceeds that make up George's estate because she conveyed her interest in the home
to George in 2006.
Simply because a state legislature enacts a law in a blatant attempt to skirt mandatory
federal limitations on estate recovery claims does not mean that the state law will withstand
challenge.

In fact, a recent district court decision out of Minnesota illustrates that courts in that

state continue to uphold the federal limitations contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p despite: contrary
state law. See Douglas Coumy v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. Dist., No. 21-CV-09-477, August 4,
2010) (Minnesota court grants summary judgment against the county concluding that the
Minnesota law authorizing recovery against third parties of correctly paid medical assistance
benefits conflicts with, and is thus preempted by, federal Medicaid law.).
Minnesota has not "remedied" anything by its new law. It has only made matk:rs worse
by clouding marital property law in Minnesota and raising serious practical and constitutional
concerns. The changes in the Minnesota statute impair the separate property rights of all married
individuals, because their property rights will be modified by operation oflaw if one or the other
applies for medical assistance benefits. This obviously discriminates against married individuals
and their spouses on the basis of receipt of federally secured benefits. Further litigation
challenging these statutes is sure to follow in Minnesota. The Minnesota legislature's recent
actions do nothing to change the conclusion that the Department's claim herein violatc:s federal
law.
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I. THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT.
The Department repeatedly invites this Court to engage in a policy debate on the intent
behind the federal law, contending that the estate recovery laws are not intended to protect an
inheritance for children. Appellant's Brief, p. 7-8, 10-11, 17. The Department's opinion of
public policy, Congressional intent, or the purpose of the Medicaid statutes is irrelevant. This
Court need not, indeed may not, engage in policy interpretations when faced with clear,
unambiguous federal statutes .
Analysis of a statute or regulation always begins with the literal language of the
enactment. Friends ofFarm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46
P.3d 9, 14 (2002) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has established that it
will not look to the legislative intent of a regulation where the express written
language of the regulation is unambiguous. Friends of Farm to Market, 13 7
Idaho at 197, 46 P .3d at 14 (citing Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 560 P .2d 497
(1977)). "Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to
construe the language . " Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, then a
court may not interpret the language to include an unwritten legislative intent.
Stafford, supra at 464-465. As Minnesota's Supreme Court noted in discussing the same types
of policy arguments made by the Department in this case, "[that] argument would take us too far
down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its
language." Barg, supra at 69.

J. THE DEPARTMENT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING ISSUES FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.
The Department cites LC. § 32-901 as authority to support its reading of LC. § 56-218.
Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11. The Department did not raise this argument in the proceedings
below. Issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v.
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Fodge, 121 Idaho 192,195,824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Similarly, the Department relh::s on
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 for the first time on appeal. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. These arguments
are not entitled to consideration on appeal 16 •
K. GEORGE, AS HIS WIFE'S AGENT, HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN
THE TRANSFER AT ISSUE ON HER BEHALF.
i. Martha's Power Of Attorney Satisfied The Requirements Of I.C. § 32-912.
The Department asserts that George's action in utilizing the power of attorney violates
I.C. § 32-912. Appellant's B1iet~ p. 27-30. This assertion is incorrect. A thorough review of the
power of attorney itself totally rebuts the Department's contention. The power of attorney form
Martha si!:,JUed is incredibly comprehensive. It starts out stating in all capital letters that the
"powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." The power of attorney then goes
into great detail explaining a very wide variety of powers that are granted to George, as agent.
Those powers include, under paragraph (H), entitled "Estate, trust, and other beneficiary

16 Even if the Court did consider J.C.* 32-901, the Department's argument lacks merit and does nothing to
advance its position. Again, the U.S. Solicitor General and HHS most recently rejected the exact same type
of argument stating,
3.
Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds little support in the Act's other
provisions concerning the treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. As petitioner notes, th{:
Medicaid Act generally considers the community spouse's assets for purposes of determining
whether an institutionalized individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts
certain property, such as the couple's home, from consideration, 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(I0, 1396r5(c)(5). and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of resources and income that
are not considered available to pay for the applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and
(f)(2). Moreover, once the institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible for benefits,
the Medicaid Act provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall be deemed
available to the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396r-S(c)(4). The Medicaid Act, in
short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted principle that "spouses are
expected to support each other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with
its plain terms thus is consistent with the broader statutory scheme. (emphasis added).

U.S. Solicitor General amicus brief, p. 11.
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transactions" the power "To ... exercise ... any ... gift ... for the principal." 17 Martha
expressly authorized George as her agent to make gifts on her behalf. A "gift" is "a voluntary
transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without consideration." Black's Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1991 ). By including the qualifier that George, as agent, may exercise "any
gift" on her behalf, Martha broadened that power to authorize George to make gifts to any
person, including himself. The Magistrate held that although this language was not the "clearest
kind of authority" he agreed that the gifting language in paragraph H "certainly can be read that
way." Tr., p. 11, LL. 12-13. Martha's power of attorney satisfied LC.§ 32-912. 18
The gifting authority that Martha gave to George must also be read in conjunction with
the other powers Martha granted to her husband, specifically the power to exercise all powers
with respect to Medicaid" that she could exercise. Paragraph (K) entitled, "Benefits from Social
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or other governmental programs, or military service" authorizes
Martha's husband as her agent
"To ... file ... claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local
or foreign statute; and in general, exercise all powers with respect to ...
government benefits, including but not limited to Medicare and Medicaid~,

which the principal could exercise if present and under no disabili~y.
(emphasis added).

17 The full sentence that contains this language states, "To accept, receipt for, exercise, release,, reject, renounce,
assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or
payment due or payable to or for the principal." (emphasis added).
18The

fact that a title company required the PR to sign off on the closing statement for Martha is not equivalent to a
legal finding that Martha's power of attorney was somehow deficient, as the Department implies. Appellant's Brief,
p. 30. That signature requirement is simply the title insurer covering its bases because the couple was married at the
time of the closing and Martha was still alive. It is standard procedure for a title insurer to have everyone possible
sign off as a liability avoidance precaution.
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As discussed supra, conveying the Medicaid spouse's interest in the couple's home to the
community spouse is expressly sanctioned by federal law. Such a transfer is typical in cases of
married couples where one needs long-term care and will be qualifying for Medicaid benefits.
Martha's power of attorney not only contemplated that her agent/husband could make such an
interspousal transfer, it expressly authorized it. The combination of the comprehensive power to
"exercise any gift" and the comprehensive power to "exercise all powers with respect to ...
Medicaid" expressly establishes that George acted well within his authority as Martha's agent in
executing the deed that the Department challenges.
The Department cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions to support its argument
that Martha's power of attorney was somehow insufficient. Appellant's Brief, p. 28-29. All of
these cases are easily distinguishable from the instant case. In none of those cases did the power
of attorney contain the specific gifting and Medicaid planning language that Martha's power of
attorney contains. In none of those cases did the power of attorney contain any gifting language
whatsoever. Jn none of those cases was an interspousal transfer at issue. In none of those cases
was Medicaid at issue.
In addition, every case the Department cites involved agents who were not spouses. In
the Department's cited cases, the non-spouse agents were conveying assets to themselves or to
other third parties, often in contravention of the principal's estate distribution plan or somehow
in contravention to what the principal would have intended. In this case, Martha's agent was her
husband, conveying Martha's interest in a home in which he was residing, to himself, while his
wife was in a nursing home. Martha had already taken action to put George's name on the title

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 37

000601

herself, indicating her intent he have ownership of the home. George is the natural object of
Martha's bounty.
The interspousal transfer makes sense and was contemplated by the power of attorney
Martha put in place specifically to allow such actions. There simply are no concerns present in
this case regarding financial abuse of the principal, negation of the principal's estate plan or
fraud on the principal as was at issue in the cases the Department relies upon.
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordance with the rules of interpretation of
written instruments generally .... " 19

In construing a written instrument, a court must consider

it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. 20 "The
intention of the donor or 6,yantor is to be gathered from the instrument of creation." 21 Reading
the power of attorney in its entirety, one is struck by the comprehensiveness of the document. In
addition to the introductory language indicating that the powers conveyed to George are broad
and all-encompassing, the powers under each paragraph provide great detail emphasizing and
. t h at cone1·
un d ersconng
us1on 22 .

19

3 Am.Jur.2d Agency§ 30, at 533-34 (1986).

20 Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Insurance Fund, I 35 Idaho 434, 437, 18 P. 3d 956 (2000), citing Magic Valley
Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565. 808 P..2d 1303, 1310 ( 1991 ).
21

49 C.J. §§ 34, 40. See also 72 C.J.S. Powers§ 22 (1951)

22

Paragraph (A) entitled "Real property transactions" authorizes George to deal with her real property
on such terms and conditions ... as my Agent shall deem proper; and to ... convey ... and in any
way or manner deal with all or any part ofany interest in real property whatsoever, irrcluding
specifically, but without limitation, real property lying and being situated in the State ofldaho,
under such terms and conditions ... as my Agent shall deem proper. (emphasis added).
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The Department argues that Martha's power of attorney contained restrictions on
George's authority in ,-r,-r G and H. Appellant's Brief, p. 28. The language referred to prohibits
the agent from designating himself as a beneficiary under an insurance contract (i-1 G) and
changing the principal 'swill or trust so that the agent benefits from that change (,-r H). These
standard provisions, however, do not prohibit George from engaging in the interspousal transfer
at issue and simply do not apply to this case23 .
ii. Martha's Power Of Attorney Met The Requirements Of I.C. § 15-5-501 et seq .

I.C. § 15-5-501 et seq. was in effect at the time Martha signed the power of attorney. I.C.
§ 15-5-502 stated in pertinent part,
All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during
any period of disability or incapacity of the principal have the same effoct and ...
The authority granted under this paragraph also includes the authority to "cancel" notes, mortgages, security interest,
or deeds to secure debt, which is equivalent to "giving away" assets of the principal. Paragraph (B) entitled
"Tangible personal property transactions" includes the power to,
in any way or manner deal with all or any part ofany real or personal property whatsoever,
tangible or intangible, or any interest therein, that I own at the time of execution or may thereafter
acquire, under such terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem
proper." (emphasis added).

Paragraph (H), discussed above, also includes language granting the agent power to" ... in general, exercise all
powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability." The
other paragraphs in Martha's power of attorney consistently imbue George with authority to act with total and
absolute discretion. The Department's counsel actually agreed with this conclusion when he stated at the hearing," .
. . this is a very comprehensive power of attorney." Tr., p. 7, LL. 5-6.
23 This language is typical "anti-slayer" language which is included in such forms to prohibit an agent from
engaging in transactions that are contrary to public policy, such as the agent taking out life insurance or changing an
estate plan to name himself as beneficiary and then murdering the principal and thereby profiting from those actions.
The meaning of these boilerplate restrictions should not stretched beyond reason, as the Department's argument
encourages. None of the concerns that underpin these type of "agent as bad actor" provisions is present in this case
where we have an agent/spouse who is the natural object of the principal's bounty acting in a manner that is fully
authorized by other language in the power of attorney and acting in a manner that Martha would have wanted.
Martha would have signed the deed at issue were she able to do so. Instead, she authorized her husband to do it for
her under a power of attorney that was adequate to accomplish her wishes in this regard.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 39

000603

bind the principal and his successors in interest, as if the principal were compe:tent
and not disabled.
The power of attorney meets I.C. § 15-5-501 's requirement that it contain words "showing the
intent of the principal that the authority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the
principal's subsequent disability or incapacity." The Idaho statute which governs Martha's
power of attorney did not mandate that Martha was required to use any specific language or
"terms of art" in order to imbue her spouse/agent with the requisite authority to make the
interspousal transfer at issue. Yet as discussed above, the power of attorney does contain such
language. The power of attorney at issue is completely sufficient under the law then in effect to
grant Martha's spouse/agent, George, the full and complete authority to engage in the
interspousal transfer at issue.
iii. Idaho's Recently Enacted Uniform Power Of Attorney Act Also Supports The
Magistrate's Ruling.

In 2008, Idaho's legislature overhauled our Uniform Power of Attorney Act and required
that specific gifting language be included in the power of attorney if the principal wanted her
agent to have that authority. J.C.§ 15-12-20l(l)(b/4 •

These changes were made, in part, to

guard against elder abuse. In the official comments to Article 2 of the Model Act it states,
The rationale for requiring a grant of specific authority to perf01m the acts
enumerated in subsection (a) [adopted as LC.§ 15-12-201(1)] is the risk those
acts pose to the principal's property and estate . ...
Subsection (b) [LC.§ 15-12-201(1)(b)] contains an additional safeguard
for the principal. It establishes as a default rule that an agent who is not an
ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal may not exercise authority to
24

This Act was constructed from a review and revision of the National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform
State Laws' Uniform Power of Attorney Act dated July, 2006 ("Model Act").
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create in the agent or in an individual the agent is legally obligated to support, an
interest in the principal's property. For example, a non-relative agent with ~~ift
making authority could not make a gift to the agent or a dependent of the
agent without the principal's express authority in the power of attorney.
This comment underscores the point that the concerns present when examining an agent
making a gift to himself are generally not present when a spouse/agent is involved. George
utilized the powers given him by his wife to convey Martha's interest in the couple's home to
himself. The new Uniform Act, LC. § 15-12-217(2), specifically recognizes that there will
continue to be powers of attorney which contains language "granting general authority with
respect to gifts" which authorize the agent to make gifts to themselves. Although the standards
encompassed in the new Act are more restrictive than those that governed Martha's power of
attorney, even the new law recognizes the fact that powers of attorney are to be read less
stringently when the spouse is the one engaging in an interspousal transfer25 .
In this case, when all of these factors are considered, the Magistrate correctly concluded
that George acted consistently with the authority granted him in Martha's power of attorney.
The amendments made in 2008 and the policy rationales behind those amendments lend
additional support for the legal conclusion Martha's power of attorney was sufficient to allow
George as her agent to effectuate the interspousal transfer.

25

In addition, the new Act's I.C. § 15-12-217(3) indicates that even if the principal's objectives are not
actually known to the agent, the agent may make gifts of the principal's property in what he determines to
be the principal's best interest, taking into account such facts as the nature of the principal's property, the
principal's foreseeable need for maintenance, the principal's history of making gifts, and eligibility for
government benefit program assistance. Thus even under the new Act it appears permissible for an
agent/spouse with gifting power to engage in exactly the type of interspousal Medicaid-motivated transfer
at issue in this case.
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iv. The Court Should Infer From The Undisputed Facts And Circumstances That
Common Law Interspousal Agency Existed And Validates The Transfer.
In Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P .2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court
stated,
We have noted that community real property can be validly encumbered
only if both spouses join in executing the instrument of encumbrance. LC. § 32912. The statute evinces a legislative policy of protecting community real
property from creditors, unless both spouses agree in writing to incur the debt.
Thus, the statute usually requires two signatures. However, an exception to this
general rule exists if one spouse is authorized to act as an agent for the
management and disposition of community real property. Noble v. Glenns
Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364,367,421 P.2d 444,447 (1966). Our Supreme
Court has held that such an agency may be created by an express power of
attorney, as authorized by I.C. § 32-912, or may be inferred from the
circumstances and conduct of the parties. Noble, 91 Idaho at 368, 421 P .2d at
448.

See also, Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank Ltd., 91 Idaho 364,421 P.2d 444 (1966) (existence
of the wife's agency was a question of fact to be determined by the finder of the facts
from the husband's and wife's dealings, circumstances, and conduct).
George and Martha's dealings, circumstances and conduct support a ruling that an
interspousal agency can be inferred from the undisputed facts of this case. Consideration of the

facts and circumstances present, including the actions Martha took in putting the power of
attorney in place, the comprehensive language it contains, and the Magistrate's factual findings
( discussed below), supports this Court affirming the interspousal conveyance based on the
alternative ground of common law interspousal agency.

v. The Magistrate Made Findings of Fact On The Power Of Attorney Issue.
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The Department argues that the Magistrate made a legal conclusion unsupported by
findings of fact when he stated, "The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power
of attorney from Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself." Order
Disallowing Claim, f.n. 1. Appellant's Brief, p. 27, 31. The Department ignores what occurred
at the hearing. The Magistrate's legal conclusion as stated in the Order was supported by
explicit findings of fact made at the hearing. There is no prohibition against a magistrate making
oral findings of fact. See e.g., State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 776, 992 P.2d 769 (1999).
The Magistrate ruled from the bench on the power of attorney issue stating,
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and -- because I
don't think that that - that paragraph where the word gift is written, paragraph H,
is the clearest kind of authority to make a gift of property. It certainly can be
read that way . ..
But I think - when everything - all of the language in that power of
attorney is considered, it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is
that document was entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as
possible, it seems to me, including the right to deal with interest in real
property.
So I'm going to make a determination for purposes of this case that
that is a valid power of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including
giving Martha Perry's interest in that property.
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes of this case. (t!mphasis

added)
Tr., p. 11, LL. 8-25; p. 12, LL. 1-11.
The Magistrate clearly ruled not only that paragraph H in the power of attorney was
sufficient to satisfy I.C. § 32-912, but also that the comprehensive nature of the document
supported a conclusion that Martha's power of attorney gave George sufficient authorilty to
legally effectuate the interspousal transfer. The Magistrate found as a matter of fact that Martha
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intended to give George the necessary authority in the power of attorney to transfer the property
to himself. There is no need. as the Department argues, to remand for further factual findings in
order to support the Magistrate's legal conclusion on the power of attorney issue, nor to find that
interspousal agency existed under the circumstances of this case sufficient to uphold the transfer
on that basis as \Vell.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the
Court affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim in its entirety.
DATED this 26 th day of August, 2010.

Attorney for Personal Representative
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Appeal from the District C.ourt, Mille Lacs County, Steven P. Ruble, J.
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Mille Lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs
County.
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent Michael Barg.
Julian J. Zweber, St. Paul, MN, for amid curiae Elder Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association and National
Senior Citizens Law Center.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for c1micus curiae
Minnesota C.ommissioner of Human Services.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en bane.

OPINION
MEYER, Justice.
The Mille Lacs County Family Services and Welfare Department (County) filed a claim against the Estat«! of Francis E.
Barg (Estate), seeking to recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of his predeceased wife, Dolores Barg. The
Estate partially allowed the claim, and disallowed the other part. The district court, conduding that Dolores Barg's
interest in the couple's property was limited because she had conveyed it to her husband before her death, evaluated
her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. The C.ounty appealed, arguing that it was e·ntitled to
recovery from the full value of the property. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, partially allowing the claim
and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in the property as a joint tenancy interest equivalent to one-half the value of the
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property. In re Estate of Bilrg, 722

57
N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Factual and Procedural Bilckground.
The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Dolores J. Barg was oom in 1926, married Fratnds E. Barg in
1948, and remained married to him until her death in 2004. In 1962 and 1967, in two separate transac:tions, the Bargs
took title as joint tenants to real property in Princeton, Minnesota. Their home was located on this property. On October
24, 2001, Dolores Barg entered a nursing home in Mille Lacs County, at first paying the costs herself. In December 2001,
she applied for long-term Medicaid benetits.(fn1)
An asset assessment for Dolores Barg was completed in February 2002. The Bargs' marital assets including their
homestead totaled $137,272.63.(fn2) Approval for long-term Medicaid benefits was given retroactive tc, December 1,
2001.
On February 27, 2002, Francis Barg executed his will, nominating the couple's son Michael F. Barg ilS personal
representative, leaving his estate to his surviving descendants, and making no provision for his wife. Dolores Barg
transferred her joint tenancy interest in the homestead property to Francis Barg on July 2, 2002, when lier daughter and
guardian of her estate, Barbara Anderson, executed a Guardian's Deed. Also in July 2002, Barbara Anderson deleted
Dolores Barg's name from certificates of deposit the couple held jointly at Bremer Bank. There is no alle~ation that these
actions were improper or fraudulent.
On January 1, 2004, Dolores Barg died, having received $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death,
assets belonging to either Dolores or Francis Barg included three certificates of deposit, a checking account, and an IRA
account, all in the name of Francis Barg alone; one certificate of deposit payable to the funeral home for Dolores Barg's
funeral; two vehicles, together worth approximately $9,000; the homestead titled in Francis Barg's name, valued at
$120,800; and miscellaneous household goods and furniture. All of these assets had been jointtv held at some time
during the couple's 55-year marriage.
On May 27, 2004, Francis Barg died, never having received Medicaid benefits. On July 30, 2004, the County filed a
claim against Francis Barg's estate, seeking to recover $108,413.53, the full amount Dolores Barg had received in
Medicaid benefits.
Michael Barg disallowed $44,533.53 of the claim, and allowed $63,880. The County petitioned for an allowance of
the full claim, arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both the homestead and the .:ertificat«!S of deposit,
was subject to its claim because Dolores Barg's joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire property. The
district court concluded that Dolores Barg's interest in the property at the time of her death was

58
equivalent to a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance.
The County appealed. The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate of Gu/Iberg, 652 N. W.2d 709
(Minn.App. 2002), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was limited to Dolores's interest in marital
or jointly owned property at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The court decided that property law
principles should be applied to determine the nature of that interest and that under federal law and Gu/Iberg, Dolores
Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. Id. at 497. The c1::,urt valu,ed that
interest as an undivided one-half of the property's value, and remanded the case to the district court for a l'ecalculation
of the amount of the claim that was allowable. Id.
The County petitioned for review. The Estate opposed review but sought conditional cross-review on th,e issue of
whether federal law permits the State to recover at all from a surviving spouse's estate. We granted review, as well as
cross-review, and asked for briefing on whether the Estate had adequately preserved for review the issue of' "whether
the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a
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surviving spouse." We granted requests by the Minnesota CommiSSioner of Human Services to file an c1micus curiae brief
aligned with the County and to participate in oral argument.(fn3) We also granted requests by the Eidt~ Law Section of
the Minnesota State Bar Association and the National Senior Otizens Law Center to file an amicus curiae brief aligned
with the Estate. After oral argument, we asked the parties for supplementary briefing on the relationship of the 2003 and
2005 amendments of Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, sutxls. 1 and lc·lk (2006), to the authority the County ar~1ues exists under
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la (2006) and Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how that relationship affects
preemption analysis and the scope of recovery permissible under Minnesota law.
Statutory Framework.

Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure medical care to individuals who
do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. Martin ex rel. Hoff v. Oty of Rochester; 642 N. W.2d 1, 9
(Minn. 2002). Medicaid was intended to be the payor of last resort. Id. The program is jointly funded with the states as a
"cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them
in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980).
Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those
plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III
2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its own
program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)(fn4) administer

59
the program and approve state plans. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the requirements imposed on state plans is that
they must "comply with the proviSions of [42 U.S.C. § 1396pJ with respect to liens, adjustments and rec1Jveries of
medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets, and treabnent of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C.. § 1396ct{a){18) (2000).
To receive Medicaid, a person must qualify as either "categorically" or "medically" needy. Estilte of Atkinson v. Minn.
Dep'tofHuman Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn.1997). A person is "categorically needy" if he is eligible for other
specified federal assistance programs. Id at 211. A person is "medically needy" if he incurs medical expenses that
reduce his income to roughly the level of those who are categorically needy. Id. To qualify as medically needy a person
may have income no higher than a defined threshold and may own assets of no more than a defined value. Id. If the
assets of a Medicaid applicant and her spouse exceed the qualifying threshold, they must "spend down" their assets until
they are at or below the qualifying threshold. Id. If a potential Medicaid recipient transfers assets below fair market value
within a certain pericx1 of time before eligibility, the recipient is deemed ineligible for benefits for a time period mandated
by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2000). This prOVision prevents people who are not needy from becoming eligible for
Medicaid by transferring their assets away.
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider assets of both husband and
wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S{c) (2000). But there are several provisions in
place to protect the community spouse(fnS) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of assets needed to
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d at 211; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2000). The value of the
couple's home Is not included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. Id§ 1396r-S{c)(5); 42 U.S.C. §
1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets
designated for his or her needs that is not considered available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r·S(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead,
to his or her community spouse. 42 U..S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community spouses to
contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the accommodation of the community
spouse's need to provide for his or her own support.

Federal Medic.aid Recovery Provisions.
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is useful to start with the pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid
recovery, because it is relied on in the parties' arguments and is the basis for the rationale of several relevant cases.
Prior to amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute
stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject

60
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to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the
State plan may be made, except ••

••••
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such
assistance, from his estate.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recover Medicaid
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the recipient's estate. The
statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the recipient's
surviving spouse. Id.§ 1396p(b}(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving
spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law
contained no definition of "estate."
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), (4)
(2000)). As amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid
payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993
amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, they lowered the age criterion f<>r recovery from 65 to 55.
Second, they made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, they added a definition
of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonreciovery rule and
the relevant exception read as follows:
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:

••••
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate • • •.
Jd. The amended version of section 1396p(b)(1)(B) retained the express reference to recovery from the recipient's
estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the recipient's estate is only permitted after the
death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made• only after the
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any • • •." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). And hke the pre1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recover,, from a
surviving spouse's estate.

The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, with a mandatory provision
that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the
scope of probate law:
[TJhe term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual ••
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as
defined

61
for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State* * * any other real and personal property and other assets in
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which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of
"estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes that indudes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be part
of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on the recip~:!nt's death. For
example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint
tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the
optional expanded definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint
tenant who had received Medicaid would be induded in his estate, rather than passing directly to the surviving joint
tenant.

Minnesota s Medicaid Recovery laws.
Minnesota has long had a policy of requiring participants in the Medicaid program and their spouses to use their own
assets to pay their share of the cost of care during or after enrollment. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a) (2006). To
implement this policy, since 1987 Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la (originally ena1cted as Act of
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255, 3347). As relevant here, subdivision la provides that, "on
the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, • • '' the total
amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the
[recipient] or the estare of the surviving spouse." Id. (emphasis added). A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse
for medical assistance provided to the recipient spouse may be made up to "the value of the assets of the estate that
were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." Id., subd. 2 (emphasis added).
The broad estate recovery authority contained in subdivisions la and 2 was supplemented in 2003 by amendments
to the statute expanding subdivision 1 and adding subdivisions lc-lk. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 1.4, art. 1:2, §§ 40-50,
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-17. These amendments implement the optional expanded definition of
"estate" authorized in the 1993 amendments to the federal law. See Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, subd. 1(a)(2} (2006); 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The 2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate recovery law modify common lctw to provide for
continuation of a recipient's life estate or joint tenancy interest in real property after his death for the purpose of
recovering medical assistance, Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. l(a)(3) (2006), and include that continued interest in the
recipient's estate. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. lg, lh(b), 1i(a), 1j. The 2003 amendments also establish specific
procedures for exercising claims against these continued life estate and joint tenancy interests, as well as procedures
and waiting periods that differ according to whether the recipient's spouse, dependent children, or other relatives

62
living in the homestead survive the recipient. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49, 200] Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess. 1751, 2213-17 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. 1i and 1j). In this case, the ec,unty filed its
claim under subdivisions la and 2 and did not rely on provisions added in the 2003 amendments.
The issues presented in this case involve several questions about the relationship between the recovery provisions of
federal and Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County's daim was
proper, relying on its earlier decision in Gu/Iberg that the broad authorization in subdivision 2 for recovery up to the value
of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned at any time during the maniagewas partially
preempted by the 1993 amendments to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient
spouse had a legal interest at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing GJ/lberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714).
The County, and its supporting amicus curiae the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, argue that
the court of appeals was wrong, both here and in Gui/berg, in finding any preemption of the broad estate recovery
authorized in subdivisions la and 2. They contend that there was nothing in the federal statute prior to thEt 1993
amendments that limited the states' authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that: the 1993
amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit them. Alternatively, the County argues that
even if recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had
an interest in the property notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, and the court of appeals erred in valuing
that interest as only one-half the value of the homestead.
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The Estate and its supporting amid curiae counter that federal law authorizes recovery only from a recipient's estate,
and Minnesota law that allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is therefore preempted.(fn6) The Estate argues
that recovery is also barred because, to the extent recovery is allowed from the estate of a surviving spouse, federal law
limits that recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, and
subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 is preempted to the extent it allows broader recovery. Finally, the Estate argues that
there should be no recovery here because Dolores Barg had no legal interest

63
in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed her interest to her husband
during her lifetime.
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. First, does federal law preempt the authorization in Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15,
subd. la, for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid for a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse? Second, if
such recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is not preempted, does federal law limit the recovery to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, preempting the broader recovery allowed in Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15,
subd. 2, as to assets owned as marital property or in joint tenancy at any time during the marriage? Third, if recovery is
limited to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death what, if any, interest did Dolores Barg
have in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, and specifically, was the c:ourt of appeals
correct in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy interest for purposes of estate recovery even though she
transferred that interest to her husband during her lifetime? We address these issues in turn, after first reviewing basic
preemption principles.
I.
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.
Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is a question of law, which we also review de novo.
Morton Bklgs., Inc. v. Comm'rofRevenue, 488 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn.1992).
Congressional purpose is"' the ultimate touchstone"' of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Oerks Int1 Assn, Loeol 1625 v. ScMrmerhom, 375
U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 ( 1963}}. Our primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertam the intent of
Congress. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause · start[s]
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Opollone v. Uggett Group, Inc., SOS U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608,
120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 s.ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Opollone, 505 U.S. at 516,518, 112

S.Ct. 2608).
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sdv. & Loan Assn, 479 U.S. at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First,
it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id. Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is,
"congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation
is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state
regulation." Id at 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress
neither expressly preempted state law nor so completely occupied the field as to leave no room for state action, because
the Medicaid program specifically permits and even requires action by participating states. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11.
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress

64
has not chosen to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-empt
state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cd/. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assh, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683.
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Pau( 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when the state law is "an obs,tacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Odvidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61
S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
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II.

We now turn to the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la, which requires Medicaid recovery against
the estate of a surviving spouse, is preempted by federal law, particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). Because only
conflict preemption may be applicable, we seek to determine whether compliance with both statutes is impossible or
whether the state law stands as an obstade to accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law.
The County seeks recovery here under subdivision la of section 256B.15, which authorizes--indeed requires-recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient. The Estate argues that this state law
authorization to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse is preempted because it conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p
(b){l}, which prohibits recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits except from the estate of the recipi;?nt of the
benefits.
The federal statute establishes a general prohibition against recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to
three specified exceptions:
( 1) No adjustment or lc'a1~ of any medical assistance correctly paid on beholf of an individu;}! under
the Slilte plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical

assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (emphasis added}. Only one exception potentially applies to the circumstance of this case:
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate • • •.

Id§ 1396p(b)(l)(B) (emphasis added). Because this express exception to the general rule against recovery of
Medicaid benefits directs that recovery come from the recipient's estate and makes no reference to a surviving spouse's
estate, the Estate argues that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law. Because
exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 IJ.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct.
1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it appears on its face that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by
federal law.
Two courts have agreed with this analysis and conduded that section 1396p(b)(l)(B) authorizes recovery only from
the recipient's estate and does not allow recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't al' Pub. Aid, 221
Ill.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (2006); In re Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245,
246 (1995), rev. denied546 N. W.2d 471 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that the federal statute
never "counter[ed] the initial blanket prohibition"

65
on recovery by authorizing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246, The Illinois
Supreme Court noted that under federal and Illinois law, the state had authority to seek reimbursement fmm the
recipient's estate a~er the death of his surviving spouse. Hines, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d at 153. But instead, as
here, the state sought recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id. The court explained that federal law allows
only three exceptions under which a state may seek reimbursement and "[a)II are specifically directed to the estate of
the recipient. No provision is made for collection from the estate of the recipient's spouse." Id. The court declined to add
to the unambiguous language of the federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond those specified in the federal law.

Id.
The Commissioner argues that Hines and Budneywere wrongly decided, misinterpreting the federal statute,
particularly in light of the presumption against preemption. The County contends that this statutory exception to the
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally against individuals who received benefits a~er age 55, and does not
narrowly limit the sources of recovery. The County asserts that the reference to the individual's estate is merely a
designation of the timing for recovery rather than a limit on the scope of recovery, because the language does not say
that the state may recover "only" from the individual's estate. The County argues that absent such express limiting
language, and applying the presumption against preemption, section 1396p(b}(1)(B) merely specifies one potential
source of rec.overy, the recipient's estate, and does not preclude others, such as a spouse's estate.

000616
,.//,t

I

/ •tnt •

/h""I,.,./("',,.,,.

I~ ... /- __

.,.n

Casemaker - MN - Case J

Page 8 of 15

v - Search - Result

~

In our view, the plain language of section 1396p(b)(1)(B) comports far more closely with the inteirpretation of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Hines than with the County's expansive view of the authority imparted by that provision.
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted the County's broad view of that language alone. Ind!eed, in explaining
the then-existing law in a report on proposed OBRA amendments in 1993, a House Report referred only to the possibility
of recovery from the estate of the recipient, even when describing recovery after the death of a surviving spouse:
Under current law, a State has the option of seeking recovery of amounts correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under its Medicaid program from the individual's estate if the individual was 65 yea~; or older at
the time he or she received Medicaid benefits. The State may not seek recovery from the benf1ficiary's
estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the individual has no surviving minor or
disabled child.
H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, at 208 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 535 (emphasis added). In contrast,
describing the proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid recovery law passed by the House, the same House Report
stated that newly-required state estate recovery programs would have to "provide for the collection of the amounts
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the
surviving Sl)Ouse." Id. Thus, when the House wanted to describe recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, it said so
clearly.
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain language providing only for recovery from the recipient's estate, we
acknowledge that several courts have interpreted the federal recovery provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a
surviving

66
spouse. The courts reaching this condusion have for the most part relied on the 1993 amendments to the federal law
that allow the states to adopt an expanded definition of estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery. For e>cample, the New
York Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that although federal law did not expressly provide for recovery of Medicaid
payments from the "secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 amendments gave the states power to recover against
the spouse's estate for certain categories of assets. In re Estate ofOaig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d
1003, 1006 ( 1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the Craig interpretation that the 1993 expanded estate
provision gave the states the option to recover against a surviving spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint tenancy
or right of survivorship. In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.1998). Indeed, the court in Thompson
rejected the ruling in Budney that recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law on the
basis that the Budneycourt had not considered the optional expanded definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at
850. The North Dakota court concluded that "consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to trace the
assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies." Id. at
851. Ttle court explained that. under the circumstances, it made no difference whether recovery was Fron, one estate or
the other:
Because the expansive federal definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in
which the medical assistance benefits recipient "had any legal title or interest in at the time of death," It is
i1 IT'Jiltter of little moment whether the department seeks to rerover the benefits paid by t.Wng a dc,im in
the estilte of the recipient after the death of the recip;ent's sufYiving spouse or by filing a claim in the
surviving spouse's

estare.

Id. n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in Idaho Department of Health and Welf.1m v. Jackman, 1.32 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d
6, 9-10 ( 1998), the Supreme Court of Idaho also ruled that some recovery of Medicaid benefits cc,uld be made from the
estate of a surviving spouse, but held that such recovery was preempted by federal law except to the extent of assets
that had been in the recipient's estate as defined by state probate law.

These courts provide little explanation for their conclusions that the statutory language expressly mentioning
recovery only from the recipient's estate also allows recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the courts
viewed the authority to recover from assets that were part of the recipient's estate after the death of the surviving
spouse to fairly imply authority to recover those assets from the surviving spouse's estate to which they had passed on
the death of the recipient. In other words, to the extent assets in the surviving spouse's estate are there bEcause they
had passed to the surviving spouse from the estate of the recipient, recovery from those assets in the surviving spouse's
estate is, in essence, recovery from the recipient's estate.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have made a similar unspoken inference in assessing preemption of
California Medicaid recovery laws in two cases. &Jcholtz v. Be/she, 114 F.3d 923 (9th Or.1997); Citizens Action League v.
Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Or.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Q. 1524, 108 l.Ed.2d 764 (1990}. In both cases,
the

67
Ninth Orcuit addressed whether califomia's Medicaid recovery law was preempted by pre-1993 amendment federal law.
The califomia law allowed the state to seek recovery not only from the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient, but
.,. against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival.'" Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005 (quoting cat.
Welf. & Inst.Code§ 14009.5 (West. Supp.1989)). Thus, (alifomia law allowed the state to trac:e assets of the deceased
Medicaid recipient and seek reimbur.;ement from the recipients of those assets.
In Kizer the plainbffs were individuals who had owned property in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient and had
succeeded to ownership by right of survivorship upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. Id. ,3t 1005. To determine
whether (alifornia's claimed right of recovery from these surviving joint tenants was inconsistent with federal law, the
court looked to section 1396p(b)(l)(B), which, as discussed above, provided the general prohibition ag.ainst recovery with
the exception for individuals who were 65 years old when they received assistance. Id. at 1006. The Ninth Orcuit noted
that the federal statute provided only for recovery from the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a federal statutory
definition of estate, looked to common law for the meaning of the term. Id. at 1006. The court held thait an "estate"
under common law did not include property held in joint tenancy at death, and therefore the California law that allowed
recovery against such property went beyond the recipient's estate and was too broad. Id. at 1008. The court in Kizer did
not expressly address the issue of whether assets within the definition of "estate" could only be reached by a claim
against the recipient's estate, or whether federal law would permit the state to follow those assets and make the claim
against a surviving joint tenant--or, as here, a surviving spouse.
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 federal law, the Ninth Orcuit again addressed a preemption challenge to
the same broad california Medicaid recovery provision. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz was application of
the state recovery law to assets of Medicaid recipients that had been subject to three forms of joint interests: inter vivos
trusts, tenancy in common, and community property. Id. at 924. The court applied the Kizer principle th,it ,,. use of the
word "estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision limits a state's recovery to property which descends to the recipient's
heir or the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,'" id. at 925 (quoting Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to each of the
forms of shared interest at issue. The court concluded that, like the joint tenancy in Kizer, property held m an inter vivos
trust is not part of the decedent's estate under California common law, and therefore was not part of the estate subject
to recovery under the federal law. Id. at 926. In contrast, the court explained, a decedent's interest in pri:)perty held in
tenancy in common or community property is subject to disposition and administration as part of the dec,edent's estate
under California law. Id. at 926-27. The Ninth Grcuit concluded not only that the decedent's interest in property held in
those forms was subject to recovery under the federal law, but also held, albeit without explanation, that recovery could
be sought from the heirs or beneficiaries who received that property: "[California] may, however, pursue people who
received property held by the decedent in the form of tenancy in common or community property." Id. at 928 (emphasis
added). Like other courts, the Ninth Orcuit seems to have inferred that the federal law's reference to recc,very from the
Medicaid recipient's "estate" conferred

68
authority to follow the assets from that estate and recover them from the people who received the property.
Thus, the courts that have considered the issue are split on the question of whether the narrow reference in section
1396p(b)(l) to recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient allows recovery only through a direct claim against that
estate, or whether recovery is also allowed from those who received covered assets from the Medicaid reci1Dient's estate,
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were this an ordinary question of statutory interpretation, we w1:>uld condude
that the plain language of the federal statute provides only for recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, as the
IllinOis court persuasively reasoned in Hines. But we are influenced by the principle that preemption of stat1! laws is
disfavored, combined with the fact that allowing recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is cor1sistent with both the
federal provision precluding recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a survivin9 spouse as
well as with the purposes of the federal legislatlon.(fn7} These additional considerations lead us to conclude that the split
in authority, in these particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate
recovery language that we cannot say that Minnesota's requirement in Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la, to seek
reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with federal law such that it is preempted.
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Accordingly, we hold that federal law does not preclude all recovery from the estate of a survivin9 spouse, and the
authorization in subdivision la to make a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. The
question remains whether federal law limits the scope of recovery against the estate of a surviving spouse and, in
particular, whether that recovery may reach all property previously held by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as
marital property or jointly with the surviving spouse during the marriage, as allowed by Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. 2.

III.
We tum to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's estate allowed under
Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover from a
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at
any time dun'ng the marriage." (Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993
amendments were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this

69
argument for broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals of federal
law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting
community spouses from pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 1396p(b)(l)
allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed
by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of
the plain meaning of its language. Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-1993 federal
law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of assets that were jointly owned during the m,miage but
transferred by the recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that
were transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz 607 N.W.2d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000).
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other than the Medicaid recipient's estate have
construed that authority to reach only assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time o,f her death,
that is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state probate law or included in the
estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27
(limiting recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006
(same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid
recovery statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under
state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of· estate' in [section]
1396p(b}(4} extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient · had any legal title cir interest rn at
the time of death"'); see also In re Estate of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *·4
(Tenn.ct.App. Nov, 1, 2006} (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery against estates of surviving spouses have
required that recipient had interest in assets at time of death).
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 amendments as authority for recovery from a surviving spouse's estate, our court of
appeals acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit the assets subject to recovery to those in which the Medicaid
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. See Gu/Iberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714 (holding that Minn.Stat. §
256B.15, subd. 2, authorization to reach assets that were marital property or owned jointly at any time dunng the
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law limitation to assets in which recipient had interest at time of death). And
the court of appeals acknowledged that limitation again in this case. /Jarg, 722 N.W.2d at 496 ("After Gu/Iberg, the
state's ability to recover was limited to the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the
recipient's death.").
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle requiring

70
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an interest at the time of death is i-wrtz. Although the North Dakota court had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson
decision that recovery allowed under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest
at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving
spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to
his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the surviving spouse·s estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court
stated that limiting recovery under section 1396p(b) to "assets in the surviving spouse•s estate that the Medicaid
recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. mrtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885.
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-136. The court did
not explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with the limitation to n~overy from assets
in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz.
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment is ambiguous 1n the sense implied
in mrtz. The plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is ammgements other
than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient's death.
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional definition of "estate" t1llows inclusion of
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a surviv1:>r, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further describes the assets that a state may
include in this expanded estate. The clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are "conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers
back to the immediately preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any legal title or
interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to whom "such" assets may have bee,n conveyed--a
"survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the clalJse describes several
methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -- "through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." Id.
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of
death. When we construe a federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 s.a. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To read "other arrangement" to include a
lifetime transfer would be to read the words "at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other
arrangement" cannot

71
include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement·· ends a list of examples of
conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor., heir, or assign of the
deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died for the conveyance to
occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "ctssign of the deceased"
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its context, the concluslon of the Wirtz court
that "other arrangement" is sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery of assets in
which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale for
finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority gr;:tnted in the federal law
to recover from the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would m)t be part of the
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, ta the extent the 1993 amendments allow
states to expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits
that expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold that
Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's
estate of assets that the recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any timedurin1~ the
marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of
her death.
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IV.
This brings us to the question of whether Dolores Barg had any interest 1n property at the time of her death that
would allow the County to make a claim against the estate of her surviving spouse, despite her transfor of her joint
interest in the property prior to her death. As we have noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the interest-at-time-ofdeath limitation on spousal estate recovery, but nevertheless found that for these purposes Dolores retained a joint
tenancy interest at the time of her death that made the value of that interest recoverable from Francis;'s estate. Barg,
722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. Eschewing reference to either marital property law or probate law to detennine the nature of
any interest at the time of death, the court of appeals looked to standard real property law and Gu/Iberg in deciding that
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest. Id. at 496-97. We do not agree.
The court of appeals determined that Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the property baSE!d on its
understanding that the court in Gu/Iberg had recognized a continuing joint tenancy interest because the lifetime transfer
was an "other arrangement," and because the court apparently understood section 1396p(b)(4) to "explicitly allow[] a
state to broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include joint-tenancy interests
that have been prewously conveyed to a spouse." Id. at 497. Section 1396p(b)(4) cannot be construed to indude lifetime
transfers of property in the phrase "other arrangement" because the plain language and the context re.1uire that phrase
to be limited to conveyances occurring upon the death of the recipient. For that reason, we cannot

72
agree with the court of appeals' characterization of section 1396p(b)(4) as allowing the expanded definition of estate to
include "previously conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language of section 1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death,
not one that was previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores did not retain a joint tenancy interest iin the property at
the time of her death, because that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death.
The question remains whether Dolores had any other interest in the property at the time of her deal:h that may be
considered part of an expanded estate for recovery purposes under Minnesota law. We agree with the court of appeals
that courts should not look to marital property law to find such an interest, because the statute in which marital property
is defined limits the definition to the purposes of that chapter. Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b (2006);(fn8) see Barg,
722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, we agree that the recognizable interests at the time of death cannot be limited to those
defined by probate law, because the purpose of section 1396p(b)(4) is to allow states to expand the defi11it1on of estate
beyond probate law. See Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree that real property law principles, informed by
principles of probate law, should be the basis for ascertaining any interests at the time of death. Any interest recognized
must be consistent with the underlying foundational rationale that recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is allowed
only because of its relationship to the recipient's estate, from which federal law expressly allows recovery. With those
principles in mind, we caution that for an interest to be traceable to and recoverable from a surviving spouse's estate,
the interest must be (1) an interest recognized by law, (2) which the Medicaid recipient held at the time o,f death, and
(3) that resulted in a conveyance of an interest of some value to the surviving spouse that occurred as a result of the
recipient's death. Further, to the extent the interest is not part of the standard probate estate, Minnesota law must have
expanded the definition of estate to indude the interest, as authorized by section 1396p(b)(4).
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer existed at the time of her death. No
other recognizable interest has been identified.
The County argues that the reference to marital property in subdivision 2 reflects the Minnesota legisl21ture's intent
to make all marital property subject to spousal estate recovery. But subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest at
the time of death or to re-defining the probate estate to include all marital property, even property transferred prior to
death. This is not surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted long before the optional estate definition authority was
added to federal law.
The district court indicated that because Dolores was married to Francis even after the transfer of her interest in the
homestead, she retained some interest in the property. But whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's; death,
rather than resulting in transfer of an interest of value to Francis.
We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of her death that were part of a probate estate or an
expanded estate definition permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no
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basis for the County's claim against the estate.
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota legislature amended section 2568.15 by extending thei definition of
estate for Medicaid recovery purposes to indude assets owned by a recipient spouse in joint tenancy c,r life estate at the
time of her death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 17S 1, 2205-2217
{codified as amended at Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subds. 1, lc-lk). The amendments do not mention the other forms of
conveyance at death listed in the federal definition of "estate," except that the "right of survivorship" is mentioned with
respect to joint tenancies. Id. subds. 1(a)(6), lg, lh(b). Thus, the legislature chose only to indude twc, forms of
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. Also, as provkfed in the federal law, the inclusion of joint tenancy and life
estate interests in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to interests the recipient owned at the time of death.
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. lh(b)(2), li{a). The amendments further limit the scope of recovery by e:<empting from the
reach of subdivisions le through lk a "homestead owned of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the recipient and
the recipient's spouse as joint tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. l(a)(6). In 2005, the
legislature retroactively made the provisions continuing life estates and joint tenancies effective only for life estate and
joint tenancy interests created on or after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn.
Laws 2454, 2649 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(c)).
It is difficult to discern the intended reach of the 2003 amendments.(fn9) If the pre-2003 law allowed recovery
against the surviving spouse's estate as argued by the County, there was little need to enact the 2003 a1mendments to
reach those assets in the case of a recipient who leaves a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree that the 2003
amendments do not apply to or influence this case, for reasons that are not clear to us.
It suffices to say that even if the 2003 amendments were applicable, they would provide no basis fa,r the County's
claim. The new subdivision 1i specifically applies to circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient against whom a recovery
claim could otherwise be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. li(b). That subdivision provides
procedures for filing a claim without making a recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. Id., subdl. l(f). If this
subdivision were to be applied to this case, several limitations would preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient,
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at the time of her death. If she had owned a joint tenancy at the time of
her death, it would have been a homestead owned of record by her and her spouse as joint tenants with a right of
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach of subdiViSion li. Id., subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that joint tenancy was
established in the 1960s, well before August 1, 2003.
In summary, we hold that federal law does not preempt all Medicaid recovery from spousal estates, and Minn.Stat. §
256B.15, subd. la, is therefore not preempted to the extent it allows claims against the estate of a surviving spouse of a
Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable scope of spousal estate recovery is limited. Subdivision 2 of SE.'Ction 256B.15
is preempted to the extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid recipient did not have a
legal interest at the time of death, and to
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the extent that it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient's interest. Finally, we hold that Dolores Barg had no
interest in property at the time of her death that can form the basis for recovery against the estate of Francis Barg.
V.

We have concluded that the County's claim for full recovery against all the assets in Francis Barg's estate was
preempted by federal law because recovery is limited to assets in which Dolores had an interest at the time of her death,
but the question of the appropriate remedy remains, because the County argues that the Estate waived the right to deny
the claim in its entirety. Although we have decided as a matter of law in our preemption analysis that the state is
preempted from requiring reimbursement from assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient spouse had no interest
at the time of her death, that does not resolve the remedy issue here. Although a state may not compel payment from a
spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by federal law, federal preemption does not preclude an estate from
voluntarily paying all or part of a claim that could not be compelled.
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed the County's claim, thus allowing the remainder of the claim. Minnesota
Statutes§ 524.3-806(a) (2006) provides that, on petition of the personal representative after notice to the claimant, the
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court may "for cause shown permit the personal representative to disallow" a previously-allowed claim. But the personal
representative made no such request here. When questioned at the hearing in district court whether the personal
representative was challenging the entire claim of the County, the representative affirmed that he was challenging only
the part already disallowed. When the district court affirmed that partial disallowance and the County appealed, the
Estate did not file a notice of review in the court of appeals to challenge the implicit award to the County of the allowed
part of its daim. A respondent who does not file a notice of review to challenge an adverse ruling of the district court
waives that issue in the court of appeals. See Minn. R. av.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.
Co., 294 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially allowed the County's claim and having then failed to properly
seek a reversal of that allowance in both the district court and court of appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek
that relief for the first time in this court.
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court's denial of the
County's claim for full recovery is affirmed. The court's remand for an award to the County based on the existence of a
joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment bc1sed on the partial
allowance made, but not subsequently challenged, by the Estate.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.

Footnotes:
FNl. "Medicaid" is the popular name for this cooperative federal-state program. See42 U.S.C. § 13Sl6-1396v (2000).
In Minnesota it is referred to as "medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 2568.02, subd. 8 (2006).
FN2. For purposes of determining eligibility of one spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home is excluded. 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1)(2000). In the asset assessment for Dolores !Barg, $104,875
was excluded. This amount corresponds to the value of the home, one jointly-owned vehide, and a burial lot. When
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the couple's resources is reserved for the needs of the spouse not
applying for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (f)(2)(A) (2000). Protected assets for the nonrecipient !;pause, Francis
Barg, were calculated to be $24,607.
FN3. The Commissioner's motion to supplement the record on review is granted as to the following documents:
North Dakota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. CJS-012; Idaho
Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No., 06-10. The motion is
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated November 4, 1999.
FN4. Formerly the Health care Financing Administration (HCFA). See Wis. Dep't of Health & Family St~. v. Blumer,
534 U.S. 473, 479 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002).
FN5. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses is premised on circumstances similar to those· of the Bargs.
One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. The other, who we refer
to as the community or surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and survives the recipient spouse.
FN6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of "whether the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly
paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a surviving spouse." We requested briefing on whether that
issue had been adequately preserved for review. The County argues that the Estate failed to preserve the issue because
it only partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed before the district court that only the disallowed portion of the
claim was contested, and it asked the court of appeals to affirm the district court's deciSion. The County's arguments go
to the scope of the remedy available in this case, an issue that we address infra. But this issue also has a legal aspect
independent of the specifte scope of recovery available in this case. That legal component is necessary to a thorough
analysis of the preemption issues presented here, and we will therefore address the issue in that context. No new or
controverted facts are needed in order to address this purely legal question, and no prejudice will result from our
consideration of the issue because the parties addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, the court of
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appeals, and this court. See Watson v. United Ser\.'S. Auto.

Assn, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Minn.199'7).

FN7. The United States Supreme Court has described Congress's passage of the anti-impoverishment provisions as
an effort to "protect community spouses from • pauperization' while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining
Medicaid assistance." Wis. Dep't of Health a Family Ser\.'S. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 4'80, 122 s.a. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, bE!Cause the spouse
must be dead for the recovery to occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid benefits to other impoverished
individuals; indeed, it can be expected to do quite the opposite. See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Ha1lth & Human
Ser\-5"., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Or.2002) (noting that Congress expected the estate recovery provisions to allow
government to realize savings of $300 million over five years, and that the savings have been even grieater).
FN8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § S18.54, subds. 1, 5 (2004).

FN9. Toe parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on this question.

MN
N.W.2d
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QUESTION PRESB~ED

The Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. 1396 en seq., generally forbid.a participating States from recovering correctly paid beneftta. The statute requiree, however, that
a Stat.e aeek to recover the coat of nursing home M?rvicee
paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 56 from
tbe Individual's probate eetate, after both the individual
and her surviving apouae have died. The statute also
permit.a (but doea not require) a State to recover from
.. any other real and personal property and other aeaeta
In which the Individual had any legal title or intereet at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such asseta conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of
the deceased individual through Joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, aurvtvonhip, lite estate, living trust. or other arrangement." '2 U.S.C. 1396p(bX4)(B).
The question presented ta whether, under Section
1396p(b)(4)(B), a State that seekl to recover correctly
paid beneftts from the estate of the recipient's surviving
spouse ta limited to recovering the value of assets in
which the recipient bad a legal intereet at the time of
her death.
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No.08-603
LBO voe, DIRECTOR, Mn,T E LACS CoUNTY.
MINNEBOrA. FAMILY SSKVICES A.ND WKLFARE

DEPARTMENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS

"·

MICHAEL F. BARG
ON PliTITION FOR A WRIT' or CBRTIORARJ
TO TH& SUPRSM6COURT01' MINNESOTA

BRIEi' FORTHB UNrl'EDSTATESASA.lUCUSCUJlIAB

Thia brief ia tiled ln response to the Court's order
inviting the Solicitor General to expreae the viewa of the
United States. In the view of the United Stare., the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
STATEMENT
1. a. The Medicaid program. established in 1965 in
Title XIX of the SoctaJ Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42
U.S.C. 1896 d aeq., ia a cooperative tederal-etate program under which the federal government provld• fundIng to Statea to provide medical aui1tance to eligible
needy persona. Harri.a v. McRa,, 448 U.S. 297, 301
(1980).

To participate in the Medicaid prorram, a State must
develop a plan epeeitytng, among other thinga, the categortee of lndividuala who will receive medical aulatance
(1)
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\l.Dder th• plan and the apeef.ftc kinda of medical care and
'8 U.S.C. 1898a. State
Medicaid plana are reviewed bJ' the Cent.en for Medicare and Medicaid Serrieea {CMS) Clormeiv the Bealtb
Ou-e F1n.ancfns Admlnlatration) In the Dapartment of
Health aad Ruman ~ c e e (HHS). 48 U.8.0. 1898; . . .
68 Fed. R ... 85,48T (2001). It CMS approv. . a State'•
plan. tb• State 1a thereatt.r eligible for federal retm. .rv1c:.a that will be covend.

bunement

tor • apedfted pereentap of the amount.

..expended • • • • medical mtatanee under the Stat.
plan." 42 U.8.C. 18Nb(a)(l), 18Nd(b).
b. Tbe Medicaid A.ct raquirea partfdpatJng Statee
to provide Medicaid benallta to the .. categol"lea)ly needy." that fe. t.boee penona eJlalbl• tor l'lnaadal uetatanee under specifled federal programa. A.tki,.,.
T • .R-i~ -t'M U.S. UM, 167 (1986); aee '2 U.B.C.
18Na(a)(10)(A)(J)(IV). (VI) and (VII).

The Act alao perm1ta Stai. to extend beneftte to
the .._edtcalq neec:17." that. la, •penN>n.a lrldn• the ability to pa:, for medlMl e:xpeneee, bat wltb bacomee too
larp to qualify for cateaorloal IINJatance." SelttNUwr.,..
0<rav POfdMrS, 461 U.S. N, 87 (1981); . . . 42 U.S.C.
18Na(a)(10)(C). To qaallt;r u medJcalb' needy. a peraon
mq h_.e Income no htper tbU a defined threabold and
m~ own aaeta ot no more than a defined •alae. If the
wet. of • Medicaid applicant eJ1:~ th• quali(yfus
t.hreahold. •h• mu•t

are at

"•pend down" her ....ta until the7

or below the quaHt)1Da threahold. a.. a U .8.C.

18Na(a)(17).
When a married SMt1"9on la l.uatltutwnallHd In a nuntns home or other tadliQ', tb• Medicaid Act eonatd..,. the
ueeta of both the tnadtattonallsed epouae and the nonlnadtatlonalf.Nd, or "community.• apoaee tn detenntn-

ln• the appUcant."• ellctbDlty for beaeftte.

48 U .s.c.
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18961'-G<c). To prevent the commumty apouee rrom beiaa
lmpoverlabed u • reaalt of a required apead-d,IJWII or
UMt8, the at.atat.e esempte certain ...eta, aucb u the
coapJ•·• bom• and an automobile, d U.S.C. UJmltt<aXl),
taaer-a(c)(&), &11d allow. the comma.alt;y apow to retain

• c.rtaln lffel of rellOW"Cee and lacome that...-. not conaldered available to pq ror the appltcant•a medical care.
U U .8.0. 18"1"-l(d) and (t)(I). See WU001U'it1 D.-p i qf
H.altl, .. FGWIU.
5M U.S. ,'1'.8, '80
(2002) (aatl-lmpcwerlaluneat provWoaa are lntAn1:led to
Mprotect. comm~Dit:, apouw tr-om •pauperlsatlon• while
preveatfns ftnandal17 aeou~ c»upl.. from obtatntu,r
Furthermore, llltboup the :Medicaid Act general~ forbtda a Medicaid appUcaat or her
spowM: from trauterrlna &tllleta at below market •ala• In
order to become •Helble tor beueftta, 42 U.S.O.
18Np(c)(l)(A), the atatute eapr...17 permit.a the appltcant to ~ - - . . . . . , mclucUnc an IAtenat ID the hiomest.ead, t.o the communlt,y •pou-, '2 U.8.0. 18Np(,c)(2).
Once the laatltudonaltsed apouae la determined 1~ be
elislbl• tor beDeftta, tbe atat.ute provfdea that ..n1i, reaoarce• ot the community apoaae •hall be deemed available to the tn.titatloaaltzed apouae." U U.S.O. 189er-

a.,.,,.. .,_ a,",,....,

.II.Heald......._...,_

lS(e)(4).

c. Aa • pneral raJe, tbe Medicaid Act torblda Stat.a
trom aeeldq recOYery of Medicaid beneftta that were
eorrect.17 paid. "2 u.s.c. 18Np(b)(l); - alao "2 u . e.c.
1S98a(a)(18). The atatu&e provtdea an eueptlon. t11owever. for reoover,y from tbe Mtatea of certain tnatltuttonalised and older beaeftotartea.

Before 1998, the Medicaid Act'• recove17 provlafon
permitted, but did not. require, Statea to reccwer benllflt.a
paid oa bebalf of certain lndtvldaala, from the indtvldu·

ala' eatatea. 42 U.S.C. 18Np(b)(l)(B) (1981). In 1998,
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Congreae amended Section 1396p to require States to
recover correctly paid benefit.a in certain circumatancea.
Omnibus Rewncillatlon Act of 1993 COBRA 1993), Pub.
L. No. 103-66, 113612, 107 StaL 62'7. Aa amended, the
Act'• eetat.recovery provialoa requires States to aeek
recover, in the caae of an iJidividual who was perma~
nent11 inatitutionalued, '2 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(A), and in.
the cue of a person who received, at age 55 or thereafter, nuning facility servicee, home aud communitybased services, or related hospital and prescription drug
services, 42 U.S.C. 1S96p(b)(l)(B). In addition, a State
baa the option t:o seek recovery of the coat or ot.her itema
or aervlcea paid on behalf of lndlvtduals over the age of
56. Ibid. The recoveey ..may be made only after the
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any," and
only at a time when the individual hu no aurvtvfnr children under the age of 21 or chlldren who are blind or
disabled. 42 U.8.C.1396p(b)(2) and (2)(A). Such recover, may be waived in casea where it "would work an undue hardship." '2 U.S.C.1396p(b)(3).
The statute provfdea for recoveey of the coat of benefit.I paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55
from "the Individual's estate." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(B).
The term "estate," t'or tboee pul'J)08ea, "1hall include all
real and personal property and other uaeta Included
within the individual's estate, aa denned ror purpoaee of
State probate law." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(bX4)(A). The statute further provides that an individual's "estate"
may include, at the option or the State • • • , any
other real and personal property and other aaaeta In
which the individual had any legal title or lntereat at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such aaaete conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
BYign ol t.he deceaaed individual through joint ten-
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ancy, tenancy ID common, survivonhip, life eatate,
living t.ru1t, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(')(B).
2. Since 1987, Minnesota law bu provided for recovery of Medicaid beneftta from the estate of a reclplent.'s
surviving spouse, aa well aa from the eetate of a recipient.. Act or June 12, 1987, ch. 408, art. .2, f Erl (Minn. Stat.,
Ann. t 266B.15 (2007)). Minnesota's estate-recovery law
provid• that U[a] claim againet the eatate of a surviving
spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for medical aaalstance rendered for the predeceaaed apouae, la
lfmit.ed to the value of the aaeete of the estate that were
marital property or Jointly owned property at any time
durlni t.he marriage." Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 256B.15, subd.
2 (2007).

a. In 2006, petitioner tiled a claim against the est.ate
of Francia Barr, In which be sought recovery of Medicaid
benefit. paid on behalf of Mr. Barg's predeceaaed
spouae, Dolores Barr. Pet. App. 4L 1
a. Darin1 their marriage, the Barga purchased real
property in Princeton, Minnesota, to which the, took
title aa joint tenant.a. In 2001, Ma. Barg entered a nursing home, and shortly thereafter applied for, and received, long-term Medicaid benefftl. Pet. App. 2a-3a.
Ms. Barg aubeequently tranaferred her joint tenanc,
intereat in the homeetead property to Mr. Barg. At the
time ot the tranafer, the asaeased value of the property
wu S120,800. Ma. Barg also tennlnated her ownership
interest in certificates of deposit the couple had held
jointly. Id.. at 3a-4a.
1 On March 2, 2009, tllia Courtp-ant«I the State otMlnnelota't conditional motion to lnc«vene u a J*t.Y allped witll petitioner Voe. All
~ in thJa brfelto '"petlUonar"' nrfff to peutionlr VOL
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Ma. Bars died ln 2004, havln1 received a tot.al of
,1oe,,11.68 In medlcal-ualatance benefit.a throu1h the
atate Medicaid prosram. Mr. Bars died five montha
later. Pet. App. u.

b. In h1I claim agalnat Mr. BUT• eat.ate, peUtloner
aou1ht to recover the full amount of Medtcald benefit.a
pafd on bebaJt of ML Barg. Pet. App. 4L Respondent,
who la the repreaentatwe of Mr. Barg'1 ..tat., allowed
"8,880 u a claim •ainet the ntate. but d1aallowed
$44,538.13. Ibid.. 1
Petitioner ftled a claim-allowance petitiol'l in state
coart. The diatrict court upheld the partial diaallowanc:e.
PeL App. 48a-61L The coart reJted on the Minneeota
Court of Appeala• decl.llon In /fl ,.. .Ettaw of Gwllwrg,
661 N. W.2d 701 (2002), which held that. Mlnneaota'•
eetate-recovery law la preempted luofar u it permita
reeoverJ' up "to the value of tbe uaeta or t.he eetate that
were marital propertJ" a IDJ point in the man-tap, becauae '2 U.S.O. 1396p(bXZXB) permit.a recovery only "to
the extent of" the Medicaid recipient'• Interest at the
time of deat.11. G ~ . 961 N.W.!d at 714. The court
concluded that. at time of her deatJI, Ml. Bug'a intereet
in the uaete ol Mr. Bari'• eat.ate tbM ,vere marital propel't.7, includin1 a lil....tate lnterat ID the homeatead and
a personal property allowmce, t.otaled '88,880. Pet.. App.

60a·61L
c. The Mlnneaota Court. of Appeal• ravened and
remanded for recalculation of petitioner'• allowable
claim. Pet. App. 52&-Na. Like the dlltrlct court, the

• lt.pandenr• part.Ill' 10aw111C1 ~ . . . , applJ"llltlJ l"llted •
t.hepNlnlNtha& Ma. Bq(l)hld aaa.hllflntallttn the bomatNd,
valued a&.._.., ii& the tlnwathtrdlltJI, ~tbelntAlr'Ylvoltnmf•, and (2). . aatitled to a pnoaaJ pnpat, allonnce In CM amount

~seooo. S..Pe&.App.-

:

'(},f3'0ti:f
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court of appeala concluded that., under federal law, the
claim waa neceauril7 limited to the value of Me. Barg's
interest ln speclfted aueta at the tJme ot her death.
/d. at 68a (citing Gullbn-g, 662 N.W.2d at 714). The
court of appeala concluded, however, that Ms. Barg'1
intA!rest in the homestead at the time of her death wu a
joint tenancy intereet, valued u a one-half interest In the
property's value of $120,800, or $60,400. Id. at 62a.
d. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part
and reversed in part, concluding that petitioner wu not
entitled to full recovery from Mr. Barg's eat.ate. Pet.
App. la-45a.
AJJ an initial matter, the court rejected respondent's
contention that federal law completely preempt. Minnesota's estate-recovery law inaolar u it permit.a recovery
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient's surviving
spouse. Pet. App. 19a-30a. The court concluded that
allowing recovery from a surviving spouae's estate is con@l1tent with both the Act's pre~luaion or recovery from
the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a
in:arvlving spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2}(A), u well aa the

purpoaea of the Medicaid Act's recovery provisiona. Pel
App. 29a.

The court concluded, however, that federal law ltmlta
the :,cope of recovery againat a surviving spouse's
estate to the value of 88Set.a in which the recipient spouse
had an interest "at the time of death," 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b)(4)(B), and thereby preempt.a Minnesota's

estate-recovery law Insofar aa ft permit.a the State
to reach any other asaeta "that were marital property or jointly owned property at a.n, time during th. ffl(JJ-riag•." Pet. App. 31a (quotin1 Minn. Stat. Ann.
I 256B.16, subd. 2 (2007)); see id. at 30&-37a.

:
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The court tGrther concluded that Ma. Bars did not
~ lntereat. lD the bomeatead or bank account.a at.
the time of her death. becauM ehe bad tl'anaferred her
interwt in tboee . . .te to Mr. e.,.. betm-w abe died. The
ha,,e

court theralore held that petitioner had no lepl entitlement. to aat.iafaetion ot the Si.we cl.;m lrolD tboee - - ·
- i . . Pet. App. 1'7a....._ Bat. becauae reepondent bad
partiall7 allowed pet,it.tonw• c:Jabn. and iw¥er cbaDe~
t.be dtat.rlct eoart•a award ol t.llat parUal allOW1111ce of
'81,880, the MiDDeaota Supreme Court held th& peti-

tioner could recOYel" t.hat amount. Id. at '8a 46a.
Dl8C1JIMIION
The Mianeeota Sapreme Court"• dedidou la correct
uad doea not WUT'llllt t'urtber rwvtew. Tb• federal
Medicaid Act pG"DUUI 1"9Ceff'erJ' al c:orrecU7 paid benaftta
trom tbe •tate of the Nelpl•t'a aanhlnc apoaae. bat
ltmtta t.hat reeGTff7 to the value ot uaeta la whJcb the
recipient. bad a lep ID.tenet at. the time other death.
Althoasb th• l"'elll1lt ID tbla caae dUl'en ft"OIII tile Nllalt
n /lflfoN q/Wim. eOT N.W.2d 882 (N.D. IOOO). the
dtffeNDce ID&7 not reflect. • dlaqreement a.boat tJae
meanin& of federal Kedicald law, but only ••sent conclmou about when. under atate law, u tndfvfdaal retmu a lepl lnterut ID UNta eonv41J,Wd to a •poaae. The
pettt.ton for a writ of eertJorarl •lloald be denied.
A. Th• Dect.toa OITH Mina..._ . .,._.. Coan Ia c...

in,.,.

r.a

1. The Mlnneaota Supreme Coa.rt correotly concluded that the Medicaid Act torbtda pedtJoner from
to reoover c o ~ paid benetlte trom aaaet.a In
•htch the Medicaid recipient had DO lesa,1 bltene& at tbe
time other death.

-•klna'
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Under the Medicaid Act. a State generalq ma_y not
Nek to rec0'9'8r coaaectq paid Medicaid benefit.a. "2
U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l). The Act providN. bowwer, that a
State (1) ,,...,. aeek. recov9r7 ot auntas home and related beneftta paid cm t..balf ot an lndffidual OYer tlle..,.
ot 66 from "'the tndnidual'• eatate,. u deftmed by abate
probate law; and (2) maw, at lta option. dllftn• ~ . tndtridual'• •tate• more broadly t.o include any ......ta In
wblch the iDdhrldual had any lepl title or lntereet at. the
time of death (to tb• extent. of aucb lnter.t.). lndudfnar
euch -eta conveyed to a eantTor, heir or a..ea'8n of the
deee-d tnclividaal tbroush joint tenancy. t.enane!7 In
common, auntronblp, life Ntat.e, lhing troet.. or ot..ber
arnmpment.." "2 U.S.O. 11Mp(b)(1)(B). (b)(4)(A) and
(B). Thu.a, th• Medicaid Am., which permtta reeovery
only after the death of the reetptut'• a,u,tvhqr epoaM.
a U.S.C. 18Np(b)(2), aat.horlsea a State to ffle a retmbunement c1alm qalnat the aamvtnc epouae'a eata&4,
up to the •alue of any wet.a In which the Medfcakl reef~
tent had a lesal tnteruL at the time of her death.
The Mlnneaota •tate-reeov-,, law exceed• tbe acope
of that authortaatton. U permtta the St.ate to recover
from a aal"Ytvhla apoua•'• •tate MUie value ot the ....ta
of the eatate that were marital property or Jotntly owned
property cal °"W ff,,.. dlfring UN mon-iac,e,,. Minn. Stat.
A.ma. I 268B.16, 1111bd. 2 (200'1) (emphuia added), without
resard to whether tbe recipient. retained aa lntereat In
the 1111Mta at the time of her deatll. BecauN a State may
not. recover correctly paid Medicaid beneftta except to
the extent authorised by federal law, aee '2 U.S.O.
13Np(b)(l), Mlnneaota'• atatute eonfflc:ta wfth federal
law and le therefore preempted. S•• Col~.,. F«I.
s,111. ~ Loa" A••'n v. G1'Cnu, ,11 U.S. ffl. 280-282
(1981).
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2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 25-28) t.b&t the ten ot the
Medicaid Act impo.se.t no limit. on penntaaible recoveey
trom t.he estate ot the Medicaid recipient's surviving
spouee, because t.he Act definee the term "aeeete" to include .. all lncome and reeow,:ea of the individual and of
the individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C.1396p(hX1), According to petitioner, "(b 'Jy including resources of both 'the
Individual' and 'of the individual's epouee' in the meaning
of 'aaeete,' Congreu clearly Intended that the apouae's
resources fall within the scope of I lS96p(bX4XB)." Pet.
'l7.

Petitioner ia incorrect. Although the general atatutory definition of "aaseta" does encompaaa resource• of
both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid recipient) and
"the individual's spouae," the particular provision of the
Medicaid Act at fasue here reten specffleally to ~ ..asset& in which tlae individual had any legal title or intereat at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(,)(B) (emphaala added). Petltloner'e argument finds it necuaary
to rewrite that clause to read "'any • • • aaaeta in
which [llithdr or bot/& ti&. individual and the i·ndiviclual'•
,pouH] had any legal title or intereat.'" Pet. 26 (brack')' eta and asteriks in original) (emphaeie added). But this
editing doea not.hlng leea than make the statute aay t.he
opposite of what It aaye. The plain language of the operative provision of the Act retu tea petitioner's reading.'
• In d81Criblns th• QJ)el'StlOG or the amended .w.e-recover;r pro,viaion. the leglllative hiltory ol th• 1991 amendmenta allo foc:ua«I on
the uaet.a of tht individual who hid NCeived Medicaid beneflta. rat.It•
than the reaourcea al both the individual and hil or h• ,pou.._ See
R.R. Cont. Rep. No. 211, load eon,., 11& Sell. 886 (1988) (..At tht
option of the State. the ntat.e against [which) • • • reet19.-Y LI IOUlb~
may Include any NIAi or penonal plJl*tJ • other uNla In which t.w

~td t.l::IS0!0l 600Z 91 ·1nr
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3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act aJao ftnda
little support in the Act's other provtatona concerning the
treatment of epoueal ueete. See Pet. 27-28. Aa petitioner notea, t.he Medicaid Act generall1 considers the
community spouse's uaeta for purpoeee of determining
whether an inatltuUonal.lzed individual ia eligib1e to receive benefit.a. But the Act also exempts certain property, such aa the couple', home. from consideration, 42
U.S.C. 1382b(aX1), 1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the community spouu to retain certain amounts of resources and
inCQme t.hat are not considered available to pay for the
applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (1)(2).
Moreovert once the inatitutionalized spouse fa determined to be eJigible for benefits, the Medicaid Act provide• that "no reaourcea of the community spouse shall
be deemed available to the fnatftutfonaJfzed spouse." 42
U.S.C. 1896r-6(cX4). The Medicaid Act, in short, impoeee eignlllcant 1lmltaUona on petitioner's asserted
prindple that "spouses are expected to support each
other." Pet. 'l:1. To read Section 1396p(bX4)(B) in accordance with it.a plain terma thua fa consistent with the

broader statutory scheme.
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity
about limitJng spousal estate recovery to the value of
888eta in which t.he Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the Ume of death, the presumption again.et preemption does not come into play, Pet. 28 (cfttng Mtdtron·
ic, Int:. v. Loh.f', 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996))--even assuming, arguendo, that thia presumption hu force tn the context of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative program like Medicaid in which the State's program la sub~ hid any lepl

dtle or lnterllt at tM t1me of death, locludtn,
the home. '1 (emphm added).
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jec:t to federal approval. And for similar reaeone, petitioner's auggeetion that the decision below improperl7
enforces againat Lhe State "Caln ambiguoua conditfon" on
the acceptance of federal !unda Wlder Spending Clauae
legialation lacka 11111 merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arli,sgtcm
Cffl&. Sela. Did. Bd. of Edvc. v, Mu'7'hf, 548 U.S. 291,

296 (2006)).
Petitioner alao em (Pet. ZO..Z3, 28 n.8) ln ueerting
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's Interpretation of
Section 1896p(b)(4}(B) la lnconalatent with the interpretation of the re.sponaible federal agency. HHS haa nett.her promulgated regulation• nor iaaued guidance interpreting Section 1896p(b)(4')(B) to authorize the kind of

eetate recovery that petitioner urges in this cue. To be
sure, CMS in 2007 approved Minnesota·• state plan
amendment incorporating lbs statutory apoaeaJ recovery
proviaiona. See Pet. App. 89a-98a. But CMS'• approval
fa not the equivalent ot binding interpretive guidance.
Ct. 42 C.F.R. 430.lG(a)(l) (a etate plan or plan amendment Is deemed approved lf CMS does not act. within 90
days aft.er eubmiaeion). Moreover, CMS'• approval followed binding Judlclal decialona In MJnneaota•a own
court.a interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit recovery to
aaaeta in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at
time of death. See, 1.g., /11 n Esta.le o f ~ ' 662
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). As aet forth
above In this brief, see p. 9, •pro, HHS also interpret.a
the Medicaid Act to limit recovery in that manner.
B. Th• Deciaton Below Dou Not WUTaDt Furtll• am.,..

1. Petitioner contende (Pet. 24-25) that review la
reaolve a conflict between the dedeion below and the North Dakota Supreme Court•a dec:taton In

warranted to

:
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Wini, ,uprc1.• In Wins, much u in tbia cue, a Medicaid
recipient had t.ranaferred ueet.a t.o bfa apouae before hla
death, and t.be State sought to recoYer the coat of the
Medieaid beneflta from the spouse's eatate after her
death. The court held that the Stat.a wu pennitted under 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(4)(B) to recover the value of an7
aueta ufJl which the deceaaed recipient once held an in·
tereat," Including aaaeta conveyed to hie spouse before
hla death. Wim, 80'1 N.W.2d at 881.
But the different reeulta in thia cue and in Wim may
not. reffect a dlaagreemeat aboat the meaning of !edenl

Medicaid law. Notabl;y, the North Dakota Supreme
Court, like the Minnesota Supreme Court. stated that
the State ..[could] assert a claim agalut real or penonal
4 Ju the Mlnaaota Supr9m8 Coutt. .ncud (l'eL App. lla-21&), two
och• et.ate courtl haw eonc:tucs.d that SectlGII 18Np(b) aut.bort- reC1J9917 oaly from U. ..... ol a Medieaid recipleni, and no& from ta
--ofhilor her apouae. SeeHiwlf v,
~/Pt,b. Aid, &
N.E.2d 1'8 (m 2008): /,a,w B**ofllwltwf, 6'1 N.W.Id 141(Wfa. Ct.
App. 1991). But. thoNdectalona and the dedlbl belolf an not In conffle&. Both Hitwa and . . . an ~ t wltb tbe pr(Ddpi. that a
State may reeo+w trvm che--vt a MllcHcul l"IIClp19at'1111rYMnt
SJ10UN tflt. all'dla ltt oplloa unda' SeccfGn 1890p(bX4XB) to deftDe
thelndlvldual"1 eatatemcn bnldlJtblD lt.llcW!nedundlratateprobate law. See Hiw, 860 N.E.%d at lU-llf (aplainlns tllatbe et.ate
teplatute could lmedlt!ned tberedplenr111tat.elnlladl •W'aJ' • to
prvtid• lor ret#lfllrJ ot catlln -tram the . . . . of hla IIUrffllnt
apouN, 1M had ebotm not to do .o); ...,,., 5'1 N.W.Jd at 241 Is
n.a (holdmr tha • ttat.e atatut.e authorilina lblJ NCOYe7 tram a..,
rivfns
•t.at.e exceeded the Stat.'1 aat.hority mxfar a U.S.O.
1391p(b). wlibaut conakla1nr whather It would have been pmnfutble

o.pa,,,,.,_

•poua'•

fortbeStawt.orweov.-ft'OlllUMIUnMnglpOUM'llltatathawlua~

...-.1n whkh tll• recipient had - intaW& I& the tJme of death). Re1pondentbeN. In aft1'9"1lt.doeana&~the f6melota8upnme
Court'• eondllllon dll&. State .. panniUal tAI ...... ft'OID tile .....
oh tunmllC lpouN Ill IOfflHircufflllaaea Set BP. In Opp. 1, 1-9, 19.
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propert)', and other ueete in whieh [the recipient] had
any legal UUe or other Int.net CIC Ai, dM:&ll&.,. Wirt,, 80'1
N.W.2d at. 886 (emphuia added); see alao ibid. ("Our
inquiry • • • ia • • • whether [the recipient] had
'real and personal property and other aaeta tn which
[be] had any legal titJe or intereat at CM Um. of d«JCh.. ")
(emphaala added). Although itl reasoning fa not entirely
clear, t.he court In Wini appeared to conclade that the
reeipient in that cue, despite formal conveyance of certain aeset.e before death, retained an interen in the relevant propert)' until hia death. when the inteNlt wu conveyed to bla apouae through "other arrangement."' 60'1
N.W.2d at 886 (quoting 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4XB)). The
court did not. elabonte on the nature of that tntereat,
although it referred to the State'• argument tbat
the recipient had retained a "marital or equitable i:ntereat" in the ueeta at the time of hla death, i<L at 888, and
noted that other court.a had interpreted Sectlon
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach etate-law community-property
and home1tead lntereata, uL at 885.
The different reeulte reached by the North Dakota
Supreme Court and the court below on similar fact.a tbue
may reflect not contlictin1 interpretaUone of federal
Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under
state law, a epouee ret.alm a legal mtereet in property
conveyed to hta or her epoaee. Compare Win•, 607
N.W.2d at 886-M, with Pet. App. 38a-40a (cOftcladJng
that, aft.er M1. Barg tranaferred her lntereat In the

homestead and bank accounts, she no longer had a lepl
tntereet that could have been conveyed to Mr. Barg upon
her death), and id. at 40a (noting that Minnesota law
"makee no reterence to • • • re-deftning the probate
eatate to include all marital property. even property
tnmaferred prior to death").
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Even If the decialona In Wirla and thla cue do reflect
a dtaagreement aa t.o proper Interpretation of the Medicaid Act, thle Court.•• review would not be warranted.
The Mlnneaota Supnme eourr, lntspl'etadon of federal
law 11 correct. and to date, on)J the North Dakota 811•
preme Court hu allowed Medfc:atd rec:oveq follcnrfna an
inter vtvoa tranater ot Uletl between spouaee. Aanmargaendo that Lhe Nortb Dakot.a Supreme Coart maundentood federal Medicaid law, rather than atmp'7
applied a peculiar feature of ltl own property law, the
North Dakota court bu not had an opportmut, to conalder HHS'• Interpretation, and the conflict may work
itself out aa the fuue la further lddreaaed in the lower
coorta.
2. Although petitioner (Pet. 31-38) ia correct that
eetate-recoveey etrorta are Important to the Medicaid
prolJ'am, queatfou concerning the scope of the Act.'•
estate-recovery pro-riaiou ba.,e not arfaen frequently,
and relatively few Stata have opted to seek eat.ate recoveq to the maximum extent permitted b7 federal law.
See Office of A.Nfatant Secretary for Policy & Eftluation, HHS, Poliq/ St'. No. I, M,dtca.idBatat. Rm,,,
Cou.cticme tbl. , (Sept. 2006) (only nine States mate
maximum use of federal poltq opUona); eee al8o Pet.. 81.
Moreover, altbourb the federal Medlcal.d Act Um1tll
estate recoveey to thOH aueta bl which the Medicaid
recipient had a legal intereet at the time of her death. the
nature and extent of euch lntereata remain largel7 the
domain ot state law. Notably, M.lnnaot.a'1 Governor hu
propoeed redefining marital property Int.ere.ta to permit
ree09e17 of medical aaaiatance trom the estate of the
later-1urvifln1 1pouse in thll contut. See Gownlor'a
R t c o m ~ Mi11fl..ola8ta.t, Bwlo.C, f010-11 Bimnicu B'Mlg.C, HumGn Sffllfc• DlfJ'r 182 (Ju. 2'1,

ln•
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2009). That. proposal haa not become law, nor baa it been
reviewed by the Secretary ot HHS. The proposal, however, euggeata that Mlnneaota may be able to work tCr
ward greater auet recovery consistent. with the clear
terms of f'ederal Medicaid law.
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY CONTAINS NO EXPRESS
GIFTING AUTHORIZATION AND THIS FACT IS
DISPOSITIVE IN THIS APPEAL.

The personal representative contends that because George Perry, using his power of
attorney for Martha, conveyed Martha's property to himself before she died, 1 the Department
may not recover the property and it can be distributed to George's heirs. This argument relies on
the validity of the purported transfer. If the transfer by George to himself was invalid., then the
personal representative's argument completely fails and, even if Medicaid law is interpreted as
the personal representative suggests, the Magistrate must be reversed and the Department's claim
allowed.
A.

Standard of Review.
The standard of review for interpretation of an instrument, such as the power of attorney

in this case, is set forth in the case of Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P .3d 1036 (2008):
This Court's standard ofreview of a lower court's interpretation of an
instrument depends on whether the instrument is ambiguous. C & G, Inc. v. Rule,
135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001) (citing DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110
Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1986)). The question of whether an instrument is
ambiguous is a question oflaw, over which this Court exercises free review. Id. In
deciding whether a document is ambiguous, this Court must seek to determine
whether it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Bondy v. Levy, 121
Idaho 993, 997, 829 P .2d 1342, 1346 ( 1992). "In the absence of ambiguity, tht:
document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to
the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." C & G,, 135 Idaho

1When

this matter began, Martha Perry was still alive. The Department has been informed by the personal
representative that Martha passed away on May 4, 2010.
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at 765, 25 P .3d at 78 (citing Juker v. Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645,
637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981)).

Chavez, 146 Idaho at 219, 192 P .3d at 1043. Here, the power of attorney is unambiguous. The
fact that the power of attorney lacks any express gifting power is not "reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation." Therefore, the interpretation of the power of attorney is a question of
law. Even if it were ambiguous, then evidence of intent would be required, of which there is
none but the document itself.

8.
The Personal Representative's Interpretation of the Power of Attorney Is Incredibly
Strained and Not Reasonable.
The personal representative takes seven sequential words out of context and constructs a
nonsensical sentence that he claims grants power to the principle to make a gift to himself of
Martha's real property. She contends the power of attorney gave George powE:r "To ... exercise
... any ... gift ... for the principle." See Respondent's Brief, p. 36 (top). She then incorrectly
states that the full sentence is found in footnote 17 of her brief. Actually the seven words are
taken from a much longer sentence with 164 words:
(H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt
for, exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or payment
due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and exercise any power
over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary control; establish a revocable
trust solely for the benefit of the principal that terminates at the death of the
principal and is then distributable to the legal representative of the estate of th1;:
principal; and, in general, exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts
which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability; provided,
however, that the Agent may not make or change a will and may not revoke or
amend a trust revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trnstee of any
trust for the benefit of the principal to pay income or principal to the Agent unless
specific authority to that end is given.
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Exhibit "G" to the Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, ,i
H (underline added). This paragraph is clearly intended to grant the agent the power to accept
gifts and exercise powers for the benefit of the principle. In no way can this language be
reasonably construed to grant George the power to make gifts to himself of Martha's property.
Indeed, the same paragraph contains several clauses prohibiting self dealing:
... establish a revocable trust solely for the benefit of the principal that terminates
at the death of the principal and is then distributable to the legal representative: of
the estate of the principal ... provided, however, that the Agent may not mah: or
change a will and may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or amendable by the
principal or require the trustee of any trust for the benefit of the principal to pay
income or principal to the Agent unless specific authority to that end is given.
Exhibit "G" to the Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, ,i
H (underline added).
If a text is long enough, words can be pieced together to say almost anything. For

example, some people claim to find hidden messages in the Bible. 2 The phrase extracted by the
personal representative is: "To ... exercise ... any ... gift ... for the principle." Respondent's
Brief, p. 36 (top). What does it mean to "exercise" as gift? One can "make" a gift, "give" a gift,
"accept" a gift, but "exercise" a gift? One can exercise a "power," but a not a '·'gift." Such a
construction exists only in the imagination of the personal representative. In s1;!arching the
"allstates" and "allfeds" databases on Westlaw, this construction is not found in any case. 3

2See

e.g. http://www.nmsr.org/biblecod.htm.

3The

personal representative's claim that ,i B of the power of attorney permits gifting of jpersonal property
(Respondent's Brief, p. 39 fn. 22 (carried over from previous page)) is similarly vacuous. Broad a1uthority to purchase,

sell and transact business is not authority to make a gift, especially to oneself.
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The simple fact is that the power of attorney lacks any express provision giving George
the power to make gifts to himself of Martha's real property.
C.
The Lack of Express Gifting Power Is Fatal to George's Purported Transfer of the
Property to Himself.
The personal representative seems to argue that even without express gifting authority,
the gift should still be valid because the power of attorney is "incredibly comprehensive" and
because "one is struck by the comprehensiveness of the document." Responde:nt's Brief, pp. 35
and 38. The argument seems to be that the right to make gifts should be inferred from the tone of
the document. However, this argument is a two-edged sword. The fact that the power of
attorney is comprehensive suggests the drafter omitted gifting powers on purpose.
More importantly, it is express gifting language that is required by the authorities cited by
the Department at section VIII(A) of the Appellant's Brief and that is required by Idaho Code§
32-912:

32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and
either may bind the community property by contract, excypt that neither the
husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell,
convey or encumber community property. either real or personal. All deeds,
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity
herewith are hereby validated.
Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added). There is nothing "express" in the power of attorney
used by George in his attempt to convey Martha's property to himself.
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D.
The Power of Attorney Didn't Grant Gifting Powers Before the Uniform Power of
Attorney Act and Does Not Grant Them after.
The personal representative claims that the power of attorney "Met The Requirements of
LC. § 15-5-501 et. seq." Respondent's Brief, p. 39. The personal representative seems to
suggest that under the former law, George's gifting to himself would have been authorized. This
is incorrect. The section cited by the personal representative reads as follows:
15-5-502. Durable Power of Attorney Not Affected by Disability. All
acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during any
period of disability or incapacity of the principle have the same effect and inure to
the benefit of and bind the principle and his successors in interest as if the
principle were competent and not disabled.

Idaho Code § 15-5-502 (1982) (underline added). This section (nor any other section of the old
law) grants powers to the agent that are not found within the four comers of the power of
attorney.
The personal representative also suggests the Uniform Power of Attorney Act,. adopted in
2008, would not have required express gifting language for an agent who was also a spouse.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 40-41. This is also incorrect. Idaho Code§ 15-12-201(1) provides as
follows:
15-12-201. Authority that requires specific grant- Grant of general
authority
( 1) An agent under a power of attorney may exercise the following
authority on behalf of the principal or with the principal's property only if the
power of attorney expressly grants the agent the authority and exercise is not
otherwise prohibited by other agreement or instrument to which the authority or
property is subject:
(a) Create, amend, revoke or terminate an inter vivos trust;
(b) Make a gift;
(c) Create or change rights of survivorship;
(d) Create or change a beneficiary designation;
(e) Delegate authority granted under the power of attorney;
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(f) Waive the principal's right to be a beneficiary of a joint and survivor
annuity, including a survivor benefit under a retirement plan; or
(g) Exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has authority to deleg8lte.

Idaho Code § 15-12-201 (underline added). The personal representative points to the comments
in the Uniform act for the proposition that the "default rule" would not apply to the spouse as
agent. Respondent's Brief, p. 40 (bottom). The personal representative quotes the folllowing
language in the comment, but incorrectly inserts the bracketed material making it appear that this
comment applies to the requirement for an express authorization to make a gift:
Subsection (b) r1.c. § 15-12-20l(l)(b)] contains an additional safeguard
for the principal. It establishes as a default rule that an agent who is not an
ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal may not exercise authority to
create in the agent or in an individual the agent is legally obligated to support, an
interest in the principal's property. For example, a non-relative agent with gift
making authority could not make a gift to the agent or a dependant of the agent
without the principal's express authority in the power of attorney. In contrast, a
spouse-agent with express gift-making authority could implement the principal's
expectation that annual family gifts be continued without additional authority in
the power of attorney.
Official Comment to Article 2 of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. However, comrary to the
personal representative's insertion, the comment does not apply to section 15-12-20 l (l )(b) at all,
it applies to section 15-12-201(2)4 which provides as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding a grant of authority to exercise authority in
subsection (1) of this section, unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, an
agent that is not an ancestor, spouse or descendant of the principal, may not
exercise authority under a power of attorney to create in the agent, or in an
individual to whom the agent owes a legal obligation of support, an interest in the
principal's property, whether by gift, right of survivorship, beneficiary
designation, disclaimer or otherwise.

4That this comment applies to subsection (2) is clearly and correctly shown by the compiler of the Idaho Code in
the Official Comment following Idaho Code~ 15-12-201 in the official Michie publication of Titles 14-17, at page 468
(second column, halfway down).
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Idaho Code§ 15-12-201(2). In other words, subsection (1) prohibits the making of gifts, or
doing the other things specified in that section, without express authority, and subsection (2)
imposes an additional restriction that applies to non-relatives. The comment in no way suggests
that an agent-spouse can make gifts, whether to himself or others, without an express grant of
authority.
Therefore, neither the original power of attorney law, nor the current power of attorney
law permits the making of gifts without express authority within the power of attorney.
E.
There Was Absolutely No Benefit to Martha in George Transferring Martha's Real
Property to Himself.
The personal representative also incorrectly makes it appear that Idaho Code § 15-12217(3) would permit George's gift to himself in this case. Respondent's Brief, p. 41, fn. 25.
However, section 15-12-217 doesn't eliminate the requirement for express gifting authority.
Instead, it applies where gifting has already been authorized. Moreover, this siection imposes
additional requirements for making gifts:
(3) An agent may make a gift of the principal's property only as the agent
determines is consistent with the principal's objectives if actually known by the
agent and, if unknown, as the agent determines is consistent with the principal' s
best interest based on all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The value and nature of the principal's property;
(b) The principal's foreseeable obligations and need for maintenance;
(c) Minimization of taxes, including income, estate, inheritanc,e,
generation-skipping transfer and gift taxes;
(d) Eligibility for a benefit, a program, or assistance under a statute or
governmental regulation; and
(e) The principal's personal history of making or joining in making gifts.
Idaho Code§ 15-12-217 (underline added).
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The personal representative suggests that the transfer was in Martha's best interest in light
of eligibility for government benefit programs. Respondent's Brief, p. 41, fu. 25. This ignores
the fact that the home is not counted when it comes to eligibility for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. §
l 396r-5( c)( 5). It was completely unnecessary for Martha to divest herself of the home in order to
qualify for Medicaid. This transfer benefitted George, not Martha. There was nothing in this for
Martha at all.
The personal representative makes several other statements that are completely
unsupported by any evidence in the record. She states that "Martha would have signed the deed
at issue were she able to do so." Respondent's Brief, p. 39, fu. 23. There is absolutely no
evidence in the record to support that claim. To the contrary, the evidence in the record is that
Martha, as the personal representative states, "put George's name on the title"5 to the propertywhile retaining her own interest in the property. Moreover, she gave George a power of attorney
that did not include gifting powers, and to the contrary, imposed specific restrictions on self
dealing. 6 See ,r,r G and Hof the Power of Attorney (Exhibit "G" to the Department's
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim). Contrary to the suggestions of the
personal representative, the power of attorney did not give all power to Georgt::, it limited those
powers. The only evidence of Martha's intent to be found in the record is the documents

5Respondent's

Brief, pp. 37-8.

6The personal representative calls these anti-self-dealing provisions "standard provisions" and "boilerplate."
Respondent's Brief, p. 39 (first paragraph and fn. 23). However, it is 1 H that the personal representative relies upon.
Therefore, apparently, the personal representative's view is that part of1 His important and represents the intent of the
principle, but the other parts of that same paragraph are mere "boilerplate." These sections are as important as any others
in the power of attorney and demonstrate that George, as the agent, was not given "comprehensive" authority; he was
given limited authority as the document clearly shows, and was limited to the powers actually expressed thc!rein.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 8

C:\Documents and Settings\cartwriw\Desktop\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd

000663

themselves, which documents evidence the intent to retain, not give away, her interest in her real
property.
Also, there is no evidence that Martha was not competent to sign a Quitclaim Deed at the
time George purported to transfer the property to himself. Likewise, there is no evidence in the
record to support the personal representative's claim of title company "standard procedure" as
stated at Respondent's Brief, p. 36, fn. 18. There is also no evidence that transfers of the home
are "typical in cases of married couples" as stated at Respondent's Brief, p. 37.
Finally, the personal representative states that there are no concerns here of"negation of
the principle's estate plan." Respondent's Brief, p. 38. That assumes, however, evidence of an
estate plan contrary to the plain language of the documents in the record. The docum1~nts in the
record suggest only an intent on Martha's part to retain her property, not give it away. No
evidence to the contrary is found in the record.
F.

The Alleged "Finding of Fact" Is, at Best, a Conclusion of Law.
The personal representative claims the Magistrate made oral findings of fact to support

the personal representative's claim of "interspousal agency." Respondent's Brief, p. 43. There
are, however, no findings of fact. There are simply unexplained and unsupported conclusions of
law. The statements of the Magistrate cited by the personal representative are the Magistrate's
conclusions drawn from the four comers of the document itself. The lines quoted by the personal
representative are the following:
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and - because I
don't think that that - that paragraph where the word gift is written, paragraph H,
is the clearest kind of authority to make a gift of property. It certainly can be mad
that way...
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But I think - when everything - all of the language in that power of
attorney is considered, it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is that
document was entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, it
seems to me, including the right to deal with interest in real property. So I'm
going to make a determination for purposes of this case that that is a valid power
of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including giving Martha Perry's int(;:rest
in that property.
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes of this case. (emphasis
added)
Respondent's Brief, p. 43 (emphasis by personal representative omitted; underline added). There
is nothing here but reference to the document itself. This is a legal, not a factual dete1mination.
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.C., 148 Idaho 638,

, 227 P.3d 568,570 (2010);

Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562,566,212 P.3d 992, 996 (2009). The
Magistrate made no findings of fact that would support the personal representative's claim that
there was somehow implied spousal authority for George's self dealing.
G.
The Failure of Georg<::'s Gift of Martha's Property to Himselfls Sufficiient to Require
Reversal of the Magistrate and the Allowance of the Department's Claim.
The personal representative's disallowance of the Department's claim rests entirely upon
the Minnesota case of Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008). The holding in the Barg
case was that the state could recover only property in which the decedent had "any title or
interest" at the time of death. In this case, it is clear that George's purported conveyance to
himself fails and, therefore, Martha had an interest in the real property, or its proceeds, both at
the time of her death and George's. Therefore, the Department's claim, even if Barg is applied
in Idaho, must be allowed in this case. The Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim should be
reversed.
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II.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

A.
The Personal Representative Is Asking the Court to Eviscerate Idaho's Medicaid Payment
System.
The personal representative attempts to minimize the importance of her attack on the
Department's recovery of Medicaid payments by claiming she is merely challenging the
"application" of Idaho Code § 56-218, as if the Department is on some frolic unexpected by the
legislature that passed this law. However, the fact scenario presented in this case is exactly the
kind of case this law was enacted to deal with. Either an elderly Medicaid recipient has a spouse
or does not. Where a single person applies for long term care Medicaid, she must have spent all
her available resources except the last $2,000 before she can be eligible. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).
She can keep her house if she intends to return home, but it is completely subj,~ct to estate
recovery. Her heirs will receive nothing until Medicaid is repaid in full. However, under the
personal representative's argument, if one of a married couple needs assistance, she may simply
convey her home to her spouse, and it is then forever protected from estate recovery. Her heirs
will get the house when she and her husband pass away (or, according to the view of the personal
representative, the husband can simply give the property to the children whene:ver he likes). The
taxpayers are left holding the bag and have subsidized and protected the inheritance of the
Medicaid recipient's non-dependent children.
Obviously, when the legislature approved a plan to protect the elderly poor and their
spouses, this is not what they had in mind. This is what is in issue in this case. The personal
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representative wishes the court to nullify the requirement to reimburse Medicaid anytime the
Medicaid recipient has a spouse. 7

B.

Standard of Review.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the court exercises free

review. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,224 P.3d 458 (2008) citing

State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827,829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001).

III.
MEDICAID IS A PROGRAM FOR THE POOR AND IS NOT
INTENDED TO SUBSIDIZE THE INHERITANCE OF NONDEPENDENT CHILDREN OF MEDICAID RECIPIENTS.

A.

Medicaid Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept.
Medicaid for elderly couples is simple in concept. Long term care is very expensive.

Many elderly couples are unable to pay for needed medical care. Medicare does not cover long
term care. Medicaid is not insurance as Medicare or Social Security is. There is no payroll tax to
support it. It is a public welfare program funded by the general funds of the state and federal
government. It is intended to be the payer of last resort. The elderly can obtain medical
assistance (Medicaid) without divesting themselves of all their assets. Where a couple is
involved, there are complex rules to allow one spouse to obtain needed medical care while the
other remains living in the community. When both spouses have passed away, their assets are
recovered to reimburse the Medicaid program and provide for others who are in need.

7The personal representative has also asked the court to strike down the Department's rules, also approved by
the legislature, which implement the recovery law where there is a spouse. Respondent's Brief, p. 15.
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B.
The History of Estate Recovery Reveals a Clear Intent to Recover the Assets of this
Estate.
The history of Idaho's estate recovery program is relevant here. While Idaho has long
had estate recovery laws relating to public assistance, the first iteration of Idaho's modern estate
recovery law was passed in 1988. The first paragraph provides as follows:

56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance.
( 1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when the individual
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate
the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to
either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical assistance corre:ctly
paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but there shall be no
adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any,
and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who is under
twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled.
Transfers of real or pt::rsonal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district court.
Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) (1988). Not coincidentally, 1988 was the year Congress pass.ed the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA). The MCCA included provisions that for the first
time permitted one spouse to qualify for Medicaid long term care without impoverishing the
community (or at-home) spouse. 8 This process includes allowing spouses to make transfers
between themselves. The concern of the legislature to be able to recoup these transferred assets
can be read in the language of the original estate recovery statute.
Congress has always sought to counter the attempts of some to use the Medicaid program,
not as a payer oflast resort, but as an estate planning tool to protect and retain their own assets.
The language of the congressional committee, cited by the court in Cohen v. Commissioner of

Div. ofMedical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399,668 N.E.2d 769 (1996) is often quoted:

8The

MCCA was later repealed, but the anti-spousal-impoverishment provisions for Medicaid were retained.
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The Committee feels compelled to state the obvious. Medicaid is, and
always has been, a program to provide basic health coverage to people who do not
have sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves. When affluent
individuals use Medicaid qualifying trusts and similar "techniques" to qualify for
the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and State resources from
low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor women and children. This
is unacceptable to the Committee.
H.R.Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 ( 1985).
Cohen, 423 Mass. at 403-4, 668 N.E.2d at 772. By 1988, the committee report for the MCCA

continued to echo these same concerns:
The Committee is informed that a number of States have not made
effective use of the authorities under current law to prevent affluent individuals
from disposing of resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home
coverage. In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement program for
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing
home patients to their non-dependent children.
H.R. Rep. No. 105(JI), 100th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
857, 896, 1987 WL 61566, p. 31).
The battle had not ceased, of course, in 1993, when OBRA '93 was passed. 9 This law
included provisions which expanded the powers of the states to recover Medicaid benefits. The
accompanying legislative history shows Congress's intent that assets divided for purposes of
Medicaid eligibility be tracked and recovered.
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The program must identiify
and track resources {whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) of
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-based services.
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain

9The battle still hasn't ended, of course. In 2006 the president signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 giving
the states additional tools to assure couple's assets are used for their own care or available for recovery, rather than being
protected for the Medicaid couple's heirs. The provisions of the DRA go to enhanced asset transfer penaltlies and the
treatment of annuities and are not in issue here.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 14

C:\Documents and Settings\cartwriw\Desktop\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd

000669

when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide for
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the
individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the
surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living
trust, or other arrangement.
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 {May 25, 1993), Section 5112. {emphasis added).
Among the tools provided in OBRA '93 is the addition of a definition of "asst::ts" for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p which provides as follows:

{h) Definitions
In this section,, the following definitions shall apply:
(I)
The te1m "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p{h)(l) (emphasis added). "This section," of course, is 1396p. "Assets"
includes the "resources" of the individual and the spouse and includes resoum:;:s transferred by
the individual or the spouse. "Resources" are defined in subsection (h)(5):
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in st::ction
1382b of this title, without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to
the exclusion described in subsection (a)(l) of such section.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5). The reference to section 1382b and the exclusion in subsection (a)(l),
is to the couple's home. In other words, the "assets" defined in subsection (h){l) specifically
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includes the couple's home whether held by one, the other or both. It is hard to imagine language
that more clearly includes the property at issue in this case.
Another tool given to the states by OBRA '93 was the expanded definition of estate found
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4):
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or :interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). The personal representative argues that the definition
of assets in subsection (h) doesn't apply to this section. However, subsection (h) says, "[i]n this
section" and doesn't make an exception for subsection (b). Subsection (b), of course, is the
section that mandates estate recovery.
The personal representative urges the court to ignore the legislative history and find that
Idaho's estate recovery law preempted by federal law. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. However, the
personal representative herself cites Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed.
581 (1941), for the proposition that "Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law is 'an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'
Respondent's Brief at 12. If one is to determine whether the state law is "an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" one must inquire
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into what the purposes and objectives of Congress are. Clearly the intent of Congress and the
legislature is relevant and important to deciding this case. 10
Understanding that Congress has said that Medicaid is for the poor, that it "should not
facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home patients to their non-dependent
children." and that the state should "track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility
purposes)" and collect them "from the estate of the individual or the surviving spouse," one can
only make one of three conclusions: (1) Congress didn't mean what it said; (2) Congress made a
huge mistake in drafting the law; or (3) the personal representative is wrong.

IV.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE RELIES UPON A
SINGLE PHRASE OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW
READ OUT OF CONTEXT.
A.
The Personal Representative's Entire Preemption Case Relies on Reading a Phrase of 42
U.S.C. § 1396p out of Context.
The personal representative's argument is that any property transferred by a Medicaid
recipient to her spouse, while she is alive, is forever off-limits to Medicaid estate recovery. She
arrives at this argument because 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) contains the following language:
(8) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest) ....

10The personal representative also states that where a statute is unambiguous it must be read literally and no
legislative intent is necessary. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. The personal representative, however, offers her own statutory
construction and interpretation asserting that "asset" in 42 U.S.C. § l 396p(b)(4) doesn't mean what the definition in
subsection (h) says it means. Respondent's Brief, p. 28. If we are to read the statute literally, then the definition of
"asset" provided in subsection (h)(l) must be applied in subsection (b)(4).
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w
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The argument is that if the individual divests herself of her property
during life, it may not then be recovered after her death.
The problem with this argument is, of course, that it is overly simplistic and totally
ignores the entire body of Medicaid law including (I) an eligibility system that permits spouses
to freely transfer property between themselves, 11 (2) a definition of "assets" that includes
property transferred to the spouse during the eligibility process and specifically includes the
home, 12 (3) the expansive nature of subsection (b)(4) and it's purpose in recapturing the couple's
assets, 13 ( 4) the legislative history and purpose of Congress, 14 and (5) the absurd and unfair
results of this narrow interpretation. 15
B.
Subsection (b)(4) Was Intended to Expand the Scope of Property to Be Recovered, Not
Limit it.
Recall that subsection (b)(4) was part of OBRA '93 and that part of the intent of OBRA
'93 was to "identify and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) ... and
... provide for the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid ... from the estate of the
individual or the surviving spouse." H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25,
1993), Section 5112 ( cited above). This section is very broad and expansive:

11 See

discussion beginning at page 13 of this Brief.

12See discussion on page 15 of this Brief.
13See discussion on page 16 of this Brief.
14See

discussion beginning at page 13 of this Brief.

15 See

discussion beginning at page 34 of this Brief.
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(4) For purposes of this subsection, 16 the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets 17 included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; 18 and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to wl1om paragraph ( 1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), includinK such assets conveyed
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added).
Thus, when the language relied upon by the personal representative is read in context
with the remainder of the subsection and the definition of "assets" in subsection (h), it becomes
clear. The phrase beginning with "including" shows the breadth of this section. In case the
drafters missed something, they included the words "or other arrangement." The North Dakota
Supreme Court found this language sufficiently expansive to include property such as that at
issue in this case. In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). 19
The personal representative contends that the "including" phrase only applies to property
which passes instantly at death. Respondent's Brief, p. 7. This distinction, however, is not found

The "subsection" is 42 US.C. § 1396p(b) which includes the federal mandate that stat,~s pursue estate
recovery. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b )( 1).
10

17The personal representative says the word "assets" used here should not be given the definition found at
subsection (h)(l) of this section. Respondent's Brief p. 28. However, if Congress did not want the expansive definition
of "assets" to apply here, it could have used the word "property" or some other undefined word.

18 The

personal representative, taking the Department's argument out of context, says "[t]he Department argues
that estate recovery is really controlled by state law." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. Of course, what the Department
actually said was that state law defines what property is available for purposes of both state probate law and Medicaid
estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10. This subsection and the following clearly confirms the Department's
position.
19The

personal representative suggests the Department believes Wirtz to be weak because the Department does
not rely solely on the "other arrangement" language. This is simply because the issue in this case is controlled by Idaho
Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), discussed below, and Wirtz is merely
persuasive authority.
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anywhere in the law and is not supported by the language of the law itself. For example, where a
living trust is created the "legal title or interest" is passed immediately. Estate ofHull v.
Williams, 126 Idaho 437,443, 885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The beneficiary holds only the
beneficial, not legal, interest, and no legal interest passes on death. Subsection (b)(4), when read
in context, is clearly intended to capture all property the Medicaid recipient, by whatever means,
may have attempted to shelter or protect.
C.

The Jackman Court Ignored the Same Preemption Arguments Being Made Here.
The record in this case includes a lengthy binder of exhibits included with the

Departments Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. Included in these
exhibits is the full set of briefs filed in the Supreme Court in Idaho Department of Health and
We(fare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P .2d 6 (1998). The Department provided these
documents so the court could see that these very same preemption arguments have already been
made to the Idaho Supreme Court. 20 The Respondent's Brief in Jackman gives as an issue on
appeal, the following:
3. Does Federal Medicaid law allow the state to recover a recipient's
Medicaid costs from the estate of the surviving spouse beyond a tracing of the
recipient's assets owned at the time of death.
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, Exhibit "D" Respondent's Brief, p.
5. The discussion of this issue begins at page 16 of the brief and continues to page 23. These
same preemption arguments were continued in the Respondent's Rehearing Brief. Memorandum

20 The Department also provided a copy of the superceded decision in the Jackman case. Contrary to the claims
of the personal representative (Respondent's Brief, p. 22), the Department has never cited that decision as Jmthority.
However, like the underlying briefing it is important to provide context for the Court's ultimate holding, especially in
light of the identical arguments being made in this case. The personal representative, apparently, would prc~fer Jackman
be taken out of context.
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in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, Exhibit "D" Rehearing Brief, pp. 27-33. The
Respondent in Jackman also made the same arguments the personal representative makes here
regarding the inapplicability of the federal definition of"assets" at pp. 27-8. Yet, the only place
that the Idaho Supreme Court found the Department preempted was in the appllication of Idaho
Code§ 56-218 to a transfer of property that took place before the effective date of OBRA '93.
The remainder of the court's discussion deals with the timing of the particular transfer in the
Jackman case. The court stated:

This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid
payments for calendar quarters be2innin2 on or after October 1, 1993,
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "othe1r
assets." Without the definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l1.
"other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate. as defined by LC. §
15-1-201(15).
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10, 970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). Once the OBRA '93 changes

were in place, the preemption argument failed.
The personal representative argues as follows:
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is
impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83
S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the
state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399,
85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
Respondent's Brief, p. 12 (underline added). The Medicaid system exists to provide health care
for the poor. The personal representative does not explain how Idaho Code § 56-218,, in any
way, makes compliance with the federal Medicaid law impossible. Certainly the personal
representative is not arguing that the "full purposes and objectives of Congress" include
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preserving an inheritance for non-dependent children. Therefore, the personal representative has
not shown how both federal Medicaid law and Idaho Code§ 56-218 are in conflict.
D.

The 1993 Changes in OBRA '93 Are Central to the Court's Holding in Jackman.
The personal representative argues that the Supreme court's discussion of OBRA '93 in

Jackman is merely dicta. Respondent's Brief, p. 24. Similarly, the personal representative
suggests that Jackman is a pre-OBRA '93 case and is, therefore, not relevant. Respondent's
Brief, pp. 13, 23-4. Actually, Jad.wan is a post-OBRA '93 case with a pre-OBRA '93 property
transfer. The discussion of OBRA '93 is central to the court's holding, and Jackman is an
important case because it demonstrates what Congress did with OBRA '93 and how the outcome
of the case would have been different had the transfer been after the effective date of OBRA '93.

If the personal representative is correct, the Court could have simply said that the assets
were transferred before death, and therefore, the Department cannot have a claim. That is not
what the Court did. The court began with the over-arching holding:
The Department asserts that LC.§ 56-218, as it existed 21 at times
applicable to this case, authorized recovery of the balance of the Medicaid
payments from Lionel's estate. We agree.

Jackman, 132 ldaho at 8,970 P.2d at 215. The Court then goes on to state that the Department
was preempted from recovering the assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to her husband
before the effective date of OBRA '93. If the Court had agreed with the personal representative's
preemption argument in this case, it could have simply said that transferred property was out of

21 The personal representative reads this "as it existed" language out of context and says that the court was
limiting it's holding to the facts of the case because it was pre-OBRA '93. Respondent's Brief, p. 23. However, if one
reads the context, it is clear the court is talking about the "if there be no estate" language that existed in the original
statute (see page 13) and was changt:d in 1998, the same year Jackman was decided.
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the Department's reach forever. However, the Court went to great pains to discuss the effective
date of OBRA '93 and the effect that had on their holding in the case. The court discussed the
expanded definition of estate enacted by OBRA '93 and discussed the federal definition of
"assets." There was no disagreement by the court on the legal effect of the federal definition of
"assets." Rather, the court merely concluded that because the marriage settlement agreement was
executed before the effective date of OBRA '93, it did not apply to the transfe1Ted property:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e).
Therefore, it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Departm(;:nt
to recover the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separak: property.
This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid
payments for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993,
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "othe1r
assets." Without the definition of "assets" contained in 42 U .S.C. §
1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate, as
defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). Lionel's separate property, including the
community property transmuted by the agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10, 970 P .2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). The obvious and necessary
inference is that with "the definition of 'assets' contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p([h])(l), 'other
assets"' would include the property transferred by the Medicaid recipient to her husband through
the marriage settlement agreement.
The personal representative says that the Department is asking this court to "speculate as
to what our highest Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar." Respondent's
Brief, p. 23. However, the necessary implication from the Court's language is direct and the
inference is necessary and unavoidable. Things that are necessarily implied are not speculative,
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they are real and can have legal effect. There can be implied consent (State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho
300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007)), implied authority (Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure
Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473,476 (2009)), and implied promises (Gray v.
Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378,387,210 P.3d 63, 72 (2009)) among other things.

There is no need to speculate about the meaning of the Court here. The Court was clearly
explaining the effect of OBRI\ '93 when it comes to spousal recovery in Idaho. 22
E.

The Solicitor General's Briefls Not Legal Authority.
The personal representative is incredulous that the "Department fails to even mention"

the Solicitor General's brief. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. The reason for this, of course, is that the
Solicitor General's brief is not legal authority and is not binding on anyone. The personal
representative, without any authority at all says: "The U.S. Solicitor General's position is in fact
HHS's (and therefore CMS's) opinion on the issue." Respondent's Brief, p. 27. However, the
personal representative grants government attorneys, including the undersigned, too much
authority. While an attorney may represent an agency, a governmental agency's official
pronouncements come through the promulgation of regulations and rules. The Department is not
bound by the statements of a government attorney in an amicus brief, however well masoned it
may be. 23 Likewise, undersigned does not have authority to make official pronouncements for
the Department of Health and Welfare. Those are made by rule-making.

22 At page 26, fn.11 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative states that even if the court finds the
Court's discussion of OBRA '93 to be part of the Supreme Court's holding, it should still rule in favor of the personal
representative. The personal representative seems to be suggesting this court over-rule the Idaho :Supreme Court.
23 lt is easy to think of Medicaid as a federal program and the states as mere contract administrators. This is not
the case. The two sovereigns are partners in this program. If the federal government believes a state has failed to abide
by its rules, it can deny federal financial participation, whereupon the state has administrative and legal remedies.
Neither party is bound by the statements of the other's attorney in briefing.
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That said, the personal representative has only cited those portions of the Solicitor
General's brief with which it agrees. The Solicitor General's brief also finds that In re Estate of
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.. 2000) is not necessarily in conflict and suggests that the Supreme
Court deny certiorari because the state of Minnesota is remedying it's problem by the same
legislation the personal representative says is "clouding marital property law in Minnesota and
raising serious practical and constitutional concems."24 Respondent's Brief, p . 33.
The Solicitor General recognized that the issue here is really what state: law allows to be
recovered, and noted that Wirtz is not necessarily in conflict with the Minnesota Supreme Court's
holding in Barg:
Although its reasoning is not entirely clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to
conclude that the recipient in that case, despite formal conveyance of certain
assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death.,
when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangem«~nt." 607
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The court did not elaborate on
the nature of that interest, although it referred to the State's argument that the
recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of
his death, id. at 883, and noted that other courts had interpreted Section
1396p(b )(4)(B) to reach state-law community-property and homestead interests,
id. at 885.
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the
court below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of
federal Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under state law, a spouse
retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14
(underline added).

24 The

personal representative cites the case of Douglas County v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. Dist., No.
21-CV-09-477, August 4, 2010) and leaves the reader with the impression that the Douglas Coun(y case invalidated
Minnesota's new marital property law. This is incorrect. The Douglas County case had nothing to do with the issues
presented here. A copy of that case is attached as Appendix A.
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Continuing to recognize the importance of state law on this issue, the Solicitor General
noted that Minnesota was already enacting legislation to change the outcome of the Barg
decision:
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits estate recovery to
those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her
death, the nature and extent of such interests remain largely the domain of state
law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has proposed redefining marital property
interests to permit recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's Recommendation,
Minnesota State Budget, 2010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Services Dep 't 132
(Jan. 27, 2009). That proposal has not become law, nor has it been reviewed by
the Secretary of HHS. The proposal, however, suggests that Minnesota may be
able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear tenns of
federal Medicaid law. 25
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-16
(underline added). The Department provided a copy of this legislation as Exhibit "F" to the
Department's Memorandum m Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim.
So, if the Solicitor General's brief is entitled to as much weight as the personal
representative claims, then the Barg case is oflittle or no application in Idaho, since Idaho is a
community property state and Minnesota is not, and Idaho's marital property and probate laws
are quite distinct from Minnesota's.
A final word concerning the Solicitor General's brief: The personal representative
claimed that the Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General. Respondent's Brief, p. 27.
However, unless the personal representative has knowledge not available to the rest of us, the
reasons for the denial of certiorari remain unknown and could have been for a hundred different

25 The

personal representative speculates that Minnesota's new law will be found unconstitutional.
Respondent's Brief, p. 33. The Solicitor General didn't seem to be so pessimistic.
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reasons. All the denial of certiorari states is: "Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Minnesota denied." Vos v. Barg, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009).
F.
Other Provisions of State and Federal Law Make Sense Only If the Property of this Estate
Is Recoverable.
At page 4 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative correctly notes that in
determining eligibility of a married person, the assets of both the husband and wife are
considered. As already noted transfers of assets can be freely made from one spouse to the other.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Since both of a couple's assets are considered for eligibility purposes,
it doesn't really matter. Somehow, in the mind of the personal representative, all this changes at
recovery time. The assets of both spouses no longer matter. It is only what the Medicaid spouse
had (generally nothing if they transfer the home to the spouse) at death that can be recovered.
Still, even where the Medicaid spouse dies first, no recovery can be made from her estate until
after the death of the non-Medicaid spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2). This doesn't make sense.
The personal representative says this is because "it is only at that time that a final determination
can be made as to what, if any, interest the Medicaid spouse has in any property at her death."
Respondent's Brief, p. 20. Yet, below, the personal representative contended that Martha's
interests could be decided now, even while she was still alive. 26 Even if it were true that
determination of property rights requires waiting until after the death of both, that is a problem
for the state probate courts, not for federal Medicaid. No, the reason is more simple: the non-

26 In

her "Reply Memorandum in Support of Objection to Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim," the
personal representative said, "The Court should find that Martha has absolutely no interest in the house sale proceeds that
make up George Perry's estate, and that she will not have any such interest at her death." Reply Memorandum etc. p. 15.
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Medicaid spouse is entitled to use the couple's assets for his own support during his lifetime;
after both are dead and the assets are no longer needed, they are subject to recovery.
Along this same line, the personal representative quotes a few lines of a 1999 letter to the
Department she claims stands for the proposition that "once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid,
any resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse and the
community spouse can do whatever he wants with them." However, when the letter is read in
context, it becomes clear that the question that was asked was whether the Medicaid spouse
would suffer an eligibility penalty if her spouse transferred assets without adequate consideration.
The question was not whether the spouse can do "whatever he wants" with the couple's assets.
When eligibility is being established, if an applicant has transferred assets without
adequate consideration within what is known as a "look-back" period, an eligibility penalty is
imposed: the person cannot be eligible for Medicaid until a certain amount of time has passed
calculated by how much the applicant has given away. The question asked by Mr. Gere was
whether the Medicaid spouse, once eligibility has been established, would suffer an eligibility
penalty if her spouse transferred assets without adequate consideration:
The transfer of assets from the community spouse to his or her heirs via a will is
not grounds for invoking a penalty against the institutionalized spouse for
transferring assets for less than fair market value.
Respondent's Brief, Appendix 3 (underline added). In concluding, the letter states:
In the event an institutionalized spouse has already been determined eligible for
Medicaid, the resources belonging to the community spouse have no impact QI!
the institutionalized spouse's eligibility, and transferring those resources to
various heirs via a will likewise does not affect the institutionalized spouse's
eligibility.
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Respondent's Brief, Appendix 3 (underline added). Clearly, the language stating the spouse "can
do whatever he or she wants to with them" refers to not having an effect on the eligibility of the
Medicaid spouse.
Idaho Code§ 56-218(2) provides:
(2) Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the look-back dates
defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without
adequate consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action itn the
district court.
Idaho Code§ 56-218(2) (underline added). This language has been in Idaho Code§ 56-218 since
the original 1988 law. See page 13. Idaho Code§ 56-218 is a specific version of the more
general fraudulent transfers act found at Chapter 9 of Title 55. Virtually every state has a similar
act. Therefore, while it is true that the non-Medicaid spouse can "do whatever he ... wants to"
with the assets without affecting the Medicaid spouse's eligibility, any transfer without adequate
consideration is voidable.
G.

The Department's Construction ofldaho Code§ 56-218 Is Entitled to Deference.
The personal representative may find Idaho Code § 56-218(2) "offensive" just as it does

the Department's regulations . 27 However, the personal representative cites Kopp v. State, 100
Idaho ] 60, 595 P.2d 309 (1979) for the proposition that agency construction is entitled to "great
weight and will be followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise."
The actual quote is:

27 Respondent's

Brief, p. 15.
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The construction given a statute by the executive and administrative
officers of the State is entitled to great weight and will be followed by the Court
unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise. 28
Kopp, 100 Idaho at 163, 595 P.2d at 312. While the personal representative intended this to

apply to the federal Medicaid agency, it would apply to the same extent to the Department. Kopp
after all was referring to a state, not federal, agency.
The Department's rules establish the Department's construction of its law in this area.
The Department has cited IDA.PA 16.03.09.900.20 and .24. Rule 900.20 makes it clear that the
Department's claim against a spouse's estate extends to all property that had been jointly owned
or separately owned by the Medicaid spouse after the effective date of OBRA '93. Rule 900.24
states:
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement.
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of the deceased
participant or the spouse. * * *

IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The personal representative deflects the court from
the important part of this rule by referring to avoidance language in the final sentence (omitted
above). Respondent's Brief., p. 14. However, this rule is important because a marriage
settlement agreement is a living transfer of assets. This is the agreement in qu,estion in Jackman.
But it also includes "other such agreement which separates assets for a married couple" which
would include the Quitclaim Deed in this case. This rule makes it clear that the transfer of an

28 The

Department recognizes that this holding in Kopp has been greatly weakened in latc:r cases including J.R.

Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991).
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asset from one spouse to the other does not eliminate the Medicaid debt recoverable from the
estate of either spouse. 29

V.
THE LAW IN IDAHO IS WHAT IS IMPORT ANT IN THIS
CASE.
A.
The Correct Question ls Whether the Property of this Estate, Even If Martha Transferred
It, Remains an "Asset" Subject to Estate Recovery.
The personal representative refers (out of context again) to a colloquy with the Magistrate
and claims the Department "was unable to answer that question." Respondent's Brie1~ p. 11.
The problem was not the Department's response to the Magistrate's question, however, but, with
respect to the Magistrate, the fact that the Magistrate was asking the wrong qui~stion. The
Magistrate asked:
THE COURT: Get me to - to the place statutorily that the timing includes
- sort of the time of death is certainly part of the - of the equation because in the
federal statute and in the state statute 218(4)(8), that's what they're looking at.
But get me to the part that says - that was transferred, which I'm assuming you're
arguing means at any time during their marriage and when she was receiving -- I
mean, would it also include a transfer made before she was receiving any - any
Medicaid benefits?
Tr. p. 24, 1. 19 top. 25. 1. 6 (underline added). The Magistrate was focusing on the question of
the timing of the transfer (if it took place) between Martha and George. The underlying
assumption was that if Martha had executed a Quitclaim Deed to George, then the property was

29 The personal representative complains that in citing this rule and Idaho Code§ 32-901, the Department is
raising new issues for the first time on appeal. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. The personal representative is confusing
"issues" with "authorities." The issue has always been the same one: Whether Martha's property conveyed by George to
himself is subject to recovery. The Department is merely citing additional authorities relating to this issue. If additional
authorities could not be cited much of the Respondent's Brief would have to be excluded.
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no longer an "asset" subject to recovery. This assumption, of course, was wrong and the
Department attempted to refocus on the Magistrate on the correct question:
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Ifl could be a little bit bold, Your Honor. I think
thatTHE COURT:: Be bold, please.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I think that's the wrong question.
COURT: Okay.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I think that the correct question is not was this
property transferred. The correct question is was this property the property of the
individual.
Tr. p. 25, 11. 9-20 (underline added). This is the correct question because, the whole point of the
definition of assets in 42 U.S . C. § 1396p(h)(l) is that the term assets includes property
transferred by the Medicaid recipient to the spouse. It wasn't important when the asset was
transferred (so long as it was after OBRA '93), or even if it was transferred. The important
question was whether even after any purported transfer, it is subject to recovery under the
expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4). In this case, it clearly was.
There are several factors that make this so. The first, of course, is the definition of asset
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) which as been thoroughly discussed. Another is Idaho Code§
56-218(1) itself, which effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the
property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) states that:
... medical assistance ... may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the
estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both ....
Idaho Code§ 56-218(1). This statute affects both probate and marital property law. The
legislature is not required to put all statutes affecting probate in the probate code and is not
required to put all statutes affecting marital property in the marital property law. It can place
statutes affecting these matters anywhere it likes.
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The Department attempted to explain this to the court in the lines following those already
quoted above. At Tr. p. 26, l. 4 to p. 28, l. 1, the Department explained how Idaho Code § 56218 can change marital property law by reference to a more obvious example found in Idaho
Code§ 56-218(4)(b). That section, which adopts the language found in 42 U.S.C. § l396p(b)(4)
states, in part, as follows:
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:

***

(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets ... including
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through .. .life estate ....
Idaho Code § 56-218( 4). This section modifies the common law in Idaho when it comes to life
estates. In essence, it says that where a Medicaid recipient transfers real property to a "survivor,
heir, or assign" and retains a life estate, that life estate interest is not extinguished on death, but
remains an "asset" of the estate. 30 The Department concluded:
That is the same thing, is the effective date of the law says that we've
modified Idaho's property transfer and marital property law, or the legislature has,
by Idaho Code section 56-218 to say if this person is on Medicaid in the futun:,
this property remains subject to recovery.
Tr. p. 27, 11. 20-25 (underline added).
Because the correct question is, under Idaho law (together with the federal definition of
assets and expanded definition of estate) is the property in this estate an "asset"' subject to
recovery, the whole tortured "at the time of death" argument become irrelevant. This is not an
attempt to grab back property transferred away. Rather, this is merely recognizing tha.t under

30See e.g. State Dept. ofHuman Services v. Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P .3d 66 (2006) ("For purposes
of the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during the lifetime of the holder of a life estate interest, the life
estate continues to exist after the death of the person holding the interest"); In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N.W.2d 312
(Iowa 2005) (life estate in fann owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was required to be included in the estate for
purposes of estate recovery).
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Idaho and federal law, whether transferred or not, the property of this estate, like the life estate
discussed above, is an "asset" of Martha's subject to estate recovery.

B.

Barg Has No Applicability in Idaho.
The personal representative claims that In Re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn.

2008) "is on all fours" with this case. In light of the fact that it is state law, not federal law, that
governs what property is subject to estate recovery, this seem highly unlikely. While the
Minnesota Supreme Court can best interpret Minnesota's probate and marital property laws,
other states are better at interpreting their own laws as the Idaho Supreme Court has done in
Jackman.
As noted in the Appellant's Brief, beginning at page 23, the Barg court did not even
consider the federal definition of "assets" found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h). The personal
representative contends otherwise, apparently because the court there used the word "assets."
However, one can search high and low and find no reference (even oblique) to the definition of
assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h). It was simply not raised before the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Barg isn't even good law in Minnesota any more.
VI.
ABSURDITY, INEQUITY AND UNFAIRNESS WOULD
RESULT FROM THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
INTERPRETATION.

As already mentioned on page 11, above, if the personal representative's argument is
correct, then those who are single must reimburse Medicaid and can pass no property to their
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heirs until Medicaid is paid in full, while those with spouses have no obligation to reimburse
Medicaid and their non-dependent children receive a windfall 31 at taxpayer expense.
Likewise, if a married couple (or perhaps the couple's children) get the advice of an
attorney, they will not have to reimburse Medicaid, but if they are too ignorant or unsophisticated
to transfer their assets away, their estate will have to pay.
Again, under the personal representative's argument, where the Medicaid spouse dies
first, a home which becomes the sole and separate property of the surviving spouse by operation
of law will be subject to recovery, but on the other hand, if the Medicaid spouse had signed a
Quitclaim Deed, making the property the non-Medicaid spouse's sole and separate property, a
moment before death, there can be no recovery.

CONCLUSION
The fact that the power of attorney lacked express language allowing George Perry to
make a gift, especially to himself~ of Martha's real property, is sufficient, all alone, to require the
Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim should be reversed. Even if the conveyance w1ere valid,
the Department retains the right to recover the property of this estate as "assets" of the estate
under both state and federal law.
DATED this 16 day of September, 2010.

4)~/4=3
W.!CgR'
. y CARTWRIGHT
Depufy Attorney General

31 It

is not unfair to use this word. If Medicaid had not paid their antecedent's medical bills, their inheritance

would have been consumed by those costs.
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STA TE OF :MINNESOTA

IN DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF DOUGLAS DOUGLAS COUNTY SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

EI LED
Douglas County,

AUG O4 2n10
~9urt File No.:

Plaintiff,
Court

V.

Ad2t7'{7

21-CV-09-477

---------Deputy

Alexandra Kjerstyn Lindgren and
Bruce Dale Lindgren,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on May 19, 2010 on cross motions for

Summary Judgment A hearing was held in front of the Honorable David R. Batu~y at the:
Douglas County Courthouse, Alexandria, Minnesota. Plaintiff, Douglas County, was
represented by attorney Megan Burkhammer. Defendant Alexandra Lindgren was represcmted
by attorney Jo Ellen Doebbert. Defendant Bruce Lindgren was present and unrepresented. The
matter was taken under advisement on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 12,
2010.
Based upon the file and records herein, the Court hereby makes the following:

ORDER
I.

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

2.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

3.

The attached Memorandum is hereby incorporated by reference, and approved in

all respects.

It is so ORDERED this

'I[,

.fl!_

of~~~;;...t====----'

Hon. David R. Battey
Judge of District Court
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JUDGMENT
I hereby certify that the foregoing Order constitutes the Judgment of this Court.
Dated:

Au tK

t}

, 2010

Rhonda Bot
Douglas County Court Administrator
By:~
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MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Douglas County brings this claim against Defendants Alexandra Lindgren and
Bruce Lindgren, alleging it is entitled to recover the value of certain gifts given to Defendants by
their mother. The parties agree that this is a legal issue, and for the purpose of thi:; motion, none
of the facts are disputed. Douglas County moved for partial summary judgment with respect to
the gifted homestead, alleging that, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595, subd.
4b(5), Defendants are required to pay a portion of their mother's long-tenn medical assistimce,
originally paid for by Medicaid. Defendants move for summary judgment, claiming that !tection
256B.0595, subd. 4b(S) is preempted by federal law.

Facts
On December 31, 2003, Dale and Marlys Lindgren ("Mr. Lindgren and Mrs. Lindgren"),

transferred an undivided one-half interest in their home to their children, Alexandra and B:ruce
Lindgren ("Defendants"). On March 18, 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Lindgren transferred the rest of
their interest in the home to Defendants. At the time, the house was valued at $109,000.
- O~-November

i9, 200(~. L~~ ~ ~itted to the Be~y Ho~~. a11ursing

·

facility in Alexandria, Minnesota. Alexandra Lindgren then applied for long-term care benefits
on her mother's behalf beginning in January, 2006. Douglas County approved the applica1fon.
However, because of the uncompensated transfers, Minnesota and Federal law required Mrs.
Lindgren be subject to a penalty period during which she was ineligible for medical assistance.
Despite the statutorily-mandated ineligibility period, Bethany Home requested a waiver

of the penalty period because continued denial of eligibility would lead to undue hardship. Mrs.
Lindgren 's bills were not being paid, and she was facing eviction. Douglas County granted the
waiver, and at the same time informed Mrs. Lindgren that the case would be rcferre:d to the
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Douglas County Attorney's office. During the thirty six months following the homestead's
transfer, Mrs. Lindgren received $53,893.30 in government-paid medical assistance. Evt:ntually
Mrs. Lindgren passed away on October 13, 2009, and this action was brought by Douglas
County against Defendants, the recipients of the transfer, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) to recover the $53,893.30.
Analysis

MINNESOTA STATlITES SECTION 2S6B.059S, SUBD. 4b(S) IS PREEMEPTED, AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE
A. Summary Judgment Standard

"Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club.

UC, 105 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Minn. 2005) (citing Minn. R Civ. P. 56.03). A court is to e~JIIIline
all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,-amhdmissions on-£1e; together with the

. _affi_flav;i_~:_inp~sjnE:9.M.JI!Q!~9n f<_>r s~j~gqi~nt.. Mjnn. ll. q:v, ];>. 56.03. Sumn~ ...
judgment should be granted only when it is clear no fact issue remains, and it WO\l~d be
unnecessary to inquire further into the facts. Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 314.
Braham, 252 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Minn. 1977).

For the purpose of these Motions, the only issue this Court must decide is whether
MiMesota's statutorily-created claim being asserted against Defendants is preempted by 11ederal
law. If that provision is not preempted, then it is clear that Defendants are liable. If the
provision is preempted, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
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B. Minnesota's Statutory Cause Of Action Against Transferees Under Minnesota
Statutes Section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) Directly Conflicts With Federal Law
And ls Preempted

Medical assistance, better known as Medicaid, is an "enonnously complic.ated" program.

Stephenson v. Shala/a, 87 F.3d 350,356 (9th Cir. 1996). To properly rule on the!,e Motions, it is
essential to understand the relevant statutory framework governing Medicaid. In 1965, <:;ongress
enacted Medicaid as a part of the Social Security Act. In re Estate of Barg, 152 N. W.2d 52, 58

(Minn. 2008). The program is jointly funded with the states.· Id. To receive·fund.ing; a s1:ate
must create a medical assistance plan by enacting legislation and rules governing Medicaiid

within the state, and submit that plan to the United States Secretary of Health and Human
Services. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396). Each state administers its own plan, however those
plans must comply with the Federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a). Relevant to this case is section
1396a(l 8), which requires that states "comply with the provisions of section 1396p of this title

with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries ofmedical assistance correctly paid."
(emphasis added).

-.'i~~M~e-;~ia.- medic~! assistmce f~; ~-eedy pe~~~ is gov~~ by Chapter 256B.
Eligibility for medical assistance is governed by Minnesota Statutes sections 256B.055256B.057. When a person be.lieves that she is eligible under one of these sections,, she may
apply for assistance. Even if someone is otherwise eligible, that person may be deemed
ineligible if she transferred property for less than fair market value within seventy-two months
prior to the application. Minn. Stat.§ 256B.0595. The person is deemed to be ineligible for an
amount oftime based on the amount of the uncompensated transfer. Id. subd. 2(b). Despite this
penalty period, the determining agency must waive that penalty period if not doing so would

cause undue hardship. Id. at subd. 4b(5). When the penalty is waived, a cause of etction arises
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against the transferee for any amount of medical assistance paid within seventy-tv,o months from
the date of application for assistance, or for the uncompensated amount, whichevc:r is less. Id.
Defendant asserts that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p preempts Minnesota Statutes se<:tion
256B.0595. To make this determination, the Court must look at the language of those sec:tions.
Federal Law - 42 U.S.C. § 1396p
Section 1396p addresses, among other things, a state's ability to recoup correctly paid
medical assistance. Specifically, subdivision (b)(l) states:
''No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of

an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:

(A) [Inapplicable exception].
(B) [Inapplicable exception].
(C) [Inapplicable exception]."
Minnesota Law- Minn. Stat § 2S6B.0595, subd. 4b(5)
Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595 governs prohibitions on and penalti,es for

also enumerates exceptions to this prohibition. Subdivision 4b(5) is one of those c:xceptio:ns. It
states:
"[A person or a person's spouse who made a transfer prohibited by subdivision 1b
is not ineligible for medical assistance services if] the local agency determines
that denial of eligibility for medical assistance services would cause undue
hardship and grants a waiver of a penalty resulting from a transfer for less
than fair market value because there exists an imminent threat to· the
individual's health and well-being ... When a waiver is granted, a ccruse of

action exists against the person to whom the assets were transferred for that
portion of medical assistance services granted within 72 months of tlae date
the transferor applied for medical assistance and satisfied all other
requirements for eligibility, or the amount of the uncompensated tr,ansfer,
whichever is less, together with the costs incurred due to the action. The
action shall be brought by the state unless the state delegates this
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responsibility to the local agency responsible for providing medical
assistance under this chapter." (emphasis added).
Preemption Standard

Defendants allege that Federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, preempts
Minnesota's statutory cause of action set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 25613.0595, subd.
4b(5). The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution 1, and invalidates any state law contradicting or interfering with an Act of Co1ngress.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("state law that conflictswith federal law
is 'without effect."') (citation omitted). Congressional intent is the basis by which the Court
determines whether a state law is preempted. Gade v. Nat'/ Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass 'n, 505 U.S.
88, 96 (1992). Preemption is generaJly disfavored, unless the Congress clearly intended it.

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
There are three main categories of preemption: (1) express preemption, which occms
when Congress specifically states its intent to preempt in the text of the Federal la.w; (2) field

the field" in that area of law; and (3) conflict preemption, which applies when state and fe:deral
law directly conflict, making it impossible to comply with the requirements of both. Engl'ish v.

General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1990). A preemption analysis requires an examin.11.tion of
Congressional intent, using both the text and purpose of the statute. Medtronic, /r.!c. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 484-5 (1996). Defendants argue that the conflict preemption doctrine applies, and
preempts Minnesota's statutory cause of action in section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5).
The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) is clear. It directs that states shall not rc<:over
correctly-paid medical assistance unless recovery would fall under one of the three: listed
1

The "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur:suance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.
7
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exceptions. Id. ("No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made ... ") (emphasis added). There is no dispute
that Minnesota's statutory cause of action against a transferee who received prop~~rty from a
medical assistance recipient does not fall within one of the exceptions listed in se1;tion
1396p(b)(l). Thus, bringing an action against a transferee under Minnesota's section
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) conflicts with the Federal mandate prohibiting recovery under thf: State
plan for correctly-paid medic:al assistance. Even in light of the presumption against preemption,
this Court fails to see how bringing a cause of a:ction-parsuantto-section-256B.0595,--subd. 4b(5)
would not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l). Minnesota's statutory cause of action under section
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § l396p(b).
The County argues that "section 2S6.0S95 does not conflict with and is not preempted by
the federal estate recovery laws embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p because Minnesota Statutes
section 256.059~ has nothing whatsoever to with estate recovery." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Sum. J. 8.
This statement, however, misinterprets section 1396p. Section 1396p does not simply apply to
r~~~~rinc~-rr;; :;~di~d~F;-·~;t~t~.iba'i:s

a- ~~~s "~tt~~pt t~ recover any ~edicar~~tsimce

correctly paid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(bXl) ("No adjustment or recovery of any medical

assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made ... ")
(emphasis added). This prefatory language is not qualified or limited, and it applic:s to any
attempt by a state to recover correctly-paid medical assistance.
When bringing a cause of action under section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5), it i!; impos!iible to
comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b), and the conflict preemption doctrine requires this Cowt find
the cause of action created by section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(S) preempted.

8

000699

8

• ";R0.1!111

JOELLEN DOEaaERT

(THU)AUQ

15

2010

1a.._.,,sT.11:l!,T,No.71517eeeeTe

p

Legislative Inunt and Policy
The County argues that legislative intent and public policy dictate a finding that the cause
of action created by section 2568.0595 subd. 4b(5) not be preempted. For this proposition, the
County cites a portion of the House Report for the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act o,f 1988
("MCCA"), which states, "in the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement prognun for
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home patients to
their non-dependent children." H.R. Rep. No. 100-105, at 73 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 857, 896. While this quote is on-point, it must be taken in context. The relevant
portion of the MCCA was added to the bill because a number of states were not effectively
utilizing the ineligibility period for medical assistance recipients who transferred 1,roperty for
less than market value. Id. lbus, the MCCA created a mandatory ineligibility period for !those
people who disposed of assets for less than fair market value.
The County is correct; Congress was in fact concerned that people would transfer assets
for less than fair market value. However it addressed the issue by requiring a period of
ineligibili~

f~; tho;~ ~o di;r it did n~t=k;;~-~j;;tli~~~sibility f~;-~tes w~~te separa~- -.....

claims against third parties for medical assistance correctly paid. The Court acknowledge!. that.
from a policy standpoint, preempting Minnesota's cause of action against transferees could lead
to individuals transferring large amom1ts of assets to non-dependent children in hopes of
receiving publicly-funded assistance; however, it is clear Congress considered this, and added
the ineligibility period to combat this potential problem.
For those reasons, the Court finds that 42 U.S.C. section 1396p(b) preempts MiMei;ota
Statutes section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5). Because section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) iis preempted,
summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendants.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4

5

6

IN THE MATIER OF:
Case No. CV-IE-0905214

GEORGE D. PERRY,

7

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Deceased.
!3
9

10
11
12

•
This case is before the court on a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117.
For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.

13
14

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1 _)'-

This is an appeal from a magistrate's order denying the Idaho Department of Health and
16

Welfare's (the Department's) claim for Medicaid reimbursement from the estate of George D. PeITy.
17

Barbara McCormick (McCormick) is the personal representative of the estate. After filing the
1!3
19

appeal, the Department sought a stay of disbursement or distribution of any estate funds pending the

20

outcome of the appeal. The personal representative did not oppose the stay, except to the extent that

21

such a stay would prohibit payment of her attorney fees in defending the appeal. The Court

2')
23

ultimately granted the stay except for payment of McCormick's counsel's fees. McCormick then
filed the pending request for attorney fees and costs incurred in relation to the Department's motion

24

to stay, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117.
2'".)

)I)

26
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000702

ANALYSIS
'l

3

4

6
7

9
11J

Idaho Code§ 12-117 provides in relevant part:
(1)
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or politicaI
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be. shall award the prevailing pa11y reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

(2)
If a party to an administrative proceeding or to a civil judicial proceeding
prevails on a po11ion of the case, and the state agency or political subdivision or
the court, as the case may be, finds that the nonprevailing paity acted Vv ithout a
reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall
award the partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case on which it
prevailed.

lL

This Court is not convinced that Idaho Code§ 12-117 is applicable to a motion during the
1:2

course of an appeal (or any other civil action.) While subsection (2) of the statute addresses an award
l l

to a party who prevails on a portion of the case, it appears that the language is designed to allow a
15

court to apportion attorney fees after the outcome of the case, not at each event or decision within the

16

case. This is intended to be similar to the language in Rule 54(d)(l )(B) regardi:ng determination of th

17

prevailing party and apportionment of costs. For these reasons, the Court denies the motion for costs

13

and fees at this time, without prejudice to renewing it at the conclusion of the appeal.

u

IT IS SO ORDERED.

20

Dated this

liv'&

day of October 2010.

21
22
23

24
25
26
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2
3

I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by
United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:

4

5
6

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0036

7

8
9

10
11

PETER C. SISSON
SISSON & SISSON, THE ELDER LAW FIRM, PLLC
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE, ID 83702
HON. MAGISTRATE CHRISTOPHER BIETER
VIA: INTERDEPARTNIENT AL MAIL

12
13

14
15
16
17

J. DAVID NAVARRO

18

Clerk of the District Comt
Ada County, daho

19
20

Date:

10(13/ro

21
22
23
24
25
26
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST~is1fepHER D. RICH,
By NICOL TYLER

2

DEP\JfY

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3

4

5

6

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,

Case No. CV-IE-2009-05214
MEMORANDUM DEClSION
AND ORDER

Deceased.

8

9

10
11

Currently before the Court is an appeal from the March 10, 2005, order of the Honorable

12

Christopher M. Bieter, dismissing the State's Medicaid reimbursement claim in probate

13

proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the opinion of the magistrate will be affirmed.

14
15

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
16

George D. Perry ("George") died February 25, 2009.

His late wife, Martha J. Perry

17

18

("Martha" or "recipient"), was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real

19

property in Ada County prior to her marriage to George. On November 18, 2002, well into the

20

couple's marriage, Martha executed a quitclaim deed on the real property, with the grantor

21

named as "Martha Jean Boyle" (her prior name) and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry &

22

George Donald Perry." Several years later, with Martha's health declining, George and Martha

23

needed assistance in paying for Martha's medical care.

To qualify for government assistance

24

with medical costs, the couple and Martha, individually, could not exceed certain maximum asset
25
26

criteria.

On or about July 31, 2006, George made the transfer now in dispute, assigning

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 1
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Martha's remaining interest in the real property to himself alone, by signing a quitclaim deed on
l
2

behalf of Martha pursuant to a power of attorney.

3

A few months later, on or about September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the

4

Department of Health and Welfare for medical assistance to help pay for Martha's medical care.

5

Since October 1, 2006, Martha has been a recipient of medical payments.

The Department

6

provided payments for Martha's medical care through the Medicaid program in the sum of at
7

least $108,364.23.
8

9

Although it was Martha's

health which was in decline, George predeceased Martha.

10

After George passed away, the Appellant, Human Services Division of the State Attorney General,

11

(the State) sought funds from his estate, specifically from the sale of the property, as reimbursement

12

for taxpayer funds previously expended on his wife's behalf. The magistrate denied this request,

7_3

holding that because Martha had conveyed her interests in the property during her Ii fetime, she had

14

no interest in the property from which the State could seek reimbursement. The Attorney General
15

subsequently filed this appeal. Martha, the recipient, died while this appeal was pending.
15
17

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

13

A.

Whether the magistrate erred in determining that the general power of attorney held
by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real
property.

B.

Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation ofldaho Code § 56218, in refusing to allow the State's claim against the estate of George Perry.

C.

Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p as preempting application of Idaho Code § 56-218.

D.

Whether the magistrate erred in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding
in Idaho Depanment of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d
6 ( 1998) to the facts of this case.

2J

21
22
23
24

25
26
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l

E.

Whether the State is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

2

ST AND ARD OF REVIE\V

3
4

When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge, the district judge is acting

5

as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P 2d 1306, 1308

6

(1992); IRCP 83(u)(l). Accordingly, the standards of review are the same as those applied by the

7

Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals in a regular appeal: the district court upholds the lower
8

court's factual findings if based on substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence; and
9

10

affirms conclusions of law which demonstrate proper application of legal principiles to the facts

11

found. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P .2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1988).

12

an instrument, such as the power of attorney, is a question of law. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho

1:3

212, 192 P.Jd 1036 (2008)

14

Interpretation of

Where issues on appeal involve questions of law, a reviewing court exercises free review.

1 _,,-

Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 814 P.2d 917 (1991 ). An issue involving
16

statutory construction and interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de nova. State
1'.'

lB

Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 102, 90 P.3d 321,325,327 (S. Ct. 2004).

19

ANALYSIS

20

21

22
23

I.

Power of Attorney and Transfer of Property
The parties agree that the transfer of Martha's interest in the property to George was not

performed by Martha, but by George acting pursuant to a power of attorney from Martha. The

24

State argues that the magistrate erred in its determination that George had the authority and valid
25

power of attorney to transfer Martha's interest in the property to himself. The State argues that
26
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George could only make a valid transfer with an express power of attorney, which specifically
1

2

granted him the authority to make gifts of Martha's property on her behalf. It argues that the

3

magistrate failed to make any requisite factual inquiry regarding whether Martha consented to the

4

transfer by interspousal agency or any other form of consent.

5

6

Although not addressed in detail in the magistrate's written opinion, at the hearing this issue
was addressed and decided by the magistrate.

The magistrate made a factual and legal

7

determination regarding the extent of the authority granted to George, and found that although the
8

gifting language in paragraph H was not the "clearest kind of authority," "[i]t certainly can be read
9

10

that way"; and considering "all of the language in that power of attorney"'', "the document was

11

entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, .. including the right to deal with

12

interest in real property."

13

14

Idaho Code § 32-912 prohibits either spouse, individually, from conveying the community
estate, unless by use of an "express power of attorney."

15

As cited by the parties, the opening statement of the power of attorney, which declares in all
16

capital letters that "powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." A subsequent
17

18

19
20

21
22
23
24
25

section states:
(H) Estate, tmst, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept., receipt for,
exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or
payment due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and
exercise any power over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary
control; establish a revocable trust solely for the benefit of the principal
that terminates at the death of the principal and is then distributable to the
legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, in general, exercise
all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could
exercise if prnsent and under no disability; provided, however, thai: the
Agent may not make or change a will and may not revoke or amend a trust
revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trustee of any trust

26
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for the benefit of the principal to pay income or principal to the Agent
unless specific authority to that end is given. (emphasis added)

1
2

The Court agrees with the State that the language relied upon by the personal representative

3

in Paragraph H is attenuated, and appears to refer to the agent's ability to act with regards to
4

additional property that the principal may obtain. However, Paragraph A of the power of attorney
5

6

allowed George to convey Martha's interests in real property as he deemed proper. The power of

7

attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current Uniform Power of Attorney Act,

8

Idaho Code§ 5-12-101 et seq, in 2008. The present act requires express authority to make gifts, but

9

it is not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the adoption

10

of the act. Based on the record before it, this Court affirn1s the interpretation by the magistrate.

11

II.

Statutory Interpretation and Preemption

12

This appeal also involves a question of statutory interpretation. A statute must be construed
13

14

as a whole, taking the literal words of the statute, which words must be given their plain, usual, and

15

ordinary meaning. Thomson v. Ci(v of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); State v. Hart,

16

135 Idaho 827, 25 P.3d 850 (2001 ). If a statute is not ambiguous, the court does not construe it, but

17

simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735

18

P.2d 974 (l 987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, or legislative intent is clearly to the contrary,

19

a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State,

20

110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445 (2003).
21

Both parties agree that the Medicaid program is a jointly funded and "cooperative endeavor
22
23

in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in

24

furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65

25

L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Thus, participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into
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state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
1

2

Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. Ill 2003).

3

At issue in this case are those provisions dealing with the ability of the State to recover costs

4

of medical care from the estate of the recipient and the recipient's spouse. The State argues that the

5

state and federal provisions allow it to recover costs from the estate of the recipient and the

6

recipient's spouse if those assets were once part of the recipient's estate and were transfeITed from

7

the recipient to the recipient's spouse. In other words, the State argues that LC. § 5(,-218( 1) allows
8

recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse, including any "assets" within tbe definition of
10
11

"estate" under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4). The definition of "assets" includes property transferred to
one's spouse prior to death under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l).

12

The personal representative argues that the magistrate's position is correct. The magistrate

13

held that the State's ability to recover costs is limited to those "assets" which were transferred to the

H

recipient's spouse at the time of death by operation of law. Because the recipient transferred her

1:5

property prior to her death, and because that transfer was not of the same nature considered in the
statutes allowing state cost recovery, the magistrate disallowed the State's claim.
17

A.

Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)

1 :3

19

Title 42 of the United States Code, Section I 396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and

20

recoveries, and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[ a ]djustment or recovery of medical

21

assistance correctly paid under a State plan" and requires "the State shall seek adjustment or

22

recovery from the [receiving] individual's estate" under certain circumstances.

23

42 U.S.C. §

1396p(b)(l)(A),(C)(i). Subsequent sections further define what is meant by an individual's "estate,"

24

and define which forms of property are subject either to mandatory or discretionary recovery by a
25

state. Those provisions state:
26
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1

2

3

(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual-(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law;
and

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of
an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy m common,
survivorship, life estate, living trnst, or other arrangement.
The State disputes the magistrate and personal representative's interpretation, which places
emphasis on the phrases limiting the property and assets of the recipient of benefits held "at the time

11

of death." The magistrate found that this definition of "estate" did not permit a state agency to look
12

back and recover property interests that the recipient divested prior to death. Thi~: Court agrees.
1.3

The language and definition of "estate" is broad, and includes all interests, including any which may
H
Ei

have automatically transferred upon the death of the recipient. However, it goes without saying that

Hi

where a recipient has long ago been divested of any particular interest, it would not fall within that

17

individual's estate.

113

divested well before death, something which the drafters were clearly able to articulate in those

19

Moreover, nothing in this provision seeks to preserve interests that were

provisions dealing with Medicaid eligibility requirements.

20

Indeed, when addressing the eligibility requirements for assistance, under

~

l 396p(c)(1 )(A),

21

the drafters made those who transfer property "for less than fair market value" ineligible for
22

23

assistance. The State argues that it would be absurd to prohibit the recipient and/or recipient's

24

spouse from disposing of assets below market value in eligibility determinations, while allowing

25

assets to be transferred at no cost post-eligibility for purposes of avoiding reimbursement or

26
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recovery payments in probate. However, § 1396p(c)(l)(A) deals specifically with eligibility, not
1
2

recovery. Had the drafters sought to include this same provision in the area of pro bale and recovery

3

matters, they easily could have made such distinction. The Court notes, however, that even in the

4

context of eligibility, "[ a]n individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance ... to the extent

5

that (A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transfcn-cd to (:i) the spouse of

6

such individual[.]"

42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2).

Thus, even in the stricter setting of eligibility

7

determinations, the drafters recognized and pennitted the transfer of a recipient's interest in the
8

home to that recipient's spouse. In addition, the drafters were clearly able to artiiculate specific
9

10
11

instances and circumstances where look-back dates should be used to counteract suspect transfers of
property.

12

Finally, for reasons which will become apparent later, the Court notes that provision (B)

13

allows the state latitude in applying this expanded definition of ''estate," except "in the case of an

14

individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies[.]" Paragraph (l)(C)(i) addresses "[a]djustment or

15

recovery of medical assistance", mandating state recovery of medical assistance where benefits were
16

paid to any individual of 55 years of age or older when the medical assistance was received.
17

However, that clause and related provisions limit recovery to certain forms of medical assistance,
16

19
2J

including long-term care services and nursing facility services. Id. In this scenario, which appears
to be the circumstance in this case, the state is required to include this expanded version of "assets."
Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)

21

B.

22

The State also dispuks the magistrate's interpretation of the definitions under § 1396p(h),

23

particularly as applied to§ 1396p(b)(4). That provision states:

24

(h) Definitions[:] In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
25
26
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(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse
is entitled to but does not receive because of action--

1
2

3

(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
4

The State argues that "assets" includes the property which originally belonged to the
5

6
7

recipient, but of which she was divested due to the action of her spouse, even it he was acting as her
agent at the time. The Court has several problems with this interpretation.

8

First of all, "assets" as described in this definition include "income or resources." The Court

9

notes that real property, while it might be described as an "asset" or "resource," is much more

10

clearly described as "real property." The drafters of this section were likely aware of this, as they

11

had previously used the phrase "real property" in multiple sections, including § 1396p(b )(4)(A),(B),
12

above.
13

14

More importantly, the definition of "resources" as listed in 1396p(h)(5), "has the meaning

15

given such term in section 1382b[.]" Thus, the definition of "resources," specifically excludes "the

1 ,;

home (including the land that appertains thereto).'' 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(l). Accordingly, where

17

"resources" as contained in this section (1396p(h)) specifically excludes the home, the Court finds it

13

necessarily excludes it from the definition of "assets" as well.

19

Thus, even with this expanded

definition of "assets" applied to § 1396p(b)( 4 )(A),(B), the Court finds it fails to expand that

2J

recovery provision to include real property owned by a recipient prior to death.
21

C.

Interpretation, Construction, and Application of I.C. § 56-218.

22
23
24

25

Idaho Code § 56-218( 1) is entitled "Recovery of certain medical assistance" and states:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such

26
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1

2

assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of
the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both:
The State argues this language clearly includes the option of recovery from "the estate of the

3

spouse" and does not limit the "estate of the spouse" to property in which the recipient had an
4

interest at the time of death. The Court recognizes and agrees that this departure from the language
5

6

7

of the federal provisions indicates a more aggressive policy adopted by this state to recover costs
from the estate of the recipient's spouse.

8

As far as I.C. § 56-218 is concerned, the Court agrees with the State that this section clearly

9

indicates an intent to recover medical costs from the estate of the spouse of a recipient. However,

l'.l

several concerns remain regarding whether this provision, standing alone, allows the state to look

11

back to any period beyond those transfers effectuated at death.
12

First of all, the subsequent provisions of §56-218 further define and limit what is meant by
13

"estate." Subsection (4)(a)-(b) of LC. § 56-218. states "the tenn "estate" shall include:"
1 .),-

(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and

16
1'7

l:l

(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent
of such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy m
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.

20

Id. This language should look familiar, because it is, almost without exception, the same language

21

used in the federal code, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A), (B). The personal representative argues that

22

because I.C. §56-218(4)(a)-(b) mirrors the language of the federal statute, it should be interpreted

23

accordingly. As discussed above, this language taken in the context of the federal statute clearly

24

limits the recovery-eligible estate of the recipient's spouse to property transferred at or around the
25

time of death. Thus, the "assistance [which] may be recovered from the ... estate of the spouse"
26
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appears to be limited accordingly. However, when taken in the context of the Idaho Code section,
1
2

and the broader language targeting recovery costs from the estate of the recipient's spouse, the

3

ability to recover from a spouse appears to be expanded.

4

recipient as the "individual," and the spouse as the "spouse." The language of§ 56-218(4)(a),(b)

5

refers only to the "individual's estate" or the estate of the recipient. It contains no reference or

6

In I. C. § 56-218(1 ), it refers to the

limitation on the estate of the spouse.

7

The State's interpretation of these provisions, and the intent to reach the assets of a Medicaid
8

recipient's spouse is further supported and explained by the internal rules and regulations of the
9

10

Department.

IDAPA 16.03.09.900 is entitled Liens and Estate Recovery, and "sets forth the

11

provisions for recovery of medical assistance," among other things. IDAP A 16.03.09.905.01, states

12

in relevant part:

13

A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the
value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1,
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the
separate property, and jointly owned property.

14
1 .-.)
16

Id. The plain language of this section does not restrict the language of I.C. § 56-218, which allows

17

the Department broad authority to seek recovery against the "estate of the spouse." LC. § 56-

lB

218(1 ). A subsequent provision, IDAPA 16.03.09.905.05 states:

19

A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of
the deceased participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage
settlement agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for
adequate consideration.

20

21
2 ,.,,
23

Id.

24

Taking into account the broad language of LC. § 56-218, in addition to the specific

2s

provisions in the Idaho Administrative Rules (which have the same force and effect of law per

26
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Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004)), it is clear 1:hat Idaho law permits
1
2

recovery from the estate of the recipient spouse, limited only by the broad interpretation of "estate"

3

of LC.§ 56-218(4)(a)-(b) and time and community property restraints ofIDAPA 16.03.09.905.01.

4

Thus, the clear and plain language of Idaho law (without considering the federal provisions and

s
6

effect they have) would allow the State to recover from the estate of the 5,pouse, so long as the
property sought was community property held by the participant after October 1, 1993, which was

7

the case here.
8

E.

Preemption Doctrine

9

10

This Court has found that the plain meaning of the Idaho and federal Medicaid provisions

11

differ, in that the Idaho provisions clearly and unambiguously broaden the ability of the State to

12

recover from separate assets of the recipient's spouse beyond those assets in which the recipient had

13

an interest at the time of death. This juxtaposition requires a discussion regarding the validity of the

14

Idaho regulations in light of the doctrine of preemption.

15

The basis for the doctrine of preemption is found in Article VI, cl. 2 of the United States
16

Constitution, which states that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
17

. . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding."
18
19

Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has established that a state law that conflicts with

20

federal law is "without effect." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, I 12 S.Ct. 2608,

21

2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 422-23 (1992); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.( 4 Wheat) 316, 427, 4 L.Ed.

22

579,606 (1819); Lewis v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho 418, 146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006).

23

Congressional purpose is " 'the ultimate touchstone' " of the preemption inquiry. Malone v.

24

White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks
25

Int'! Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)).
26
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This Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal. Fed.
1
2

Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The

3

United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the

4

Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]

5

not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'

6

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407

7

(1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447
8

(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 518, 112 S.Ct.
9

10
11

2608).
Federal law may preempt state law in two ways, either expressly or impliedly. Boundary

12

Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996).

13

preemption occurs where Congress exhibits intent to occupy a given field of law. Lewis v. State,

14

Dept. of Transp., supra. Where such intent is shown, then any state law encroaching into that field

15

is preempted. Id.

Express

In this instance congress clearly did not intend to occupy the entire field of

16

Medicaid law. Rather, the intent appears to be to the contrary, as the laws in this area are full of
17

provisions which encourage the States to enact legislation and rules, and incorporate them into their
18
19

overall medical assistance plans. See inter alia 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b). Nevertheless, many of

2:)

the sections contained in the federal code require that the states must "comply with the provisions of

21

the federal code, particularly with respect to liens and other recovery for assistance paid. 42 U.S.C.

22

§ 1396p; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l 8).

23

Thus, where congress has not expressed the intent to occupy a given field of law, state law

24

may still run afoul of the preemption doctrine to the extent the state law conflicts with federal law.
25

Lewis v. State, Dept. of Transp., supra. This is called "conflict preemption" and requires that state
26
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law is preempted to the extent it conflicts with the federal law. Id. However, conflict preemption is
1
2

only found where compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible (Fla. Lime Avocado

3

Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963)), or when the

4

state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

5

Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).

6

In Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 P.3d 456, 460 (S.

7

Ct. 2008), the court conducted a review of the Idaho rules regarding Medicaid, in particular the rules
8

involved with Medicaid qualification. While that court noted the need for the State to promulgate
9

10
11

rules, it also found that ''both the federal government and state government expect federal law to
predominate" in that regard. Id. at 460, 534.

12

In the case of In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 64 (Minn. 2008),, the court specifically

13

dealt with a conflict involving the federal statutes at issue in this case. As that court noted, the

14

federal statute regarding recovery contains specific language limiting the field of available recovery.

15

Id. Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and recoveries,

16

and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[a]djustment or recovery of medical assistance
17

correctly paid under a State plan."

Parenthesis (1) begins the subsection with the broad rule

18

19
20
21
22

23

prohibiting recovery in general, and then requiring the State seek recovery in certain circumstances.
That provision states:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on
behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the
following individuals:

24

42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l).

Thus, the federal government has outlined a general rule prohibiting

25

recovery. As such, Congress has indicated its object and desire to prevent recovery in all but a
26
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limited number of circumstances. It follows then, that if these circumstances are expanded by a
1
2

3

particular state law, the state law becomes an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress to limit recovery, and is thereby preempted.

4

Subsection (B) explains the required recovery exception against the estate of the recipient

5

individual who was 55 years of age or older when assistance was received, but further limits

6

recovery to care costs at nursing facilities, home and community. For convenience, that provision

7

states:
8
9

10

In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical
assistance consisting of--

11

12
13

14
15

(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and
related hospital and prescription drug services, or
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan
(but not including medical assistance for medicare cost-sharing or for
benefits described in section 1396a(a)(10)(E) of this title).
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(B)(i-ii). This provision limits recovery by age, by type of service, or by

16

types of allowed services any particular state might choose to include. Neither party has argued
17

regarding the ability to recover for services in this case. Thus, the issues in this case bring us back,
18

19

full circle, to the interpretation and effect of 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l), and

20

J.C. § 56-218(1), regarding whether recovery may be had against the assets of the recipient's spouse

21

in which the spouse did not have any interest prior to the time of death. As discussed in detail

22

above, the federal provisions limit such recovery to assets of the spouse in which the recipient had

23

an interest at death.

24

Because the federal provisions seek, overall, to limit recovery except in certain
25

circumstances, because exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, and
26
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because the state provisions expand this recovery policy, the Court finds the State provisions are
1
2

preempted. Comm 'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 ( 1989).
Effect of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackm,m

3

D.

4

Up to this point in the process of interpreting and applying the provisions above, the Court

5

6

has relied upon relatively little case Jaw.

By so doing, the Court has followed the rules of

statutory construction as required by Idaho law. The Court first considered the plain language

7

contained in the provisions, which it found unambiguous. Consequently, legislative intent and
8

case law are not necessary to further interpret the language.

George W. Watkins Family v.

9

10

Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley

11

County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (S. Ct. 2002) (citing Lawless v. Davis,_98 Idaho 175,560

1:2

P.2d 497 (1977) ("Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the

13

legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to construe the

14

language.")).

,1 .J

The State, however,, argues throughout its briefing that Idaho has clear precedent
16

interpreting these provisions differently. In the case of Idaho Department
17

of Health

and Welfare

1B

v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), the recipient's spouse received nearly a11

19

community property of the recipient pursuant to a marriage settlement agreement. After both the

20

recipient and the spouse had died, the Department sought recovery from the estate of the spouse.
Id. at 214, 7. The language of I.C. § 56-218 as it existed at that time allowed recovery from the

2 -,,,

spousal estate only where the estate of the recipient contained absolutely nothing. Thus, although
23

there was clear legislative intent that the State should be able to seek recovery from the spousal
24

2:c
26

estate, this expressed intent of the legislature would virtually never occur, where the imprecise,
express language of the statute led to an absurd result. Id. at 215, 8.
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The Idaho Supreme Court found that a more reasonable interpretation, which would be in
1

2

line with the legislature's intent, would be to allow recovery against the spousal estate where the

3

estate of the recipient was insufficient. Id. However, in the very next section, the court found

4

federal law preempted the Department's authority given by I.C. § 56-218 to recover from the

5

spouse's separate estate. Id. at 216, 9. The court's analysis in that case involved state and

6

federal provisions which have since been replaced and/or amended.

This Court finds it offers

7

little or no guidance to the relevant and determinative issues in this case.
8

The State's reliance on Jackman is based largely on the original opinion in that case,

9

10

which has since been substituted. The State urges this Court to consider this opinion, arguing that

11

it clearly shows the court's intent to give "assets" a broad interpretation, and that the decision

12

would have been different if the court had been able to apply the statutes in their current form.

13

The Court does not agree. The full reasons for issuing a substitute opinion are not ascertainable

14

by simple comparison of a substitute opinion. Given Internal Rule of the Idaho Supreme Court
15

15(t)'s prohibition against citation of unpublished opinions, the Court will not speculate about a
15
17

withdrawn opinion to determine how the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes m
question should be interpreted, or to determine the applicability of the preemption doctrine.

19
2J

21

III.

Attorney's Fees

Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(5) and LC.§ 12-117, each party has reserved the right to attorney's
fees on appeal. Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) requires this Court to award reasonable attorney's fees and

22

expenses to the prevailing party "if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable
23

basis in fact or law."
25
26

Where questions of law are raised, attorney's fees should be awarded only if

the nonprevailing party advocates a plainly fallacious, and, therefore, not fairly debatable, position.

Lowery v. Board of County Com 'rs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 764 P .2d 431 (S. Ct. 1988). A
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...

state agency acted without reasonable basis where it has no authority to take a particular action.
1

2

Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 90 P.3d 340 (S. Ct. 2004). In this

9 56-218

3

case the State acted in accordance with the authority granted it by LC.

4

agency regulations. Although this Court found that provision to be preempted, the magistrate did

5

not make such a clear finding. Given this, and the fact that this is a matter of first impression, the

6

and corresponding

State acted based on reasonable argument and authority.

7

8

CONCLUSION
9

10

Based on the reasoning above, the decision of the magistrate is AFFIRMED.

11

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12

Dated this

Iv~

day of March, 2011.

13
14
15
16
17

18

19
2D

21

22
23

2 .),-

26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1
2

3

I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by
United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the attorneys ofrecord in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:

4

5

6

PETER C. SISSON
SISSON AND SISSON
2402 W. JEFFERSON STREET
BOISE IDAHO 83702

7

s
9

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
3276 ELDER, SUITE B
BOISE IDAHO 83720-0036

10
11

HON. MAGISTRATE CHRISTOPHER M. BIETER
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

12
13

14

l

r·

.)

16

18

19
20

21
22
23

24
25
26
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FIL~-~-----

APR: 0 7 2011
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0009
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
ISB No. 3361
cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of the Estate Of:
George D. Perry,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Deceased.
________________
State of Idaho, Department of Health and
Welfare,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
Barbara K. McCormick, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D.
Perry,
Respondent.

Case No. CV IE 0905214
NOTICE OF APPEAL

----------------

TO:
Barbara K. McCormick, Personal Representative and her Attorney, Peter C. Sisson, Esq.,
and to the Clerk of the above Entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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1.

The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "the

Department"), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order,
entered on the 16th day of March, 2011, Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge,
presiding.
2.

The Department has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment or

order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Rules 1 l(a)i(2) and 1 l(b),
Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code§ 17-201(7).
3.

The issues on appeal include, but may not be limited to:

a.

Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that George Perry, through a general

power of attorney, had the power to divest Martha Perry of her interest in the couple's home, and
gift that interest to himself, even though the power of attorney did not include any gifling power.
b.

Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) -- which

authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had been community property,
or had been the property of the Medicaid spouse - is preempted by federal law.
4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The Department requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript: The standard transcript supplemented by:
1.

Oral argument presented to the district court at the hearing held November

18, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.
n.

Oral argument presented to the magistrate division at the hearing held

February 26, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the c:lerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

m.
n.
o.
p.

Last Will And Testament (03/19/2009)
Claim Against Estate (4/15/2009)
Demand For Notice (4/15/2009)
Inventory (5/28/2009)
Notice of Disallowance of Claim (6/4/2009)
Petition for Allowance of Claim (6/15/2009)
Affidavit of Barbara K McCormick In Support of Objection To Dept of Health
and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of Claim (11/27/2009)
Memorandum in Support of the PR's Objection to Dept of Health And Welfare's
Petition for Allowance of Claim (11/27/2009)
Memorandum in Support Of Petition for Allowance of Claim (01/29/2010)
Exhibit Cover Page (Memorandum In Support Of Petition for Allowance of
Claim)
Exhibits A, B, C, E, F, G (Memo In Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim)
Order Disallowing Claim (3/10/2010)
Appellant's Brief (District Court) (07/08/2010)
Respondent's Brief (District Court) (08/26/2010)
Appellant's Reply Brief (District Court) (09/16/2010)
Memorandum Decision and Order (03/16/2011)

7.

Not applicable:.

8.

I certify:

h.
1.

J.

k.

I.

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on 1he reporter.

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been contacted and arrangements

have been made to have the court reporter bill this office for preparation of transcripts of the
hearings dated November 18, 2010 and February 26, 2010.
(c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212.
(d)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee pursuant

to Idaho Code§ 67-2301.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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( e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be serv,ed pursuant

to Rule 20.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2011.

~~~-.C

~CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
KASEY REDLICH
C/O ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLERK
200 W FRONT ST
BOISE ID 83 702-7300
DATED this

_l;L day of April, 2011.

~e~~
Contracts and Administrative Law Division

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

Y:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\PenyM&G\Supreme Court\Notice of Appeal.wpd

000727

:

,ii: ;/5 ~~----

MAY 3 1 2011

Fax: 334-2616

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

e, MARGARET LUNDQUIST
DEPUTY

In the Supreme Court of the State ofidaho

State of Idaho, Dept of Health & Welfare
)
vs.
)
Barbara K. McCormick, Personal
)
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry)

Docket No.

38694-2011

Notice of Transcript Lodged

Notice is hereby given that on May 23, 2011,
I lodged one (I) transcript of a total of 36 pages in length,
as listed below, for the above referenced appeal with
the District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial District.

TRANSCRIPTS LODGED
11-18-10

Oral Argument
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE EST ATE OF: GEORGE
D. PERRY.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,

Supreme Court Case No. 38694
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Petitioner-Appellant,
\'S.

BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
Respondent on Appeal.

I, CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following document will be submitted as EXHIBIT to
the Record:
1. Transcript of proceedings held on February 26, 2010, before Magistrate Court Judge
Christopher M. Bieter, filed May 10, 2010.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 31st day of May, 2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE
D. PERRY.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,

Supreme Court Case No. 38694
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
Respondent on Appeal.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that 1 have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCR[PT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT

PETER C. SISSON

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATT OR NEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

Date of Service:

JUNO ~!.. 20,,
---------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TN THE MATTER OF THE EST ATE OF: GEORGE
D. PERRY.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,

Supreme Court Case No. 38694
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
Respondent 011 Appeal.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as
well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
7th day of April, 2011.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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